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THE CHANGED STATE OF WITTGENSTEIN SCHOLARSHIP 
Two independent publishing projects have thoroughly changed the state of Wittgenstein 
scholarship in recent years. Michael Nedo's 'Wiener Ausgabe'1 offers a traditional critical 
edition of Wittgenstein's philosophical writings ranging from 1929 up to and including the 'Big 
Typescript' (1933). Considering the eclectic and - at times - arbitrary editorial policy 
underlying previous publications from the Nachlass2 Nedo's project offers unprecedented 
philosophical rigor as well as textual criticism in volumes designed for comfortable reading. A 
second, more ambitious, attempt at a critical edition is the Bergen electronic edition.3 It is 
planned to include 4 CD-ROMs, covering the entire range of the philosopher's unpublished 
writing. Two disks are currently available, comprising all of Wittgenstein's manuscripts from 
1929-1939, as well as type-scripts, beginning with 'Notes on Logic' (1913) and leading up to 
Typescript 226, composed in 1939.
Wittgenstein's writings from the Thirties are, therefore, available in independent, reliable 
printed and electronic editions respectively. Readers can, for the first time, observe the 
philosopher at work, transferring paragraphs from pocket notebooks to handwritten 'volumes'; 
picking acceptable remarks to be included in type-scripts that are, at a later stage, cut up 
into slips of paper which are again annotated, rearranged and put together in further volumes 
and type-scripts. But this is only half the excitement. The 'Wiener Ausgabe' and the 'Bergen 
Edition' stake their success on different media, inevitably provoking a comparison between the 
well known features of printed scholarly editions and the not so familiar realm of digitized 
texts.
Some of the differences are immediately obvious. Scrutinizing philosophical texts on a printed 
page implies sensual qualities lacking in electronic space. Many readers will prefer a material 
sheet of paper over its virtual substitute. There are, on the other hand, definite advantages 
in digitally stored transcriptions. A CD-ROM does not occupy desk-space and allows almost 
instant access to every single remark of the extended Wittgenstein corpus. In addition to the 
actual texts, the 'Wiener Ausgabe' contains separate volumes of sophisticated registers, 
cross-referencing all the printed material. Considering the fact that the Bergen edition 
includes an excellent search function Nedo's tables are an anachronistic nicety at best. In a 
recent volume Nedo, in fact, announces a 'comprehensive electronic Apparatus, 
supplementing the Wiener Ausgabe'4. And there is simply no viable alternative to an electronic 
medium if one wants to present facsimiles of every page of the Nachlass, suitably linked to 
diplomatic and normalized versions of its content. These features make the Bergen edition a 
far more comprehensive enterprise. It seems that, pace  the predictable skepticism stemming 
from deeply ingrained scholarly habits, there is a convincing case in favor of switching to the 
digital format. The present paper will, at any rate, proceed from this assumption. But matters 
of technical convenience should not be allowed to decide the more profound issues arising 
from the competition of the media involved.
The accessibility of Wittgenstein's texts has been tremendously enhanced by putting them on 
CD-ROMs. If this were information like the listings in a telephone directory one could let the 
issue rest at this point. It might be confined to a discussion of the availability and design of 
necessary electronic interfaces. Philosophical production, and in particular Wittgenstein's 
literary remains, raise more interesting questions, though. Can conceptual content be neatly 
separated from its presentation in a given medium? Since its inception philosophy was done 
by teaching, in scholarly discourse, or by writing books/papers. What will be the impact of 
current digital technology on those traditional practices?5 
The preceding sketch has emphasized several characteristics of electronic texts that printed 
books cannot match. It does not follow that a given work actually demands - or even bears - 
digital treatment. Essential use of single pages, to mention a simple case, cannot easily be 
simulated electronically. The first section of this paper will, therefore, explore what might be 
called the textuality of Wittgenstein's Nachlass. Tracing the development of an important 
Wittgensteinian motive, this exploration surveys part of the newly available material, testing 
the suitability of computer-assisted scholarship to this particular collection of writings. Is 
there a general lesson to be learned from involving oneself in hands-on digital philology? As it 
turns out the Wittgenstein Nachlass provides an excellent occasion to reflect upon the range 
and limits of the Gutenberg heritage. This is discussed in section two. The concluding remarks 
focus on the Bergen edition. Given that digitization does not simply extend the established 
tool-set of textual scholarship but opens up new philosophical perspectives - how well does 
this particular enterprise support (and possibly inspire) a re-configuration of the philological 
status quo?
TOOTHACHES: PHILOLOGY 
The so-called 'private language' argument laid out in Philosophical Investigations §§ 243ff has 
been widely discussed in the literature. One of Wittgenstein's ways to introduce the problem 
is to argue for the incomprehensibility of naming pains in a strictly solipsistic setting. What are 
the circumstances enabling us to identify sensations? We have to participate in interpersonal 
activities expressing e.g. pain.
Wie wäre es, wenn die Menschen ihre Schmerzen nicht äußerten (nicht stöhnten, das Gesicht 
nicht verzögen etc.)? Dann könnte man einem Kind nicht den Gebrauch des Wortes 
'Zahnschmerzen' beibringen. (PhU § 257)
The fleeting reference to toothaches here does not carry conceptual weight in the context of 
the Investigations. But, surprisingly enough, Wittgenstein's earliest treatment of the issues 
that were to lead to his private language argument centers around this very sensation. There 
are at least three methods available to reach the present conclusion. By juxtaposing them we 
get a first glimpse at the possible scope of computer-assisted textual criticism. 
(1) Five volumes of the Wiener Ausgabe have hitherto been published, comprising - in appr. 
1300 pages - Wittgenstein's manuscripts from the time when he took up philosophy again, 
ending his self-imposed moratorium subsequent to the completion of the Tractatus . These 
manuscripts contain, in chronological order, Wittgenstein's discussions of a wide range of 
issues. In essence they are philosophical diaries, freely switching between different matters 
of interest, developing threads of thought up to a certain point, interrupting and returning at 
a later date. One might read through all of this material and pick out remarks concerning 
toothaches. The term appears for the first time on Nov. 19, 1929: 'Warum nenne ich 
Zahnschmerzen ' meine Zahnschmerzen' ?' (MS 107, 199; WA 2, 1146). Wittgenstein then 
develops this motive from different angles up to Dec. 14, 1929 (MS 108, 8f; WA 2,136) and 
returns to discuss it in a loose sequence of remarks from Jan. 31, 1930 (MS 107, 270; WA 2, 
186) to Feb. 7, 1930 (MS 107, 288; WA 2, 196). All of those entries are intermingled with 
reflections on many different topics: probability, theory of measurement, Euclidean geometry, 
realism et.al.. No guiding principle is discernible. Wittgenstein is following his own idiosyncratic 
lines of thought that often consist of digressions, retractions and cognitive jumps. It is not 
impossible, but exceedingly hard, to recognize the making of the private language argument in 
those scattered aphorisms. This should not come as a surprise since, after all, the 
manuscripts are Wittgenstein's philosophical workshop. Philological attention is often informed 
by prior knowledge of the results of such incipient processes.
In the light of Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy the first approach does, anyway, make 
little sense. Examining his manuscripts he picked a number of remarks for dictation. Copies of 
the resulting type-scripts were consequently cut into slips of paper and rearranged according 
to rules that seem to be revised within the organizing process itself. This procedure can be 
appropriately illustrated by tracking the course of Wittgenstein's notes on toothaches. 
Typescript 208, which is an extract from manuscripts 105-108, is only partially preserved.7 As 
far as toothaches are concerned, only the paragraphs dating from Dec. 14, 1929 can be 
found in this compilation. Alois Pichler has reconstructed the likely shape of TS 208. According 
to his conjecture most of the material on toothaches was contained in the missing pages 1-
1448. It reappears, completely rearranged, in TS 209, which is the text source for 
Philosophische Bemerkungen, edited by Rush Rees and published in 1964. Wittgenstein's 
original typescript shows no classifications whatsoever. At first inspection it is simply a very 
long sequence of paragraphs. Rush Rees divided the script into sections and invented groups 
of paragraphs which he numbered according to an undocumented, inscrutable scheme. A 
collection of Wittgenstein's reflections on toothaches happens to make up section VI of 
Philosophische Bemerkungen. This is a promising place to look for the conceptual genesis of 
his later views on mental states, sensations and language.
While all sections of Philosophische Bemerkungen are the invention of Rush Rees it is, 
nevertheless, also true that it was Wittgenstein who assembles the pieces into one particular 
order, thus emphazising his interest in an analysis of how first-person talk determines our 
understanding of pain. These notes have been available for a long time and attentive readers 
have doubtlessly noticed connections between them and later discussions of similar issues. 
This material was, however, entirely separated from its context of origin, a stand-alone 
compilation of philosophical insights. There is nothing per se wrong with restricting oneself to 
this state of affairs. It can very well serve as a starting point for enquiries like the present 
essay. Yet, the recent publications from the Nachlass have opened up a range of exiting 
possibilities. What used to be philologically opaque collections of Wittgensteinian ideas can 
now be disassembled and regarded as intermediate results of an ongoing process of creative 
writing and revision. It has become feasible not only to identify the building blocks of 
Wittgenstein's more elaborate editorial arrangements but - what is more important - to 
actually observe his philosophical labor, i.e. the decision process leading from day-to-day 
notes towards (as he envisaged it) eventual publication of his thoughts.
(2) Conventional methodology offers indices and synopses to assist such an enterprise. Both 
are provided by the Wiener Ausgabe, suggesting a second approach to access the 
Wittgensteinian corpus. 'Toothache' is an index entry; it can be looked up and the resulting 
items can in turn be traced through the Wittgenstein papers. Wiener Ausgabe - Apparatus, 
Register zu den Bänden 1-5 consists entirely of tables correlating every single paragraph from 
the manuscripts to its subsequent occurances in these volumes and (more commonly) to its 
location within the Philosophische Bemerkungen or Philosophische Grammatik. On Nov. 29, 
1929 Wittgenstein noted:
Von Sinnesdaten in dem Sinne des Wortes in dem es undenkbar ist daß der Andere sie hat, 
kann man eben aus diesem Grunde auch nicht sagen, daß der Andere sie nicht hat. Und aus 
ebendiesem Grunde ist es sinnlos zu sagen, daß  ich im Gegensatz zum Anderen sie habe. (MS 
107, 215f; WA 2, 124)
As the synopsis shows this remark was included in TS 209 (aka Philosophische Bemerkungen) 
presumably in mid-19309 as entry VI, 61 and taken up again on Jun. 1, 1932, when 
Wittgenstein started a revision of his earlier ideas on the topic. Investigating this kind of 
dependency is standard procedure in textual criticism. Until very recently this had to be done 
by consulting printed synopses. It seems fair to say that there is very little sense in carrying 
on the old way, if the advance of digital technologies is taken into account.
The point is not just that it is quite cumbersome to work with multiple versions of basically 
the same paragraph located in different places in various bound volumes. This impediment 
could be alleviated by liberal use of the xerox machine. Printed synopses of material as 
complex as Wittgenstein's Nachlass face a more serious problem. It seems next to impossible 
to combine indexing and synopsis. The reader is presented with either a list of significant 
terms or a table of correlations of textual segments. She cannot simultaneously look for the 
occurance of a word and the history of rearrangements of the paragraph it is included in. No 
one would finance a series of books (or care to use them) containing the astronomical number 
of relations between index entries and changes of contexts in gory detail. Consider the remark 
quoted above. Instinctively one would at least consider the terms 'Sinnesdaten', 'Sinn', 'Wort', 
'der Andere', 'Grund', 'sinnlos' and 'Gegensatz'.10 The quote considered here does not even 
contain the term 'Zahnschmerzen' which is, at this point, Wittgenstein's guiding paradigm. 
Imagine all those terms put into correlation with all the changes of their occurrences 
elsewhere in the Nachlass. The ensuing combinatorial explosion effectively prevents putting 
the result on paper. In the present case one cannot have a general, usable, semantics-to-
(section)-numbers and (section)-numbers-to-(section-)numbers mapping, one on top of the 
other, in a print medium.
(3) It is easily done if the texts have been properly digitized. Since words are encoded by 
numbers it is quite simple to set up an index and it takes just another couple of numbers to 
represent the trace of 'words' to and from given contexts. Much of this can be done 
automatically; there is no need to actually visualize the necessary relational apparatus. If a 
correlation seems interesting it can be called up at will, with no time lost for browsing, 
copying or shuffling around papers. Searching for 'Zahnschmerzen' in the Bergen edition 
immediately yields 138 hits across the entire collection. The search can be restricted to 
particular (groups of) volumes and modified to include co-occurring or proximate terms as well 
as dates. A query for 'Sinnesdaten and Zahnschmerzen' produces as a result precisely three 
common occurances. First is a paragraph from MS 114 (MS 114, 16; WA 5, 179) into which 
Wittgenstein had assimilated separate earlier notes, followed by its typescript derivatives in 
TS 211, 755 and TS 213, 510 (Big Typescript). The quote previously presented (MS 107, 
215f; WA 2, 124), lacking the term 'Zahnschmerzen', is picked out among the 30 hits returned 
by querying 'Sinnesdaten'. It occurs in a stand-alone paragraph in TS 209, 23 (PhB VI, 61) 
and is flagged accordingly. In other words: a couple of straightforward enquiries lead directly 
to an important juncture in Wittgenstein's investigation of the logic of talk about sense 
impressions and toothaches in particular.
But wait. There is something suspicious about the last sentence. Manipulation of the index 
mechanism per se cannot produce important results. The disappearance of manifest meaning 
is, in fact, the price to pay for enhanced electronic facilities. One can easily pick any 
combination of terms and search constraints - but there is no guarantee whatsoever that this 
will lead to an interesting result. So where does 'importance' come in? This is a category of 
reflective assessment, crucially different from automated procedures. The discrepancy is at 
the center of any discussion about computer-assisted philology. A certain amount of cheating 
is necessary to reach the comfortable conclusion presented in the previous paragraph. 
Criteria enabling one to judge upon the importance of algorithmic procedures have to be 
presupposed in order for such procedures to be of any help. To put it very simply: elaborate 
tools are of little help without knowledge of their proper use. One has to have a hunch about 
the possible significance of a term to profitably employ the electronic search function. The 
non-sequitur above may serve as a reminder to first-generation digital scholars. It is easy to 
fall into the trap of overestimating technology. None of the powerful programming at work 
below the WYSIWYG-surface guarantees philosophical content. 
The difficulty, consequently, is the following one: How can technological advancements in 
textual criticism be constrained by a sense of proportion relating to a prior understanding of 
the subject matter. This type of question is well-known and often discussed between 
technophiles and technophobes. The present paper is a case study, trying to answer the 
question for one particular instance of the general problem. But we have not yet assembled 
the necessary evidence. It remains quite unclear why a philosopher should worry about 
toothaches. A powerful mechanism has been sketched, yet it is fair to assume that 
Wittgenstein scholars go about their business projecting hypotheses to understand the 
complexities of the Nachlass quite independently. The above account does not include a 
reason for using the mechanism. Providing such reasons is itself a philosophical activity. This 
section has offered a rough overview of the itinerary of some sample paragraphs. One has to 
explore their content and in particular the conceptual significance of their itinerary in order to 
get the full picture. A satisfactory answer to the issue at stake between digital technology 
and its critics has to appeal to philosophy in action.
TOOTHACHES: PHILOSOPHY 
Wittgenstein's first entry into manuscript 107 refers back to the Tractatus . There he had 
claimed: 'Das denkende, vorstellende, Subjekt gibt es nicht.' (5.631) And he had explained 
this dictum by pointing to the visual field: 'nichts am Gesichtsfeld läßt darauf schließen, daß 
es von einem Auge gesehen wird.' ( Tractatus  5.633). Compare MS 107, 1 (WA 2,3): 'Der 
Gesichtsraum so wie er ist hat seine selbständige Realität. Er selbst enthält kein Subjekt. Er 
ist autonom.' In 1929 Wittgenstein's anti-intentionalism is still in place, but his views on 
atomic sentences begin to change. The basic units of his epistemological account are not 
single sentences any more: 'Ich lege nicht den Satz als Maßstab an die Wirklichkeit an 
sondern das System von Sätzen.' (MS 107, 35; WA 2, 149) The logic of color terms has, as 
Wittgenstein discovered, to take account of the field of possibilities given by the spectrum. 
Atomic sentences cannot be independent of each other since 'This plate is blue' logically 
implies - among many other propositions - that it is not red. Yet, this is not a tautology. 
Given the visual field and the customary color space one has a priori knowledge of the 
structural dependencies of possible colors. To look for any actual one necessarily includes 
mastery of a presupposed color scheme. 'Wie es einen Sinn hat zu sagen die Farbe R ist am 
Ort P wenn ich überhaupt den Gesichtsraum mit dem Farbraum "vor mir" habe.' (MS 107, 158; 
WA 2, 92) Wittgenstein's quotes indicate that he is still officially unwilling to grant the 
existence of a subject. But it is interesting to take a closer look at his day's work (Oct. 10, 
1929).
The point of reference of the previous quote ('Wie es einen Sinn hat ...') are stomach aches. 
Wittgenstein is discussing the meaning of negation. How can one truthfully deny the presence 
of stomach aches? Such sentences seem to lack external sensual corroboration. They cannot 
be constructed as somehow linking stomachs and pains either. 'Es ist nur wesentlich, daß ich 
den Raum vor mir habe in dem der Magen liegt und den worin die Schmerzen liegen.' (MS 107, 
157; WA 2, 92) Like colors within the visual field pains are a kind of sensation constitutivly 
associated with stomachs. This seems an unobjectionable parallel - with a twist. We have 
noted Wittgenstein's avoidance of the common notion of a subject in his discussion of the 
visual field. This strategy cannot, however, be carried over to the case of 'internal' 
sensations. There is nothing comparable to the geometry of shared, public, visible spaces in 
the realm of our intestines. If you remove the subject from stomach aches not even the 
illusion of a legitimate issue remains. Switching from the visual field to internal sensations, 
Wittgenstein's doctrine of the subject is severely shaken. He cannot but employ the first 
person pronoun in these contexts, even though his commitment is to exclude it from the 
scientific vocabulary. Such is the dilemma apparent in his first remark on toothaches: 'Warum 
nenne ich Zahnschmerzen " meine Zahnschmerzen" '? (MS 107, 199; WA 2, 114)
Wittgenstein does not follow any pre-set agenda that could lead to a systematic 
investigation of various modalities of the senses. His move from vision to stomach aches to 
tooth aches is obviously not aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive view. Ten 
days after raising the issue of toothaches being my toothaches Wittgenstein comes up with 
the brilliant aphorism quoted above. The private language argument is, in nuce, contained in 
two extremely compact sentences (MS 107, 215f; WA 2, 124). If another person cannot be 
said to be the subject of my internal sense data it is meaningless to deny her those very 
sense data. Their possible occurrences do not include this kind of bearer. Alas, this is no 
comfort for anyone tempted to regard awareness of one's own intentional states as privileged 
knowledge. There is no force in such pronouncements. I cannot determine something uniquely 
subjective in appealing to an incomprehensible option, i.e. another person's having my internal 
states. The Tractatus  view of the subject was of a metaphysical entity, a border of the 
World, not part of it ( Tractatus 5.641). The early post-Tractarian manuscripts are gradually 
abandoning this dualism, conceding a role for first-person talk. Yet, most of the original 
skepticism remains. How can one conceive of a role for 'private' sensations and avoid 
idealism?
Such questions are external to Wittgenstein's writing in the manuscripts. The present sketch 
puts emphasis on only a small number of issues discussed within those volumes. The general 
line of argument is, however, supported by Wittgenstein's own subsequent selective rewriting 
of the material. When he cut up TS 208 to rearrange its content into what is now known as 
the Philosophische Bemerkungen, one of his points of emphasis was toothaches. His 
discussion of logical features of talk about the subject centers around a selection of remarks 
devoted to the remarkable fact of me - Ludwig Wittgenstein - having toothaches (cf. PhB VI, 
58). This revision introduces complexity of a higher order. Many of Wittgenstein's paragraphs 
are initially small, self-contained philosophical analyses. The next auctorial step is to try and 
put them together so that some larger, overarching connection is established. Philosophische 
Bemerkungen VI does, in fact, offer extremely dense philosophical substance, much too 
involved to be discussed here. Just an outline of Wittgenstein's strategy of using his 
arrangements as arguments can be given.
A first group of remarks, serving as a kind of prolegomenon, is derived from entries for Dec. 
14, 1929 and Oct. 11, 1929, expounding the general direction of the succeeding paragraphs. 
The use of the first person pronoun is fraught with difficulties, particularly if talk about 
perception is modelled according to external circumstances. 'I am experiencing a red patch' is 
quoted as a case in point. To analyze the difficulties one might re-write the puzzling 
descriptions, substituting some un-objectionable term for the offensive 'I'. This exercise is 
next. Remarkably, Wittgenstein switches from sense impressions to internal sensation again, 
as he designs a language game supposed to exhibit the same logical multiplicity as the 
common idiom and yet to avoid mention of a subject. His idea is to externalize the privileged 
position of subjectivity by designating one particular person as an universal point of 
reference. If 'I am' Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'I have toothaches' becomes 'There are toothaches' 
and 'A has toothaches' can be rephrased as 'A behaves like Ludwig Wittgenstein when there 
are toothaches'. (PhBemerkungen VI, 58). The apparent uniqueness of subjective experience 
is transformed into a qualitative difference in public discourse; the mysterious realm of 
subjectivity replaced by an idiom of matching complexity: everyone can take center stage in 
this language. Once this focus is set the remaining moves of the language game are 
equivalent to the traditional one. Wittgenstein offers a playful simile. The logic of first-person 
talk recalls oriental despotism, with the subject taking the place of the despot in providing 
the origin of the communicative coordinate system.
The point is that talk about sensations is inevitably dualistic. 'The subject' - as well as an 
oriental despot - is supposed to fall outside ordinary discourse directed towards physical 
things. If Timur Lenk's state of health is taken as the measuring device of health-talk it makes 
no sense to ask whether he has toothaches. In the event, toothaches simply are among his 
personal states and having toothaches is a condition derived from this primordial condition. 
Even though Wittgenstein has thus eliminated first-person talk the Tractarian criterion of 
meaning fails, however. It is impossible to attribute possession of toothaches or lack thereof 
to a suitably designated individuum. (The discussion prefigures later reflections on the Paris 
ur-meter.) After this setting of the stage Wittgenstein embarks on a series of grammatical 
investigations, exploring the comprehensibility of our dualistic idiom. There is no obvious way 
to stratify his dialectical dialogues into a single argument. 'I cannot feel your toothaches.' 
Does this sentence express an empirical truth or rather a kind of logical necessity 
Wittgenstein had not provided for in his Tractatus? (cf. PhB VI, 61) Rather than answering 
questions like this, Wittgenstein keeps changing his focus and his examples, circling around 
the issues. What is he up to? To a casual reader it looks like an open-ended, aporetic 
elenchus. But Wittgenstein, surprisingly, and without so much as minimal warning, does 
actually close his argument by the strategic placement of one paragraph.
Wittgenstein's transposition of first person talk was anchored in the neutral statement: 'There 
are toothaches'. The following quote is an obvious echo, concluding the argument:
Das Phänomen des Schmerzgefühls in einem Zahn, welches ich kenne, ist in der 
Ausdrucksweise der gewöhnlichen Sprache dargestellt durch ' ich habe in dem und dem Zahn 
Schmerzen'. Nicht durch einen Ausdruck von der Art, 'an diesem Ort ist ein Schmerzgefühl'. 
(PhB VI, 66)
As it turns out, it is impossible to capture the subjectivist intuitions in Wittgenstein's 
alternative scheme. There cannot be pains outside of consciousness. Designating a physical 
body to be the paradigmatic bearer of pain is no better than ascribing pain to some tooth put 
on a table ( Philosophische Bermerkungen VI, 65). Timur Lenk is, inevitably, located in public 
space, so we are back to Wittgenstein's initial reminder: the problem arises because physical 
circumstances are inappropriately projected onto another context.
Das ganze Feld dieser Erfahrung wird in dieser Sprache durch Ausdrücke von der Form 'ich 
habe ...' beschrieben. Die Sätze von der Form 'N hat Zahnschmerzen' sind für ein ganz 
anderes Feld reserviert. (PhB VI, 66) 
In other words: Wittgenstein advises himself to desist from trying to battle ordinary language. 
He is quite aware of the tension: In order to unravel the philosophical knot one has to re-
trace the complicated movements underlying it. Thus ends the second take on toothaches. 
Resting content with the ordinary was, however, always a temporary affair for Wittgenstein. 
In 1932 we find him returning to the very issues he had supposedly resolved in MS 110, 30ff 
(WA5, 179ff). These are the quotes remarked upon earlier in this paper: Wittgenstein's 
second, condensing revision of the material on toothaches.
This third stratum of the textual evidence and its further development will not be pursued 
here. The sole purpose of the preceding intermezzo was to redress the balance between the 
digital toolkit and topics in established Wittgenstein scholarship. The problem was to mediate 
between proponents of largely syntactic manipulation of linguistic data and traditional 
approaches that turn to texts with a prior understanding of their subject matter. The way to 
escape a stand-off is to refuse the contra-position from the very start. Semantic data-
mining11 as exemplified by the previous sub-section, is simultaneously an exercise in digital 
philology and philosophy. Wittgenstein's Nachlass is an excellent place to look for such a 
synthesis because the author's ideas are, to a large extent, expressed by arranging and 
rearranging small textual units. Tracking the dynamics of Wittgenstein's philosophical 
variations can, admittedly, be done in the conventional framework of a printed edition of his 
manuscripts and type-scripts. Computer-assisted procedures do, however, push philology 
towards horizons previously out of reach. To repeat: No collection of printed volumes can 
conceivably present any synopsis of any terms, occurring at arbitrary dates, in just a few 
seconds. Such opportunities are bound to have a major impact on future Wittgenstein 
scholarship. This concludes the philological assessment of conventional versus digital 
approaches to the Wittgenstein papers. A more detached attitude has already been hinted 
at. It seems that Wittgenstein's writing is particularly well suited to a post-Gutenberg 
environment. In order to get the full picture regarding the Bergen edition we have to take a 
closer look at Wittgenstein's failure to turn his writings into a book.
BEYOND BOOKS 
J.C. Nyíri has made a strong case for considering the Wittgenstein Nachlass in the light of 
recent media philosophy. Quoting Walter Ong and Erich Havelock he reminds his readers of the 
prospect that the age of literacy might be giving way to a period of secondary orality, with 
the spoken word regaining the most influential position in a broadcast society. According to 
Nyíri's suggestion Wittgenstein's failure to distinguish between the written and the spoken 
word might explain his 'ultimate inability to complete the "book" he always wanted to 
complete'12. The ductus of his writings is, indeed, more akin to on-going conversations than 
to neatly delineated propositions. Did Wittgenstein miss the adequate medium for his 
exertions? Nyíri draws attention to the fact that his writing is, in certain places, a direct 
rejoinder to the Socratic dialogues. 'Ich finde bei Plato auf eine Frage wie 'was ist Erkenntnis' 
nicht die vorläufige Antwort: Sehen wir einmal nach, wie dieses Wort gebraucht wird.' (TS 
211, 17) Wittgenstein's inverse Socratic role consists in dissolving platonic confidence in 
essences and is, therefore, ill suited to be put into a classical philosophical treatise. As Nyíri 
(following Havelock) rightly reminds us, Platonic ideas are inextricably connected to the rise of 
literacy over an oral tradition which lacked expressive means for a proper treatment of 
abstract terms. Yet, Wittgenstein could have rested content with his actual teaching, leaving 
it to his disciples to provide written records. He did not do so, but rather forced himself, 
against better knowledge, to conform to the given standard.
Wenn ich für mich denke ohne ein Buch schreiben zu wollen, so springe ich um das Thema 
herum; das ist die einzige mir natürliche Denkweise. In einer Reihe gezwungen fortzudenken ist 
mir eine Qual. Soll ich es nun überhaupt probieren? Ich verschwende unsägliche Mühe auf ein 
Anordnen der Gedanken, das vielleicht gar keinen Wert hat. (MS 118, 185)
The key word is 'vielleicht' indicating Wittgenstein's ambivalent ambitions to write a book. His 
difficulties are methodologically profound. One way to bring this into focus is to position them 
at the crossroads between books and hypertext.
Decades of Wittgenstein scholarship have been shaped by editorial decisions made by the 
trustees of the Nachlass. Their general policy was to present provisional steps in 
Wittgenstein's ongoing process of revision as standalone volumes, often effacing the 
dynamics demonstrated in the preceding section. David Stern, in his perceptive paper, 
correctly describes the state of affairs.
The Wittgenstein Nachlass is not a haphazard pile of working papers that happened to survive 
his death, nor is it a collection of works that only awaited publication. While it is both a 
carefully selected and highly structured record of his life's work, a collection of material that 
he deliberately assembled and left to posterity, it is also the record of a writer continually in 
flux, never entirely satisfied with anything he had written.13  
In view of this situation it actually seems a little unfair to reapproach the editors of 
Wittgenstein's posthumous writing. There is no good way to capture the activity vividly 
described by Stern into the confines of a printed volume. Despite outward appearances there 
are no 'works of Wittgenstein' that could confidently be taken as points of departure. Even 
the Philosophische Untersuchungen are, as Stern observes, 'only one of a number of possible 
arrangements Wittgenstein proposed, many of which extend, amplify, or cast light on the 
remarks in the published book.'14 References to current models of textual interdependency 
become almost irresistible at this point. 'Because the Wittgenstein Nachlass is the result of 
such an extensive act of rewriting, it is less a collection of texts than a hypertext, an 
interconnected network of remarks.'15 Stern's remarks certainly point into the right direction. 
Still, there are some intermediary steps between the range of options available to 
Wittgenstein and writing that is embedded in digital technology. Those steps have to be 
spelled out if one wants to get a grasp on how the CD-ROM edition might change out habits 
of scholarship based on self-contained books. 
One feature of a culture based on books deserves special attention as this culture is 
challenged by the advent of digital, globally distributed information. Books are marked by the 
coincidence of two seperate decisions: their content and its appearance are determined 
simultaneously. This is what publication of a book, in effect, amounts to - and it throws some 
light on Wittgenstein's qualms. He felt unable to decide on one shape for his ideas. 
Publication, throughout European history, simply meant drawing a line between a creative 
process and its (albeit provisional) results. Sending a manuscript to the publisher was to 
distinguish a line between sketches, preliminary attempts, experimental drafts and an entity 
exhibiting both the features of the most prestigious information technology and of auctorial 
closure. Books divided the lifetime of an author into continuous activity and singular results, 
texts that, from a certain moment in time, assume a life of their own. This arrangement is 
being thoroughly shaken by the advent of new media. First of all, digital encoding disrupts the 
familiar coordination between form and content. Characters are mapped into numbers that 
are, in turn, symbolized in an electronic format unsuitable for direct perception. And this 
transposition, secondly, triggers dramatic changes in the nature of publicity. Electronic texts 
can instantly be published to a world audience and still be constantly revised.
In the given context it is particularly instructive to notice the implication for posthumous 
'works'. In the world of books a Nachlass is defined as all the material an author did not 
manage or see fit to get printed. Its peculiar character is that future generations retro-
activly elevate such writing to the status of books. If books published by an author are what 
software developers call a 'feature-freeze', publications from a Nachlass are based on 
decisions to overrule such limitations. There is no way to escape the allure of 'works' in book 
culture. In Nachlass-publications auxiliary authors assume responsibility to supplement a 
writer's oeuvre with 'second order' books. Applying this to the case at hand yields a 
suggestive prospect. While the trustees failed to do justice to Wittgenstein's open-ended, 
conversations philosophical style, a digital edition of the Nachlass is much better suited to 
achieve this aim. Such an enterprise is not forced to turn a collection of tentative designs 
into bound volumes. The 'Wiener Ausgabe' seems set to publish the largely repetetive material 
from 1929-1933 in 12 weighty volumes. Michael Nedo sounds apologetic in defending this 
expenditure:
... the book is still the carrier of thoughts, of written heritage in our culture, and familiarity 
with this medium certainly affects not only one's dealings with the texts themselves, but also 
the accompanying Apparatuses.16  
One does not have to subscribe to deconstruction to find this eulogy anachronistic. The 
transitory character of Wittgenstein's writing, its complex genealogy and its numerous 
recapitulations seem to call for a digital format of presentation which matches its inherent 
temporality by avoiding ultimate editorial decisions and allowing easy manipulation of the 
textual material.
Impressions like these, convincing as they may sound - once again - overstress technology. 
Wittgenstein, it is true, despaired of achieving the linear order demanded by a printed book. 
But this does not imply that hypertext could have solved his problem. His desparation is the 
important feature: the fight against a spell cast upon his writing by the demands of books 
culture. He worried about the correct arrangement of his ideas, so much is obvious from the 
examples discussed above. One understanding of 'hypertext' is of segments of texts linked 
together in a more or less haphazard way, often without any single, controling authority. This 
meaning is certainly not applicable to Wittgenstein. He could have saved himself a lot of 
trouble had he been prepared to regard his writing as a kind of private web-space. A second 
understanding might be more appropriate. Hypertext can also refer to autonomous non-linear 
writing which transcends the obligatory step-by-step sequence of print-products by 
constructing a topological matrix without hierarchical order. Digitized texts are encoded as 
numbers and have to be re-established in a legible format. Visualization by a monitor is one 
step removed from the pages of a book and offers flexibility unmatched by their arrangement. 
Wittgenstein's famous metaphor of wandering through a philosophical landscape comes to 
mind. The Nachlass does, in fact, contain a number of tentative registers that could easily be 
implemented as a hypertext.17 
This is one side of Wittgenstein's struggle with conventional means of expressing thoughts. 
But his need for a different kind of complexity is offset by an equally important desire. In 
many places he insists on finding definitive answers. This motive, manifest in the Tractatus , 
is also present in Wittgenstein's later calls for 'Übersichtlichkeit' (surveyability) and well laid-
out description:
Wir wollen nicht das Regelsystem für die Verwendung unserer Worte in unerhörter Weise 
verfeinern oder vervollständigen. Denn die Klarheit, die wir anstreben, ist allerdings eine 
vollkommene. Aber das heißt nur, daß die philosophischen Probleme vollkommen verschwinden 
sollen. (PhU § 133)
In this context, the 'treatment' of philosophical problems is likened to therapeutical 
intervention and its ultimate aim is to put vexing thoughts to rest. Such an attitude cannot 
be easily reconciled with calls for open-ended auctorial multiplicity and the suspension of 
binding results. Wittgenstein's 'hypertext' avant la lettre arises from unsuccessful attempts at 
closure rather than from intentional design. It does not anticipate a more flexible medium 
which might alleviate the rigor of philosophical arguments. As the Nachlass material on 
toothaches shows, Wittgenstein did not simply reject the linear progression of thoughts in 
favor of a compilation of aphorisms. He actually proposes a solution - even though it does not 
satisfy him in the long run. Look at it this way: If he had been able to reach a satisfactory 
conclusion he would have put it into print. Hypertext, on the other hand, is by design non-
conclusive. Had Wittgenstein used hypertext, his characteristic struggle against premature 
closure would have been lost. Hypertext lacks the kind of physical inertia needed to make a 
sentence stick to a certain position and while Wittgenstein kept overturning pre-established 
patterns of thought and inferences he never abandoned his drive to return to 
straightforward, easily surveyable positions.
Wir sind aufs Glatteis geraten, wo die Reibung fehlt, also die Bedingungen in gewissem Sinn 
ideal sind, aber wir eben deshalb auch nicht gehen können. Wir wollen gehen; dann brauchen 
wir Reibung. Zurück auf den rauhen Boden. (PhU § 107)
Wittgenstein would, in all likelihood, have extended this complaint against free-floating 
philosophical speculation to l'art pour l'art hypertext.
To sum up and focus on the case at hand: Electronic texts are not just a kind of print; the 
graphical rendering of information on a monitor is no 'page' in any ordinary sense. It is 
tempting - and to some extent plausible - to distinguish Wittgenstein's writing from 
conventional philosophical authorship by employing jargon from media studies. Actually putting 
his Nachlass on a CD-ROM adds considerable complexity to the story. There is an important 
difference between a writer's decision to publish his or her work (in whatever format) and 
someone else administering a heritage. Nachlass publications, including electronic editions, are 
per definitionem second order closures. The flexibility of digitized texts is of another order as 
Wittgenstein's work in progress. How those papers are to be rendered on CD-ROMs is by no 
means self-evident. It is easy to pretend that the Bergen project is just an extension of well-
known editorial strategies. Such an attitude does, however, seriously underestimate the 
range of problems involved. All the conveniences set forth in the previous pages do not come 
for free. The change from books to computers is in itself an important theoretical and political 
issue. Putting Wittgenstein on disk demands a considerable number of decisions beyond the 
scope of printed editions. This is new territory, hardly even noticed as a philosophical issue 
amongst Wittgenstein scholars.
THE POLITICS OF DIGITAL TEXTS 
The Bergen electronic edition effaces its own novelty. Its structuring principle are the 
physical volumes of the Nachlass which are presented one after the other in linear sequence. 
The search facilities include easy access to single manuscripts or type-scripts. Facsimiles 
provide unprecedented opportunities to scrutinize Wittgenstein's actual output.The electronic 
edition might be argued to beat its print competitors at their own game. One apparent 
platitude is of utmost importance, though. Digitized texts need computers which need 
software which needs operating systems. In centuries of print culture we have become 
accustomed to the fact that once a book is published it is freely accessible to readers 
without further effort. Historical pictures of lockable books raise amused smiles. Yet, they are 
not a bad analogy to so-called digital books: in order to read them one needs additional 
devices, even 'keys'. Book publishing is a business charging once per item, regardless of its 
further use. But those products are, nowadays, revealed as just one interface to information. 
In many respects digital documents offer more convenient access to identical content. This 
surplus value has a price: a set of electronic equipment is inserted between the reader and 
her text. Once they have been published (and as long as they are in print) books are available 
without further decoding. As everyone who has to exchange files on the internet knows, this 
is far from true for electronic documents. Different computer platforms, different word 
processors and conflicting versions tend to produce confusions unheard of in former times.
The reason for this is that there are several competing standards to implement a mapping 
between alpha-numerical symbols and digital numbers. Strictly speaking only the basic letters, 
numerals and diacritical signs of the English alphabet are interchangeable on any platform. 
Different sets of characters, and in particular the elaborate additional code necessary to 
simulate printed pages on a monitor, demand special attention. International bodies are in 
charge of supervising the encoding of the world's languages. Software simulation of written 
material, however, obeys different rules. It is to a considerable extent a commercial affair and 
subject to the laws of economics. The result is, predictably, a considerable variety of 
proprietary software tools trying to get their share of the market by offering particularly 
comfortable - and mutually incompatible - features. This is the state of affairs confronting 
any digitization of texts. Two minimalistic approaches are either to scan existing pages or to 
stick to 7-bit ASCII code in transcribing them electronically. It is immediately obvious that 
neither of these options is satisfactory for a textual corpus of the degree of complexity of the 
Wittgenstein Nachlass. The editors were faced with a situation unprecedented in ordinary 
publishing. They had to decide upon a software package capable of producing the desired 
results, which also meant forcing that package upon the readers. Textual scholarship finds 
itself on unfamiliar terrain. The tools it needs to even access its subject matter are produced 
by big companies with only marginal interest in the academy.
The Bergen edition runs on the Windows platform (Windows 3.1, 3.11, Windows 95 and 
Windows NT4 according to the promotion sheet). For word-processing capacity it uses a 
program named 'FolioViews' which provides the usual services: cut and paste, printing, 
searching, window control, electronic bookmarks and back tracing. For scholars who habitually 
use the Microsoft range of products and do not worry about the ensuing dependency of their 
basic data on market competition these are excellent choices, even though some of its 
limitations will affect the ordinary user. The entire collection of normalized and diplomatic 
transcripts is put into a single binary file respectively. (The facsimiles are offered as single 
graphic documents, one per physical page.) Consequently, two huge electronic files contain 
the entire content of the Bergen edition in a completely opaque format. The user is allowed to 
read and manipulate texts via FolioViews but none of the structural information that has been 
presented in the first section of this paper is directly accessible to her. She can copy 
selected texts, paste and print them - but neither can she touch the indexing mechanism nor 
modify any of the underlying data. There is a strict separation between interface and non-
transparent, computational deep structure. Copyright considerations are a prominent reason 
for this arrangement: the content of a printed book cannot as easily be reproduced, 
manipulated and distributed as its digital counterpart. Provisions have to be taken to protect 
the investment put into such long-term projects. Media change unsettles venerable customs. 
The traditional understanding was that the result of scholarly work, most often financed by 
the taxpayer's money, are generally available in their entirety. This feature does, indeed, 
distinguish scholarship from commercially induced research. As teams of experts have to use 
proprietary software to reassure the copyright-holders and ensure the profit for the publishing 
house, this availability is restricted. But, it might be objected, where is the problem? 
Wittgenstein's writings are at one's disposal, all of them and in an extremely comfortable 
fashion. True enough, judged by the standards of the printed book. Yet, as was discussed in 
section two, Wittgenstein's Nachlass transcends the limits of such standards and an 
electronic edition might be better suited to capture those peculiarities. It might be organized 
so as to mirror Wittgenstein's editorial techniques, starting with single remarks as elementary 
building blocks and putting them together in a variety of ways, following Wittgenstein's lead. 
His working process, not its result, could be taken as the guiding principle. As a matter of fact 
the encapsulated FolioViews file is the very opposite of hypertext.18 Yet, the Bergen edition 
does not offer any tools to actually rearrange its content or redesign its appearance on the 
primary level. For all its flexibility and ease of use the Bergen edition is still in the conceptual 
grip of classical printed editions. Does it have to mimic the necessities of print culture?
The question turns on the issue of access to the internal, structural information hidden inside 
the binary files. Under present conditions one can find a particular paragraph and all of its 
subsequent instances as they appear in the later volumes. It is, however, impossible to break 
out of the straitjacket of the von Wright classification and deal with paragraphs as basic data 
units. If this were possible digital equivalences of Wittgenstein's notes could be freely 
assembled and re-assembled. As of now one is, for example, presented with manuscripts 105-
108 plus typescripts 208-209 plus manuscript 110 and has to extract relevant paragraphs for 
personal post-processing. A more appropriate way might be to pick out relevant paragraphs 
(e.g. on toothaches) and re-assemble them at bottom level, echoing the author's own 
procedure. It would be an attractive way to overcome the Nachlass effect of irrevocable 
closure. The internal dynamics of the Wittgenstein papers would be much more in evidence if 
a more open digital format had been chosen. Years of labor have been spent on the electronic 
transcription of the original documents. The records of the Wittgenstein archive do in fact 
contain all the information necessary for micrological analysis and multiple synthesis. The use 
of the CD-ROM, however, remains restricted to find, cut and paste with no provisions to 
address the editorial information from outside FolioViews. In order to visualize the conclusion 
on toothaches from the first section one might want to write a small program. It could not 
operate on the existing data structure which would have to be re-inscribed onto copies of 
segments extracted from the database.
This is the place to touch upon some basic issues in the theory and practice of text 
encoding. The discussion of the peculiar overlap between the requirements of digitization and 
commercial interests at the beginning of this section deliberately omitted an alternative 
possibility. Standard General Markup Language (SGML) is an attempt to avoid dependency on 
proprietary formats and irreconcilable software development with regard to electronic texts. 
The idea is, briefly, to supplement the alpha-numeric ciphers with additional (groups of) 
characters ('mark up') that serve the purpose of encoding meta-information by means of the 
available, restricted set of ASCII code. HTML, the language of the World Wide Web, in an 
instance of SGML. An easy example of mark up is the use (in HTML) of '<h1>' to indicate the 
beginning (and '</h1>' the end) of a top level heading. Such mark up indications do not in 
themselves cause any formatting to be done. (This distinguishes them from the binary code 
inserted into text files by common word processors.) Their function is to delineate the logical 
structure of the document and provide anchors to include additional content (like cross-
references, dates or hierarchical dependencies). A marked-up document can be read on any 
computer platform, the catch being that it needs software to render the mark-up as 
intended. This is a substantial difficulty given the fact that word processing has been much 
more popular with the general public. But consider a Web browser to get the general idea. 
Such browser are software which takes '<h1>Title</h1>' as an input and turns it (e.g.) into
                                                          TITLE
SGML (and its recent variant XML) offers a top-down solution to the problem of incompatible 
standards in text encoding and concurrent information storage.
The Bergen edition is based upon transcriptions of Wittgenstein's original pages into a mark up 
language using the 'Multi-Element Code System' (MECS). This system provides a meta-
grammar that can be implemented in particular instances of transcriptional grammar and is 
well suited to the task of capturing the complexities of Wittgenstein's autographs in a digital 
format. For technical reasons MECS is not entirely compatible with SGML. The thing to keep in 
mind is, however, that the Bergen transcriptions contain the entire set of editorial information 
in mark up format, i.e. in 'tags' that can be addressed in programming constructions. This 
information is filtered to produce the diplomatic and normalized versions offered on the CD-
ROMs. In customary, printed editions there is no possible gap between the pages on offer and 
their basic encoding. This does not carry over into the electronic realm where digital code has 
to be re-implemented in order to be perceptible. The need for secondary processing 
introduces a discrepancy which can be used to shield off operative background information 
from its surface rendition. Electronic documents offer spectacular improvements over many of 
the usual features of printed texts. Ironically, it is just because of their versatility that 
mechanisms to constrain their scope are feasible - and called for. The Bergen edition is just 
one example of a more comprehensive problem that is often overlooked in recent digitization 
campaigns. It is perfectly possible to combine global, digital distribution of information with 
highly selective, exclusive standards of its generation and transmission. While most people 
would be prepared to accept this for cable TV or DVD it should at least be a matter of 
concern in textual scholarship.
This is an area of conflict between claims of copyright holders and the scientific community. 
Broaching this issue is not intended to deflect attention from the impressive achievements of 
the Bergen electronic edition. Its presentation of the material is an epochal advance in 
Wittgenstein scholarship. It is, at the same time, a precursor of many electronic editions yet 
to be published and is apt to trigger a more general discussion on how similar scholarly 
editions might be designed. Disregarding, for the purpose of this conclusion, external 
constraints an optimum solution for (future) computer-savvy scholars would enable them to 
address their texts at any of the three levels that have to constitute a serious editorial 
project: the mark-up, diplomatic and normalized versions should all be manipulable to ensure 
optimum results. It is impossible for any single endeavor to adequately charter the wealth of 
variants and cross-relations in Wittgenstein's Nachlass. But if scholars were able to freely 
access the underlying mark up resources based on the canonical transcription could easily be 
enriched by resources taken from literal computing. As several commentators have pointed 
out, the recent 'Open Source' movement in software management echoes the concepts of 
free peer access and peer review well established within science. In the best case scenario 
source code, e.g. the mark-up version of Wittgenstein's texts, would be freely available. Book 
culture charges relatively little for relatively static texts. Expensive electronic editions offer 
advanced research tools, blocking collaboration based on their data structure. There will be 
an 'open source' Wittgenstein sometime this century.
Currently, a confusing variety of formats is used to tentatively provide comprehensive access 
in selected collections, mainly for corpora from earlier centuries. Projects like CELT, the 'Celtic 
Corpus of Electronic Texts'19and the 'Victorian Women Writer's Project'20 offer browsable 
HTML-front-ends, ftp download of marked-up documents and printable Postscript copies. TMI 
('Thesaurus Musicarum Italicarum')21 or 'The William Blake Archive'22 employ DynaWeb to 
translate SGML-coded files for use with common browsers. At the Wittgenstein archive's web-
site23 TS 201a 'Notes on Logic' and MS 115, 'Philosophische Bemerkungen' are available in 
different versions: HTML frames for concurrent inspection of the diplomatic and normalized 
text and for download in Postscript and Word Perfect format respectively. It remains unclear 
whether electronic publishing will develop standards as transparent as those of traditional 
literary culture. The technological advances we have been discussing are in fact instrumental 
in de-familiarizing earlier standards that have acquired second nature status. New 
opportunities arise, but there is still little institutional background and almost none of the hard 
questions have been answered. Meanwhile, from a philosophical point of view, the 
Wittgenstein papers raise an issue that cuts across old and new forms of writing. 
Wittgenstein's struggle against the linear progression of arguments should neither be 
remodeled as a peaceful exercise in hypertext, nor put to rest in an series of (printed or 
virtual) volumes. The driving force behind the Nachlass is a continuous effort to put together 
the pieces of a number of puzzles that seem to change as this activity unfolds. Nachlass 
means: this process has definitely ended. Digitization of the Nachlass offers an opportunity to 
breath life back into an accumulation of notes.
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THE CHANGED STATE OF WITTGENSTEIN SCHOLARSHIP 
Two independent publishing projects have thoroughly changed the state of Wittgenstein 
scholarship in recent years. Michael Nedo's 'Wiener Ausgabe'1 offers a traditional critical 
edition of Wittgenstein's philosophical writings ranging from 1929 up to and including the 'Big 
Typescript' (1933). Considering the eclectic and - at times - arbitrary editorial policy 
underlying previous publications from the Nachlass2 Nedo's project offers unprecedented 
philosophical rigor as well as textual criticism in volumes designed for comfortable reading. A 
second, more ambitious, attempt at a critical edition is the Bergen electronic edition.3 It is 
planned to include 4 CD-ROMs, covering the entire range of the philosopher's unpublished 
writing. Two disks are currently available, comprising all of Wittgenstein's manuscripts from 
1929-1939, as well as type-scripts, beginning with 'Notes on Logic' (1913) and leading up to 
Typescript 226, composed in 1939.
Wittgenstein's writings from the Thirties are, therefore, available in independent, reliable 
printed and electronic editions respectively. Readers can, for the first time, observe the 
philosopher at work, transferring paragraphs from pocket notebooks to handwritten 'volumes'; 
picking acceptable remarks to be included in type-scripts that are, at a later stage, cut up 
into slips of paper which are again annotated, rearranged and put together in further volumes 
and type-scripts. But this is only half the excitement. The 'Wiener Ausgabe' and the 'Bergen 
Edition' stake their success on different media, inevitably provoking a comparison between the 
well known features of printed scholarly editions and the not so familiar realm of digitized 
texts.
Some of the differences are immediately obvious. Scrutinizing philosophical texts on a printed 
page implies sensual qualities lacking in electronic space. Many readers will prefer a material 
sheet of paper over its virtual substitute. There are, on the other hand, definite advantages 
in digitally stored transcriptions. A CD-ROM does not occupy desk-space and allows almost 
instant access to every single remark of the extended Wittgenstein corpus. In addition to the 
actual texts, the 'Wiener Ausgabe' contains separate volumes of sophisticated registers, 
cross-referencing all the printed material. Considering the fact that the Bergen edition 
includes an excellent search function Nedo's tables are an anachronistic nicety at best. In a 
recent volume Nedo, in fact, announces a 'comprehensive electronic Apparatus, 
supplementing the Wiener Ausgabe'4. And there is simply no viable alternative to an electronic 
medium if one wants to present facsimiles of every page of the Nachlass, suitably linked to 
diplomatic and normalized versions of its content. These features make the Bergen edition a 
far more comprehensive enterprise. It seems that, pace  the predictable skepticism stemming 
from deeply ingrained scholarly habits, there is a convincing case in favor of switching to the 
digital format. The present paper will, at any rate, proceed from this assumption. But matters 
of technical convenience should not be allowed to decide the more profound issues arising 
from the competition of the media involved.
The accessibility of Wittgenstein's texts has been tremendously enhanced by putting them on 
CD-ROMs. If this were information like the listings in a telephone directory one could let the 
issue rest at this point. It might be confined to a discussion of the availability and design of 
necessary electronic interfaces. Philosophical production, and in particular Wittgenstein's 
literary remains, raise more interesting questions, though. Can conceptual content be neatly 
separated from its presentation in a given medium? Since its inception philosophy was done 
by teaching, in scholarly discourse, or by writing books/papers. What will be the impact of 
current digital technology on those traditional practices?5 
The preceding sketch has emphasized several characteristics of electronic texts that printed 
books cannot match. It does not follow that a given work actually demands - or even bears - 
digital treatment. Essential use of single pages, to mention a simple case, cannot easily be 
simulated electronically. The first section of this paper will, therefore, explore what might be 
called the textuality of Wittgenstein's Nachlass. Tracing the development of an important 
Wittgensteinian motive, this exploration surveys part of the newly available material, testing 
the suitability of computer-assisted scholarship to this particular collection of writings. Is 
there a general lesson to be learned from involving oneself in hands-on digital philology? As it 
turns out the Wittgenstein Nachlass provides an excellent occasion to reflect upon the range 
and limits of the Gutenberg heritage. This is discussed in section two. The concluding remarks 
focus on the Bergen edition. Given that digitization does not simply extend the established 
tool-set of textual scholarship but opens up new philosophical perspectives - how well does 
this particular enterprise support (and possibly inspire) a re-configuration of the philological 
status quo?
TOOTHACHES: PHILOLOGY 
The so-called 'private language' argument laid out in Philosophical Investigations §§ 243ff has 
been widely discussed in the literature. One of Wittgenstein's ways to introduce the problem 
is to argue for the incomprehensibility of naming pains in a strictly solipsistic setting. What are 
the circumstances enabling us to identify sensations? We have to participate in interpersonal 
activities expressing e.g. pain.
Wie wäre es, wenn die Menschen ihre Schmerzen nicht äußerten (nicht stöhnten, das Gesicht 
nicht verzögen etc.)? Dann könnte man einem Kind nicht den Gebrauch des Wortes 
'Zahnschmerzen' beibringen. (PhU § 257)
The fleeting reference to toothaches here does not carry conceptual weight in the context of 
the Investigations. But, surprisingly enough, Wittgenstein's earliest treatment of the issues 
that were to lead to his private language argument centers around this very sensation. There 
are at least three methods available to reach the present conclusion. By juxtaposing them we 
get a first glimpse at the possible scope of computer-assisted textual criticism. 
(1) Five volumes of the Wiener Ausgabe have hitherto been published, comprising - in appr. 
1300 pages - Wittgenstein's manuscripts from the time when he took up philosophy again, 
ending his self-imposed moratorium subsequent to the completion of the Tractatus . These 
manuscripts contain, in chronological order, Wittgenstein's discussions of a wide range of 
issues. In essence they are philosophical diaries, freely switching between different matters 
of interest, developing threads of thought up to a certain point, interrupting and returning at 
a later date. One might read through all of this material and pick out remarks concerning 
toothaches. The term appears for the first time on Nov. 19, 1929: 'Warum nenne ich 
Zahnschmerzen ' meine Zahnschmerzen' ?' (MS 107, 199; WA 2, 1146). Wittgenstein then 
develops this motive from different angles up to Dec. 14, 1929 (MS 108, 8f; WA 2,136) and 
returns to discuss it in a loose sequence of remarks from Jan. 31, 1930 (MS 107, 270; WA 2, 
186) to Feb. 7, 1930 (MS 107, 288; WA 2, 196). All of those entries are intermingled with 
reflections on many different topics: probability, theory of measurement, Euclidean geometry, 
realism et.al.. No guiding principle is discernible. Wittgenstein is following his own idiosyncratic 
lines of thought that often consist of digressions, retractions and cognitive jumps. It is not 
impossible, but exceedingly hard, to recognize the making of the private language argument in 
those scattered aphorisms. This should not come as a surprise since, after all, the 
manuscripts are Wittgenstein's philosophical workshop. Philological attention is often informed 
by prior knowledge of the results of such incipient processes.
In the light of Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy the first approach does, anyway, make 
little sense. Examining his manuscripts he picked a number of remarks for dictation. Copies of 
the resulting type-scripts were consequently cut into slips of paper and rearranged according 
to rules that seem to be revised within the organizing process itself. This procedure can be 
appropriately illustrated by tracking the course of Wittgenstein's notes on toothaches. 
Typescript 208, which is an extract from manuscripts 105-108, is only partially preserved.7 As 
far as toothaches are concerned, only the paragraphs dating from Dec. 14, 1929 can be 
found in this compilation. Alois Pichler has reconstructed the likely shape of TS 208. According 
to his conjecture most of the material on toothaches was contained in the missing pages 1-
1448. It reappears, completely rearranged, in TS 209, which is the text source for 
Philosophische Bemerkungen, edited by Rush Rees and published in 1964. Wittgenstein's 
original typescript shows no classifications whatsoever. At first inspection it is simply a very 
long sequence of paragraphs. Rush Rees divided the script into sections and invented groups 
of paragraphs which he numbered according to an undocumented, inscrutable scheme. A 
collection of Wittgenstein's reflections on toothaches happens to make up section VI of 
Philosophische Bemerkungen. This is a promising place to look for the conceptual genesis of 
his later views on mental states, sensations and language.
While all sections of Philosophische Bemerkungen are the invention of Rush Rees it is, 
nevertheless, also true that it was Wittgenstein who assembles the pieces into one particular 
order, thus emphazising his interest in an analysis of how first-person talk determines our 
understanding of pain. These notes have been available for a long time and attentive readers 
have doubtlessly noticed connections between them and later discussions of similar issues. 
This material was, however, entirely separated from its context of origin, a stand-alone 
compilation of philosophical insights. There is nothing per se wrong with restricting oneself to 
this state of affairs. It can very well serve as a starting point for enquiries like the present 
essay. Yet, the recent publications from the Nachlass have opened up a range of exiting 
possibilities. What used to be philologically opaque collections of Wittgensteinian ideas can 
now be disassembled and regarded as intermediate results of an ongoing process of creative 
writing and revision. It has become feasible not only to identify the building blocks of 
Wittgenstein's more elaborate editorial arrangements but - what is more important - to 
actually observe his philosophical labor, i.e. the decision process leading from day-to-day 
notes towards (as he envisaged it) eventual publication of his thoughts.
(2) Conventional methodology offers indices and synopses to assist such an enterprise. Both 
are provided by the Wiener Ausgabe, suggesting a second approach to access the 
Wittgensteinian corpus. 'Toothache' is an index entry; it can be looked up and the resulting 
items can in turn be traced through the Wittgenstein papers. Wiener Ausgabe - Apparatus, 
Register zu den Bänden 1-5 consists entirely of tables correlating every single paragraph from 
the manuscripts to its subsequent occurances in these volumes and (more commonly) to its 
location within the Philosophische Bemerkungen or Philosophische Grammatik. On Nov. 29, 
1929 Wittgenstein noted:
Von Sinnesdaten in dem Sinne des Wortes in dem es undenkbar ist daß der Andere sie hat, 
kann man eben aus diesem Grunde auch nicht sagen, daß der Andere sie nicht hat. Und aus 
ebendiesem Grunde ist es sinnlos zu sagen, daß  ich im Gegensatz zum Anderen sie habe. (MS 
107, 215f; WA 2, 124)
As the synopsis shows this remark was included in TS 209 (aka Philosophische Bemerkungen) 
presumably in mid-19309 as entry VI, 61 and taken up again on Jun. 1, 1932, when 
Wittgenstein started a revision of his earlier ideas on the topic. Investigating this kind of 
dependency is standard procedure in textual criticism. Until very recently this had to be done 
by consulting printed synopses. It seems fair to say that there is very little sense in carrying 
on the old way, if the advance of digital technologies is taken into account.
The point is not just that it is quite cumbersome to work with multiple versions of basically 
the same paragraph located in different places in various bound volumes. This impediment 
could be alleviated by liberal use of the xerox machine. Printed synopses of material as 
complex as Wittgenstein's Nachlass face a more serious problem. It seems next to impossible 
to combine indexing and synopsis. The reader is presented with either a list of significant 
terms or a table of correlations of textual segments. She cannot simultaneously look for the 
occurance of a word and the history of rearrangements of the paragraph it is included in. No 
one would finance a series of books (or care to use them) containing the astronomical number 
of relations between index entries and changes of contexts in gory detail. Consider the remark 
quoted above. Instinctively one would at least consider the terms 'Sinnesdaten', 'Sinn', 'Wort', 
'der Andere', 'Grund', 'sinnlos' and 'Gegensatz'.10 The quote considered here does not even 
contain the term 'Zahnschmerzen' which is, at this point, Wittgenstein's guiding paradigm. 
Imagine all those terms put into correlation with all the changes of their occurrences 
elsewhere in the Nachlass. The ensuing combinatorial explosion effectively prevents putting 
the result on paper. In the present case one cannot have a general, usable, semantics-to-
(section)-numbers and (section)-numbers-to-(section-)numbers mapping, one on top of the 
other, in a print medium.
(3) It is easily done if the texts have been properly digitized. Since words are encoded by 
numbers it is quite simple to set up an index and it takes just another couple of numbers to 
represent the trace of 'words' to and from given contexts. Much of this can be done 
automatically; there is no need to actually visualize the necessary relational apparatus. If a 
correlation seems interesting it can be called up at will, with no time lost for browsing, 
copying or shuffling around papers. Searching for 'Zahnschmerzen' in the Bergen edition 
immediately yields 138 hits across the entire collection. The search can be restricted to 
particular (groups of) volumes and modified to include co-occurring or proximate terms as well 
as dates. A query for 'Sinnesdaten and Zahnschmerzen' produces as a result precisely three 
common occurances. First is a paragraph from MS 114 (MS 114, 16; WA 5, 179) into which 
Wittgenstein had assimilated separate earlier notes, followed by its typescript derivatives in 
TS 211, 755 and TS 213, 510 (Big Typescript). The quote previously presented (MS 107, 
215f; WA 2, 124), lacking the term 'Zahnschmerzen', is picked out among the 30 hits returned 
by querying 'Sinnesdaten'. It occurs in a stand-alone paragraph in TS 209, 23 (PhB VI, 61) 
and is flagged accordingly. In other words: a couple of straightforward enquiries lead directly 
to an important juncture in Wittgenstein's investigation of the logic of talk about sense 
impressions and toothaches in particular.
But wait. There is something suspicious about the last sentence. Manipulation of the index 
mechanism per se cannot produce important results. The disappearance of manifest meaning 
is, in fact, the price to pay for enhanced electronic facilities. One can easily pick any 
combination of terms and search constraints - but there is no guarantee whatsoever that this 
will lead to an interesting result. So where does 'importance' come in? This is a category of 
reflective assessment, crucially different from automated procedures. The discrepancy is at 
the center of any discussion about computer-assisted philology. A certain amount of cheating 
is necessary to reach the comfortable conclusion presented in the previous paragraph. 
Criteria enabling one to judge upon the importance of algorithmic procedures have to be 
presupposed in order for such procedures to be of any help. To put it very simply: elaborate 
tools are of little help without knowledge of their proper use. One has to have a hunch about 
the possible significance of a term to profitably employ the electronic search function. The 
non-sequitur above may serve as a reminder to first-generation digital scholars. It is easy to 
fall into the trap of overestimating technology. None of the powerful programming at work 
below the WYSIWYG-surface guarantees philosophical content. 
The difficulty, consequently, is the following one: How can technological advancements in 
textual criticism be constrained by a sense of proportion relating to a prior understanding of 
the subject matter. This type of question is well-known and often discussed between 
technophiles and technophobes. The present paper is a case study, trying to answer the 
question for one particular instance of the general problem. But we have not yet assembled 
the necessary evidence. It remains quite unclear why a philosopher should worry about 
toothaches. A powerful mechanism has been sketched, yet it is fair to assume that 
Wittgenstein scholars go about their business projecting hypotheses to understand the 
complexities of the Nachlass quite independently. The above account does not include a 
reason for using the mechanism. Providing such reasons is itself a philosophical activity. This 
section has offered a rough overview of the itinerary of some sample paragraphs. One has to 
explore their content and in particular the conceptual significance of their itinerary in order to 
get the full picture. A satisfactory answer to the issue at stake between digital technology 
and its critics has to appeal to philosophy in action.
TOOTHACHES: PHILOSOPHY 
Wittgenstein's first entry into manuscript 107 refers back to the Tractatus . There he had 
claimed: 'Das denkende, vorstellende, Subjekt gibt es nicht.' (5.631) And he had explained 
this dictum by pointing to the visual field: 'nichts am Gesichtsfeld läßt darauf schließen, daß 
es von einem Auge gesehen wird.' ( Tractatus  5.633). Compare MS 107, 1 (WA 2,3): 'Der 
Gesichtsraum so wie er ist hat seine selbständige Realität. Er selbst enthält kein Subjekt. Er 
ist autonom.' In 1929 Wittgenstein's anti-intentionalism is still in place, but his views on 
atomic sentences begin to change. The basic units of his epistemological account are not 
single sentences any more: 'Ich lege nicht den Satz als Maßstab an die Wirklichkeit an 
sondern das System von Sätzen.' (MS 107, 35; WA 2, 149) The logic of color terms has, as 
Wittgenstein discovered, to take account of the field of possibilities given by the spectrum. 
Atomic sentences cannot be independent of each other since 'This plate is blue' logically 
implies - among many other propositions - that it is not red. Yet, this is not a tautology. 
Given the visual field and the customary color space one has a priori knowledge of the 
structural dependencies of possible colors. To look for any actual one necessarily includes 
mastery of a presupposed color scheme. 'Wie es einen Sinn hat zu sagen die Farbe R ist am 
Ort P wenn ich überhaupt den Gesichtsraum mit dem Farbraum "vor mir" habe.' (MS 107, 158; 
WA 2, 92) Wittgenstein's quotes indicate that he is still officially unwilling to grant the 
existence of a subject. But it is interesting to take a closer look at his day's work (Oct. 10, 
1929).
The point of reference of the previous quote ('Wie es einen Sinn hat ...') are stomach aches. 
Wittgenstein is discussing the meaning of negation. How can one truthfully deny the presence 
of stomach aches? Such sentences seem to lack external sensual corroboration. They cannot 
be constructed as somehow linking stomachs and pains either. 'Es ist nur wesentlich, daß ich 
den Raum vor mir habe in dem der Magen liegt und den worin die Schmerzen liegen.' (MS 107, 
157; WA 2, 92) Like colors within the visual field pains are a kind of sensation constitutivly 
associated with stomachs. This seems an unobjectionable parallel - with a twist. We have 
noted Wittgenstein's avoidance of the common notion of a subject in his discussion of the 
visual field. This strategy cannot, however, be carried over to the case of 'internal' 
sensations. There is nothing comparable to the geometry of shared, public, visible spaces in 
the realm of our intestines. If you remove the subject from stomach aches not even the 
illusion of a legitimate issue remains. Switching from the visual field to internal sensations, 
Wittgenstein's doctrine of the subject is severely shaken. He cannot but employ the first 
person pronoun in these contexts, even though his commitment is to exclude it from the 
scientific vocabulary. Such is the dilemma apparent in his first remark on toothaches: 'Warum 
nenne ich Zahnschmerzen " meine Zahnschmerzen" '? (MS 107, 199; WA 2, 114)
Wittgenstein does not follow any pre-set agenda that could lead to a systematic 
investigation of various modalities of the senses. His move from vision to stomach aches to 
tooth aches is obviously not aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive view. Ten 
days after raising the issue of toothaches being my toothaches Wittgenstein comes up with 
the brilliant aphorism quoted above. The private language argument is, in nuce, contained in 
two extremely compact sentences (MS 107, 215f; WA 2, 124). If another person cannot be 
said to be the subject of my internal sense data it is meaningless to deny her those very 
sense data. Their possible occurrences do not include this kind of bearer. Alas, this is no 
comfort for anyone tempted to regard awareness of one's own intentional states as privileged 
knowledge. There is no force in such pronouncements. I cannot determine something uniquely 
subjective in appealing to an incomprehensible option, i.e. another person's having my internal 
states. The Tractatus  view of the subject was of a metaphysical entity, a border of the 
World, not part of it ( Tractatus 5.641). The early post-Tractarian manuscripts are gradually 
abandoning this dualism, conceding a role for first-person talk. Yet, most of the original 
skepticism remains. How can one conceive of a role for 'private' sensations and avoid 
idealism?
Such questions are external to Wittgenstein's writing in the manuscripts. The present sketch 
puts emphasis on only a small number of issues discussed within those volumes. The general 
line of argument is, however, supported by Wittgenstein's own subsequent selective rewriting 
of the material. When he cut up TS 208 to rearrange its content into what is now known as 
the Philosophische Bemerkungen, one of his points of emphasis was toothaches. His 
discussion of logical features of talk about the subject centers around a selection of remarks 
devoted to the remarkable fact of me - Ludwig Wittgenstein - having toothaches (cf. PhB VI, 
58). This revision introduces complexity of a higher order. Many of Wittgenstein's paragraphs 
are initially small, self-contained philosophical analyses. The next auctorial step is to try and 
put them together so that some larger, overarching connection is established. Philosophische 
Bemerkungen VI does, in fact, offer extremely dense philosophical substance, much too 
involved to be discussed here. Just an outline of Wittgenstein's strategy of using his 
arrangements as arguments can be given.
A first group of remarks, serving as a kind of prolegomenon, is derived from entries for Dec. 
14, 1929 and Oct. 11, 1929, expounding the general direction of the succeeding paragraphs. 
The use of the first person pronoun is fraught with difficulties, particularly if talk about 
perception is modelled according to external circumstances. 'I am experiencing a red patch' is 
quoted as a case in point. To analyze the difficulties one might re-write the puzzling 
descriptions, substituting some un-objectionable term for the offensive 'I'. This exercise is 
next. Remarkably, Wittgenstein switches from sense impressions to internal sensation again, 
as he designs a language game supposed to exhibit the same logical multiplicity as the 
common idiom and yet to avoid mention of a subject. His idea is to externalize the privileged 
position of subjectivity by designating one particular person as an universal point of 
reference. If 'I am' Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'I have toothaches' becomes 'There are toothaches' 
and 'A has toothaches' can be rephrased as 'A behaves like Ludwig Wittgenstein when there 
are toothaches'. (PhBemerkungen VI, 58). The apparent uniqueness of subjective experience 
is transformed into a qualitative difference in public discourse; the mysterious realm of 
subjectivity replaced by an idiom of matching complexity: everyone can take center stage in 
this language. Once this focus is set the remaining moves of the language game are 
equivalent to the traditional one. Wittgenstein offers a playful simile. The logic of first-person 
talk recalls oriental despotism, with the subject taking the place of the despot in providing 
the origin of the communicative coordinate system.
The point is that talk about sensations is inevitably dualistic. 'The subject' - as well as an 
oriental despot - is supposed to fall outside ordinary discourse directed towards physical 
things. If Timur Lenk's state of health is taken as the measuring device of health-talk it makes 
no sense to ask whether he has toothaches. In the event, toothaches simply are among his 
personal states and having toothaches is a condition derived from this primordial condition. 
Even though Wittgenstein has thus eliminated first-person talk the Tractarian criterion of 
meaning fails, however. It is impossible to attribute possession of toothaches or lack thereof 
to a suitably designated individuum. (The discussion prefigures later reflections on the Paris 
ur-meter.) After this setting of the stage Wittgenstein embarks on a series of grammatical 
investigations, exploring the comprehensibility of our dualistic idiom. There is no obvious way 
to stratify his dialectical dialogues into a single argument. 'I cannot feel your toothaches.' 
Does this sentence express an empirical truth or rather a kind of logical necessity 
Wittgenstein had not provided for in his Tractatus? (cf. PhB VI, 61) Rather than answering 
questions like this, Wittgenstein keeps changing his focus and his examples, circling around 
the issues. What is he up to? To a casual reader it looks like an open-ended, aporetic 
elenchus. But Wittgenstein, surprisingly, and without so much as minimal warning, does 
actually close his argument by the strategic placement of one paragraph.
Wittgenstein's transposition of first person talk was anchored in the neutral statement: 'There 
are toothaches'. The following quote is an obvious echo, concluding the argument:
Das Phänomen des Schmerzgefühls in einem Zahn, welches ich kenne, ist in der 
Ausdrucksweise der gewöhnlichen Sprache dargestellt durch ' ich habe in dem und dem Zahn 
Schmerzen'. Nicht durch einen Ausdruck von der Art, 'an diesem Ort ist ein Schmerzgefühl'. 
(PhB VI, 66)
As it turns out, it is impossible to capture the subjectivist intuitions in Wittgenstein's 
alternative scheme. There cannot be pains outside of consciousness. Designating a physical 
body to be the paradigmatic bearer of pain is no better than ascribing pain to some tooth put 
on a table ( Philosophische Bermerkungen VI, 65). Timur Lenk is, inevitably, located in public 
space, so we are back to Wittgenstein's initial reminder: the problem arises because physical 
circumstances are inappropriately projected onto another context.
Das ganze Feld dieser Erfahrung wird in dieser Sprache durch Ausdrücke von der Form 'ich 
habe ...' beschrieben. Die Sätze von der Form 'N hat Zahnschmerzen' sind für ein ganz 
anderes Feld reserviert. (PhB VI, 66) 
In other words: Wittgenstein advises himself to desist from trying to battle ordinary language. 
He is quite aware of the tension: In order to unravel the philosophical knot one has to re-
trace the complicated movements underlying it. Thus ends the second take on toothaches. 
Resting content with the ordinary was, however, always a temporary affair for Wittgenstein. 
In 1932 we find him returning to the very issues he had supposedly resolved in MS 110, 30ff 
(WA5, 179ff). These are the quotes remarked upon earlier in this paper: Wittgenstein's 
second, condensing revision of the material on toothaches.
This third stratum of the textual evidence and its further development will not be pursued 
here. The sole purpose of the preceding intermezzo was to redress the balance between the 
digital toolkit and topics in established Wittgenstein scholarship. The problem was to mediate 
between proponents of largely syntactic manipulation of linguistic data and traditional 
approaches that turn to texts with a prior understanding of their subject matter. The way to 
escape a stand-off is to refuse the contra-position from the very start. Semantic data-
mining11 as exemplified by the previous sub-section, is simultaneously an exercise in digital 
philology and philosophy. Wittgenstein's Nachlass is an excellent place to look for such a 
synthesis because the author's ideas are, to a large extent, expressed by arranging and 
rearranging small textual units. Tracking the dynamics of Wittgenstein's philosophical 
variations can, admittedly, be done in the conventional framework of a printed edition of his 
manuscripts and type-scripts. Computer-assisted procedures do, however, push philology 
towards horizons previously out of reach. To repeat: No collection of printed volumes can 
conceivably present any synopsis of any terms, occurring at arbitrary dates, in just a few 
seconds. Such opportunities are bound to have a major impact on future Wittgenstein 
scholarship. This concludes the philological assessment of conventional versus digital 
approaches to the Wittgenstein papers. A more detached attitude has already been hinted 
at. It seems that Wittgenstein's writing is particularly well suited to a post-Gutenberg 
environment. In order to get the full picture regarding the Bergen edition we have to take a 
closer look at Wittgenstein's failure to turn his writings into a book.
BEYOND BOOKS 
J.C. Nyíri has made a strong case for considering the Wittgenstein Nachlass in the light of 
recent media philosophy. Quoting Walter Ong and Erich Havelock he reminds his readers of the 
prospect that the age of literacy might be giving way to a period of secondary orality, with 
the spoken word regaining the most influential position in a broadcast society. According to 
Nyíri's suggestion Wittgenstein's failure to distinguish between the written and the spoken 
word might explain his 'ultimate inability to complete the "book" he always wanted to 
complete'12. The ductus of his writings is, indeed, more akin to on-going conversations than 
to neatly delineated propositions. Did Wittgenstein miss the adequate medium for his 
exertions? Nyíri draws attention to the fact that his writing is, in certain places, a direct 
rejoinder to the Socratic dialogues. 'Ich finde bei Plato auf eine Frage wie 'was ist Erkenntnis' 
nicht die vorläufige Antwort: Sehen wir einmal nach, wie dieses Wort gebraucht wird.' (TS 
211, 17) Wittgenstein's inverse Socratic role consists in dissolving platonic confidence in 
essences and is, therefore, ill suited to be put into a classical philosophical treatise. As Nyíri 
(following Havelock) rightly reminds us, Platonic ideas are inextricably connected to the rise of 
literacy over an oral tradition which lacked expressive means for a proper treatment of 
abstract terms. Yet, Wittgenstein could have rested content with his actual teaching, leaving 
it to his disciples to provide written records. He did not do so, but rather forced himself, 
against better knowledge, to conform to the given standard.
Wenn ich für mich denke ohne ein Buch schreiben zu wollen, so springe ich um das Thema 
herum; das ist die einzige mir natürliche Denkweise. In einer Reihe gezwungen fortzudenken ist 
mir eine Qual. Soll ich es nun überhaupt probieren? Ich verschwende unsägliche Mühe auf ein 
Anordnen der Gedanken, das vielleicht gar keinen Wert hat. (MS 118, 185)
The key word is 'vielleicht' indicating Wittgenstein's ambivalent ambitions to write a book. His 
difficulties are methodologically profound. One way to bring this into focus is to position them 
at the crossroads between books and hypertext.
Decades of Wittgenstein scholarship have been shaped by editorial decisions made by the 
trustees of the Nachlass. Their general policy was to present provisional steps in 
Wittgenstein's ongoing process of revision as standalone volumes, often effacing the 
dynamics demonstrated in the preceding section. David Stern, in his perceptive paper, 
correctly describes the state of affairs.
The Wittgenstein Nachlass is not a haphazard pile of working papers that happened to survive 
his death, nor is it a collection of works that only awaited publication. While it is both a 
carefully selected and highly structured record of his life's work, a collection of material that 
he deliberately assembled and left to posterity, it is also the record of a writer continually in 
flux, never entirely satisfied with anything he had written.13  
In view of this situation it actually seems a little unfair to reapproach the editors of 
Wittgenstein's posthumous writing. There is no good way to capture the activity vividly 
described by Stern into the confines of a printed volume. Despite outward appearances there 
are no 'works of Wittgenstein' that could confidently be taken as points of departure. Even 
the Philosophische Untersuchungen are, as Stern observes, 'only one of a number of possible 
arrangements Wittgenstein proposed, many of which extend, amplify, or cast light on the 
remarks in the published book.'14 References to current models of textual interdependency 
become almost irresistible at this point. 'Because the Wittgenstein Nachlass is the result of 
such an extensive act of rewriting, it is less a collection of texts than a hypertext, an 
interconnected network of remarks.'15 Stern's remarks certainly point into the right direction. 
Still, there are some intermediary steps between the range of options available to 
Wittgenstein and writing that is embedded in digital technology. Those steps have to be 
spelled out if one wants to get a grasp on how the CD-ROM edition might change out habits 
of scholarship based on self-contained books. 
One feature of a culture based on books deserves special attention as this culture is 
challenged by the advent of digital, globally distributed information. Books are marked by the 
coincidence of two seperate decisions: their content and its appearance are determined 
simultaneously. This is what publication of a book, in effect, amounts to - and it throws some 
light on Wittgenstein's qualms. He felt unable to decide on one shape for his ideas. 
Publication, throughout European history, simply meant drawing a line between a creative 
process and its (albeit provisional) results. Sending a manuscript to the publisher was to 
distinguish a line between sketches, preliminary attempts, experimental drafts and an entity 
exhibiting both the features of the most prestigious information technology and of auctorial 
closure. Books divided the lifetime of an author into continuous activity and singular results, 
texts that, from a certain moment in time, assume a life of their own. This arrangement is 
being thoroughly shaken by the advent of new media. First of all, digital encoding disrupts the 
familiar coordination between form and content. Characters are mapped into numbers that 
are, in turn, symbolized in an electronic format unsuitable for direct perception. And this 
transposition, secondly, triggers dramatic changes in the nature of publicity. Electronic texts 
can instantly be published to a world audience and still be constantly revised.
In the given context it is particularly instructive to notice the implication for posthumous 
'works'. In the world of books a Nachlass is defined as all the material an author did not 
manage or see fit to get printed. Its peculiar character is that future generations retro-
activly elevate such writing to the status of books. If books published by an author are what 
software developers call a 'feature-freeze', publications from a Nachlass are based on 
decisions to overrule such limitations. There is no way to escape the allure of 'works' in book 
culture. In Nachlass-publications auxiliary authors assume responsibility to supplement a 
writer's oeuvre with 'second order' books. Applying this to the case at hand yields a 
suggestive prospect. While the trustees failed to do justice to Wittgenstein's open-ended, 
conversations philosophical style, a digital edition of the Nachlass is much better suited to 
achieve this aim. Such an enterprise is not forced to turn a collection of tentative designs 
into bound volumes. The 'Wiener Ausgabe' seems set to publish the largely repetetive material 
from 1929-1933 in 12 weighty volumes. Michael Nedo sounds apologetic in defending this 
expenditure:
... the book is still the carrier of thoughts, of written heritage in our culture, and familiarity 
with this medium certainly affects not only one's dealings with the texts themselves, but also 
the accompanying Apparatuses.16  
One does not have to subscribe to deconstruction to find this eulogy anachronistic. The 
transitory character of Wittgenstein's writing, its complex genealogy and its numerous 
recapitulations seem to call for a digital format of presentation which matches its inherent 
temporality by avoiding ultimate editorial decisions and allowing easy manipulation of the 
textual material.
Impressions like these, convincing as they may sound - once again - overstress technology. 
Wittgenstein, it is true, despaired of achieving the linear order demanded by a printed book. 
But this does not imply that hypertext could have solved his problem. His desparation is the 
important feature: the fight against a spell cast upon his writing by the demands of books 
culture. He worried about the correct arrangement of his ideas, so much is obvious from the 
examples discussed above. One understanding of 'hypertext' is of segments of texts linked 
together in a more or less haphazard way, often without any single, controling authority. This 
meaning is certainly not applicable to Wittgenstein. He could have saved himself a lot of 
trouble had he been prepared to regard his writing as a kind of private web-space. A second 
understanding might be more appropriate. Hypertext can also refer to autonomous non-linear 
writing which transcends the obligatory step-by-step sequence of print-products by 
constructing a topological matrix without hierarchical order. Digitized texts are encoded as 
numbers and have to be re-established in a legible format. Visualization by a monitor is one 
step removed from the pages of a book and offers flexibility unmatched by their arrangement. 
Wittgenstein's famous metaphor of wandering through a philosophical landscape comes to 
mind. The Nachlass does, in fact, contain a number of tentative registers that could easily be 
implemented as a hypertext.17 
This is one side of Wittgenstein's struggle with conventional means of expressing thoughts. 
But his need for a different kind of complexity is offset by an equally important desire. In 
many places he insists on finding definitive answers. This motive, manifest in the Tractatus , 
is also present in Wittgenstein's later calls for 'Übersichtlichkeit' (surveyability) and well laid-
out description:
Wir wollen nicht das Regelsystem für die Verwendung unserer Worte in unerhörter Weise 
verfeinern oder vervollständigen. Denn die Klarheit, die wir anstreben, ist allerdings eine 
vollkommene. Aber das heißt nur, daß die philosophischen Probleme vollkommen verschwinden 
sollen. (PhU § 133)
In this context, the 'treatment' of philosophical problems is likened to therapeutical 
intervention and its ultimate aim is to put vexing thoughts to rest. Such an attitude cannot 
be easily reconciled with calls for open-ended auctorial multiplicity and the suspension of 
binding results. Wittgenstein's 'hypertext' avant la lettre arises from unsuccessful attempts at 
closure rather than from intentional design. It does not anticipate a more flexible medium 
which might alleviate the rigor of philosophical arguments. As the Nachlass material on 
toothaches shows, Wittgenstein did not simply reject the linear progression of thoughts in 
favor of a compilation of aphorisms. He actually proposes a solution - even though it does not 
satisfy him in the long run. Look at it this way: If he had been able to reach a satisfactory 
conclusion he would have put it into print. Hypertext, on the other hand, is by design non-
conclusive. Had Wittgenstein used hypertext, his characteristic struggle against premature 
closure would have been lost. Hypertext lacks the kind of physical inertia needed to make a 
sentence stick to a certain position and while Wittgenstein kept overturning pre-established 
patterns of thought and inferences he never abandoned his drive to return to 
straightforward, easily surveyable positions.
Wir sind aufs Glatteis geraten, wo die Reibung fehlt, also die Bedingungen in gewissem Sinn 
ideal sind, aber wir eben deshalb auch nicht gehen können. Wir wollen gehen; dann brauchen 
wir Reibung. Zurück auf den rauhen Boden. (PhU § 107)
Wittgenstein would, in all likelihood, have extended this complaint against free-floating 
philosophical speculation to l'art pour l'art hypertext.
To sum up and focus on the case at hand: Electronic texts are not just a kind of print; the 
graphical rendering of information on a monitor is no 'page' in any ordinary sense. It is 
tempting - and to some extent plausible - to distinguish Wittgenstein's writing from 
conventional philosophical authorship by employing jargon from media studies. Actually putting 
his Nachlass on a CD-ROM adds considerable complexity to the story. There is an important 
difference between a writer's decision to publish his or her work (in whatever format) and 
someone else administering a heritage. Nachlass publications, including electronic editions, are 
per definitionem second order closures. The flexibility of digitized texts is of another order as 
Wittgenstein's work in progress. How those papers are to be rendered on CD-ROMs is by no 
means self-evident. It is easy to pretend that the Bergen project is just an extension of well-
known editorial strategies. Such an attitude does, however, seriously underestimate the 
range of problems involved. All the conveniences set forth in the previous pages do not come 
for free. The change from books to computers is in itself an important theoretical and political 
issue. Putting Wittgenstein on disk demands a considerable number of decisions beyond the 
scope of printed editions. This is new territory, hardly even noticed as a philosophical issue 
amongst Wittgenstein scholars.
THE POLITICS OF DIGITAL TEXTS 
The Bergen electronic edition effaces its own novelty. Its structuring principle are the 
physical volumes of the Nachlass which are presented one after the other in linear sequence. 
The search facilities include easy access to single manuscripts or type-scripts. Facsimiles 
provide unprecedented opportunities to scrutinize Wittgenstein's actual output.The electronic 
edition might be argued to beat its print competitors at their own game. One apparent 
platitude is of utmost importance, though. Digitized texts need computers which need 
software which needs operating systems. In centuries of print culture we have become 
accustomed to the fact that once a book is published it is freely accessible to readers 
without further effort. Historical pictures of lockable books raise amused smiles. Yet, they are 
not a bad analogy to so-called digital books: in order to read them one needs additional 
devices, even 'keys'. Book publishing is a business charging once per item, regardless of its 
further use. But those products are, nowadays, revealed as just one interface to information. 
In many respects digital documents offer more convenient access to identical content. This 
surplus value has a price: a set of electronic equipment is inserted between the reader and 
her text. Once they have been published (and as long as they are in print) books are available 
without further decoding. As everyone who has to exchange files on the internet knows, this 
is far from true for electronic documents. Different computer platforms, different word 
processors and conflicting versions tend to produce confusions unheard of in former times.
The reason for this is that there are several competing standards to implement a mapping 
between alpha-numerical symbols and digital numbers. Strictly speaking only the basic letters, 
numerals and diacritical signs of the English alphabet are interchangeable on any platform. 
Different sets of characters, and in particular the elaborate additional code necessary to 
simulate printed pages on a monitor, demand special attention. International bodies are in 
charge of supervising the encoding of the world's languages. Software simulation of written 
material, however, obeys different rules. It is to a considerable extent a commercial affair and 
subject to the laws of economics. The result is, predictably, a considerable variety of 
proprietary software tools trying to get their share of the market by offering particularly 
comfortable - and mutually incompatible - features. This is the state of affairs confronting 
any digitization of texts. Two minimalistic approaches are either to scan existing pages or to 
stick to 7-bit ASCII code in transcribing them electronically. It is immediately obvious that 
neither of these options is satisfactory for a textual corpus of the degree of complexity of the 
Wittgenstein Nachlass. The editors were faced with a situation unprecedented in ordinary 
publishing. They had to decide upon a software package capable of producing the desired 
results, which also meant forcing that package upon the readers. Textual scholarship finds 
itself on unfamiliar terrain. The tools it needs to even access its subject matter are produced 
by big companies with only marginal interest in the academy.
The Bergen edition runs on the Windows platform (Windows 3.1, 3.11, Windows 95 and 
Windows NT4 according to the promotion sheet). For word-processing capacity it uses a 
program named 'FolioViews' which provides the usual services: cut and paste, printing, 
searching, window control, electronic bookmarks and back tracing. For scholars who habitually 
use the Microsoft range of products and do not worry about the ensuing dependency of their 
basic data on market competition these are excellent choices, even though some of its 
limitations will affect the ordinary user. The entire collection of normalized and diplomatic 
transcripts is put into a single binary file respectively. (The facsimiles are offered as single 
graphic documents, one per physical page.) Consequently, two huge electronic files contain 
the entire content of the Bergen edition in a completely opaque format. The user is allowed to 
read and manipulate texts via FolioViews but none of the structural information that has been 
presented in the first section of this paper is directly accessible to her. She can copy 
selected texts, paste and print them - but neither can she touch the indexing mechanism nor 
modify any of the underlying data. There is a strict separation between interface and non-
transparent, computational deep structure. Copyright considerations are a prominent reason 
for this arrangement: the content of a printed book cannot as easily be reproduced, 
manipulated and distributed as its digital counterpart. Provisions have to be taken to protect 
the investment put into such long-term projects. Media change unsettles venerable customs. 
The traditional understanding was that the result of scholarly work, most often financed by 
the taxpayer's money, are generally available in their entirety. This feature does, indeed, 
distinguish scholarship from commercially induced research. As teams of experts have to use 
proprietary software to reassure the copyright-holders and ensure the profit for the publishing 
house, this availability is restricted. But, it might be objected, where is the problem? 
Wittgenstein's writings are at one's disposal, all of them and in an extremely comfortable 
fashion. True enough, judged by the standards of the printed book. Yet, as was discussed in 
section two, Wittgenstein's Nachlass transcends the limits of such standards and an 
electronic edition might be better suited to capture those peculiarities. It might be organized 
so as to mirror Wittgenstein's editorial techniques, starting with single remarks as elementary 
building blocks and putting them together in a variety of ways, following Wittgenstein's lead. 
His working process, not its result, could be taken as the guiding principle. As a matter of fact 
the encapsulated FolioViews file is the very opposite of hypertext.18 Yet, the Bergen edition 
does not offer any tools to actually rearrange its content or redesign its appearance on the 
primary level. For all its flexibility and ease of use the Bergen edition is still in the conceptual 
grip of classical printed editions. Does it have to mimic the necessities of print culture?
The question turns on the issue of access to the internal, structural information hidden inside 
the binary files. Under present conditions one can find a particular paragraph and all of its 
subsequent instances as they appear in the later volumes. It is, however, impossible to break 
out of the straitjacket of the von Wright classification and deal with paragraphs as basic data 
units. If this were possible digital equivalences of Wittgenstein's notes could be freely 
assembled and re-assembled. As of now one is, for example, presented with manuscripts 105-
108 plus typescripts 208-209 plus manuscript 110 and has to extract relevant paragraphs for 
personal post-processing. A more appropriate way might be to pick out relevant paragraphs 
(e.g. on toothaches) and re-assemble them at bottom level, echoing the author's own 
procedure. It would be an attractive way to overcome the Nachlass effect of irrevocable 
closure. The internal dynamics of the Wittgenstein papers would be much more in evidence if 
a more open digital format had been chosen. Years of labor have been spent on the electronic 
transcription of the original documents. The records of the Wittgenstein archive do in fact 
contain all the information necessary for micrological analysis and multiple synthesis. The use 
of the CD-ROM, however, remains restricted to find, cut and paste with no provisions to 
address the editorial information from outside FolioViews. In order to visualize the conclusion 
on toothaches from the first section one might want to write a small program. It could not 
operate on the existing data structure which would have to be re-inscribed onto copies of 
segments extracted from the database.
This is the place to touch upon some basic issues in the theory and practice of text 
encoding. The discussion of the peculiar overlap between the requirements of digitization and 
commercial interests at the beginning of this section deliberately omitted an alternative 
possibility. Standard General Markup Language (SGML) is an attempt to avoid dependency on 
proprietary formats and irreconcilable software development with regard to electronic texts. 
The idea is, briefly, to supplement the alpha-numeric ciphers with additional (groups of) 
characters ('mark up') that serve the purpose of encoding meta-information by means of the 
available, restricted set of ASCII code. HTML, the language of the World Wide Web, in an 
instance of SGML. An easy example of mark up is the use (in HTML) of '<h1>' to indicate the 
beginning (and '</h1>' the end) of a top level heading. Such mark up indications do not in 
themselves cause any formatting to be done. (This distinguishes them from the binary code 
inserted into text files by common word processors.) Their function is to delineate the logical 
structure of the document and provide anchors to include additional content (like cross-
references, dates or hierarchical dependencies). A marked-up document can be read on any 
computer platform, the catch being that it needs software to render the mark-up as 
intended. This is a substantial difficulty given the fact that word processing has been much 
more popular with the general public. But consider a Web browser to get the general idea. 
Such browser are software which takes '<h1>Title</h1>' as an input and turns it (e.g.) into
                                                          TITLE
SGML (and its recent variant XML) offers a top-down solution to the problem of incompatible 
standards in text encoding and concurrent information storage.
The Bergen edition is based upon transcriptions of Wittgenstein's original pages into a mark up 
language using the 'Multi-Element Code System' (MECS). This system provides a meta-
grammar that can be implemented in particular instances of transcriptional grammar and is 
well suited to the task of capturing the complexities of Wittgenstein's autographs in a digital 
format. For technical reasons MECS is not entirely compatible with SGML. The thing to keep in 
mind is, however, that the Bergen transcriptions contain the entire set of editorial information 
in mark up format, i.e. in 'tags' that can be addressed in programming constructions. This 
information is filtered to produce the diplomatic and normalized versions offered on the CD-
ROMs. In customary, printed editions there is no possible gap between the pages on offer and 
their basic encoding. This does not carry over into the electronic realm where digital code has 
to be re-implemented in order to be perceptible. The need for secondary processing 
introduces a discrepancy which can be used to shield off operative background information 
from its surface rendition. Electronic documents offer spectacular improvements over many of 
the usual features of printed texts. Ironically, it is just because of their versatility that 
mechanisms to constrain their scope are feasible - and called for. The Bergen edition is just 
one example of a more comprehensive problem that is often overlooked in recent digitization 
campaigns. It is perfectly possible to combine global, digital distribution of information with 
highly selective, exclusive standards of its generation and transmission. While most people 
would be prepared to accept this for cable TV or DVD it should at least be a matter of 
concern in textual scholarship.
This is an area of conflict between claims of copyright holders and the scientific community. 
Broaching this issue is not intended to deflect attention from the impressive achievements of 
the Bergen electronic edition. Its presentation of the material is an epochal advance in 
Wittgenstein scholarship. It is, at the same time, a precursor of many electronic editions yet 
to be published and is apt to trigger a more general discussion on how similar scholarly 
editions might be designed. Disregarding, for the purpose of this conclusion, external 
constraints an optimum solution for (future) computer-savvy scholars would enable them to 
address their texts at any of the three levels that have to constitute a serious editorial 
project: the mark-up, diplomatic and normalized versions should all be manipulable to ensure 
optimum results. It is impossible for any single endeavor to adequately charter the wealth of 
variants and cross-relations in Wittgenstein's Nachlass. But if scholars were able to freely 
access the underlying mark up resources based on the canonical transcription could easily be 
enriched by resources taken from literal computing. As several commentators have pointed 
out, the recent 'Open Source' movement in software management echoes the concepts of 
free peer access and peer review well established within science. In the best case scenario 
source code, e.g. the mark-up version of Wittgenstein's texts, would be freely available. Book 
culture charges relatively little for relatively static texts. Expensive electronic editions offer 
advanced research tools, blocking collaboration based on their data structure. There will be 
an 'open source' Wittgenstein sometime this century.
Currently, a confusing variety of formats is used to tentatively provide comprehensive access 
in selected collections, mainly for corpora from earlier centuries. Projects like CELT, the 'Celtic 
Corpus of Electronic Texts'19and the 'Victorian Women Writer's Project'20 offer browsable 
HTML-front-ends, ftp download of marked-up documents and printable Postscript copies. TMI 
('Thesaurus Musicarum Italicarum')21 or 'The William Blake Archive'22 employ DynaWeb to 
translate SGML-coded files for use with common browsers. At the Wittgenstein archive's web-
site23 TS 201a 'Notes on Logic' and MS 115, 'Philosophische Bemerkungen' are available in 
different versions: HTML frames for concurrent inspection of the diplomatic and normalized 
text and for download in Postscript and Word Perfect format respectively. It remains unclear 
whether electronic publishing will develop standards as transparent as those of traditional 
literary culture. The technological advances we have been discussing are in fact instrumental 
in de-familiarizing earlier standards that have acquired second nature status. New 
opportunities arise, but there is still little institutional background and almost none of the hard 
questions have been answered. Meanwhile, from a philosophical point of view, the 
Wittgenstein papers raise an issue that cuts across old and new forms of writing. 
Wittgenstein's struggle against the linear progression of arguments should neither be 
remodeled as a peaceful exercise in hypertext, nor put to rest in an series of (printed or 
virtual) volumes. The driving force behind the Nachlass is a continuous effort to put together 
the pieces of a number of puzzles that seem to change as this activity unfolds. Nachlass 
means: this process has definitely ended. Digitization of the Nachlass offers an opportunity to 
breath life back into an accumulation of notes.
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THE CHANGED STATE OF WITTGENSTEIN SCHOLARSHIP 
Two independent publishing projects have thoroughly changed the state of Wittgenstein 
scholarship in recent years. Michael Nedo's 'Wiener Ausgabe'1 offers a traditional critical 
edition of Wittgenstein's philosophical writings ranging from 1929 up to and including the 'Big 
Typescript' (1933). Considering the eclectic and - at times - arbitrary editorial policy 
underlying previous publications from the Nachlass2 Nedo's project offers unprecedented 
philosophical rigor as well as textual criticism in volumes designed for comfortable reading. A 
second, more ambitious, attempt at a critical edition is the Bergen electronic edition.3 It is 
planned to include 4 CD-ROMs, covering the entire range of the philosopher's unpublished 
writing. Two disks are currently available, comprising all of Wittgenstein's manuscripts from 
1929-1939, as well as type-scripts, beginning with 'Notes on Logic' (1913) and leading up to 
Typescript 226, composed in 1939.
Wittgenstein's writings from the Thirties are, therefore, available in independent, reliable 
printed and electronic editions respectively. Readers can, for the first time, observe the 
philosopher at work, transferring paragraphs from pocket notebooks to handwritten 'volumes'; 
picking acceptable remarks to be included in type-scripts that are, at a later stage, cut up 
into slips of paper which are again annotated, rearranged and put together in further volumes 
and type-scripts. But this is only half the excitement. The 'Wiener Ausgabe' and the 'Bergen 
Edition' stake their success on different media, inevitably provoking a comparison between the 
well known features of printed scholarly editions and the not so familiar realm of digitized 
texts.
Some of the differences are immediately obvious. Scrutinizing philosophical texts on a printed 
page implies sensual qualities lacking in electronic space. Many readers will prefer a material 
sheet of paper over its virtual substitute. There are, on the other hand, definite advantages 
in digitally stored transcriptions. A CD-ROM does not occupy desk-space and allows almost 
instant access to every single remark of the extended Wittgenstein corpus. In addition to the 
actual texts, the 'Wiener Ausgabe' contains separate volumes of sophisticated registers, 
cross-referencing all the printed material. Considering the fact that the Bergen edition 
includes an excellent search function Nedo's tables are an anachronistic nicety at best. In a 
recent volume Nedo, in fact, announces a 'comprehensive electronic Apparatus, 
supplementing the Wiener Ausgabe'4. And there is simply no viable alternative to an electronic 
medium if one wants to present facsimiles of every page of the Nachlass, suitably linked to 
diplomatic and normalized versions of its content. These features make the Bergen edition a 
far more comprehensive enterprise. It seems that, pace  the predictable skepticism stemming 
from deeply ingrained scholarly habits, there is a convincing case in favor of switching to the 
digital format. The present paper will, at any rate, proceed from this assumption. But matters 
of technical convenience should not be allowed to decide the more profound issues arising 
from the competition of the media involved.
The accessibility of Wittgenstein's texts has been tremendously enhanced by putting them on 
CD-ROMs. If this were information like the listings in a telephone directory one could let the 
issue rest at this point. It might be confined to a discussion of the availability and design of 
necessary electronic interfaces. Philosophical production, and in particular Wittgenstein's 
literary remains, raise more interesting questions, though. Can conceptual content be neatly 
separated from its presentation in a given medium? Since its inception philosophy was done 
by teaching, in scholarly discourse, or by writing books/papers. What will be the impact of 
current digital technology on those traditional practices?5 
The preceding sketch has emphasized several characteristics of electronic texts that printed 
books cannot match. It does not follow that a given work actually demands - or even bears - 
digital treatment. Essential use of single pages, to mention a simple case, cannot easily be 
simulated electronically. The first section of this paper will, therefore, explore what might be 
called the textuality of Wittgenstein's Nachlass. Tracing the development of an important 
Wittgensteinian motive, this exploration surveys part of the newly available material, testing 
the suitability of computer-assisted scholarship to this particular collection of writings. Is 
there a general lesson to be learned from involving oneself in hands-on digital philology? As it 
turns out the Wittgenstein Nachlass provides an excellent occasion to reflect upon the range 
and limits of the Gutenberg heritage. This is discussed in section two. The concluding remarks 
focus on the Bergen edition. Given that digitization does not simply extend the established 
tool-set of textual scholarship but opens up new philosophical perspectives - how well does 
this particular enterprise support (and possibly inspire) a re-configuration of the philological 
status quo?
TOOTHACHES: PHILOLOGY 
The so-called 'private language' argument laid out in Philosophical Investigations §§ 243ff has 
been widely discussed in the literature. One of Wittgenstein's ways to introduce the problem 
is to argue for the incomprehensibility of naming pains in a strictly solipsistic setting. What are 
the circumstances enabling us to identify sensations? We have to participate in interpersonal 
activities expressing e.g. pain.
Wie wäre es, wenn die Menschen ihre Schmerzen nicht äußerten (nicht stöhnten, das Gesicht 
nicht verzögen etc.)? Dann könnte man einem Kind nicht den Gebrauch des Wortes 
'Zahnschmerzen' beibringen. (PhU § 257)
The fleeting reference to toothaches here does not carry conceptual weight in the context of 
the Investigations. But, surprisingly enough, Wittgenstein's earliest treatment of the issues 
that were to lead to his private language argument centers around this very sensation. There 
are at least three methods available to reach the present conclusion. By juxtaposing them we 
get a first glimpse at the possible scope of computer-assisted textual criticism. 
(1) Five volumes of the Wiener Ausgabe have hitherto been published, comprising - in appr. 
1300 pages - Wittgenstein's manuscripts from the time when he took up philosophy again, 
ending his self-imposed moratorium subsequent to the completion of the Tractatus . These 
manuscripts contain, in chronological order, Wittgenstein's discussions of a wide range of 
issues. In essence they are philosophical diaries, freely switching between different matters 
of interest, developing threads of thought up to a certain point, interrupting and returning at 
a later date. One might read through all of this material and pick out remarks concerning 
toothaches. The term appears for the first time on Nov. 19, 1929: 'Warum nenne ich 
Zahnschmerzen ' meine Zahnschmerzen' ?' (MS 107, 199; WA 2, 1146). Wittgenstein then 
develops this motive from different angles up to Dec. 14, 1929 (MS 108, 8f; WA 2,136) and 
returns to discuss it in a loose sequence of remarks from Jan. 31, 1930 (MS 107, 270; WA 2, 
186) to Feb. 7, 1930 (MS 107, 288; WA 2, 196). All of those entries are intermingled with 
reflections on many different topics: probability, theory of measurement, Euclidean geometry, 
realism et.al.. No guiding principle is discernible. Wittgenstein is following his own idiosyncratic 
lines of thought that often consist of digressions, retractions and cognitive jumps. It is not 
impossible, but exceedingly hard, to recognize the making of the private language argument in 
those scattered aphorisms. This should not come as a surprise since, after all, the 
manuscripts are Wittgenstein's philosophical workshop. Philological attention is often informed 
by prior knowledge of the results of such incipient processes.
In the light of Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy the first approach does, anyway, make 
little sense. Examining his manuscripts he picked a number of remarks for dictation. Copies of 
the resulting type-scripts were consequently cut into slips of paper and rearranged according 
to rules that seem to be revised within the organizing process itself. This procedure can be 
appropriately illustrated by tracking the course of Wittgenstein's notes on toothaches. 
Typescript 208, which is an extract from manuscripts 105-108, is only partially preserved.7 As 
far as toothaches are concerned, only the paragraphs dating from Dec. 14, 1929 can be 
found in this compilation. Alois Pichler has reconstructed the likely shape of TS 208. According 
to his conjecture most of the material on toothaches was contained in the missing pages 1-
1448. It reappears, completely rearranged, in TS 209, which is the text source for 
Philosophische Bemerkungen, edited by Rush Rees and published in 1964. Wittgenstein's 
original typescript shows no classifications whatsoever. At first inspection it is simply a very 
long sequence of paragraphs. Rush Rees divided the script into sections and invented groups 
of paragraphs which he numbered according to an undocumented, inscrutable scheme. A 
collection of Wittgenstein's reflections on toothaches happens to make up section VI of 
Philosophische Bemerkungen. This is a promising place to look for the conceptual genesis of 
his later views on mental states, sensations and language.
While all sections of Philosophische Bemerkungen are the invention of Rush Rees it is, 
nevertheless, also true that it was Wittgenstein who assembles the pieces into one particular 
order, thus emphazising his interest in an analysis of how first-person talk determines our 
understanding of pain. These notes have been available for a long time and attentive readers 
have doubtlessly noticed connections between them and later discussions of similar issues. 
This material was, however, entirely separated from its context of origin, a stand-alone 
compilation of philosophical insights. There is nothing per se wrong with restricting oneself to 
this state of affairs. It can very well serve as a starting point for enquiries like the present 
essay. Yet, the recent publications from the Nachlass have opened up a range of exiting 
possibilities. What used to be philologically opaque collections of Wittgensteinian ideas can 
now be disassembled and regarded as intermediate results of an ongoing process of creative 
writing and revision. It has become feasible not only to identify the building blocks of 
Wittgenstein's more elaborate editorial arrangements but - what is more important - to 
actually observe his philosophical labor, i.e. the decision process leading from day-to-day 
notes towards (as he envisaged it) eventual publication of his thoughts.
(2) Conventional methodology offers indices and synopses to assist such an enterprise. Both 
are provided by the Wiener Ausgabe, suggesting a second approach to access the 
Wittgensteinian corpus. 'Toothache' is an index entry; it can be looked up and the resulting 
items can in turn be traced through the Wittgenstein papers. Wiener Ausgabe - Apparatus, 
Register zu den Bänden 1-5 consists entirely of tables correlating every single paragraph from 
the manuscripts to its subsequent occurances in these volumes and (more commonly) to its 
location within the Philosophische Bemerkungen or Philosophische Grammatik. On Nov. 29, 
1929 Wittgenstein noted:
Von Sinnesdaten in dem Sinne des Wortes in dem es undenkbar ist daß der Andere sie hat, 
kann man eben aus diesem Grunde auch nicht sagen, daß der Andere sie nicht hat. Und aus 
ebendiesem Grunde ist es sinnlos zu sagen, daß  ich im Gegensatz zum Anderen sie habe. (MS 
107, 215f; WA 2, 124)
As the synopsis shows this remark was included in TS 209 (aka Philosophische Bemerkungen) 
presumably in mid-19309 as entry VI, 61 and taken up again on Jun. 1, 1932, when 
Wittgenstein started a revision of his earlier ideas on the topic. Investigating this kind of 
dependency is standard procedure in textual criticism. Until very recently this had to be done 
by consulting printed synopses. It seems fair to say that there is very little sense in carrying 
on the old way, if the advance of digital technologies is taken into account.
The point is not just that it is quite cumbersome to work with multiple versions of basically 
the same paragraph located in different places in various bound volumes. This impediment 
could be alleviated by liberal use of the xerox machine. Printed synopses of material as 
complex as Wittgenstein's Nachlass face a more serious problem. It seems next to impossible 
to combine indexing and synopsis. The reader is presented with either a list of significant 
terms or a table of correlations of textual segments. She cannot simultaneously look for the 
occurance of a word and the history of rearrangements of the paragraph it is included in. No 
one would finance a series of books (or care to use them) containing the astronomical number 
of relations between index entries and changes of contexts in gory detail. Consider the remark 
quoted above. Instinctively one would at least consider the terms 'Sinnesdaten', 'Sinn', 'Wort', 
'der Andere', 'Grund', 'sinnlos' and 'Gegensatz'.10 The quote considered here does not even 
contain the term 'Zahnschmerzen' which is, at this point, Wittgenstein's guiding paradigm. 
Imagine all those terms put into correlation with all the changes of their occurrences 
elsewhere in the Nachlass. The ensuing combinatorial explosion effectively prevents putting 
the result on paper. In the present case one cannot have a general, usable, semantics-to-
(section)-numbers and (section)-numbers-to-(section-)numbers mapping, one on top of the 
other, in a print medium.
(3) It is easily done if the texts have been properly digitized. Since words are encoded by 
numbers it is quite simple to set up an index and it takes just another couple of numbers to 
represent the trace of 'words' to and from given contexts. Much of this can be done 
automatically; there is no need to actually visualize the necessary relational apparatus. If a 
correlation seems interesting it can be called up at will, with no time lost for browsing, 
copying or shuffling around papers. Searching for 'Zahnschmerzen' in the Bergen edition 
immediately yields 138 hits across the entire collection. The search can be restricted to 
particular (groups of) volumes and modified to include co-occurring or proximate terms as well 
as dates. A query for 'Sinnesdaten and Zahnschmerzen' produces as a result precisely three 
common occurances. First is a paragraph from MS 114 (MS 114, 16; WA 5, 179) into which 
Wittgenstein had assimilated separate earlier notes, followed by its typescript derivatives in 
TS 211, 755 and TS 213, 510 (Big Typescript). The quote previously presented (MS 107, 
215f; WA 2, 124), lacking the term 'Zahnschmerzen', is picked out among the 30 hits returned 
by querying 'Sinnesdaten'. It occurs in a stand-alone paragraph in TS 209, 23 (PhB VI, 61) 
and is flagged accordingly. In other words: a couple of straightforward enquiries lead directly 
to an important juncture in Wittgenstein's investigation of the logic of talk about sense 
impressions and toothaches in particular.
But wait. There is something suspicious about the last sentence. Manipulation of the index 
mechanism per se cannot produce important results. The disappearance of manifest meaning 
is, in fact, the price to pay for enhanced electronic facilities. One can easily pick any 
combination of terms and search constraints - but there is no guarantee whatsoever that this 
will lead to an interesting result. So where does 'importance' come in? This is a category of 
reflective assessment, crucially different from automated procedures. The discrepancy is at 
the center of any discussion about computer-assisted philology. A certain amount of cheating 
is necessary to reach the comfortable conclusion presented in the previous paragraph. 
Criteria enabling one to judge upon the importance of algorithmic procedures have to be 
presupposed in order for such procedures to be of any help. To put it very simply: elaborate 
tools are of little help without knowledge of their proper use. One has to have a hunch about 
the possible significance of a term to profitably employ the electronic search function. The 
non-sequitur above may serve as a reminder to first-generation digital scholars. It is easy to 
fall into the trap of overestimating technology. None of the powerful programming at work 
below the WYSIWYG-surface guarantees philosophical content. 
The difficulty, consequently, is the following one: How can technological advancements in 
textual criticism be constrained by a sense of proportion relating to a prior understanding of 
the subject matter. This type of question is well-known and often discussed between 
technophiles and technophobes. The present paper is a case study, trying to answer the 
question for one particular instance of the general problem. But we have not yet assembled 
the necessary evidence. It remains quite unclear why a philosopher should worry about 
toothaches. A powerful mechanism has been sketched, yet it is fair to assume that 
Wittgenstein scholars go about their business projecting hypotheses to understand the 
complexities of the Nachlass quite independently. The above account does not include a 
reason for using the mechanism. Providing such reasons is itself a philosophical activity. This 
section has offered a rough overview of the itinerary of some sample paragraphs. One has to 
explore their content and in particular the conceptual significance of their itinerary in order to 
get the full picture. A satisfactory answer to the issue at stake between digital technology 
and its critics has to appeal to philosophy in action.
TOOTHACHES: PHILOSOPHY 
Wittgenstein's first entry into manuscript 107 refers back to the Tractatus . There he had 
claimed: 'Das denkende, vorstellende, Subjekt gibt es nicht.' (5.631) And he had explained 
this dictum by pointing to the visual field: 'nichts am Gesichtsfeld läßt darauf schließen, daß 
es von einem Auge gesehen wird.' ( Tractatus  5.633). Compare MS 107, 1 (WA 2,3): 'Der 
Gesichtsraum so wie er ist hat seine selbständige Realität. Er selbst enthält kein Subjekt. Er 
ist autonom.' In 1929 Wittgenstein's anti-intentionalism is still in place, but his views on 
atomic sentences begin to change. The basic units of his epistemological account are not 
single sentences any more: 'Ich lege nicht den Satz als Maßstab an die Wirklichkeit an 
sondern das System von Sätzen.' (MS 107, 35; WA 2, 149) The logic of color terms has, as 
Wittgenstein discovered, to take account of the field of possibilities given by the spectrum. 
Atomic sentences cannot be independent of each other since 'This plate is blue' logically 
implies - among many other propositions - that it is not red. Yet, this is not a tautology. 
Given the visual field and the customary color space one has a priori knowledge of the 
structural dependencies of possible colors. To look for any actual one necessarily includes 
mastery of a presupposed color scheme. 'Wie es einen Sinn hat zu sagen die Farbe R ist am 
Ort P wenn ich überhaupt den Gesichtsraum mit dem Farbraum "vor mir" habe.' (MS 107, 158; 
WA 2, 92) Wittgenstein's quotes indicate that he is still officially unwilling to grant the 
existence of a subject. But it is interesting to take a closer look at his day's work (Oct. 10, 
1929).
The point of reference of the previous quote ('Wie es einen Sinn hat ...') are stomach aches. 
Wittgenstein is discussing the meaning of negation. How can one truthfully deny the presence 
of stomach aches? Such sentences seem to lack external sensual corroboration. They cannot 
be constructed as somehow linking stomachs and pains either. 'Es ist nur wesentlich, daß ich 
den Raum vor mir habe in dem der Magen liegt und den worin die Schmerzen liegen.' (MS 107, 
157; WA 2, 92) Like colors within the visual field pains are a kind of sensation constitutivly 
associated with stomachs. This seems an unobjectionable parallel - with a twist. We have 
noted Wittgenstein's avoidance of the common notion of a subject in his discussion of the 
visual field. This strategy cannot, however, be carried over to the case of 'internal' 
sensations. There is nothing comparable to the geometry of shared, public, visible spaces in 
the realm of our intestines. If you remove the subject from stomach aches not even the 
illusion of a legitimate issue remains. Switching from the visual field to internal sensations, 
Wittgenstein's doctrine of the subject is severely shaken. He cannot but employ the first 
person pronoun in these contexts, even though his commitment is to exclude it from the 
scientific vocabulary. Such is the dilemma apparent in his first remark on toothaches: 'Warum 
nenne ich Zahnschmerzen " meine Zahnschmerzen" '? (MS 107, 199; WA 2, 114)
Wittgenstein does not follow any pre-set agenda that could lead to a systematic 
investigation of various modalities of the senses. His move from vision to stomach aches to 
tooth aches is obviously not aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive view. Ten 
days after raising the issue of toothaches being my toothaches Wittgenstein comes up with 
the brilliant aphorism quoted above. The private language argument is, in nuce, contained in 
two extremely compact sentences (MS 107, 215f; WA 2, 124). If another person cannot be 
said to be the subject of my internal sense data it is meaningless to deny her those very 
sense data. Their possible occurrences do not include this kind of bearer. Alas, this is no 
comfort for anyone tempted to regard awareness of one's own intentional states as privileged 
knowledge. There is no force in such pronouncements. I cannot determine something uniquely 
subjective in appealing to an incomprehensible option, i.e. another person's having my internal 
states. The Tractatus  view of the subject was of a metaphysical entity, a border of the 
World, not part of it ( Tractatus 5.641). The early post-Tractarian manuscripts are gradually 
abandoning this dualism, conceding a role for first-person talk. Yet, most of the original 
skepticism remains. How can one conceive of a role for 'private' sensations and avoid 
idealism?
Such questions are external to Wittgenstein's writing in the manuscripts. The present sketch 
puts emphasis on only a small number of issues discussed within those volumes. The general 
line of argument is, however, supported by Wittgenstein's own subsequent selective rewriting 
of the material. When he cut up TS 208 to rearrange its content into what is now known as 
the Philosophische Bemerkungen, one of his points of emphasis was toothaches. His 
discussion of logical features of talk about the subject centers around a selection of remarks 
devoted to the remarkable fact of me - Ludwig Wittgenstein - having toothaches (cf. PhB VI, 
58). This revision introduces complexity of a higher order. Many of Wittgenstein's paragraphs 
are initially small, self-contained philosophical analyses. The next auctorial step is to try and 
put them together so that some larger, overarching connection is established. Philosophische 
Bemerkungen VI does, in fact, offer extremely dense philosophical substance, much too 
involved to be discussed here. Just an outline of Wittgenstein's strategy of using his 
arrangements as arguments can be given.
A first group of remarks, serving as a kind of prolegomenon, is derived from entries for Dec. 
14, 1929 and Oct. 11, 1929, expounding the general direction of the succeeding paragraphs. 
The use of the first person pronoun is fraught with difficulties, particularly if talk about 
perception is modelled according to external circumstances. 'I am experiencing a red patch' is 
quoted as a case in point. To analyze the difficulties one might re-write the puzzling 
descriptions, substituting some un-objectionable term for the offensive 'I'. This exercise is 
next. Remarkably, Wittgenstein switches from sense impressions to internal sensation again, 
as he designs a language game supposed to exhibit the same logical multiplicity as the 
common idiom and yet to avoid mention of a subject. His idea is to externalize the privileged 
position of subjectivity by designating one particular person as an universal point of 
reference. If 'I am' Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'I have toothaches' becomes 'There are toothaches' 
and 'A has toothaches' can be rephrased as 'A behaves like Ludwig Wittgenstein when there 
are toothaches'. (PhBemerkungen VI, 58). The apparent uniqueness of subjective experience 
is transformed into a qualitative difference in public discourse; the mysterious realm of 
subjectivity replaced by an idiom of matching complexity: everyone can take center stage in 
this language. Once this focus is set the remaining moves of the language game are 
equivalent to the traditional one. Wittgenstein offers a playful simile. The logic of first-person 
talk recalls oriental despotism, with the subject taking the place of the despot in providing 
the origin of the communicative coordinate system.
The point is that talk about sensations is inevitably dualistic. 'The subject' - as well as an 
oriental despot - is supposed to fall outside ordinary discourse directed towards physical 
things. If Timur Lenk's state of health is taken as the measuring device of health-talk it makes 
no sense to ask whether he has toothaches. In the event, toothaches simply are among his 
personal states and having toothaches is a condition derived from this primordial condition. 
Even though Wittgenstein has thus eliminated first-person talk the Tractarian criterion of 
meaning fails, however. It is impossible to attribute possession of toothaches or lack thereof 
to a suitably designated individuum. (The discussion prefigures later reflections on the Paris 
ur-meter.) After this setting of the stage Wittgenstein embarks on a series of grammatical 
investigations, exploring the comprehensibility of our dualistic idiom. There is no obvious way 
to stratify his dialectical dialogues into a single argument. 'I cannot feel your toothaches.' 
Does this sentence express an empirical truth or rather a kind of logical necessity 
Wittgenstein had not provided for in his Tractatus? (cf. PhB VI, 61) Rather than answering 
questions like this, Wittgenstein keeps changing his focus and his examples, circling around 
the issues. What is he up to? To a casual reader it looks like an open-ended, aporetic 
elenchus. But Wittgenstein, surprisingly, and without so much as minimal warning, does 
actually close his argument by the strategic placement of one paragraph.
Wittgenstein's transposition of first person talk was anchored in the neutral statement: 'There 
are toothaches'. The following quote is an obvious echo, concluding the argument:
Das Phänomen des Schmerzgefühls in einem Zahn, welches ich kenne, ist in der 
Ausdrucksweise der gewöhnlichen Sprache dargestellt durch ' ich habe in dem und dem Zahn 
Schmerzen'. Nicht durch einen Ausdruck von der Art, 'an diesem Ort ist ein Schmerzgefühl'. 
(PhB VI, 66)
As it turns out, it is impossible to capture the subjectivist intuitions in Wittgenstein's 
alternative scheme. There cannot be pains outside of consciousness. Designating a physical 
body to be the paradigmatic bearer of pain is no better than ascribing pain to some tooth put 
on a table ( Philosophische Bermerkungen VI, 65). Timur Lenk is, inevitably, located in public 
space, so we are back to Wittgenstein's initial reminder: the problem arises because physical 
circumstances are inappropriately projected onto another context.
Das ganze Feld dieser Erfahrung wird in dieser Sprache durch Ausdrücke von der Form 'ich 
habe ...' beschrieben. Die Sätze von der Form 'N hat Zahnschmerzen' sind für ein ganz 
anderes Feld reserviert. (PhB VI, 66) 
In other words: Wittgenstein advises himself to desist from trying to battle ordinary language. 
He is quite aware of the tension: In order to unravel the philosophical knot one has to re-
trace the complicated movements underlying it. Thus ends the second take on toothaches. 
Resting content with the ordinary was, however, always a temporary affair for Wittgenstein. 
In 1932 we find him returning to the very issues he had supposedly resolved in MS 110, 30ff 
(WA5, 179ff). These are the quotes remarked upon earlier in this paper: Wittgenstein's 
second, condensing revision of the material on toothaches.
This third stratum of the textual evidence and its further development will not be pursued 
here. The sole purpose of the preceding intermezzo was to redress the balance between the 
digital toolkit and topics in established Wittgenstein scholarship. The problem was to mediate 
between proponents of largely syntactic manipulation of linguistic data and traditional 
approaches that turn to texts with a prior understanding of their subject matter. The way to 
escape a stand-off is to refuse the contra-position from the very start. Semantic data-
mining11 as exemplified by the previous sub-section, is simultaneously an exercise in digital 
philology and philosophy. Wittgenstein's Nachlass is an excellent place to look for such a 
synthesis because the author's ideas are, to a large extent, expressed by arranging and 
rearranging small textual units. Tracking the dynamics of Wittgenstein's philosophical 
variations can, admittedly, be done in the conventional framework of a printed edition of his 
manuscripts and type-scripts. Computer-assisted procedures do, however, push philology 
towards horizons previously out of reach. To repeat: No collection of printed volumes can 
conceivably present any synopsis of any terms, occurring at arbitrary dates, in just a few 
seconds. Such opportunities are bound to have a major impact on future Wittgenstein 
scholarship. This concludes the philological assessment of conventional versus digital 
approaches to the Wittgenstein papers. A more detached attitude has already been hinted 
at. It seems that Wittgenstein's writing is particularly well suited to a post-Gutenberg 
environment. In order to get the full picture regarding the Bergen edition we have to take a 
closer look at Wittgenstein's failure to turn his writings into a book.
BEYOND BOOKS 
J.C. Nyíri has made a strong case for considering the Wittgenstein Nachlass in the light of 
recent media philosophy. Quoting Walter Ong and Erich Havelock he reminds his readers of the 
prospect that the age of literacy might be giving way to a period of secondary orality, with 
the spoken word regaining the most influential position in a broadcast society. According to 
Nyíri's suggestion Wittgenstein's failure to distinguish between the written and the spoken 
word might explain his 'ultimate inability to complete the "book" he always wanted to 
complete'12. The ductus of his writings is, indeed, more akin to on-going conversations than 
to neatly delineated propositions. Did Wittgenstein miss the adequate medium for his 
exertions? Nyíri draws attention to the fact that his writing is, in certain places, a direct 
rejoinder to the Socratic dialogues. 'Ich finde bei Plato auf eine Frage wie 'was ist Erkenntnis' 
nicht die vorläufige Antwort: Sehen wir einmal nach, wie dieses Wort gebraucht wird.' (TS 
211, 17) Wittgenstein's inverse Socratic role consists in dissolving platonic confidence in 
essences and is, therefore, ill suited to be put into a classical philosophical treatise. As Nyíri 
(following Havelock) rightly reminds us, Platonic ideas are inextricably connected to the rise of 
literacy over an oral tradition which lacked expressive means for a proper treatment of 
abstract terms. Yet, Wittgenstein could have rested content with his actual teaching, leaving 
it to his disciples to provide written records. He did not do so, but rather forced himself, 
against better knowledge, to conform to the given standard.
Wenn ich für mich denke ohne ein Buch schreiben zu wollen, so springe ich um das Thema 
herum; das ist die einzige mir natürliche Denkweise. In einer Reihe gezwungen fortzudenken ist 
mir eine Qual. Soll ich es nun überhaupt probieren? Ich verschwende unsägliche Mühe auf ein 
Anordnen der Gedanken, das vielleicht gar keinen Wert hat. (MS 118, 185)
The key word is 'vielleicht' indicating Wittgenstein's ambivalent ambitions to write a book. His 
difficulties are methodologically profound. One way to bring this into focus is to position them 
at the crossroads between books and hypertext.
Decades of Wittgenstein scholarship have been shaped by editorial decisions made by the 
trustees of the Nachlass. Their general policy was to present provisional steps in 
Wittgenstein's ongoing process of revision as standalone volumes, often effacing the 
dynamics demonstrated in the preceding section. David Stern, in his perceptive paper, 
correctly describes the state of affairs.
The Wittgenstein Nachlass is not a haphazard pile of working papers that happened to survive 
his death, nor is it a collection of works that only awaited publication. While it is both a 
carefully selected and highly structured record of his life's work, a collection of material that 
he deliberately assembled and left to posterity, it is also the record of a writer continually in 
flux, never entirely satisfied with anything he had written.13  
In view of this situation it actually seems a little unfair to reapproach the editors of 
Wittgenstein's posthumous writing. There is no good way to capture the activity vividly 
described by Stern into the confines of a printed volume. Despite outward appearances there 
are no 'works of Wittgenstein' that could confidently be taken as points of departure. Even 
the Philosophische Untersuchungen are, as Stern observes, 'only one of a number of possible 
arrangements Wittgenstein proposed, many of which extend, amplify, or cast light on the 
remarks in the published book.'14 References to current models of textual interdependency 
become almost irresistible at this point. 'Because the Wittgenstein Nachlass is the result of 
such an extensive act of rewriting, it is less a collection of texts than a hypertext, an 
interconnected network of remarks.'15 Stern's remarks certainly point into the right direction. 
Still, there are some intermediary steps between the range of options available to 
Wittgenstein and writing that is embedded in digital technology. Those steps have to be 
spelled out if one wants to get a grasp on how the CD-ROM edition might change out habits 
of scholarship based on self-contained books. 
One feature of a culture based on books deserves special attention as this culture is 
challenged by the advent of digital, globally distributed information. Books are marked by the 
coincidence of two seperate decisions: their content and its appearance are determined 
simultaneously. This is what publication of a book, in effect, amounts to - and it throws some 
light on Wittgenstein's qualms. He felt unable to decide on one shape for his ideas. 
Publication, throughout European history, simply meant drawing a line between a creative 
process and its (albeit provisional) results. Sending a manuscript to the publisher was to 
distinguish a line between sketches, preliminary attempts, experimental drafts and an entity 
exhibiting both the features of the most prestigious information technology and of auctorial 
closure. Books divided the lifetime of an author into continuous activity and singular results, 
texts that, from a certain moment in time, assume a life of their own. This arrangement is 
being thoroughly shaken by the advent of new media. First of all, digital encoding disrupts the 
familiar coordination between form and content. Characters are mapped into numbers that 
are, in turn, symbolized in an electronic format unsuitable for direct perception. And this 
transposition, secondly, triggers dramatic changes in the nature of publicity. Electronic texts 
can instantly be published to a world audience and still be constantly revised.
In the given context it is particularly instructive to notice the implication for posthumous 
'works'. In the world of books a Nachlass is defined as all the material an author did not 
manage or see fit to get printed. Its peculiar character is that future generations retro-
activly elevate such writing to the status of books. If books published by an author are what 
software developers call a 'feature-freeze', publications from a Nachlass are based on 
decisions to overrule such limitations. There is no way to escape the allure of 'works' in book 
culture. In Nachlass-publications auxiliary authors assume responsibility to supplement a 
writer's oeuvre with 'second order' books. Applying this to the case at hand yields a 
suggestive prospect. While the trustees failed to do justice to Wittgenstein's open-ended, 
conversations philosophical style, a digital edition of the Nachlass is much better suited to 
achieve this aim. Such an enterprise is not forced to turn a collection of tentative designs 
into bound volumes. The 'Wiener Ausgabe' seems set to publish the largely repetetive material 
from 1929-1933 in 12 weighty volumes. Michael Nedo sounds apologetic in defending this 
expenditure:
... the book is still the carrier of thoughts, of written heritage in our culture, and familiarity 
with this medium certainly affects not only one's dealings with the texts themselves, but also 
the accompanying Apparatuses.16  
One does not have to subscribe to deconstruction to find this eulogy anachronistic. The 
transitory character of Wittgenstein's writing, its complex genealogy and its numerous 
recapitulations seem to call for a digital format of presentation which matches its inherent 
temporality by avoiding ultimate editorial decisions and allowing easy manipulation of the 
textual material.
Impressions like these, convincing as they may sound - once again - overstress technology. 
Wittgenstein, it is true, despaired of achieving the linear order demanded by a printed book. 
But this does not imply that hypertext could have solved his problem. His desparation is the 
important feature: the fight against a spell cast upon his writing by the demands of books 
culture. He worried about the correct arrangement of his ideas, so much is obvious from the 
examples discussed above. One understanding of 'hypertext' is of segments of texts linked 
together in a more or less haphazard way, often without any single, controling authority. This 
meaning is certainly not applicable to Wittgenstein. He could have saved himself a lot of 
trouble had he been prepared to regard his writing as a kind of private web-space. A second 
understanding might be more appropriate. Hypertext can also refer to autonomous non-linear 
writing which transcends the obligatory step-by-step sequence of print-products by 
constructing a topological matrix without hierarchical order. Digitized texts are encoded as 
numbers and have to be re-established in a legible format. Visualization by a monitor is one 
step removed from the pages of a book and offers flexibility unmatched by their arrangement. 
Wittgenstein's famous metaphor of wandering through a philosophical landscape comes to 
mind. The Nachlass does, in fact, contain a number of tentative registers that could easily be 
implemented as a hypertext.17 
This is one side of Wittgenstein's struggle with conventional means of expressing thoughts. 
But his need for a different kind of complexity is offset by an equally important desire. In 
many places he insists on finding definitive answers. This motive, manifest in the Tractatus , 
is also present in Wittgenstein's later calls for 'Übersichtlichkeit' (surveyability) and well laid-
out description:
Wir wollen nicht das Regelsystem für die Verwendung unserer Worte in unerhörter Weise 
verfeinern oder vervollständigen. Denn die Klarheit, die wir anstreben, ist allerdings eine 
vollkommene. Aber das heißt nur, daß die philosophischen Probleme vollkommen verschwinden 
sollen. (PhU § 133)
In this context, the 'treatment' of philosophical problems is likened to therapeutical 
intervention and its ultimate aim is to put vexing thoughts to rest. Such an attitude cannot 
be easily reconciled with calls for open-ended auctorial multiplicity and the suspension of 
binding results. Wittgenstein's 'hypertext' avant la lettre arises from unsuccessful attempts at 
closure rather than from intentional design. It does not anticipate a more flexible medium 
which might alleviate the rigor of philosophical arguments. As the Nachlass material on 
toothaches shows, Wittgenstein did not simply reject the linear progression of thoughts in 
favor of a compilation of aphorisms. He actually proposes a solution - even though it does not 
satisfy him in the long run. Look at it this way: If he had been able to reach a satisfactory 
conclusion he would have put it into print. Hypertext, on the other hand, is by design non-
conclusive. Had Wittgenstein used hypertext, his characteristic struggle against premature 
closure would have been lost. Hypertext lacks the kind of physical inertia needed to make a 
sentence stick to a certain position and while Wittgenstein kept overturning pre-established 
patterns of thought and inferences he never abandoned his drive to return to 
straightforward, easily surveyable positions.
Wir sind aufs Glatteis geraten, wo die Reibung fehlt, also die Bedingungen in gewissem Sinn 
ideal sind, aber wir eben deshalb auch nicht gehen können. Wir wollen gehen; dann brauchen 
wir Reibung. Zurück auf den rauhen Boden. (PhU § 107)
Wittgenstein would, in all likelihood, have extended this complaint against free-floating 
philosophical speculation to l'art pour l'art hypertext.
To sum up and focus on the case at hand: Electronic texts are not just a kind of print; the 
graphical rendering of information on a monitor is no 'page' in any ordinary sense. It is 
tempting - and to some extent plausible - to distinguish Wittgenstein's writing from 
conventional philosophical authorship by employing jargon from media studies. Actually putting 
his Nachlass on a CD-ROM adds considerable complexity to the story. There is an important 
difference between a writer's decision to publish his or her work (in whatever format) and 
someone else administering a heritage. Nachlass publications, including electronic editions, are 
per definitionem second order closures. The flexibility of digitized texts is of another order as 
Wittgenstein's work in progress. How those papers are to be rendered on CD-ROMs is by no 
means self-evident. It is easy to pretend that the Bergen project is just an extension of well-
known editorial strategies. Such an attitude does, however, seriously underestimate the 
range of problems involved. All the conveniences set forth in the previous pages do not come 
for free. The change from books to computers is in itself an important theoretical and political 
issue. Putting Wittgenstein on disk demands a considerable number of decisions beyond the 
scope of printed editions. This is new territory, hardly even noticed as a philosophical issue 
amongst Wittgenstein scholars.
THE POLITICS OF DIGITAL TEXTS 
The Bergen electronic edition effaces its own novelty. Its structuring principle are the 
physical volumes of the Nachlass which are presented one after the other in linear sequence. 
The search facilities include easy access to single manuscripts or type-scripts. Facsimiles 
provide unprecedented opportunities to scrutinize Wittgenstein's actual output.The electronic 
edition might be argued to beat its print competitors at their own game. One apparent 
platitude is of utmost importance, though. Digitized texts need computers which need 
software which needs operating systems. In centuries of print culture we have become 
accustomed to the fact that once a book is published it is freely accessible to readers 
without further effort. Historical pictures of lockable books raise amused smiles. Yet, they are 
not a bad analogy to so-called digital books: in order to read them one needs additional 
devices, even 'keys'. Book publishing is a business charging once per item, regardless of its 
further use. But those products are, nowadays, revealed as just one interface to information. 
In many respects digital documents offer more convenient access to identical content. This 
surplus value has a price: a set of electronic equipment is inserted between the reader and 
her text. Once they have been published (and as long as they are in print) books are available 
without further decoding. As everyone who has to exchange files on the internet knows, this 
is far from true for electronic documents. Different computer platforms, different word 
processors and conflicting versions tend to produce confusions unheard of in former times.
The reason for this is that there are several competing standards to implement a mapping 
between alpha-numerical symbols and digital numbers. Strictly speaking only the basic letters, 
numerals and diacritical signs of the English alphabet are interchangeable on any platform. 
Different sets of characters, and in particular the elaborate additional code necessary to 
simulate printed pages on a monitor, demand special attention. International bodies are in 
charge of supervising the encoding of the world's languages. Software simulation of written 
material, however, obeys different rules. It is to a considerable extent a commercial affair and 
subject to the laws of economics. The result is, predictably, a considerable variety of 
proprietary software tools trying to get their share of the market by offering particularly 
comfortable - and mutually incompatible - features. This is the state of affairs confronting 
any digitization of texts. Two minimalistic approaches are either to scan existing pages or to 
stick to 7-bit ASCII code in transcribing them electronically. It is immediately obvious that 
neither of these options is satisfactory for a textual corpus of the degree of complexity of the 
Wittgenstein Nachlass. The editors were faced with a situation unprecedented in ordinary 
publishing. They had to decide upon a software package capable of producing the desired 
results, which also meant forcing that package upon the readers. Textual scholarship finds 
itself on unfamiliar terrain. The tools it needs to even access its subject matter are produced 
by big companies with only marginal interest in the academy.
The Bergen edition runs on the Windows platform (Windows 3.1, 3.11, Windows 95 and 
Windows NT4 according to the promotion sheet). For word-processing capacity it uses a 
program named 'FolioViews' which provides the usual services: cut and paste, printing, 
searching, window control, electronic bookmarks and back tracing. For scholars who habitually 
use the Microsoft range of products and do not worry about the ensuing dependency of their 
basic data on market competition these are excellent choices, even though some of its 
limitations will affect the ordinary user. The entire collection of normalized and diplomatic 
transcripts is put into a single binary file respectively. (The facsimiles are offered as single 
graphic documents, one per physical page.) Consequently, two huge electronic files contain 
the entire content of the Bergen edition in a completely opaque format. The user is allowed to 
read and manipulate texts via FolioViews but none of the structural information that has been 
presented in the first section of this paper is directly accessible to her. She can copy 
selected texts, paste and print them - but neither can she touch the indexing mechanism nor 
modify any of the underlying data. There is a strict separation between interface and non-
transparent, computational deep structure. Copyright considerations are a prominent reason 
for this arrangement: the content of a printed book cannot as easily be reproduced, 
manipulated and distributed as its digital counterpart. Provisions have to be taken to protect 
the investment put into such long-term projects. Media change unsettles venerable customs. 
The traditional understanding was that the result of scholarly work, most often financed by 
the taxpayer's money, are generally available in their entirety. This feature does, indeed, 
distinguish scholarship from commercially induced research. As teams of experts have to use 
proprietary software to reassure the copyright-holders and ensure the profit for the publishing 
house, this availability is restricted. But, it might be objected, where is the problem? 
Wittgenstein's writings are at one's disposal, all of them and in an extremely comfortable 
fashion. True enough, judged by the standards of the printed book. Yet, as was discussed in 
section two, Wittgenstein's Nachlass transcends the limits of such standards and an 
electronic edition might be better suited to capture those peculiarities. It might be organized 
so as to mirror Wittgenstein's editorial techniques, starting with single remarks as elementary 
building blocks and putting them together in a variety of ways, following Wittgenstein's lead. 
His working process, not its result, could be taken as the guiding principle. As a matter of fact 
the encapsulated FolioViews file is the very opposite of hypertext.18 Yet, the Bergen edition 
does not offer any tools to actually rearrange its content or redesign its appearance on the 
primary level. For all its flexibility and ease of use the Bergen edition is still in the conceptual 
grip of classical printed editions. Does it have to mimic the necessities of print culture?
The question turns on the issue of access to the internal, structural information hidden inside 
the binary files. Under present conditions one can find a particular paragraph and all of its 
subsequent instances as they appear in the later volumes. It is, however, impossible to break 
out of the straitjacket of the von Wright classification and deal with paragraphs as basic data 
units. If this were possible digital equivalences of Wittgenstein's notes could be freely 
assembled and re-assembled. As of now one is, for example, presented with manuscripts 105-
108 plus typescripts 208-209 plus manuscript 110 and has to extract relevant paragraphs for 
personal post-processing. A more appropriate way might be to pick out relevant paragraphs 
(e.g. on toothaches) and re-assemble them at bottom level, echoing the author's own 
procedure. It would be an attractive way to overcome the Nachlass effect of irrevocable 
closure. The internal dynamics of the Wittgenstein papers would be much more in evidence if 
a more open digital format had been chosen. Years of labor have been spent on the electronic 
transcription of the original documents. The records of the Wittgenstein archive do in fact 
contain all the information necessary for micrological analysis and multiple synthesis. The use 
of the CD-ROM, however, remains restricted to find, cut and paste with no provisions to 
address the editorial information from outside FolioViews. In order to visualize the conclusion 
on toothaches from the first section one might want to write a small program. It could not 
operate on the existing data structure which would have to be re-inscribed onto copies of 
segments extracted from the database.
This is the place to touch upon some basic issues in the theory and practice of text 
encoding. The discussion of the peculiar overlap between the requirements of digitization and 
commercial interests at the beginning of this section deliberately omitted an alternative 
possibility. Standard General Markup Language (SGML) is an attempt to avoid dependency on 
proprietary formats and irreconcilable software development with regard to electronic texts. 
The idea is, briefly, to supplement the alpha-numeric ciphers with additional (groups of) 
characters ('mark up') that serve the purpose of encoding meta-information by means of the 
available, restricted set of ASCII code. HTML, the language of the World Wide Web, in an 
instance of SGML. An easy example of mark up is the use (in HTML) of '<h1>' to indicate the 
beginning (and '</h1>' the end) of a top level heading. Such mark up indications do not in 
themselves cause any formatting to be done. (This distinguishes them from the binary code 
inserted into text files by common word processors.) Their function is to delineate the logical 
structure of the document and provide anchors to include additional content (like cross-
references, dates or hierarchical dependencies). A marked-up document can be read on any 
computer platform, the catch being that it needs software to render the mark-up as 
intended. This is a substantial difficulty given the fact that word processing has been much 
more popular with the general public. But consider a Web browser to get the general idea. 
Such browser are software which takes '<h1>Title</h1>' as an input and turns it (e.g.) into
                                                          TITLE
SGML (and its recent variant XML) offers a top-down solution to the problem of incompatible 
standards in text encoding and concurrent information storage.
The Bergen edition is based upon transcriptions of Wittgenstein's original pages into a mark up 
language using the 'Multi-Element Code System' (MECS). This system provides a meta-
grammar that can be implemented in particular instances of transcriptional grammar and is 
well suited to the task of capturing the complexities of Wittgenstein's autographs in a digital 
format. For technical reasons MECS is not entirely compatible with SGML. The thing to keep in 
mind is, however, that the Bergen transcriptions contain the entire set of editorial information 
in mark up format, i.e. in 'tags' that can be addressed in programming constructions. This 
information is filtered to produce the diplomatic and normalized versions offered on the CD-
ROMs. In customary, printed editions there is no possible gap between the pages on offer and 
their basic encoding. This does not carry over into the electronic realm where digital code has 
to be re-implemented in order to be perceptible. The need for secondary processing 
introduces a discrepancy which can be used to shield off operative background information 
from its surface rendition. Electronic documents offer spectacular improvements over many of 
the usual features of printed texts. Ironically, it is just because of their versatility that 
mechanisms to constrain their scope are feasible - and called for. The Bergen edition is just 
one example of a more comprehensive problem that is often overlooked in recent digitization 
campaigns. It is perfectly possible to combine global, digital distribution of information with 
highly selective, exclusive standards of its generation and transmission. While most people 
would be prepared to accept this for cable TV or DVD it should at least be a matter of 
concern in textual scholarship.
This is an area of conflict between claims of copyright holders and the scientific community. 
Broaching this issue is not intended to deflect attention from the impressive achievements of 
the Bergen electronic edition. Its presentation of the material is an epochal advance in 
Wittgenstein scholarship. It is, at the same time, a precursor of many electronic editions yet 
to be published and is apt to trigger a more general discussion on how similar scholarly 
editions might be designed. Disregarding, for the purpose of this conclusion, external 
constraints an optimum solution for (future) computer-savvy scholars would enable them to 
address their texts at any of the three levels that have to constitute a serious editorial 
project: the mark-up, diplomatic and normalized versions should all be manipulable to ensure 
optimum results. It is impossible for any single endeavor to adequately charter the wealth of 
variants and cross-relations in Wittgenstein's Nachlass. But if scholars were able to freely 
access the underlying mark up resources based on the canonical transcription could easily be 
enriched by resources taken from literal computing. As several commentators have pointed 
out, the recent 'Open Source' movement in software management echoes the concepts of 
free peer access and peer review well established within science. In the best case scenario 
source code, e.g. the mark-up version of Wittgenstein's texts, would be freely available. Book 
culture charges relatively little for relatively static texts. Expensive electronic editions offer 
advanced research tools, blocking collaboration based on their data structure. There will be 
an 'open source' Wittgenstein sometime this century.
Currently, a confusing variety of formats is used to tentatively provide comprehensive access 
in selected collections, mainly for corpora from earlier centuries. Projects like CELT, the 'Celtic 
Corpus of Electronic Texts'19and the 'Victorian Women Writer's Project'20 offer browsable 
HTML-front-ends, ftp download of marked-up documents and printable Postscript copies. TMI 
('Thesaurus Musicarum Italicarum')21 or 'The William Blake Archive'22 employ DynaWeb to 
translate SGML-coded files for use with common browsers. At the Wittgenstein archive's web-
site23 TS 201a 'Notes on Logic' and MS 115, 'Philosophische Bemerkungen' are available in 
different versions: HTML frames for concurrent inspection of the diplomatic and normalized 
text and for download in Postscript and Word Perfect format respectively. It remains unclear 
whether electronic publishing will develop standards as transparent as those of traditional 
literary culture. The technological advances we have been discussing are in fact instrumental 
in de-familiarizing earlier standards that have acquired second nature status. New 
opportunities arise, but there is still little institutional background and almost none of the hard 
questions have been answered. Meanwhile, from a philosophical point of view, the 
Wittgenstein papers raise an issue that cuts across old and new forms of writing. 
Wittgenstein's struggle against the linear progression of arguments should neither be 
remodeled as a peaceful exercise in hypertext, nor put to rest in an series of (printed or 
virtual) volumes. The driving force behind the Nachlass is a continuous effort to put together 
the pieces of a number of puzzles that seem to change as this activity unfolds. Nachlass 
means: this process has definitely ended. Digitization of the Nachlass offers an opportunity to 
breath life back into an accumulation of notes.
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THE CHANGED STATE OF WITTGENSTEIN SCHOLARSHIP 
Two independent publishing projects have thoroughly changed the state of Wittgenstein 
scholarship in recent years. Michael Nedo's 'Wiener Ausgabe'1 offers a traditional critical 
edition of Wittgenstein's philosophical writings ranging from 1929 up to and including the 'Big 
Typescript' (1933). Considering the eclectic and - at times - arbitrary editorial policy 
underlying previous publications from the Nachlass2 Nedo's project offers unprecedented 
philosophical rigor as well as textual criticism in volumes designed for comfortable reading. A 
second, more ambitious, attempt at a critical edition is the Bergen electronic edition.3 It is 
planned to include 4 CD-ROMs, covering the entire range of the philosopher's unpublished 
writing. Two disks are currently available, comprising all of Wittgenstein's manuscripts from 
1929-1939, as well as type-scripts, beginning with 'Notes on Logic' (1913) and leading up to 
Typescript 226, composed in 1939.
Wittgenstein's writings from the Thirties are, therefore, available in independent, reliable 
printed and electronic editions respectively. Readers can, for the first time, observe the 
philosopher at work, transferring paragraphs from pocket notebooks to handwritten 'volumes'; 
picking acceptable remarks to be included in type-scripts that are, at a later stage, cut up 
into slips of paper which are again annotated, rearranged and put together in further volumes 
and type-scripts. But this is only half the excitement. The 'Wiener Ausgabe' and the 'Bergen 
Edition' stake their success on different media, inevitably provoking a comparison between the 
well known features of printed scholarly editions and the not so familiar realm of digitized 
texts.
Some of the differences are immediately obvious. Scrutinizing philosophical texts on a printed 
page implies sensual qualities lacking in electronic space. Many readers will prefer a material 
sheet of paper over its virtual substitute. There are, on the other hand, definite advantages 
in digitally stored transcriptions. A CD-ROM does not occupy desk-space and allows almost 
instant access to every single remark of the extended Wittgenstein corpus. In addition to the 
actual texts, the 'Wiener Ausgabe' contains separate volumes of sophisticated registers, 
cross-referencing all the printed material. Considering the fact that the Bergen edition 
includes an excellent search function Nedo's tables are an anachronistic nicety at best. In a 
recent volume Nedo, in fact, announces a 'comprehensive electronic Apparatus, 
supplementing the Wiener Ausgabe'4. And there is simply no viable alternative to an electronic 
medium if one wants to present facsimiles of every page of the Nachlass, suitably linked to 
diplomatic and normalized versions of its content. These features make the Bergen edition a 
far more comprehensive enterprise. It seems that, pace  the predictable skepticism stemming 
from deeply ingrained scholarly habits, there is a convincing case in favor of switching to the 
digital format. The present paper will, at any rate, proceed from this assumption. But matters 
of technical convenience should not be allowed to decide the more profound issues arising 
from the competition of the media involved.
The accessibility of Wittgenstein's texts has been tremendously enhanced by putting them on 
CD-ROMs. If this were information like the listings in a telephone directory one could let the 
issue rest at this point. It might be confined to a discussion of the availability and design of 
necessary electronic interfaces. Philosophical production, and in particular Wittgenstein's 
literary remains, raise more interesting questions, though. Can conceptual content be neatly 
separated from its presentation in a given medium? Since its inception philosophy was done 
by teaching, in scholarly discourse, or by writing books/papers. What will be the impact of 
current digital technology on those traditional practices?5 
The preceding sketch has emphasized several characteristics of electronic texts that printed 
books cannot match. It does not follow that a given work actually demands - or even bears - 
digital treatment. Essential use of single pages, to mention a simple case, cannot easily be 
simulated electronically. The first section of this paper will, therefore, explore what might be 
called the textuality of Wittgenstein's Nachlass. Tracing the development of an important 
Wittgensteinian motive, this exploration surveys part of the newly available material, testing 
the suitability of computer-assisted scholarship to this particular collection of writings. Is 
there a general lesson to be learned from involving oneself in hands-on digital philology? As it 
turns out the Wittgenstein Nachlass provides an excellent occasion to reflect upon the range 
and limits of the Gutenberg heritage. This is discussed in section two. The concluding remarks 
focus on the Bergen edition. Given that digitization does not simply extend the established 
tool-set of textual scholarship but opens up new philosophical perspectives - how well does 
this particular enterprise support (and possibly inspire) a re-configuration of the philological 
status quo?
TOOTHACHES: PHILOLOGY 
The so-called 'private language' argument laid out in Philosophical Investigations §§ 243ff has 
been widely discussed in the literature. One of Wittgenstein's ways to introduce the problem 
is to argue for the incomprehensibility of naming pains in a strictly solipsistic setting. What are 
the circumstances enabling us to identify sensations? We have to participate in interpersonal 
activities expressing e.g. pain.
Wie wäre es, wenn die Menschen ihre Schmerzen nicht äußerten (nicht stöhnten, das Gesicht 
nicht verzögen etc.)? Dann könnte man einem Kind nicht den Gebrauch des Wortes 
'Zahnschmerzen' beibringen. (PhU § 257)
The fleeting reference to toothaches here does not carry conceptual weight in the context of 
the Investigations. But, surprisingly enough, Wittgenstein's earliest treatment of the issues 
that were to lead to his private language argument centers around this very sensation. There 
are at least three methods available to reach the present conclusion. By juxtaposing them we 
get a first glimpse at the possible scope of computer-assisted textual criticism. 
(1) Five volumes of the Wiener Ausgabe have hitherto been published, comprising - in appr. 
1300 pages - Wittgenstein's manuscripts from the time when he took up philosophy again, 
ending his self-imposed moratorium subsequent to the completion of the Tractatus . These 
manuscripts contain, in chronological order, Wittgenstein's discussions of a wide range of 
issues. In essence they are philosophical diaries, freely switching between different matters 
of interest, developing threads of thought up to a certain point, interrupting and returning at 
a later date. One might read through all of this material and pick out remarks concerning 
toothaches. The term appears for the first time on Nov. 19, 1929: 'Warum nenne ich 
Zahnschmerzen ' meine Zahnschmerzen' ?' (MS 107, 199; WA 2, 1146). Wittgenstein then 
develops this motive from different angles up to Dec. 14, 1929 (MS 108, 8f; WA 2,136) and 
returns to discuss it in a loose sequence of remarks from Jan. 31, 1930 (MS 107, 270; WA 2, 
186) to Feb. 7, 1930 (MS 107, 288; WA 2, 196). All of those entries are intermingled with 
reflections on many different topics: probability, theory of measurement, Euclidean geometry, 
realism et.al.. No guiding principle is discernible. Wittgenstein is following his own idiosyncratic 
lines of thought that often consist of digressions, retractions and cognitive jumps. It is not 
impossible, but exceedingly hard, to recognize the making of the private language argument in 
those scattered aphorisms. This should not come as a surprise since, after all, the 
manuscripts are Wittgenstein's philosophical workshop. Philological attention is often informed 
by prior knowledge of the results of such incipient processes.
In the light of Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy the first approach does, anyway, make 
little sense. Examining his manuscripts he picked a number of remarks for dictation. Copies of 
the resulting type-scripts were consequently cut into slips of paper and rearranged according 
to rules that seem to be revised within the organizing process itself. This procedure can be 
appropriately illustrated by tracking the course of Wittgenstein's notes on toothaches. 
Typescript 208, which is an extract from manuscripts 105-108, is only partially preserved.7 As 
far as toothaches are concerned, only the paragraphs dating from Dec. 14, 1929 can be 
found in this compilation. Alois Pichler has reconstructed the likely shape of TS 208. According 
to his conjecture most of the material on toothaches was contained in the missing pages 1-
1448. It reappears, completely rearranged, in TS 209, which is the text source for 
Philosophische Bemerkungen, edited by Rush Rees and published in 1964. Wittgenstein's 
original typescript shows no classifications whatsoever. At first inspection it is simply a very 
long sequence of paragraphs. Rush Rees divided the script into sections and invented groups 
of paragraphs which he numbered according to an undocumented, inscrutable scheme. A 
collection of Wittgenstein's reflections on toothaches happens to make up section VI of 
Philosophische Bemerkungen. This is a promising place to look for the conceptual genesis of 
his later views on mental states, sensations and language.
While all sections of Philosophische Bemerkungen are the invention of Rush Rees it is, 
nevertheless, also true that it was Wittgenstein who assembles the pieces into one particular 
order, thus emphazising his interest in an analysis of how first-person talk determines our 
understanding of pain. These notes have been available for a long time and attentive readers 
have doubtlessly noticed connections between them and later discussions of similar issues. 
This material was, however, entirely separated from its context of origin, a stand-alone 
compilation of philosophical insights. There is nothing per se wrong with restricting oneself to 
this state of affairs. It can very well serve as a starting point for enquiries like the present 
essay. Yet, the recent publications from the Nachlass have opened up a range of exiting 
possibilities. What used to be philologically opaque collections of Wittgensteinian ideas can 
now be disassembled and regarded as intermediate results of an ongoing process of creative 
writing and revision. It has become feasible not only to identify the building blocks of 
Wittgenstein's more elaborate editorial arrangements but - what is more important - to 
actually observe his philosophical labor, i.e. the decision process leading from day-to-day 
notes towards (as he envisaged it) eventual publication of his thoughts.
(2) Conventional methodology offers indices and synopses to assist such an enterprise. Both 
are provided by the Wiener Ausgabe, suggesting a second approach to access the 
Wittgensteinian corpus. 'Toothache' is an index entry; it can be looked up and the resulting 
items can in turn be traced through the Wittgenstein papers. Wiener Ausgabe - Apparatus, 
Register zu den Bänden 1-5 consists entirely of tables correlating every single paragraph from 
the manuscripts to its subsequent occurances in these volumes and (more commonly) to its 
location within the Philosophische Bemerkungen or Philosophische Grammatik. On Nov. 29, 
1929 Wittgenstein noted:
Von Sinnesdaten in dem Sinne des Wortes in dem es undenkbar ist daß der Andere sie hat, 
kann man eben aus diesem Grunde auch nicht sagen, daß der Andere sie nicht hat. Und aus 
ebendiesem Grunde ist es sinnlos zu sagen, daß  ich im Gegensatz zum Anderen sie habe. (MS 
107, 215f; WA 2, 124)
As the synopsis shows this remark was included in TS 209 (aka Philosophische Bemerkungen) 
presumably in mid-19309 as entry VI, 61 and taken up again on Jun. 1, 1932, when 
Wittgenstein started a revision of his earlier ideas on the topic. Investigating this kind of 
dependency is standard procedure in textual criticism. Until very recently this had to be done 
by consulting printed synopses. It seems fair to say that there is very little sense in carrying 
on the old way, if the advance of digital technologies is taken into account.
The point is not just that it is quite cumbersome to work with multiple versions of basically 
the same paragraph located in different places in various bound volumes. This impediment 
could be alleviated by liberal use of the xerox machine. Printed synopses of material as 
complex as Wittgenstein's Nachlass face a more serious problem. It seems next to impossible 
to combine indexing and synopsis. The reader is presented with either a list of significant 
terms or a table of correlations of textual segments. She cannot simultaneously look for the 
occurance of a word and the history of rearrangements of the paragraph it is included in. No 
one would finance a series of books (or care to use them) containing the astronomical number 
of relations between index entries and changes of contexts in gory detail. Consider the remark 
quoted above. Instinctively one would at least consider the terms 'Sinnesdaten', 'Sinn', 'Wort', 
'der Andere', 'Grund', 'sinnlos' and 'Gegensatz'.10 The quote considered here does not even 
contain the term 'Zahnschmerzen' which is, at this point, Wittgenstein's guiding paradigm. 
Imagine all those terms put into correlation with all the changes of their occurrences 
elsewhere in the Nachlass. The ensuing combinatorial explosion effectively prevents putting 
the result on paper. In the present case one cannot have a general, usable, semantics-to-
(section)-numbers and (section)-numbers-to-(section-)numbers mapping, one on top of the 
other, in a print medium.
(3) It is easily done if the texts have been properly digitized. Since words are encoded by 
numbers it is quite simple to set up an index and it takes just another couple of numbers to 
represent the trace of 'words' to and from given contexts. Much of this can be done 
automatically; there is no need to actually visualize the necessary relational apparatus. If a 
correlation seems interesting it can be called up at will, with no time lost for browsing, 
copying or shuffling around papers. Searching for 'Zahnschmerzen' in the Bergen edition 
immediately yields 138 hits across the entire collection. The search can be restricted to 
particular (groups of) volumes and modified to include co-occurring or proximate terms as well 
as dates. A query for 'Sinnesdaten and Zahnschmerzen' produces as a result precisely three 
common occurances. First is a paragraph from MS 114 (MS 114, 16; WA 5, 179) into which 
Wittgenstein had assimilated separate earlier notes, followed by its typescript derivatives in 
TS 211, 755 and TS 213, 510 (Big Typescript). The quote previously presented (MS 107, 
215f; WA 2, 124), lacking the term 'Zahnschmerzen', is picked out among the 30 hits returned 
by querying 'Sinnesdaten'. It occurs in a stand-alone paragraph in TS 209, 23 (PhB VI, 61) 
and is flagged accordingly. In other words: a couple of straightforward enquiries lead directly 
to an important juncture in Wittgenstein's investigation of the logic of talk about sense 
impressions and toothaches in particular.
But wait. There is something suspicious about the last sentence. Manipulation of the index 
mechanism per se cannot produce important results. The disappearance of manifest meaning 
is, in fact, the price to pay for enhanced electronic facilities. One can easily pick any 
combination of terms and search constraints - but there is no guarantee whatsoever that this 
will lead to an interesting result. So where does 'importance' come in? This is a category of 
reflective assessment, crucially different from automated procedures. The discrepancy is at 
the center of any discussion about computer-assisted philology. A certain amount of cheating 
is necessary to reach the comfortable conclusion presented in the previous paragraph. 
Criteria enabling one to judge upon the importance of algorithmic procedures have to be 
presupposed in order for such procedures to be of any help. To put it very simply: elaborate 
tools are of little help without knowledge of their proper use. One has to have a hunch about 
the possible significance of a term to profitably employ the electronic search function. The 
non-sequitur above may serve as a reminder to first-generation digital scholars. It is easy to 
fall into the trap of overestimating technology. None of the powerful programming at work 
below the WYSIWYG-surface guarantees philosophical content. 
The difficulty, consequently, is the following one: How can technological advancements in 
textual criticism be constrained by a sense of proportion relating to a prior understanding of 
the subject matter. This type of question is well-known and often discussed between 
technophiles and technophobes. The present paper is a case study, trying to answer the 
question for one particular instance of the general problem. But we have not yet assembled 
the necessary evidence. It remains quite unclear why a philosopher should worry about 
toothaches. A powerful mechanism has been sketched, yet it is fair to assume that 
Wittgenstein scholars go about their business projecting hypotheses to understand the 
complexities of the Nachlass quite independently. The above account does not include a 
reason for using the mechanism. Providing such reasons is itself a philosophical activity. This 
section has offered a rough overview of the itinerary of some sample paragraphs. One has to 
explore their content and in particular the conceptual significance of their itinerary in order to 
get the full picture. A satisfactory answer to the issue at stake between digital technology 
and its critics has to appeal to philosophy in action.
TOOTHACHES: PHILOSOPHY 
Wittgenstein's first entry into manuscript 107 refers back to the Tractatus . There he had 
claimed: 'Das denkende, vorstellende, Subjekt gibt es nicht.' (5.631) And he had explained 
this dictum by pointing to the visual field: 'nichts am Gesichtsfeld läßt darauf schließen, daß 
es von einem Auge gesehen wird.' ( Tractatus  5.633). Compare MS 107, 1 (WA 2,3): 'Der 
Gesichtsraum so wie er ist hat seine selbständige Realität. Er selbst enthält kein Subjekt. Er 
ist autonom.' In 1929 Wittgenstein's anti-intentionalism is still in place, but his views on 
atomic sentences begin to change. The basic units of his epistemological account are not 
single sentences any more: 'Ich lege nicht den Satz als Maßstab an die Wirklichkeit an 
sondern das System von Sätzen.' (MS 107, 35; WA 2, 149) The logic of color terms has, as 
Wittgenstein discovered, to take account of the field of possibilities given by the spectrum. 
Atomic sentences cannot be independent of each other since 'This plate is blue' logically 
implies - among many other propositions - that it is not red. Yet, this is not a tautology. 
Given the visual field and the customary color space one has a priori knowledge of the 
structural dependencies of possible colors. To look for any actual one necessarily includes 
mastery of a presupposed color scheme. 'Wie es einen Sinn hat zu sagen die Farbe R ist am 
Ort P wenn ich überhaupt den Gesichtsraum mit dem Farbraum "vor mir" habe.' (MS 107, 158; 
WA 2, 92) Wittgenstein's quotes indicate that he is still officially unwilling to grant the 
existence of a subject. But it is interesting to take a closer look at his day's work (Oct. 10, 
1929).
The point of reference of the previous quote ('Wie es einen Sinn hat ...') are stomach aches. 
Wittgenstein is discussing the meaning of negation. How can one truthfully deny the presence 
of stomach aches? Such sentences seem to lack external sensual corroboration. They cannot 
be constructed as somehow linking stomachs and pains either. 'Es ist nur wesentlich, daß ich 
den Raum vor mir habe in dem der Magen liegt und den worin die Schmerzen liegen.' (MS 107, 
157; WA 2, 92) Like colors within the visual field pains are a kind of sensation constitutivly 
associated with stomachs. This seems an unobjectionable parallel - with a twist. We have 
noted Wittgenstein's avoidance of the common notion of a subject in his discussion of the 
visual field. This strategy cannot, however, be carried over to the case of 'internal' 
sensations. There is nothing comparable to the geometry of shared, public, visible spaces in 
the realm of our intestines. If you remove the subject from stomach aches not even the 
illusion of a legitimate issue remains. Switching from the visual field to internal sensations, 
Wittgenstein's doctrine of the subject is severely shaken. He cannot but employ the first 
person pronoun in these contexts, even though his commitment is to exclude it from the 
scientific vocabulary. Such is the dilemma apparent in his first remark on toothaches: 'Warum 
nenne ich Zahnschmerzen " meine Zahnschmerzen" '? (MS 107, 199; WA 2, 114)
Wittgenstein does not follow any pre-set agenda that could lead to a systematic 
investigation of various modalities of the senses. His move from vision to stomach aches to 
tooth aches is obviously not aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive view. Ten 
days after raising the issue of toothaches being my toothaches Wittgenstein comes up with 
the brilliant aphorism quoted above. The private language argument is, in nuce, contained in 
two extremely compact sentences (MS 107, 215f; WA 2, 124). If another person cannot be 
said to be the subject of my internal sense data it is meaningless to deny her those very 
sense data. Their possible occurrences do not include this kind of bearer. Alas, this is no 
comfort for anyone tempted to regard awareness of one's own intentional states as privileged 
knowledge. There is no force in such pronouncements. I cannot determine something uniquely 
subjective in appealing to an incomprehensible option, i.e. another person's having my internal 
states. The Tractatus  view of the subject was of a metaphysical entity, a border of the 
World, not part of it ( Tractatus 5.641). The early post-Tractarian manuscripts are gradually 
abandoning this dualism, conceding a role for first-person talk. Yet, most of the original 
skepticism remains. How can one conceive of a role for 'private' sensations and avoid 
idealism?
Such questions are external to Wittgenstein's writing in the manuscripts. The present sketch 
puts emphasis on only a small number of issues discussed within those volumes. The general 
line of argument is, however, supported by Wittgenstein's own subsequent selective rewriting 
of the material. When he cut up TS 208 to rearrange its content into what is now known as 
the Philosophische Bemerkungen, one of his points of emphasis was toothaches. His 
discussion of logical features of talk about the subject centers around a selection of remarks 
devoted to the remarkable fact of me - Ludwig Wittgenstein - having toothaches (cf. PhB VI, 
58). This revision introduces complexity of a higher order. Many of Wittgenstein's paragraphs 
are initially small, self-contained philosophical analyses. The next auctorial step is to try and 
put them together so that some larger, overarching connection is established. Philosophische 
Bemerkungen VI does, in fact, offer extremely dense philosophical substance, much too 
involved to be discussed here. Just an outline of Wittgenstein's strategy of using his 
arrangements as arguments can be given.
A first group of remarks, serving as a kind of prolegomenon, is derived from entries for Dec. 
14, 1929 and Oct. 11, 1929, expounding the general direction of the succeeding paragraphs. 
The use of the first person pronoun is fraught with difficulties, particularly if talk about 
perception is modelled according to external circumstances. 'I am experiencing a red patch' is 
quoted as a case in point. To analyze the difficulties one might re-write the puzzling 
descriptions, substituting some un-objectionable term for the offensive 'I'. This exercise is 
next. Remarkably, Wittgenstein switches from sense impressions to internal sensation again, 
as he designs a language game supposed to exhibit the same logical multiplicity as the 
common idiom and yet to avoid mention of a subject. His idea is to externalize the privileged 
position of subjectivity by designating one particular person as an universal point of 
reference. If 'I am' Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'I have toothaches' becomes 'There are toothaches' 
and 'A has toothaches' can be rephrased as 'A behaves like Ludwig Wittgenstein when there 
are toothaches'. (PhBemerkungen VI, 58). The apparent uniqueness of subjective experience 
is transformed into a qualitative difference in public discourse; the mysterious realm of 
subjectivity replaced by an idiom of matching complexity: everyone can take center stage in 
this language. Once this focus is set the remaining moves of the language game are 
equivalent to the traditional one. Wittgenstein offers a playful simile. The logic of first-person 
talk recalls oriental despotism, with the subject taking the place of the despot in providing 
the origin of the communicative coordinate system.
The point is that talk about sensations is inevitably dualistic. 'The subject' - as well as an 
oriental despot - is supposed to fall outside ordinary discourse directed towards physical 
things. If Timur Lenk's state of health is taken as the measuring device of health-talk it makes 
no sense to ask whether he has toothaches. In the event, toothaches simply are among his 
personal states and having toothaches is a condition derived from this primordial condition. 
Even though Wittgenstein has thus eliminated first-person talk the Tractarian criterion of 
meaning fails, however. It is impossible to attribute possession of toothaches or lack thereof 
to a suitably designated individuum. (The discussion prefigures later reflections on the Paris 
ur-meter.) After this setting of the stage Wittgenstein embarks on a series of grammatical 
investigations, exploring the comprehensibility of our dualistic idiom. There is no obvious way 
to stratify his dialectical dialogues into a single argument. 'I cannot feel your toothaches.' 
Does this sentence express an empirical truth or rather a kind of logical necessity 
Wittgenstein had not provided for in his Tractatus? (cf. PhB VI, 61) Rather than answering 
questions like this, Wittgenstein keeps changing his focus and his examples, circling around 
the issues. What is he up to? To a casual reader it looks like an open-ended, aporetic 
elenchus. But Wittgenstein, surprisingly, and without so much as minimal warning, does 
actually close his argument by the strategic placement of one paragraph.
Wittgenstein's transposition of first person talk was anchored in the neutral statement: 'There 
are toothaches'. The following quote is an obvious echo, concluding the argument:
Das Phänomen des Schmerzgefühls in einem Zahn, welches ich kenne, ist in der 
Ausdrucksweise der gewöhnlichen Sprache dargestellt durch ' ich habe in dem und dem Zahn 
Schmerzen'. Nicht durch einen Ausdruck von der Art, 'an diesem Ort ist ein Schmerzgefühl'. 
(PhB VI, 66)
As it turns out, it is impossible to capture the subjectivist intuitions in Wittgenstein's 
alternative scheme. There cannot be pains outside of consciousness. Designating a physical 
body to be the paradigmatic bearer of pain is no better than ascribing pain to some tooth put 
on a table ( Philosophische Bermerkungen VI, 65). Timur Lenk is, inevitably, located in public 
space, so we are back to Wittgenstein's initial reminder: the problem arises because physical 
circumstances are inappropriately projected onto another context.
Das ganze Feld dieser Erfahrung wird in dieser Sprache durch Ausdrücke von der Form 'ich 
habe ...' beschrieben. Die Sätze von der Form 'N hat Zahnschmerzen' sind für ein ganz 
anderes Feld reserviert. (PhB VI, 66) 
In other words: Wittgenstein advises himself to desist from trying to battle ordinary language. 
He is quite aware of the tension: In order to unravel the philosophical knot one has to re-
trace the complicated movements underlying it. Thus ends the second take on toothaches. 
Resting content with the ordinary was, however, always a temporary affair for Wittgenstein. 
In 1932 we find him returning to the very issues he had supposedly resolved in MS 110, 30ff 
(WA5, 179ff). These are the quotes remarked upon earlier in this paper: Wittgenstein's 
second, condensing revision of the material on toothaches.
This third stratum of the textual evidence and its further development will not be pursued 
here. The sole purpose of the preceding intermezzo was to redress the balance between the 
digital toolkit and topics in established Wittgenstein scholarship. The problem was to mediate 
between proponents of largely syntactic manipulation of linguistic data and traditional 
approaches that turn to texts with a prior understanding of their subject matter. The way to 
escape a stand-off is to refuse the contra-position from the very start. Semantic data-
mining11 as exemplified by the previous sub-section, is simultaneously an exercise in digital 
philology and philosophy. Wittgenstein's Nachlass is an excellent place to look for such a 
synthesis because the author's ideas are, to a large extent, expressed by arranging and 
rearranging small textual units. Tracking the dynamics of Wittgenstein's philosophical 
variations can, admittedly, be done in the conventional framework of a printed edition of his 
manuscripts and type-scripts. Computer-assisted procedures do, however, push philology 
towards horizons previously out of reach. To repeat: No collection of printed volumes can 
conceivably present any synopsis of any terms, occurring at arbitrary dates, in just a few 
seconds. Such opportunities are bound to have a major impact on future Wittgenstein 
scholarship. This concludes the philological assessment of conventional versus digital 
approaches to the Wittgenstein papers. A more detached attitude has already been hinted 
at. It seems that Wittgenstein's writing is particularly well suited to a post-Gutenberg 
environment. In order to get the full picture regarding the Bergen edition we have to take a 
closer look at Wittgenstein's failure to turn his writings into a book.
BEYOND BOOKS 
J.C. Nyíri has made a strong case for considering the Wittgenstein Nachlass in the light of 
recent media philosophy. Quoting Walter Ong and Erich Havelock he reminds his readers of the 
prospect that the age of literacy might be giving way to a period of secondary orality, with 
the spoken word regaining the most influential position in a broadcast society. According to 
Nyíri's suggestion Wittgenstein's failure to distinguish between the written and the spoken 
word might explain his 'ultimate inability to complete the "book" he always wanted to 
complete'12. The ductus of his writings is, indeed, more akin to on-going conversations than 
to neatly delineated propositions. Did Wittgenstein miss the adequate medium for his 
exertions? Nyíri draws attention to the fact that his writing is, in certain places, a direct 
rejoinder to the Socratic dialogues. 'Ich finde bei Plato auf eine Frage wie 'was ist Erkenntnis' 
nicht die vorläufige Antwort: Sehen wir einmal nach, wie dieses Wort gebraucht wird.' (TS 
211, 17) Wittgenstein's inverse Socratic role consists in dissolving platonic confidence in 
essences and is, therefore, ill suited to be put into a classical philosophical treatise. As Nyíri 
(following Havelock) rightly reminds us, Platonic ideas are inextricably connected to the rise of 
literacy over an oral tradition which lacked expressive means for a proper treatment of 
abstract terms. Yet, Wittgenstein could have rested content with his actual teaching, leaving 
it to his disciples to provide written records. He did not do so, but rather forced himself, 
against better knowledge, to conform to the given standard.
Wenn ich für mich denke ohne ein Buch schreiben zu wollen, so springe ich um das Thema 
herum; das ist die einzige mir natürliche Denkweise. In einer Reihe gezwungen fortzudenken ist 
mir eine Qual. Soll ich es nun überhaupt probieren? Ich verschwende unsägliche Mühe auf ein 
Anordnen der Gedanken, das vielleicht gar keinen Wert hat. (MS 118, 185)
The key word is 'vielleicht' indicating Wittgenstein's ambivalent ambitions to write a book. His 
difficulties are methodologically profound. One way to bring this into focus is to position them 
at the crossroads between books and hypertext.
Decades of Wittgenstein scholarship have been shaped by editorial decisions made by the 
trustees of the Nachlass. Their general policy was to present provisional steps in 
Wittgenstein's ongoing process of revision as standalone volumes, often effacing the 
dynamics demonstrated in the preceding section. David Stern, in his perceptive paper, 
correctly describes the state of affairs.
The Wittgenstein Nachlass is not a haphazard pile of working papers that happened to survive 
his death, nor is it a collection of works that only awaited publication. While it is both a 
carefully selected and highly structured record of his life's work, a collection of material that 
he deliberately assembled and left to posterity, it is also the record of a writer continually in 
flux, never entirely satisfied with anything he had written.13  
In view of this situation it actually seems a little unfair to reapproach the editors of 
Wittgenstein's posthumous writing. There is no good way to capture the activity vividly 
described by Stern into the confines of a printed volume. Despite outward appearances there 
are no 'works of Wittgenstein' that could confidently be taken as points of departure. Even 
the Philosophische Untersuchungen are, as Stern observes, 'only one of a number of possible 
arrangements Wittgenstein proposed, many of which extend, amplify, or cast light on the 
remarks in the published book.'14 References to current models of textual interdependency 
become almost irresistible at this point. 'Because the Wittgenstein Nachlass is the result of 
such an extensive act of rewriting, it is less a collection of texts than a hypertext, an 
interconnected network of remarks.'15 Stern's remarks certainly point into the right direction. 
Still, there are some intermediary steps between the range of options available to 
Wittgenstein and writing that is embedded in digital technology. Those steps have to be 
spelled out if one wants to get a grasp on how the CD-ROM edition might change out habits 
of scholarship based on self-contained books. 
One feature of a culture based on books deserves special attention as this culture is 
challenged by the advent of digital, globally distributed information. Books are marked by the 
coincidence of two seperate decisions: their content and its appearance are determined 
simultaneously. This is what publication of a book, in effect, amounts to - and it throws some 
light on Wittgenstein's qualms. He felt unable to decide on one shape for his ideas. 
Publication, throughout European history, simply meant drawing a line between a creative 
process and its (albeit provisional) results. Sending a manuscript to the publisher was to 
distinguish a line between sketches, preliminary attempts, experimental drafts and an entity 
exhibiting both the features of the most prestigious information technology and of auctorial 
closure. Books divided the lifetime of an author into continuous activity and singular results, 
texts that, from a certain moment in time, assume a life of their own. This arrangement is 
being thoroughly shaken by the advent of new media. First of all, digital encoding disrupts the 
familiar coordination between form and content. Characters are mapped into numbers that 
are, in turn, symbolized in an electronic format unsuitable for direct perception. And this 
transposition, secondly, triggers dramatic changes in the nature of publicity. Electronic texts 
can instantly be published to a world audience and still be constantly revised.
In the given context it is particularly instructive to notice the implication for posthumous 
'works'. In the world of books a Nachlass is defined as all the material an author did not 
manage or see fit to get printed. Its peculiar character is that future generations retro-
activly elevate such writing to the status of books. If books published by an author are what 
software developers call a 'feature-freeze', publications from a Nachlass are based on 
decisions to overrule such limitations. There is no way to escape the allure of 'works' in book 
culture. In Nachlass-publications auxiliary authors assume responsibility to supplement a 
writer's oeuvre with 'second order' books. Applying this to the case at hand yields a 
suggestive prospect. While the trustees failed to do justice to Wittgenstein's open-ended, 
conversations philosophical style, a digital edition of the Nachlass is much better suited to 
achieve this aim. Such an enterprise is not forced to turn a collection of tentative designs 
into bound volumes. The 'Wiener Ausgabe' seems set to publish the largely repetetive material 
from 1929-1933 in 12 weighty volumes. Michael Nedo sounds apologetic in defending this 
expenditure:
... the book is still the carrier of thoughts, of written heritage in our culture, and familiarity 
with this medium certainly affects not only one's dealings with the texts themselves, but also 
the accompanying Apparatuses.16  
One does not have to subscribe to deconstruction to find this eulogy anachronistic. The 
transitory character of Wittgenstein's writing, its complex genealogy and its numerous 
recapitulations seem to call for a digital format of presentation which matches its inherent 
temporality by avoiding ultimate editorial decisions and allowing easy manipulation of the 
textual material.
Impressions like these, convincing as they may sound - once again - overstress technology. 
Wittgenstein, it is true, despaired of achieving the linear order demanded by a printed book. 
But this does not imply that hypertext could have solved his problem. His desparation is the 
important feature: the fight against a spell cast upon his writing by the demands of books 
culture. He worried about the correct arrangement of his ideas, so much is obvious from the 
examples discussed above. One understanding of 'hypertext' is of segments of texts linked 
together in a more or less haphazard way, often without any single, controling authority. This 
meaning is certainly not applicable to Wittgenstein. He could have saved himself a lot of 
trouble had he been prepared to regard his writing as a kind of private web-space. A second 
understanding might be more appropriate. Hypertext can also refer to autonomous non-linear 
writing which transcends the obligatory step-by-step sequence of print-products by 
constructing a topological matrix without hierarchical order. Digitized texts are encoded as 
numbers and have to be re-established in a legible format. Visualization by a monitor is one 
step removed from the pages of a book and offers flexibility unmatched by their arrangement. 
Wittgenstein's famous metaphor of wandering through a philosophical landscape comes to 
mind. The Nachlass does, in fact, contain a number of tentative registers that could easily be 
implemented as a hypertext.17 
This is one side of Wittgenstein's struggle with conventional means of expressing thoughts. 
But his need for a different kind of complexity is offset by an equally important desire. In 
many places he insists on finding definitive answers. This motive, manifest in the Tractatus , 
is also present in Wittgenstein's later calls for 'Übersichtlichkeit' (surveyability) and well laid-
out description:
Wir wollen nicht das Regelsystem für die Verwendung unserer Worte in unerhörter Weise 
verfeinern oder vervollständigen. Denn die Klarheit, die wir anstreben, ist allerdings eine 
vollkommene. Aber das heißt nur, daß die philosophischen Probleme vollkommen verschwinden 
sollen. (PhU § 133)
In this context, the 'treatment' of philosophical problems is likened to therapeutical 
intervention and its ultimate aim is to put vexing thoughts to rest. Such an attitude cannot 
be easily reconciled with calls for open-ended auctorial multiplicity and the suspension of 
binding results. Wittgenstein's 'hypertext' avant la lettre arises from unsuccessful attempts at 
closure rather than from intentional design. It does not anticipate a more flexible medium 
which might alleviate the rigor of philosophical arguments. As the Nachlass material on 
toothaches shows, Wittgenstein did not simply reject the linear progression of thoughts in 
favor of a compilation of aphorisms. He actually proposes a solution - even though it does not 
satisfy him in the long run. Look at it this way: If he had been able to reach a satisfactory 
conclusion he would have put it into print. Hypertext, on the other hand, is by design non-
conclusive. Had Wittgenstein used hypertext, his characteristic struggle against premature 
closure would have been lost. Hypertext lacks the kind of physical inertia needed to make a 
sentence stick to a certain position and while Wittgenstein kept overturning pre-established 
patterns of thought and inferences he never abandoned his drive to return to 
straightforward, easily surveyable positions.
Wir sind aufs Glatteis geraten, wo die Reibung fehlt, also die Bedingungen in gewissem Sinn 
ideal sind, aber wir eben deshalb auch nicht gehen können. Wir wollen gehen; dann brauchen 
wir Reibung. Zurück auf den rauhen Boden. (PhU § 107)
Wittgenstein would, in all likelihood, have extended this complaint against free-floating 
philosophical speculation to l'art pour l'art hypertext.
To sum up and focus on the case at hand: Electronic texts are not just a kind of print; the 
graphical rendering of information on a monitor is no 'page' in any ordinary sense. It is 
tempting - and to some extent plausible - to distinguish Wittgenstein's writing from 
conventional philosophical authorship by employing jargon from media studies. Actually putting 
his Nachlass on a CD-ROM adds considerable complexity to the story. There is an important 
difference between a writer's decision to publish his or her work (in whatever format) and 
someone else administering a heritage. Nachlass publications, including electronic editions, are 
per definitionem second order closures. The flexibility of digitized texts is of another order as 
Wittgenstein's work in progress. How those papers are to be rendered on CD-ROMs is by no 
means self-evident. It is easy to pretend that the Bergen project is just an extension of well-
known editorial strategies. Such an attitude does, however, seriously underestimate the 
range of problems involved. All the conveniences set forth in the previous pages do not come 
for free. The change from books to computers is in itself an important theoretical and political 
issue. Putting Wittgenstein on disk demands a considerable number of decisions beyond the 
scope of printed editions. This is new territory, hardly even noticed as a philosophical issue 
amongst Wittgenstein scholars.
THE POLITICS OF DIGITAL TEXTS 
The Bergen electronic edition effaces its own novelty. Its structuring principle are the 
physical volumes of the Nachlass which are presented one after the other in linear sequence. 
The search facilities include easy access to single manuscripts or type-scripts. Facsimiles 
provide unprecedented opportunities to scrutinize Wittgenstein's actual output.The electronic 
edition might be argued to beat its print competitors at their own game. One apparent 
platitude is of utmost importance, though. Digitized texts need computers which need 
software which needs operating systems. In centuries of print culture we have become 
accustomed to the fact that once a book is published it is freely accessible to readers 
without further effort. Historical pictures of lockable books raise amused smiles. Yet, they are 
not a bad analogy to so-called digital books: in order to read them one needs additional 
devices, even 'keys'. Book publishing is a business charging once per item, regardless of its 
further use. But those products are, nowadays, revealed as just one interface to information. 
In many respects digital documents offer more convenient access to identical content. This 
surplus value has a price: a set of electronic equipment is inserted between the reader and 
her text. Once they have been published (and as long as they are in print) books are available 
without further decoding. As everyone who has to exchange files on the internet knows, this 
is far from true for electronic documents. Different computer platforms, different word 
processors and conflicting versions tend to produce confusions unheard of in former times.
The reason for this is that there are several competing standards to implement a mapping 
between alpha-numerical symbols and digital numbers. Strictly speaking only the basic letters, 
numerals and diacritical signs of the English alphabet are interchangeable on any platform. 
Different sets of characters, and in particular the elaborate additional code necessary to 
simulate printed pages on a monitor, demand special attention. International bodies are in 
charge of supervising the encoding of the world's languages. Software simulation of written 
material, however, obeys different rules. It is to a considerable extent a commercial affair and 
subject to the laws of economics. The result is, predictably, a considerable variety of 
proprietary software tools trying to get their share of the market by offering particularly 
comfortable - and mutually incompatible - features. This is the state of affairs confronting 
any digitization of texts. Two minimalistic approaches are either to scan existing pages or to 
stick to 7-bit ASCII code in transcribing them electronically. It is immediately obvious that 
neither of these options is satisfactory for a textual corpus of the degree of complexity of the 
Wittgenstein Nachlass. The editors were faced with a situation unprecedented in ordinary 
publishing. They had to decide upon a software package capable of producing the desired 
results, which also meant forcing that package upon the readers. Textual scholarship finds 
itself on unfamiliar terrain. The tools it needs to even access its subject matter are produced 
by big companies with only marginal interest in the academy.
The Bergen edition runs on the Windows platform (Windows 3.1, 3.11, Windows 95 and 
Windows NT4 according to the promotion sheet). For word-processing capacity it uses a 
program named 'FolioViews' which provides the usual services: cut and paste, printing, 
searching, window control, electronic bookmarks and back tracing. For scholars who habitually 
use the Microsoft range of products and do not worry about the ensuing dependency of their 
basic data on market competition these are excellent choices, even though some of its 
limitations will affect the ordinary user. The entire collection of normalized and diplomatic 
transcripts is put into a single binary file respectively. (The facsimiles are offered as single 
graphic documents, one per physical page.) Consequently, two huge electronic files contain 
the entire content of the Bergen edition in a completely opaque format. The user is allowed to 
read and manipulate texts via FolioViews but none of the structural information that has been 
presented in the first section of this paper is directly accessible to her. She can copy 
selected texts, paste and print them - but neither can she touch the indexing mechanism nor 
modify any of the underlying data. There is a strict separation between interface and non-
transparent, computational deep structure. Copyright considerations are a prominent reason 
for this arrangement: the content of a printed book cannot as easily be reproduced, 
manipulated and distributed as its digital counterpart. Provisions have to be taken to protect 
the investment put into such long-term projects. Media change unsettles venerable customs. 
The traditional understanding was that the result of scholarly work, most often financed by 
the taxpayer's money, are generally available in their entirety. This feature does, indeed, 
distinguish scholarship from commercially induced research. As teams of experts have to use 
proprietary software to reassure the copyright-holders and ensure the profit for the publishing 
house, this availability is restricted. But, it might be objected, where is the problem? 
Wittgenstein's writings are at one's disposal, all of them and in an extremely comfortable 
fashion. True enough, judged by the standards of the printed book. Yet, as was discussed in 
section two, Wittgenstein's Nachlass transcends the limits of such standards and an 
electronic edition might be better suited to capture those peculiarities. It might be organized 
so as to mirror Wittgenstein's editorial techniques, starting with single remarks as elementary 
building blocks and putting them together in a variety of ways, following Wittgenstein's lead. 
His working process, not its result, could be taken as the guiding principle. As a matter of fact 
the encapsulated FolioViews file is the very opposite of hypertext.18 Yet, the Bergen edition 
does not offer any tools to actually rearrange its content or redesign its appearance on the 
primary level. For all its flexibility and ease of use the Bergen edition is still in the conceptual 
grip of classical printed editions. Does it have to mimic the necessities of print culture?
The question turns on the issue of access to the internal, structural information hidden inside 
the binary files. Under present conditions one can find a particular paragraph and all of its 
subsequent instances as they appear in the later volumes. It is, however, impossible to break 
out of the straitjacket of the von Wright classification and deal with paragraphs as basic data 
units. If this were possible digital equivalences of Wittgenstein's notes could be freely 
assembled and re-assembled. As of now one is, for example, presented with manuscripts 105-
108 plus typescripts 208-209 plus manuscript 110 and has to extract relevant paragraphs for 
personal post-processing. A more appropriate way might be to pick out relevant paragraphs 
(e.g. on toothaches) and re-assemble them at bottom level, echoing the author's own 
procedure. It would be an attractive way to overcome the Nachlass effect of irrevocable 
closure. The internal dynamics of the Wittgenstein papers would be much more in evidence if 
a more open digital format had been chosen. Years of labor have been spent on the electronic 
transcription of the original documents. The records of the Wittgenstein archive do in fact 
contain all the information necessary for micrological analysis and multiple synthesis. The use 
of the CD-ROM, however, remains restricted to find, cut and paste with no provisions to 
address the editorial information from outside FolioViews. In order to visualize the conclusion 
on toothaches from the first section one might want to write a small program. It could not 
operate on the existing data structure which would have to be re-inscribed onto copies of 
segments extracted from the database.
This is the place to touch upon some basic issues in the theory and practice of text 
encoding. The discussion of the peculiar overlap between the requirements of digitization and 
commercial interests at the beginning of this section deliberately omitted an alternative 
possibility. Standard General Markup Language (SGML) is an attempt to avoid dependency on 
proprietary formats and irreconcilable software development with regard to electronic texts. 
The idea is, briefly, to supplement the alpha-numeric ciphers with additional (groups of) 
characters ('mark up') that serve the purpose of encoding meta-information by means of the 
available, restricted set of ASCII code. HTML, the language of the World Wide Web, in an 
instance of SGML. An easy example of mark up is the use (in HTML) of '<h1>' to indicate the 
beginning (and '</h1>' the end) of a top level heading. Such mark up indications do not in 
themselves cause any formatting to be done. (This distinguishes them from the binary code 
inserted into text files by common word processors.) Their function is to delineate the logical 
structure of the document and provide anchors to include additional content (like cross-
references, dates or hierarchical dependencies). A marked-up document can be read on any 
computer platform, the catch being that it needs software to render the mark-up as 
intended. This is a substantial difficulty given the fact that word processing has been much 
more popular with the general public. But consider a Web browser to get the general idea. 
Such browser are software which takes '<h1>Title</h1>' as an input and turns it (e.g.) into
                                                          TITLE
SGML (and its recent variant XML) offers a top-down solution to the problem of incompatible 
standards in text encoding and concurrent information storage.
The Bergen edition is based upon transcriptions of Wittgenstein's original pages into a mark up 
language using the 'Multi-Element Code System' (MECS). This system provides a meta-
grammar that can be implemented in particular instances of transcriptional grammar and is 
well suited to the task of capturing the complexities of Wittgenstein's autographs in a digital 
format. For technical reasons MECS is not entirely compatible with SGML. The thing to keep in 
mind is, however, that the Bergen transcriptions contain the entire set of editorial information 
in mark up format, i.e. in 'tags' that can be addressed in programming constructions. This 
information is filtered to produce the diplomatic and normalized versions offered on the CD-
ROMs. In customary, printed editions there is no possible gap between the pages on offer and 
their basic encoding. This does not carry over into the electronic realm where digital code has 
to be re-implemented in order to be perceptible. The need for secondary processing 
introduces a discrepancy which can be used to shield off operative background information 
from its surface rendition. Electronic documents offer spectacular improvements over many of 
the usual features of printed texts. Ironically, it is just because of their versatility that 
mechanisms to constrain their scope are feasible - and called for. The Bergen edition is just 
one example of a more comprehensive problem that is often overlooked in recent digitization 
campaigns. It is perfectly possible to combine global, digital distribution of information with 
highly selective, exclusive standards of its generation and transmission. While most people 
would be prepared to accept this for cable TV or DVD it should at least be a matter of 
concern in textual scholarship.
This is an area of conflict between claims of copyright holders and the scientific community. 
Broaching this issue is not intended to deflect attention from the impressive achievements of 
the Bergen electronic edition. Its presentation of the material is an epochal advance in 
Wittgenstein scholarship. It is, at the same time, a precursor of many electronic editions yet 
to be published and is apt to trigger a more general discussion on how similar scholarly 
editions might be designed. Disregarding, for the purpose of this conclusion, external 
constraints an optimum solution for (future) computer-savvy scholars would enable them to 
address their texts at any of the three levels that have to constitute a serious editorial 
project: the mark-up, diplomatic and normalized versions should all be manipulable to ensure 
optimum results. It is impossible for any single endeavor to adequately charter the wealth of 
variants and cross-relations in Wittgenstein's Nachlass. But if scholars were able to freely 
access the underlying mark up resources based on the canonical transcription could easily be 
enriched by resources taken from literal computing. As several commentators have pointed 
out, the recent 'Open Source' movement in software management echoes the concepts of 
free peer access and peer review well established within science. In the best case scenario 
source code, e.g. the mark-up version of Wittgenstein's texts, would be freely available. Book 
culture charges relatively little for relatively static texts. Expensive electronic editions offer 
advanced research tools, blocking collaboration based on their data structure. There will be 
an 'open source' Wittgenstein sometime this century.
Currently, a confusing variety of formats is used to tentatively provide comprehensive access 
in selected collections, mainly for corpora from earlier centuries. Projects like CELT, the 'Celtic 
Corpus of Electronic Texts'19and the 'Victorian Women Writer's Project'20 offer browsable 
HTML-front-ends, ftp download of marked-up documents and printable Postscript copies. TMI 
('Thesaurus Musicarum Italicarum')21 or 'The William Blake Archive'22 employ DynaWeb to 
translate SGML-coded files for use with common browsers. At the Wittgenstein archive's web-
site23 TS 201a 'Notes on Logic' and MS 115, 'Philosophische Bemerkungen' are available in 
different versions: HTML frames for concurrent inspection of the diplomatic and normalized 
text and for download in Postscript and Word Perfect format respectively. It remains unclear 
whether electronic publishing will develop standards as transparent as those of traditional 
literary culture. The technological advances we have been discussing are in fact instrumental 
in de-familiarizing earlier standards that have acquired second nature status. New 
opportunities arise, but there is still little institutional background and almost none of the hard 
questions have been answered. Meanwhile, from a philosophical point of view, the 
Wittgenstein papers raise an issue that cuts across old and new forms of writing. 
Wittgenstein's struggle against the linear progression of arguments should neither be 
remodeled as a peaceful exercise in hypertext, nor put to rest in an series of (printed or 
virtual) volumes. The driving force behind the Nachlass is a continuous effort to put together 
the pieces of a number of puzzles that seem to change as this activity unfolds. Nachlass 
means: this process has definitely ended. Digitization of the Nachlass offers an opportunity to 
breath life back into an accumulation of notes.
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THE CHANGED STATE OF WITTGENSTEIN SCHOLARSHIP 
Two independent publishing projects have thoroughly changed the state of Wittgenstein 
scholarship in recent years. Michael Nedo's 'Wiener Ausgabe'1 offers a traditional critical 
edition of Wittgenstein's philosophical writings ranging from 1929 up to and including the 'Big 
Typescript' (1933). Considering the eclectic and - at times - arbitrary editorial policy 
underlying previous publications from the Nachlass2 Nedo's project offers unprecedented 
philosophical rigor as well as textual criticism in volumes designed for comfortable reading. A 
second, more ambitious, attempt at a critical edition is the Bergen electronic edition.3 It is 
planned to include 4 CD-ROMs, covering the entire range of the philosopher's unpublished 
writing. Two disks are currently available, comprising all of Wittgenstein's manuscripts from 
1929-1939, as well as type-scripts, beginning with 'Notes on Logic' (1913) and leading up to 
Typescript 226, composed in 1939.
Wittgenstein's writings from the Thirties are, therefore, available in independent, reliable 
printed and electronic editions respectively. Readers can, for the first time, observe the 
philosopher at work, transferring paragraphs from pocket notebooks to handwritten 'volumes'; 
picking acceptable remarks to be included in type-scripts that are, at a later stage, cut up 
into slips of paper which are again annotated, rearranged and put together in further volumes 
and type-scripts. But this is only half the excitement. The 'Wiener Ausgabe' and the 'Bergen 
Edition' stake their success on different media, inevitably provoking a comparison between the 
well known features of printed scholarly editions and the not so familiar realm of digitized 
texts.
Some of the differences are immediately obvious. Scrutinizing philosophical texts on a printed 
page implies sensual qualities lacking in electronic space. Many readers will prefer a material 
sheet of paper over its virtual substitute. There are, on the other hand, definite advantages 
in digitally stored transcriptions. A CD-ROM does not occupy desk-space and allows almost 
instant access to every single remark of the extended Wittgenstein corpus. In addition to the 
actual texts, the 'Wiener Ausgabe' contains separate volumes of sophisticated registers, 
cross-referencing all the printed material. Considering the fact that the Bergen edition 
includes an excellent search function Nedo's tables are an anachronistic nicety at best. In a 
recent volume Nedo, in fact, announces a 'comprehensive electronic Apparatus, 
supplementing the Wiener Ausgabe'4. And there is simply no viable alternative to an electronic 
medium if one wants to present facsimiles of every page of the Nachlass, suitably linked to 
diplomatic and normalized versions of its content. These features make the Bergen edition a 
far more comprehensive enterprise. It seems that, pace  the predictable skepticism stemming 
from deeply ingrained scholarly habits, there is a convincing case in favor of switching to the 
digital format. The present paper will, at any rate, proceed from this assumption. But matters 
of technical convenience should not be allowed to decide the more profound issues arising 
from the competition of the media involved.
The accessibility of Wittgenstein's texts has been tremendously enhanced by putting them on 
CD-ROMs. If this were information like the listings in a telephone directory one could let the 
issue rest at this point. It might be confined to a discussion of the availability and design of 
necessary electronic interfaces. Philosophical production, and in particular Wittgenstein's 
literary remains, raise more interesting questions, though. Can conceptual content be neatly 
separated from its presentation in a given medium? Since its inception philosophy was done 
by teaching, in scholarly discourse, or by writing books/papers. What will be the impact of 
current digital technology on those traditional practices?5 
The preceding sketch has emphasized several characteristics of electronic texts that printed 
books cannot match. It does not follow that a given work actually demands - or even bears - 
digital treatment. Essential use of single pages, to mention a simple case, cannot easily be 
simulated electronically. The first section of this paper will, therefore, explore what might be 
called the textuality of Wittgenstein's Nachlass. Tracing the development of an important 
Wittgensteinian motive, this exploration surveys part of the newly available material, testing 
the suitability of computer-assisted scholarship to this particular collection of writings. Is 
there a general lesson to be learned from involving oneself in hands-on digital philology? As it 
turns out the Wittgenstein Nachlass provides an excellent occasion to reflect upon the range 
and limits of the Gutenberg heritage. This is discussed in section two. The concluding remarks 
focus on the Bergen edition. Given that digitization does not simply extend the established 
tool-set of textual scholarship but opens up new philosophical perspectives - how well does 
this particular enterprise support (and possibly inspire) a re-configuration of the philological 
status quo?
TOOTHACHES: PHILOLOGY 
The so-called 'private language' argument laid out in Philosophical Investigations §§ 243ff has 
been widely discussed in the literature. One of Wittgenstein's ways to introduce the problem 
is to argue for the incomprehensibility of naming pains in a strictly solipsistic setting. What are 
the circumstances enabling us to identify sensations? We have to participate in interpersonal 
activities expressing e.g. pain.
Wie wäre es, wenn die Menschen ihre Schmerzen nicht äußerten (nicht stöhnten, das Gesicht 
nicht verzögen etc.)? Dann könnte man einem Kind nicht den Gebrauch des Wortes 
'Zahnschmerzen' beibringen. (PhU § 257)
The fleeting reference to toothaches here does not carry conceptual weight in the context of 
the Investigations. But, surprisingly enough, Wittgenstein's earliest treatment of the issues 
that were to lead to his private language argument centers around this very sensation. There 
are at least three methods available to reach the present conclusion. By juxtaposing them we 
get a first glimpse at the possible scope of computer-assisted textual criticism. 
(1) Five volumes of the Wiener Ausgabe have hitherto been published, comprising - in appr. 
1300 pages - Wittgenstein's manuscripts from the time when he took up philosophy again, 
ending his self-imposed moratorium subsequent to the completion of the Tractatus . These 
manuscripts contain, in chronological order, Wittgenstein's discussions of a wide range of 
issues. In essence they are philosophical diaries, freely switching between different matters 
of interest, developing threads of thought up to a certain point, interrupting and returning at 
a later date. One might read through all of this material and pick out remarks concerning 
toothaches. The term appears for the first time on Nov. 19, 1929: 'Warum nenne ich 
Zahnschmerzen ' meine Zahnschmerzen' ?' (MS 107, 199; WA 2, 1146). Wittgenstein then 
develops this motive from different angles up to Dec. 14, 1929 (MS 108, 8f; WA 2,136) and 
returns to discuss it in a loose sequence of remarks from Jan. 31, 1930 (MS 107, 270; WA 2, 
186) to Feb. 7, 1930 (MS 107, 288; WA 2, 196). All of those entries are intermingled with 
reflections on many different topics: probability, theory of measurement, Euclidean geometry, 
realism et.al.. No guiding principle is discernible. Wittgenstein is following his own idiosyncratic 
lines of thought that often consist of digressions, retractions and cognitive jumps. It is not 
impossible, but exceedingly hard, to recognize the making of the private language argument in 
those scattered aphorisms. This should not come as a surprise since, after all, the 
manuscripts are Wittgenstein's philosophical workshop. Philological attention is often informed 
by prior knowledge of the results of such incipient processes.
In the light of Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy the first approach does, anyway, make 
little sense. Examining his manuscripts he picked a number of remarks for dictation. Copies of 
the resulting type-scripts were consequently cut into slips of paper and rearranged according 
to rules that seem to be revised within the organizing process itself. This procedure can be 
appropriately illustrated by tracking the course of Wittgenstein's notes on toothaches. 
Typescript 208, which is an extract from manuscripts 105-108, is only partially preserved.7 As 
far as toothaches are concerned, only the paragraphs dating from Dec. 14, 1929 can be 
found in this compilation. Alois Pichler has reconstructed the likely shape of TS 208. According 
to his conjecture most of the material on toothaches was contained in the missing pages 1-
1448. It reappears, completely rearranged, in TS 209, which is the text source for 
Philosophische Bemerkungen, edited by Rush Rees and published in 1964. Wittgenstein's 
original typescript shows no classifications whatsoever. At first inspection it is simply a very 
long sequence of paragraphs. Rush Rees divided the script into sections and invented groups 
of paragraphs which he numbered according to an undocumented, inscrutable scheme. A 
collection of Wittgenstein's reflections on toothaches happens to make up section VI of 
Philosophische Bemerkungen. This is a promising place to look for the conceptual genesis of 
his later views on mental states, sensations and language.
While all sections of Philosophische Bemerkungen are the invention of Rush Rees it is, 
nevertheless, also true that it was Wittgenstein who assembles the pieces into one particular 
order, thus emphazising his interest in an analysis of how first-person talk determines our 
understanding of pain. These notes have been available for a long time and attentive readers 
have doubtlessly noticed connections between them and later discussions of similar issues. 
This material was, however, entirely separated from its context of origin, a stand-alone 
compilation of philosophical insights. There is nothing per se wrong with restricting oneself to 
this state of affairs. It can very well serve as a starting point for enquiries like the present 
essay. Yet, the recent publications from the Nachlass have opened up a range of exiting 
possibilities. What used to be philologically opaque collections of Wittgensteinian ideas can 
now be disassembled and regarded as intermediate results of an ongoing process of creative 
writing and revision. It has become feasible not only to identify the building blocks of 
Wittgenstein's more elaborate editorial arrangements but - what is more important - to 
actually observe his philosophical labor, i.e. the decision process leading from day-to-day 
notes towards (as he envisaged it) eventual publication of his thoughts.
(2) Conventional methodology offers indices and synopses to assist such an enterprise. Both 
are provided by the Wiener Ausgabe, suggesting a second approach to access the 
Wittgensteinian corpus. 'Toothache' is an index entry; it can be looked up and the resulting 
items can in turn be traced through the Wittgenstein papers. Wiener Ausgabe - Apparatus, 
Register zu den Bänden 1-5 consists entirely of tables correlating every single paragraph from 
the manuscripts to its subsequent occurances in these volumes and (more commonly) to its 
location within the Philosophische Bemerkungen or Philosophische Grammatik. On Nov. 29, 
1929 Wittgenstein noted:
Von Sinnesdaten in dem Sinne des Wortes in dem es undenkbar ist daß der Andere sie hat, 
kann man eben aus diesem Grunde auch nicht sagen, daß der Andere sie nicht hat. Und aus 
ebendiesem Grunde ist es sinnlos zu sagen, daß  ich im Gegensatz zum Anderen sie habe. (MS 
107, 215f; WA 2, 124)
As the synopsis shows this remark was included in TS 209 (aka Philosophische Bemerkungen) 
presumably in mid-19309 as entry VI, 61 and taken up again on Jun. 1, 1932, when 
Wittgenstein started a revision of his earlier ideas on the topic. Investigating this kind of 
dependency is standard procedure in textual criticism. Until very recently this had to be done 
by consulting printed synopses. It seems fair to say that there is very little sense in carrying 
on the old way, if the advance of digital technologies is taken into account.
The point is not just that it is quite cumbersome to work with multiple versions of basically 
the same paragraph located in different places in various bound volumes. This impediment 
could be alleviated by liberal use of the xerox machine. Printed synopses of material as 
complex as Wittgenstein's Nachlass face a more serious problem. It seems next to impossible 
to combine indexing and synopsis. The reader is presented with either a list of significant 
terms or a table of correlations of textual segments. She cannot simultaneously look for the 
occurance of a word and the history of rearrangements of the paragraph it is included in. No 
one would finance a series of books (or care to use them) containing the astronomical number 
of relations between index entries and changes of contexts in gory detail. Consider the remark 
quoted above. Instinctively one would at least consider the terms 'Sinnesdaten', 'Sinn', 'Wort', 
'der Andere', 'Grund', 'sinnlos' and 'Gegensatz'.10 The quote considered here does not even 
contain the term 'Zahnschmerzen' which is, at this point, Wittgenstein's guiding paradigm. 
Imagine all those terms put into correlation with all the changes of their occurrences 
elsewhere in the Nachlass. The ensuing combinatorial explosion effectively prevents putting 
the result on paper. In the present case one cannot have a general, usable, semantics-to-
(section)-numbers and (section)-numbers-to-(section-)numbers mapping, one on top of the 
other, in a print medium.
(3) It is easily done if the texts have been properly digitized. Since words are encoded by 
numbers it is quite simple to set up an index and it takes just another couple of numbers to 
represent the trace of 'words' to and from given contexts. Much of this can be done 
automatically; there is no need to actually visualize the necessary relational apparatus. If a 
correlation seems interesting it can be called up at will, with no time lost for browsing, 
copying or shuffling around papers. Searching for 'Zahnschmerzen' in the Bergen edition 
immediately yields 138 hits across the entire collection. The search can be restricted to 
particular (groups of) volumes and modified to include co-occurring or proximate terms as well 
as dates. A query for 'Sinnesdaten and Zahnschmerzen' produces as a result precisely three 
common occurances. First is a paragraph from MS 114 (MS 114, 16; WA 5, 179) into which 
Wittgenstein had assimilated separate earlier notes, followed by its typescript derivatives in 
TS 211, 755 and TS 213, 510 (Big Typescript). The quote previously presented (MS 107, 
215f; WA 2, 124), lacking the term 'Zahnschmerzen', is picked out among the 30 hits returned 
by querying 'Sinnesdaten'. It occurs in a stand-alone paragraph in TS 209, 23 (PhB VI, 61) 
and is flagged accordingly. In other words: a couple of straightforward enquiries lead directly 
to an important juncture in Wittgenstein's investigation of the logic of talk about sense 
impressions and toothaches in particular.
But wait. There is something suspicious about the last sentence. Manipulation of the index 
mechanism per se cannot produce important results. The disappearance of manifest meaning 
is, in fact, the price to pay for enhanced electronic facilities. One can easily pick any 
combination of terms and search constraints - but there is no guarantee whatsoever that this 
will lead to an interesting result. So where does 'importance' come in? This is a category of 
reflective assessment, crucially different from automated procedures. The discrepancy is at 
the center of any discussion about computer-assisted philology. A certain amount of cheating 
is necessary to reach the comfortable conclusion presented in the previous paragraph. 
Criteria enabling one to judge upon the importance of algorithmic procedures have to be 
presupposed in order for such procedures to be of any help. To put it very simply: elaborate 
tools are of little help without knowledge of their proper use. One has to have a hunch about 
the possible significance of a term to profitably employ the electronic search function. The 
non-sequitur above may serve as a reminder to first-generation digital scholars. It is easy to 
fall into the trap of overestimating technology. None of the powerful programming at work 
below the WYSIWYG-surface guarantees philosophical content. 
The difficulty, consequently, is the following one: How can technological advancements in 
textual criticism be constrained by a sense of proportion relating to a prior understanding of 
the subject matter. This type of question is well-known and often discussed between 
technophiles and technophobes. The present paper is a case study, trying to answer the 
question for one particular instance of the general problem. But we have not yet assembled 
the necessary evidence. It remains quite unclear why a philosopher should worry about 
toothaches. A powerful mechanism has been sketched, yet it is fair to assume that 
Wittgenstein scholars go about their business projecting hypotheses to understand the 
complexities of the Nachlass quite independently. The above account does not include a 
reason for using the mechanism. Providing such reasons is itself a philosophical activity. This 
section has offered a rough overview of the itinerary of some sample paragraphs. One has to 
explore their content and in particular the conceptual significance of their itinerary in order to 
get the full picture. A satisfactory answer to the issue at stake between digital technology 
and its critics has to appeal to philosophy in action.
TOOTHACHES: PHILOSOPHY 
Wittgenstein's first entry into manuscript 107 refers back to the Tractatus . There he had 
claimed: 'Das denkende, vorstellende, Subjekt gibt es nicht.' (5.631) And he had explained 
this dictum by pointing to the visual field: 'nichts am Gesichtsfeld läßt darauf schließen, daß 
es von einem Auge gesehen wird.' ( Tractatus  5.633). Compare MS 107, 1 (WA 2,3): 'Der 
Gesichtsraum so wie er ist hat seine selbständige Realität. Er selbst enthält kein Subjekt. Er 
ist autonom.' In 1929 Wittgenstein's anti-intentionalism is still in place, but his views on 
atomic sentences begin to change. The basic units of his epistemological account are not 
single sentences any more: 'Ich lege nicht den Satz als Maßstab an die Wirklichkeit an 
sondern das System von Sätzen.' (MS 107, 35; WA 2, 149) The logic of color terms has, as 
Wittgenstein discovered, to take account of the field of possibilities given by the spectrum. 
Atomic sentences cannot be independent of each other since 'This plate is blue' logically 
implies - among many other propositions - that it is not red. Yet, this is not a tautology. 
Given the visual field and the customary color space one has a priori knowledge of the 
structural dependencies of possible colors. To look for any actual one necessarily includes 
mastery of a presupposed color scheme. 'Wie es einen Sinn hat zu sagen die Farbe R ist am 
Ort P wenn ich überhaupt den Gesichtsraum mit dem Farbraum "vor mir" habe.' (MS 107, 158; 
WA 2, 92) Wittgenstein's quotes indicate that he is still officially unwilling to grant the 
existence of a subject. But it is interesting to take a closer look at his day's work (Oct. 10, 
1929).
The point of reference of the previous quote ('Wie es einen Sinn hat ...') are stomach aches. 
Wittgenstein is discussing the meaning of negation. How can one truthfully deny the presence 
of stomach aches? Such sentences seem to lack external sensual corroboration. They cannot 
be constructed as somehow linking stomachs and pains either. 'Es ist nur wesentlich, daß ich 
den Raum vor mir habe in dem der Magen liegt und den worin die Schmerzen liegen.' (MS 107, 
157; WA 2, 92) Like colors within the visual field pains are a kind of sensation constitutivly 
associated with stomachs. This seems an unobjectionable parallel - with a twist. We have 
noted Wittgenstein's avoidance of the common notion of a subject in his discussion of the 
visual field. This strategy cannot, however, be carried over to the case of 'internal' 
sensations. There is nothing comparable to the geometry of shared, public, visible spaces in 
the realm of our intestines. If you remove the subject from stomach aches not even the 
illusion of a legitimate issue remains. Switching from the visual field to internal sensations, 
Wittgenstein's doctrine of the subject is severely shaken. He cannot but employ the first 
person pronoun in these contexts, even though his commitment is to exclude it from the 
scientific vocabulary. Such is the dilemma apparent in his first remark on toothaches: 'Warum 
nenne ich Zahnschmerzen " meine Zahnschmerzen" '? (MS 107, 199; WA 2, 114)
Wittgenstein does not follow any pre-set agenda that could lead to a systematic 
investigation of various modalities of the senses. His move from vision to stomach aches to 
tooth aches is obviously not aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive view. Ten 
days after raising the issue of toothaches being my toothaches Wittgenstein comes up with 
the brilliant aphorism quoted above. The private language argument is, in nuce, contained in 
two extremely compact sentences (MS 107, 215f; WA 2, 124). If another person cannot be 
said to be the subject of my internal sense data it is meaningless to deny her those very 
sense data. Their possible occurrences do not include this kind of bearer. Alas, this is no 
comfort for anyone tempted to regard awareness of one's own intentional states as privileged 
knowledge. There is no force in such pronouncements. I cannot determine something uniquely 
subjective in appealing to an incomprehensible option, i.e. another person's having my internal 
states. The Tractatus  view of the subject was of a metaphysical entity, a border of the 
World, not part of it ( Tractatus 5.641). The early post-Tractarian manuscripts are gradually 
abandoning this dualism, conceding a role for first-person talk. Yet, most of the original 
skepticism remains. How can one conceive of a role for 'private' sensations and avoid 
idealism?
Such questions are external to Wittgenstein's writing in the manuscripts. The present sketch 
puts emphasis on only a small number of issues discussed within those volumes. The general 
line of argument is, however, supported by Wittgenstein's own subsequent selective rewriting 
of the material. When he cut up TS 208 to rearrange its content into what is now known as 
the Philosophische Bemerkungen, one of his points of emphasis was toothaches. His 
discussion of logical features of talk about the subject centers around a selection of remarks 
devoted to the remarkable fact of me - Ludwig Wittgenstein - having toothaches (cf. PhB VI, 
58). This revision introduces complexity of a higher order. Many of Wittgenstein's paragraphs 
are initially small, self-contained philosophical analyses. The next auctorial step is to try and 
put them together so that some larger, overarching connection is established. Philosophische 
Bemerkungen VI does, in fact, offer extremely dense philosophical substance, much too 
involved to be discussed here. Just an outline of Wittgenstein's strategy of using his 
arrangements as arguments can be given.
A first group of remarks, serving as a kind of prolegomenon, is derived from entries for Dec. 
14, 1929 and Oct. 11, 1929, expounding the general direction of the succeeding paragraphs. 
The use of the first person pronoun is fraught with difficulties, particularly if talk about 
perception is modelled according to external circumstances. 'I am experiencing a red patch' is 
quoted as a case in point. To analyze the difficulties one might re-write the puzzling 
descriptions, substituting some un-objectionable term for the offensive 'I'. This exercise is 
next. Remarkably, Wittgenstein switches from sense impressions to internal sensation again, 
as he designs a language game supposed to exhibit the same logical multiplicity as the 
common idiom and yet to avoid mention of a subject. His idea is to externalize the privileged 
position of subjectivity by designating one particular person as an universal point of 
reference. If 'I am' Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'I have toothaches' becomes 'There are toothaches' 
and 'A has toothaches' can be rephrased as 'A behaves like Ludwig Wittgenstein when there 
are toothaches'. (PhBemerkungen VI, 58). The apparent uniqueness of subjective experience 
is transformed into a qualitative difference in public discourse; the mysterious realm of 
subjectivity replaced by an idiom of matching complexity: everyone can take center stage in 
this language. Once this focus is set the remaining moves of the language game are 
equivalent to the traditional one. Wittgenstein offers a playful simile. The logic of first-person 
talk recalls oriental despotism, with the subject taking the place of the despot in providing 
the origin of the communicative coordinate system.
The point is that talk about sensations is inevitably dualistic. 'The subject' - as well as an 
oriental despot - is supposed to fall outside ordinary discourse directed towards physical 
things. If Timur Lenk's state of health is taken as the measuring device of health-talk it makes 
no sense to ask whether he has toothaches. In the event, toothaches simply are among his 
personal states and having toothaches is a condition derived from this primordial condition. 
Even though Wittgenstein has thus eliminated first-person talk the Tractarian criterion of 
meaning fails, however. It is impossible to attribute possession of toothaches or lack thereof 
to a suitably designated individuum. (The discussion prefigures later reflections on the Paris 
ur-meter.) After this setting of the stage Wittgenstein embarks on a series of grammatical 
investigations, exploring the comprehensibility of our dualistic idiom. There is no obvious way 
to stratify his dialectical dialogues into a single argument. 'I cannot feel your toothaches.' 
Does this sentence express an empirical truth or rather a kind of logical necessity 
Wittgenstein had not provided for in his Tractatus? (cf. PhB VI, 61) Rather than answering 
questions like this, Wittgenstein keeps changing his focus and his examples, circling around 
the issues. What is he up to? To a casual reader it looks like an open-ended, aporetic 
elenchus. But Wittgenstein, surprisingly, and without so much as minimal warning, does 
actually close his argument by the strategic placement of one paragraph.
Wittgenstein's transposition of first person talk was anchored in the neutral statement: 'There 
are toothaches'. The following quote is an obvious echo, concluding the argument:
Das Phänomen des Schmerzgefühls in einem Zahn, welches ich kenne, ist in der 
Ausdrucksweise der gewöhnlichen Sprache dargestellt durch ' ich habe in dem und dem Zahn 
Schmerzen'. Nicht durch einen Ausdruck von der Art, 'an diesem Ort ist ein Schmerzgefühl'. 
(PhB VI, 66)
As it turns out, it is impossible to capture the subjectivist intuitions in Wittgenstein's 
alternative scheme. There cannot be pains outside of consciousness. Designating a physical 
body to be the paradigmatic bearer of pain is no better than ascribing pain to some tooth put 
on a table ( Philosophische Bermerkungen VI, 65). Timur Lenk is, inevitably, located in public 
space, so we are back to Wittgenstein's initial reminder: the problem arises because physical 
circumstances are inappropriately projected onto another context.
Das ganze Feld dieser Erfahrung wird in dieser Sprache durch Ausdrücke von der Form 'ich 
habe ...' beschrieben. Die Sätze von der Form 'N hat Zahnschmerzen' sind für ein ganz 
anderes Feld reserviert. (PhB VI, 66) 
In other words: Wittgenstein advises himself to desist from trying to battle ordinary language. 
He is quite aware of the tension: In order to unravel the philosophical knot one has to re-
trace the complicated movements underlying it. Thus ends the second take on toothaches. 
Resting content with the ordinary was, however, always a temporary affair for Wittgenstein. 
In 1932 we find him returning to the very issues he had supposedly resolved in MS 110, 30ff 
(WA5, 179ff). These are the quotes remarked upon earlier in this paper: Wittgenstein's 
second, condensing revision of the material on toothaches.
This third stratum of the textual evidence and its further development will not be pursued 
here. The sole purpose of the preceding intermezzo was to redress the balance between the 
digital toolkit and topics in established Wittgenstein scholarship. The problem was to mediate 
between proponents of largely syntactic manipulation of linguistic data and traditional 
approaches that turn to texts with a prior understanding of their subject matter. The way to 
escape a stand-off is to refuse the contra-position from the very start. Semantic data-
mining11 as exemplified by the previous sub-section, is simultaneously an exercise in digital 
philology and philosophy. Wittgenstein's Nachlass is an excellent place to look for such a 
synthesis because the author's ideas are, to a large extent, expressed by arranging and 
rearranging small textual units. Tracking the dynamics of Wittgenstein's philosophical 
variations can, admittedly, be done in the conventional framework of a printed edition of his 
manuscripts and type-scripts. Computer-assisted procedures do, however, push philology 
towards horizons previously out of reach. To repeat: No collection of printed volumes can 
conceivably present any synopsis of any terms, occurring at arbitrary dates, in just a few 
seconds. Such opportunities are bound to have a major impact on future Wittgenstein 
scholarship. This concludes the philological assessment of conventional versus digital 
approaches to the Wittgenstein papers. A more detached attitude has already been hinted 
at. It seems that Wittgenstein's writing is particularly well suited to a post-Gutenberg 
environment. In order to get the full picture regarding the Bergen edition we have to take a 
closer look at Wittgenstein's failure to turn his writings into a book.
BEYOND BOOKS 
J.C. Nyíri has made a strong case for considering the Wittgenstein Nachlass in the light of 
recent media philosophy. Quoting Walter Ong and Erich Havelock he reminds his readers of the 
prospect that the age of literacy might be giving way to a period of secondary orality, with 
the spoken word regaining the most influential position in a broadcast society. According to 
Nyíri's suggestion Wittgenstein's failure to distinguish between the written and the spoken 
word might explain his 'ultimate inability to complete the "book" he always wanted to 
complete'12. The ductus of his writings is, indeed, more akin to on-going conversations than 
to neatly delineated propositions. Did Wittgenstein miss the adequate medium for his 
exertions? Nyíri draws attention to the fact that his writing is, in certain places, a direct 
rejoinder to the Socratic dialogues. 'Ich finde bei Plato auf eine Frage wie 'was ist Erkenntnis' 
nicht die vorläufige Antwort: Sehen wir einmal nach, wie dieses Wort gebraucht wird.' (TS 
211, 17) Wittgenstein's inverse Socratic role consists in dissolving platonic confidence in 
essences and is, therefore, ill suited to be put into a classical philosophical treatise. As Nyíri 
(following Havelock) rightly reminds us, Platonic ideas are inextricably connected to the rise of 
literacy over an oral tradition which lacked expressive means for a proper treatment of 
abstract terms. Yet, Wittgenstein could have rested content with his actual teaching, leaving 
it to his disciples to provide written records. He did not do so, but rather forced himself, 
against better knowledge, to conform to the given standard.
Wenn ich für mich denke ohne ein Buch schreiben zu wollen, so springe ich um das Thema 
herum; das ist die einzige mir natürliche Denkweise. In einer Reihe gezwungen fortzudenken ist 
mir eine Qual. Soll ich es nun überhaupt probieren? Ich verschwende unsägliche Mühe auf ein 
Anordnen der Gedanken, das vielleicht gar keinen Wert hat. (MS 118, 185)
The key word is 'vielleicht' indicating Wittgenstein's ambivalent ambitions to write a book. His 
difficulties are methodologically profound. One way to bring this into focus is to position them 
at the crossroads between books and hypertext.
Decades of Wittgenstein scholarship have been shaped by editorial decisions made by the 
trustees of the Nachlass. Their general policy was to present provisional steps in 
Wittgenstein's ongoing process of revision as standalone volumes, often effacing the 
dynamics demonstrated in the preceding section. David Stern, in his perceptive paper, 
correctly describes the state of affairs.
The Wittgenstein Nachlass is not a haphazard pile of working papers that happened to survive 
his death, nor is it a collection of works that only awaited publication. While it is both a 
carefully selected and highly structured record of his life's work, a collection of material that 
he deliberately assembled and left to posterity, it is also the record of a writer continually in 
flux, never entirely satisfied with anything he had written.13  
In view of this situation it actually seems a little unfair to reapproach the editors of 
Wittgenstein's posthumous writing. There is no good way to capture the activity vividly 
described by Stern into the confines of a printed volume. Despite outward appearances there 
are no 'works of Wittgenstein' that could confidently be taken as points of departure. Even 
the Philosophische Untersuchungen are, as Stern observes, 'only one of a number of possible 
arrangements Wittgenstein proposed, many of which extend, amplify, or cast light on the 
remarks in the published book.'14 References to current models of textual interdependency 
become almost irresistible at this point. 'Because the Wittgenstein Nachlass is the result of 
such an extensive act of rewriting, it is less a collection of texts than a hypertext, an 
interconnected network of remarks.'15 Stern's remarks certainly point into the right direction. 
Still, there are some intermediary steps between the range of options available to 
Wittgenstein and writing that is embedded in digital technology. Those steps have to be 
spelled out if one wants to get a grasp on how the CD-ROM edition might change out habits 
of scholarship based on self-contained books. 
One feature of a culture based on books deserves special attention as this culture is 
challenged by the advent of digital, globally distributed information. Books are marked by the 
coincidence of two seperate decisions: their content and its appearance are determined 
simultaneously. This is what publication of a book, in effect, amounts to - and it throws some 
light on Wittgenstein's qualms. He felt unable to decide on one shape for his ideas. 
Publication, throughout European history, simply meant drawing a line between a creative 
process and its (albeit provisional) results. Sending a manuscript to the publisher was to 
distinguish a line between sketches, preliminary attempts, experimental drafts and an entity 
exhibiting both the features of the most prestigious information technology and of auctorial 
closure. Books divided the lifetime of an author into continuous activity and singular results, 
texts that, from a certain moment in time, assume a life of their own. This arrangement is 
being thoroughly shaken by the advent of new media. First of all, digital encoding disrupts the 
familiar coordination between form and content. Characters are mapped into numbers that 
are, in turn, symbolized in an electronic format unsuitable for direct perception. And this 
transposition, secondly, triggers dramatic changes in the nature of publicity. Electronic texts 
can instantly be published to a world audience and still be constantly revised.
In the given context it is particularly instructive to notice the implication for posthumous 
'works'. In the world of books a Nachlass is defined as all the material an author did not 
manage or see fit to get printed. Its peculiar character is that future generations retro-
activly elevate such writing to the status of books. If books published by an author are what 
software developers call a 'feature-freeze', publications from a Nachlass are based on 
decisions to overrule such limitations. There is no way to escape the allure of 'works' in book 
culture. In Nachlass-publications auxiliary authors assume responsibility to supplement a 
writer's oeuvre with 'second order' books. Applying this to the case at hand yields a 
suggestive prospect. While the trustees failed to do justice to Wittgenstein's open-ended, 
conversations philosophical style, a digital edition of the Nachlass is much better suited to 
achieve this aim. Such an enterprise is not forced to turn a collection of tentative designs 
into bound volumes. The 'Wiener Ausgabe' seems set to publish the largely repetetive material 
from 1929-1933 in 12 weighty volumes. Michael Nedo sounds apologetic in defending this 
expenditure:
... the book is still the carrier of thoughts, of written heritage in our culture, and familiarity 
with this medium certainly affects not only one's dealings with the texts themselves, but also 
the accompanying Apparatuses.16  
One does not have to subscribe to deconstruction to find this eulogy anachronistic. The 
transitory character of Wittgenstein's writing, its complex genealogy and its numerous 
recapitulations seem to call for a digital format of presentation which matches its inherent 
temporality by avoiding ultimate editorial decisions and allowing easy manipulation of the 
textual material.
Impressions like these, convincing as they may sound - once again - overstress technology. 
Wittgenstein, it is true, despaired of achieving the linear order demanded by a printed book. 
But this does not imply that hypertext could have solved his problem. His desparation is the 
important feature: the fight against a spell cast upon his writing by the demands of books 
culture. He worried about the correct arrangement of his ideas, so much is obvious from the 
examples discussed above. One understanding of 'hypertext' is of segments of texts linked 
together in a more or less haphazard way, often without any single, controling authority. This 
meaning is certainly not applicable to Wittgenstein. He could have saved himself a lot of 
trouble had he been prepared to regard his writing as a kind of private web-space. A second 
understanding might be more appropriate. Hypertext can also refer to autonomous non-linear 
writing which transcends the obligatory step-by-step sequence of print-products by 
constructing a topological matrix without hierarchical order. Digitized texts are encoded as 
numbers and have to be re-established in a legible format. Visualization by a monitor is one 
step removed from the pages of a book and offers flexibility unmatched by their arrangement. 
Wittgenstein's famous metaphor of wandering through a philosophical landscape comes to 
mind. The Nachlass does, in fact, contain a number of tentative registers that could easily be 
implemented as a hypertext.17 
This is one side of Wittgenstein's struggle with conventional means of expressing thoughts. 
But his need for a different kind of complexity is offset by an equally important desire. In 
many places he insists on finding definitive answers. This motive, manifest in the Tractatus , 
is also present in Wittgenstein's later calls for 'Übersichtlichkeit' (surveyability) and well laid-
out description:
Wir wollen nicht das Regelsystem für die Verwendung unserer Worte in unerhörter Weise 
verfeinern oder vervollständigen. Denn die Klarheit, die wir anstreben, ist allerdings eine 
vollkommene. Aber das heißt nur, daß die philosophischen Probleme vollkommen verschwinden 
sollen. (PhU § 133)
In this context, the 'treatment' of philosophical problems is likened to therapeutical 
intervention and its ultimate aim is to put vexing thoughts to rest. Such an attitude cannot 
be easily reconciled with calls for open-ended auctorial multiplicity and the suspension of 
binding results. Wittgenstein's 'hypertext' avant la lettre arises from unsuccessful attempts at 
closure rather than from intentional design. It does not anticipate a more flexible medium 
which might alleviate the rigor of philosophical arguments. As the Nachlass material on 
toothaches shows, Wittgenstein did not simply reject the linear progression of thoughts in 
favor of a compilation of aphorisms. He actually proposes a solution - even though it does not 
satisfy him in the long run. Look at it this way: If he had been able to reach a satisfactory 
conclusion he would have put it into print. Hypertext, on the other hand, is by design non-
conclusive. Had Wittgenstein used hypertext, his characteristic struggle against premature 
closure would have been lost. Hypertext lacks the kind of physical inertia needed to make a 
sentence stick to a certain position and while Wittgenstein kept overturning pre-established 
patterns of thought and inferences he never abandoned his drive to return to 
straightforward, easily surveyable positions.
Wir sind aufs Glatteis geraten, wo die Reibung fehlt, also die Bedingungen in gewissem Sinn 
ideal sind, aber wir eben deshalb auch nicht gehen können. Wir wollen gehen; dann brauchen 
wir Reibung. Zurück auf den rauhen Boden. (PhU § 107)
Wittgenstein would, in all likelihood, have extended this complaint against free-floating 
philosophical speculation to l'art pour l'art hypertext.
To sum up and focus on the case at hand: Electronic texts are not just a kind of print; the 
graphical rendering of information on a monitor is no 'page' in any ordinary sense. It is 
tempting - and to some extent plausible - to distinguish Wittgenstein's writing from 
conventional philosophical authorship by employing jargon from media studies. Actually putting 
his Nachlass on a CD-ROM adds considerable complexity to the story. There is an important 
difference between a writer's decision to publish his or her work (in whatever format) and 
someone else administering a heritage. Nachlass publications, including electronic editions, are 
per definitionem second order closures. The flexibility of digitized texts is of another order as 
Wittgenstein's work in progress. How those papers are to be rendered on CD-ROMs is by no 
means self-evident. It is easy to pretend that the Bergen project is just an extension of well-
known editorial strategies. Such an attitude does, however, seriously underestimate the 
range of problems involved. All the conveniences set forth in the previous pages do not come 
for free. The change from books to computers is in itself an important theoretical and political 
issue. Putting Wittgenstein on disk demands a considerable number of decisions beyond the 
scope of printed editions. This is new territory, hardly even noticed as a philosophical issue 
amongst Wittgenstein scholars.
THE POLITICS OF DIGITAL TEXTS 
The Bergen electronic edition effaces its own novelty. Its structuring principle are the 
physical volumes of the Nachlass which are presented one after the other in linear sequence. 
The search facilities include easy access to single manuscripts or type-scripts. Facsimiles 
provide unprecedented opportunities to scrutinize Wittgenstein's actual output.The electronic 
edition might be argued to beat its print competitors at their own game. One apparent 
platitude is of utmost importance, though. Digitized texts need computers which need 
software which needs operating systems. In centuries of print culture we have become 
accustomed to the fact that once a book is published it is freely accessible to readers 
without further effort. Historical pictures of lockable books raise amused smiles. Yet, they are 
not a bad analogy to so-called digital books: in order to read them one needs additional 
devices, even 'keys'. Book publishing is a business charging once per item, regardless of its 
further use. But those products are, nowadays, revealed as just one interface to information. 
In many respects digital documents offer more convenient access to identical content. This 
surplus value has a price: a set of electronic equipment is inserted between the reader and 
her text. Once they have been published (and as long as they are in print) books are available 
without further decoding. As everyone who has to exchange files on the internet knows, this 
is far from true for electronic documents. Different computer platforms, different word 
processors and conflicting versions tend to produce confusions unheard of in former times.
The reason for this is that there are several competing standards to implement a mapping 
between alpha-numerical symbols and digital numbers. Strictly speaking only the basic letters, 
numerals and diacritical signs of the English alphabet are interchangeable on any platform. 
Different sets of characters, and in particular the elaborate additional code necessary to 
simulate printed pages on a monitor, demand special attention. International bodies are in 
charge of supervising the encoding of the world's languages. Software simulation of written 
material, however, obeys different rules. It is to a considerable extent a commercial affair and 
subject to the laws of economics. The result is, predictably, a considerable variety of 
proprietary software tools trying to get their share of the market by offering particularly 
comfortable - and mutually incompatible - features. This is the state of affairs confronting 
any digitization of texts. Two minimalistic approaches are either to scan existing pages or to 
stick to 7-bit ASCII code in transcribing them electronically. It is immediately obvious that 
neither of these options is satisfactory for a textual corpus of the degree of complexity of the 
Wittgenstein Nachlass. The editors were faced with a situation unprecedented in ordinary 
publishing. They had to decide upon a software package capable of producing the desired 
results, which also meant forcing that package upon the readers. Textual scholarship finds 
itself on unfamiliar terrain. The tools it needs to even access its subject matter are produced 
by big companies with only marginal interest in the academy.
The Bergen edition runs on the Windows platform (Windows 3.1, 3.11, Windows 95 and 
Windows NT4 according to the promotion sheet). For word-processing capacity it uses a 
program named 'FolioViews' which provides the usual services: cut and paste, printing, 
searching, window control, electronic bookmarks and back tracing. For scholars who habitually 
use the Microsoft range of products and do not worry about the ensuing dependency of their 
basic data on market competition these are excellent choices, even though some of its 
limitations will affect the ordinary user. The entire collection of normalized and diplomatic 
transcripts is put into a single binary file respectively. (The facsimiles are offered as single 
graphic documents, one per physical page.) Consequently, two huge electronic files contain 
the entire content of the Bergen edition in a completely opaque format. The user is allowed to 
read and manipulate texts via FolioViews but none of the structural information that has been 
presented in the first section of this paper is directly accessible to her. She can copy 
selected texts, paste and print them - but neither can she touch the indexing mechanism nor 
modify any of the underlying data. There is a strict separation between interface and non-
transparent, computational deep structure. Copyright considerations are a prominent reason 
for this arrangement: the content of a printed book cannot as easily be reproduced, 
manipulated and distributed as its digital counterpart. Provisions have to be taken to protect 
the investment put into such long-term projects. Media change unsettles venerable customs. 
The traditional understanding was that the result of scholarly work, most often financed by 
the taxpayer's money, are generally available in their entirety. This feature does, indeed, 
distinguish scholarship from commercially induced research. As teams of experts have to use 
proprietary software to reassure the copyright-holders and ensure the profit for the publishing 
house, this availability is restricted. But, it might be objected, where is the problem? 
Wittgenstein's writings are at one's disposal, all of them and in an extremely comfortable 
fashion. True enough, judged by the standards of the printed book. Yet, as was discussed in 
section two, Wittgenstein's Nachlass transcends the limits of such standards and an 
electronic edition might be better suited to capture those peculiarities. It might be organized 
so as to mirror Wittgenstein's editorial techniques, starting with single remarks as elementary 
building blocks and putting them together in a variety of ways, following Wittgenstein's lead. 
His working process, not its result, could be taken as the guiding principle. As a matter of fact 
the encapsulated FolioViews file is the very opposite of hypertext.18 Yet, the Bergen edition 
does not offer any tools to actually rearrange its content or redesign its appearance on the 
primary level. For all its flexibility and ease of use the Bergen edition is still in the conceptual 
grip of classical printed editions. Does it have to mimic the necessities of print culture?
The question turns on the issue of access to the internal, structural information hidden inside 
the binary files. Under present conditions one can find a particular paragraph and all of its 
subsequent instances as they appear in the later volumes. It is, however, impossible to break 
out of the straitjacket of the von Wright classification and deal with paragraphs as basic data 
units. If this were possible digital equivalences of Wittgenstein's notes could be freely 
assembled and re-assembled. As of now one is, for example, presented with manuscripts 105-
108 plus typescripts 208-209 plus manuscript 110 and has to extract relevant paragraphs for 
personal post-processing. A more appropriate way might be to pick out relevant paragraphs 
(e.g. on toothaches) and re-assemble them at bottom level, echoing the author's own 
procedure. It would be an attractive way to overcome the Nachlass effect of irrevocable 
closure. The internal dynamics of the Wittgenstein papers would be much more in evidence if 
a more open digital format had been chosen. Years of labor have been spent on the electronic 
transcription of the original documents. The records of the Wittgenstein archive do in fact 
contain all the information necessary for micrological analysis and multiple synthesis. The use 
of the CD-ROM, however, remains restricted to find, cut and paste with no provisions to 
address the editorial information from outside FolioViews. In order to visualize the conclusion 
on toothaches from the first section one might want to write a small program. It could not 
operate on the existing data structure which would have to be re-inscribed onto copies of 
segments extracted from the database.
This is the place to touch upon some basic issues in the theory and practice of text 
encoding. The discussion of the peculiar overlap between the requirements of digitization and 
commercial interests at the beginning of this section deliberately omitted an alternative 
possibility. Standard General Markup Language (SGML) is an attempt to avoid dependency on 
proprietary formats and irreconcilable software development with regard to electronic texts. 
The idea is, briefly, to supplement the alpha-numeric ciphers with additional (groups of) 
characters ('mark up') that serve the purpose of encoding meta-information by means of the 
available, restricted set of ASCII code. HTML, the language of the World Wide Web, in an 
instance of SGML. An easy example of mark up is the use (in HTML) of '<h1>' to indicate the 
beginning (and '</h1>' the end) of a top level heading. Such mark up indications do not in 
themselves cause any formatting to be done. (This distinguishes them from the binary code 
inserted into text files by common word processors.) Their function is to delineate the logical 
structure of the document and provide anchors to include additional content (like cross-
references, dates or hierarchical dependencies). A marked-up document can be read on any 
computer platform, the catch being that it needs software to render the mark-up as 
intended. This is a substantial difficulty given the fact that word processing has been much 
more popular with the general public. But consider a Web browser to get the general idea. 
Such browser are software which takes '<h1>Title</h1>' as an input and turns it (e.g.) into
                                                          TITLE
SGML (and its recent variant XML) offers a top-down solution to the problem of incompatible 
standards in text encoding and concurrent information storage.
The Bergen edition is based upon transcriptions of Wittgenstein's original pages into a mark up 
language using the 'Multi-Element Code System' (MECS). This system provides a meta-
grammar that can be implemented in particular instances of transcriptional grammar and is 
well suited to the task of capturing the complexities of Wittgenstein's autographs in a digital 
format. For technical reasons MECS is not entirely compatible with SGML. The thing to keep in 
mind is, however, that the Bergen transcriptions contain the entire set of editorial information 
in mark up format, i.e. in 'tags' that can be addressed in programming constructions. This 
information is filtered to produce the diplomatic and normalized versions offered on the CD-
ROMs. In customary, printed editions there is no possible gap between the pages on offer and 
their basic encoding. This does not carry over into the electronic realm where digital code has 
to be re-implemented in order to be perceptible. The need for secondary processing 
introduces a discrepancy which can be used to shield off operative background information 
from its surface rendition. Electronic documents offer spectacular improvements over many of 
the usual features of printed texts. Ironically, it is just because of their versatility that 
mechanisms to constrain their scope are feasible - and called for. The Bergen edition is just 
one example of a more comprehensive problem that is often overlooked in recent digitization 
campaigns. It is perfectly possible to combine global, digital distribution of information with 
highly selective, exclusive standards of its generation and transmission. While most people 
would be prepared to accept this for cable TV or DVD it should at least be a matter of 
concern in textual scholarship.
This is an area of conflict between claims of copyright holders and the scientific community. 
Broaching this issue is not intended to deflect attention from the impressive achievements of 
the Bergen electronic edition. Its presentation of the material is an epochal advance in 
Wittgenstein scholarship. It is, at the same time, a precursor of many electronic editions yet 
to be published and is apt to trigger a more general discussion on how similar scholarly 
editions might be designed. Disregarding, for the purpose of this conclusion, external 
constraints an optimum solution for (future) computer-savvy scholars would enable them to 
address their texts at any of the three levels that have to constitute a serious editorial 
project: the mark-up, diplomatic and normalized versions should all be manipulable to ensure 
optimum results. It is impossible for any single endeavor to adequately charter the wealth of 
variants and cross-relations in Wittgenstein's Nachlass. But if scholars were able to freely 
access the underlying mark up resources based on the canonical transcription could easily be 
enriched by resources taken from literal computing. As several commentators have pointed 
out, the recent 'Open Source' movement in software management echoes the concepts of 
free peer access and peer review well established within science. In the best case scenario 
source code, e.g. the mark-up version of Wittgenstein's texts, would be freely available. Book 
culture charges relatively little for relatively static texts. Expensive electronic editions offer 
advanced research tools, blocking collaboration based on their data structure. There will be 
an 'open source' Wittgenstein sometime this century.
Currently, a confusing variety of formats is used to tentatively provide comprehensive access 
in selected collections, mainly for corpora from earlier centuries. Projects like CELT, the 'Celtic 
Corpus of Electronic Texts'19and the 'Victorian Women Writer's Project'20 offer browsable 
HTML-front-ends, ftp download of marked-up documents and printable Postscript copies. TMI 
('Thesaurus Musicarum Italicarum')21 or 'The William Blake Archive'22 employ DynaWeb to 
translate SGML-coded files for use with common browsers. At the Wittgenstein archive's web-
site23 TS 201a 'Notes on Logic' and MS 115, 'Philosophische Bemerkungen' are available in 
different versions: HTML frames for concurrent inspection of the diplomatic and normalized 
text and for download in Postscript and Word Perfect format respectively. It remains unclear 
whether electronic publishing will develop standards as transparent as those of traditional 
literary culture. The technological advances we have been discussing are in fact instrumental 
in de-familiarizing earlier standards that have acquired second nature status. New 
opportunities arise, but there is still little institutional background and almost none of the hard 
questions have been answered. Meanwhile, from a philosophical point of view, the 
Wittgenstein papers raise an issue that cuts across old and new forms of writing. 
Wittgenstein's struggle against the linear progression of arguments should neither be 
remodeled as a peaceful exercise in hypertext, nor put to rest in an series of (printed or 
virtual) volumes. The driving force behind the Nachlass is a continuous effort to put together 
the pieces of a number of puzzles that seem to change as this activity unfolds. Nachlass 
means: this process has definitely ended. Digitization of the Nachlass offers an opportunity to 
breath life back into an accumulation of notes.
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THE CHANGED STATE OF WITTGENSTEIN SCHOLARSHIP 
Two independent publishing projects have thoroughly changed the state of Wittgenstein 
scholarship in recent years. Michael Nedo's 'Wiener Ausgabe'1 offers a traditional critical 
edition of Wittgenstein's philosophical writings ranging from 1929 up to and including the 'Big 
Typescript' (1933). Considering the eclectic and - at times - arbitrary editorial policy 
underlying previous publications from the Nachlass2 Nedo's project offers unprecedented 
philosophical rigor as well as textual criticism in volumes designed for comfortable reading. A 
second, more ambitious, attempt at a critical edition is the Bergen electronic edition.3 It is 
planned to include 4 CD-ROMs, covering the entire range of the philosopher's unpublished 
writing. Two disks are currently available, comprising all of Wittgenstein's manuscripts from 
1929-1939, as well as type-scripts, beginning with 'Notes on Logic' (1913) and leading up to 
Typescript 226, composed in 1939.
Wittgenstein's writings from the Thirties are, therefore, available in independent, reliable 
printed and electronic editions respectively. Readers can, for the first time, observe the 
philosopher at work, transferring paragraphs from pocket notebooks to handwritten 'volumes'; 
picking acceptable remarks to be included in type-scripts that are, at a later stage, cut up 
into slips of paper which are again annotated, rearranged and put together in further volumes 
and type-scripts. But this is only half the excitement. The 'Wiener Ausgabe' and the 'Bergen 
Edition' stake their success on different media, inevitably provoking a comparison between the 
well known features of printed scholarly editions and the not so familiar realm of digitized 
texts.
Some of the differences are immediately obvious. Scrutinizing philosophical texts on a printed 
page implies sensual qualities lacking in electronic space. Many readers will prefer a material 
sheet of paper over its virtual substitute. There are, on the other hand, definite advantages 
in digitally stored transcriptions. A CD-ROM does not occupy desk-space and allows almost 
instant access to every single remark of the extended Wittgenstein corpus. In addition to the 
actual texts, the 'Wiener Ausgabe' contains separate volumes of sophisticated registers, 
cross-referencing all the printed material. Considering the fact that the Bergen edition 
includes an excellent search function Nedo's tables are an anachronistic nicety at best. In a 
recent volume Nedo, in fact, announces a 'comprehensive electronic Apparatus, 
supplementing the Wiener Ausgabe'4. And there is simply no viable alternative to an electronic 
medium if one wants to present facsimiles of every page of the Nachlass, suitably linked to 
diplomatic and normalized versions of its content. These features make the Bergen edition a 
far more comprehensive enterprise. It seems that, pace  the predictable skepticism stemming 
from deeply ingrained scholarly habits, there is a convincing case in favor of switching to the 
digital format. The present paper will, at any rate, proceed from this assumption. But matters 
of technical convenience should not be allowed to decide the more profound issues arising 
from the competition of the media involved.
The accessibility of Wittgenstein's texts has been tremendously enhanced by putting them on 
CD-ROMs. If this were information like the listings in a telephone directory one could let the 
issue rest at this point. It might be confined to a discussion of the availability and design of 
necessary electronic interfaces. Philosophical production, and in particular Wittgenstein's 
literary remains, raise more interesting questions, though. Can conceptual content be neatly 
separated from its presentation in a given medium? Since its inception philosophy was done 
by teaching, in scholarly discourse, or by writing books/papers. What will be the impact of 
current digital technology on those traditional practices?5 
The preceding sketch has emphasized several characteristics of electronic texts that printed 
books cannot match. It does not follow that a given work actually demands - or even bears - 
digital treatment. Essential use of single pages, to mention a simple case, cannot easily be 
simulated electronically. The first section of this paper will, therefore, explore what might be 
called the textuality of Wittgenstein's Nachlass. Tracing the development of an important 
Wittgensteinian motive, this exploration surveys part of the newly available material, testing 
the suitability of computer-assisted scholarship to this particular collection of writings. Is 
there a general lesson to be learned from involving oneself in hands-on digital philology? As it 
turns out the Wittgenstein Nachlass provides an excellent occasion to reflect upon the range 
and limits of the Gutenberg heritage. This is discussed in section two. The concluding remarks 
focus on the Bergen edition. Given that digitization does not simply extend the established 
tool-set of textual scholarship but opens up new philosophical perspectives - how well does 
this particular enterprise support (and possibly inspire) a re-configuration of the philological 
status quo?
TOOTHACHES: PHILOLOGY 
The so-called 'private language' argument laid out in Philosophical Investigations §§ 243ff has 
been widely discussed in the literature. One of Wittgenstein's ways to introduce the problem 
is to argue for the incomprehensibility of naming pains in a strictly solipsistic setting. What are 
the circumstances enabling us to identify sensations? We have to participate in interpersonal 
activities expressing e.g. pain.
Wie wäre es, wenn die Menschen ihre Schmerzen nicht äußerten (nicht stöhnten, das Gesicht 
nicht verzögen etc.)? Dann könnte man einem Kind nicht den Gebrauch des Wortes 
'Zahnschmerzen' beibringen. (PhU § 257)
The fleeting reference to toothaches here does not carry conceptual weight in the context of 
the Investigations. But, surprisingly enough, Wittgenstein's earliest treatment of the issues 
that were to lead to his private language argument centers around this very sensation. There 
are at least three methods available to reach the present conclusion. By juxtaposing them we 
get a first glimpse at the possible scope of computer-assisted textual criticism. 
(1) Five volumes of the Wiener Ausgabe have hitherto been published, comprising - in appr. 
1300 pages - Wittgenstein's manuscripts from the time when he took up philosophy again, 
ending his self-imposed moratorium subsequent to the completion of the Tractatus . These 
manuscripts contain, in chronological order, Wittgenstein's discussions of a wide range of 
issues. In essence they are philosophical diaries, freely switching between different matters 
of interest, developing threads of thought up to a certain point, interrupting and returning at 
a later date. One might read through all of this material and pick out remarks concerning 
toothaches. The term appears for the first time on Nov. 19, 1929: 'Warum nenne ich 
Zahnschmerzen ' meine Zahnschmerzen' ?' (MS 107, 199; WA 2, 1146). Wittgenstein then 
develops this motive from different angles up to Dec. 14, 1929 (MS 108, 8f; WA 2,136) and 
returns to discuss it in a loose sequence of remarks from Jan. 31, 1930 (MS 107, 270; WA 2, 
186) to Feb. 7, 1930 (MS 107, 288; WA 2, 196). All of those entries are intermingled with 
reflections on many different topics: probability, theory of measurement, Euclidean geometry, 
realism et.al.. No guiding principle is discernible. Wittgenstein is following his own idiosyncratic 
lines of thought that often consist of digressions, retractions and cognitive jumps. It is not 
impossible, but exceedingly hard, to recognize the making of the private language argument in 
those scattered aphorisms. This should not come as a surprise since, after all, the 
manuscripts are Wittgenstein's philosophical workshop. Philological attention is often informed 
by prior knowledge of the results of such incipient processes.
In the light of Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy the first approach does, anyway, make 
little sense. Examining his manuscripts he picked a number of remarks for dictation. Copies of 
the resulting type-scripts were consequently cut into slips of paper and rearranged according 
to rules that seem to be revised within the organizing process itself. This procedure can be 
appropriately illustrated by tracking the course of Wittgenstein's notes on toothaches. 
Typescript 208, which is an extract from manuscripts 105-108, is only partially preserved.7 As 
far as toothaches are concerned, only the paragraphs dating from Dec. 14, 1929 can be 
found in this compilation. Alois Pichler has reconstructed the likely shape of TS 208. According 
to his conjecture most of the material on toothaches was contained in the missing pages 1-
1448. It reappears, completely rearranged, in TS 209, which is the text source for 
Philosophische Bemerkungen, edited by Rush Rees and published in 1964. Wittgenstein's 
original typescript shows no classifications whatsoever. At first inspection it is simply a very 
long sequence of paragraphs. Rush Rees divided the script into sections and invented groups 
of paragraphs which he numbered according to an undocumented, inscrutable scheme. A 
collection of Wittgenstein's reflections on toothaches happens to make up section VI of 
Philosophische Bemerkungen. This is a promising place to look for the conceptual genesis of 
his later views on mental states, sensations and language.
While all sections of Philosophische Bemerkungen are the invention of Rush Rees it is, 
nevertheless, also true that it was Wittgenstein who assembles the pieces into one particular 
order, thus emphazising his interest in an analysis of how first-person talk determines our 
understanding of pain. These notes have been available for a long time and attentive readers 
have doubtlessly noticed connections between them and later discussions of similar issues. 
This material was, however, entirely separated from its context of origin, a stand-alone 
compilation of philosophical insights. There is nothing per se wrong with restricting oneself to 
this state of affairs. It can very well serve as a starting point for enquiries like the present 
essay. Yet, the recent publications from the Nachlass have opened up a range of exiting 
possibilities. What used to be philologically opaque collections of Wittgensteinian ideas can 
now be disassembled and regarded as intermediate results of an ongoing process of creative 
writing and revision. It has become feasible not only to identify the building blocks of 
Wittgenstein's more elaborate editorial arrangements but - what is more important - to 
actually observe his philosophical labor, i.e. the decision process leading from day-to-day 
notes towards (as he envisaged it) eventual publication of his thoughts.
(2) Conventional methodology offers indices and synopses to assist such an enterprise. Both 
are provided by the Wiener Ausgabe, suggesting a second approach to access the 
Wittgensteinian corpus. 'Toothache' is an index entry; it can be looked up and the resulting 
items can in turn be traced through the Wittgenstein papers. Wiener Ausgabe - Apparatus, 
Register zu den Bänden 1-5 consists entirely of tables correlating every single paragraph from 
the manuscripts to its subsequent occurances in these volumes and (more commonly) to its 
location within the Philosophische Bemerkungen or Philosophische Grammatik. On Nov. 29, 
1929 Wittgenstein noted:
Von Sinnesdaten in dem Sinne des Wortes in dem es undenkbar ist daß der Andere sie hat, 
kann man eben aus diesem Grunde auch nicht sagen, daß der Andere sie nicht hat. Und aus 
ebendiesem Grunde ist es sinnlos zu sagen, daß  ich im Gegensatz zum Anderen sie habe. (MS 
107, 215f; WA 2, 124)
As the synopsis shows this remark was included in TS 209 (aka Philosophische Bemerkungen) 
presumably in mid-19309 as entry VI, 61 and taken up again on Jun. 1, 1932, when 
Wittgenstein started a revision of his earlier ideas on the topic. Investigating this kind of 
dependency is standard procedure in textual criticism. Until very recently this had to be done 
by consulting printed synopses. It seems fair to say that there is very little sense in carrying 
on the old way, if the advance of digital technologies is taken into account.
The point is not just that it is quite cumbersome to work with multiple versions of basically 
the same paragraph located in different places in various bound volumes. This impediment 
could be alleviated by liberal use of the xerox machine. Printed synopses of material as 
complex as Wittgenstein's Nachlass face a more serious problem. It seems next to impossible 
to combine indexing and synopsis. The reader is presented with either a list of significant 
terms or a table of correlations of textual segments. She cannot simultaneously look for the 
occurance of a word and the history of rearrangements of the paragraph it is included in. No 
one would finance a series of books (or care to use them) containing the astronomical number 
of relations between index entries and changes of contexts in gory detail. Consider the remark 
quoted above. Instinctively one would at least consider the terms 'Sinnesdaten', 'Sinn', 'Wort', 
'der Andere', 'Grund', 'sinnlos' and 'Gegensatz'.10 The quote considered here does not even 
contain the term 'Zahnschmerzen' which is, at this point, Wittgenstein's guiding paradigm. 
Imagine all those terms put into correlation with all the changes of their occurrences 
elsewhere in the Nachlass. The ensuing combinatorial explosion effectively prevents putting 
the result on paper. In the present case one cannot have a general, usable, semantics-to-
(section)-numbers and (section)-numbers-to-(section-)numbers mapping, one on top of the 
other, in a print medium.
(3) It is easily done if the texts have been properly digitized. Since words are encoded by 
numbers it is quite simple to set up an index and it takes just another couple of numbers to 
represent the trace of 'words' to and from given contexts. Much of this can be done 
automatically; there is no need to actually visualize the necessary relational apparatus. If a 
correlation seems interesting it can be called up at will, with no time lost for browsing, 
copying or shuffling around papers. Searching for 'Zahnschmerzen' in the Bergen edition 
immediately yields 138 hits across the entire collection. The search can be restricted to 
particular (groups of) volumes and modified to include co-occurring or proximate terms as well 
as dates. A query for 'Sinnesdaten and Zahnschmerzen' produces as a result precisely three 
common occurances. First is a paragraph from MS 114 (MS 114, 16; WA 5, 179) into which 
Wittgenstein had assimilated separate earlier notes, followed by its typescript derivatives in 
TS 211, 755 and TS 213, 510 (Big Typescript). The quote previously presented (MS 107, 
215f; WA 2, 124), lacking the term 'Zahnschmerzen', is picked out among the 30 hits returned 
by querying 'Sinnesdaten'. It occurs in a stand-alone paragraph in TS 209, 23 (PhB VI, 61) 
and is flagged accordingly. In other words: a couple of straightforward enquiries lead directly 
to an important juncture in Wittgenstein's investigation of the logic of talk about sense 
impressions and toothaches in particular.
But wait. There is something suspicious about the last sentence. Manipulation of the index 
mechanism per se cannot produce important results. The disappearance of manifest meaning 
is, in fact, the price to pay for enhanced electronic facilities. One can easily pick any 
combination of terms and search constraints - but there is no guarantee whatsoever that this 
will lead to an interesting result. So where does 'importance' come in? This is a category of 
reflective assessment, crucially different from automated procedures. The discrepancy is at 
the center of any discussion about computer-assisted philology. A certain amount of cheating 
is necessary to reach the comfortable conclusion presented in the previous paragraph. 
Criteria enabling one to judge upon the importance of algorithmic procedures have to be 
presupposed in order for such procedures to be of any help. To put it very simply: elaborate 
tools are of little help without knowledge of their proper use. One has to have a hunch about 
the possible significance of a term to profitably employ the electronic search function. The 
non-sequitur above may serve as a reminder to first-generation digital scholars. It is easy to 
fall into the trap of overestimating technology. None of the powerful programming at work 
below the WYSIWYG-surface guarantees philosophical content. 
The difficulty, consequently, is the following one: How can technological advancements in 
textual criticism be constrained by a sense of proportion relating to a prior understanding of 
the subject matter. This type of question is well-known and often discussed between 
technophiles and technophobes. The present paper is a case study, trying to answer the 
question for one particular instance of the general problem. But we have not yet assembled 
the necessary evidence. It remains quite unclear why a philosopher should worry about 
toothaches. A powerful mechanism has been sketched, yet it is fair to assume that 
Wittgenstein scholars go about their business projecting hypotheses to understand the 
complexities of the Nachlass quite independently. The above account does not include a 
reason for using the mechanism. Providing such reasons is itself a philosophical activity. This 
section has offered a rough overview of the itinerary of some sample paragraphs. One has to 
explore their content and in particular the conceptual significance of their itinerary in order to 
get the full picture. A satisfactory answer to the issue at stake between digital technology 
and its critics has to appeal to philosophy in action.
TOOTHACHES: PHILOSOPHY 
Wittgenstein's first entry into manuscript 107 refers back to the Tractatus . There he had 
claimed: 'Das denkende, vorstellende, Subjekt gibt es nicht.' (5.631) And he had explained 
this dictum by pointing to the visual field: 'nichts am Gesichtsfeld läßt darauf schließen, daß 
es von einem Auge gesehen wird.' ( Tractatus  5.633). Compare MS 107, 1 (WA 2,3): 'Der 
Gesichtsraum so wie er ist hat seine selbständige Realität. Er selbst enthält kein Subjekt. Er 
ist autonom.' In 1929 Wittgenstein's anti-intentionalism is still in place, but his views on 
atomic sentences begin to change. The basic units of his epistemological account are not 
single sentences any more: 'Ich lege nicht den Satz als Maßstab an die Wirklichkeit an 
sondern das System von Sätzen.' (MS 107, 35; WA 2, 149) The logic of color terms has, as 
Wittgenstein discovered, to take account of the field of possibilities given by the spectrum. 
Atomic sentences cannot be independent of each other since 'This plate is blue' logically 
implies - among many other propositions - that it is not red. Yet, this is not a tautology. 
Given the visual field and the customary color space one has a priori knowledge of the 
structural dependencies of possible colors. To look for any actual one necessarily includes 
mastery of a presupposed color scheme. 'Wie es einen Sinn hat zu sagen die Farbe R ist am 
Ort P wenn ich überhaupt den Gesichtsraum mit dem Farbraum "vor mir" habe.' (MS 107, 158; 
WA 2, 92) Wittgenstein's quotes indicate that he is still officially unwilling to grant the 
existence of a subject. But it is interesting to take a closer look at his day's work (Oct. 10, 
1929).
The point of reference of the previous quote ('Wie es einen Sinn hat ...') are stomach aches. 
Wittgenstein is discussing the meaning of negation. How can one truthfully deny the presence 
of stomach aches? Such sentences seem to lack external sensual corroboration. They cannot 
be constructed as somehow linking stomachs and pains either. 'Es ist nur wesentlich, daß ich 
den Raum vor mir habe in dem der Magen liegt und den worin die Schmerzen liegen.' (MS 107, 
157; WA 2, 92) Like colors within the visual field pains are a kind of sensation constitutivly 
associated with stomachs. This seems an unobjectionable parallel - with a twist. We have 
noted Wittgenstein's avoidance of the common notion of a subject in his discussion of the 
visual field. This strategy cannot, however, be carried over to the case of 'internal' 
sensations. There is nothing comparable to the geometry of shared, public, visible spaces in 
the realm of our intestines. If you remove the subject from stomach aches not even the 
illusion of a legitimate issue remains. Switching from the visual field to internal sensations, 
Wittgenstein's doctrine of the subject is severely shaken. He cannot but employ the first 
person pronoun in these contexts, even though his commitment is to exclude it from the 
scientific vocabulary. Such is the dilemma apparent in his first remark on toothaches: 'Warum 
nenne ich Zahnschmerzen " meine Zahnschmerzen" '? (MS 107, 199; WA 2, 114)
Wittgenstein does not follow any pre-set agenda that could lead to a systematic 
investigation of various modalities of the senses. His move from vision to stomach aches to 
tooth aches is obviously not aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive view. Ten 
days after raising the issue of toothaches being my toothaches Wittgenstein comes up with 
the brilliant aphorism quoted above. The private language argument is, in nuce, contained in 
two extremely compact sentences (MS 107, 215f; WA 2, 124). If another person cannot be 
said to be the subject of my internal sense data it is meaningless to deny her those very 
sense data. Their possible occurrences do not include this kind of bearer. Alas, this is no 
comfort for anyone tempted to regard awareness of one's own intentional states as privileged 
knowledge. There is no force in such pronouncements. I cannot determine something uniquely 
subjective in appealing to an incomprehensible option, i.e. another person's having my internal 
states. The Tractatus  view of the subject was of a metaphysical entity, a border of the 
World, not part of it ( Tractatus 5.641). The early post-Tractarian manuscripts are gradually 
abandoning this dualism, conceding a role for first-person talk. Yet, most of the original 
skepticism remains. How can one conceive of a role for 'private' sensations and avoid 
idealism?
Such questions are external to Wittgenstein's writing in the manuscripts. The present sketch 
puts emphasis on only a small number of issues discussed within those volumes. The general 
line of argument is, however, supported by Wittgenstein's own subsequent selective rewriting 
of the material. When he cut up TS 208 to rearrange its content into what is now known as 
the Philosophische Bemerkungen, one of his points of emphasis was toothaches. His 
discussion of logical features of talk about the subject centers around a selection of remarks 
devoted to the remarkable fact of me - Ludwig Wittgenstein - having toothaches (cf. PhB VI, 
58). This revision introduces complexity of a higher order. Many of Wittgenstein's paragraphs 
are initially small, self-contained philosophical analyses. The next auctorial step is to try and 
put them together so that some larger, overarching connection is established. Philosophische 
Bemerkungen VI does, in fact, offer extremely dense philosophical substance, much too 
involved to be discussed here. Just an outline of Wittgenstein's strategy of using his 
arrangements as arguments can be given.
A first group of remarks, serving as a kind of prolegomenon, is derived from entries for Dec. 
14, 1929 and Oct. 11, 1929, expounding the general direction of the succeeding paragraphs. 
The use of the first person pronoun is fraught with difficulties, particularly if talk about 
perception is modelled according to external circumstances. 'I am experiencing a red patch' is 
quoted as a case in point. To analyze the difficulties one might re-write the puzzling 
descriptions, substituting some un-objectionable term for the offensive 'I'. This exercise is 
next. Remarkably, Wittgenstein switches from sense impressions to internal sensation again, 
as he designs a language game supposed to exhibit the same logical multiplicity as the 
common idiom and yet to avoid mention of a subject. His idea is to externalize the privileged 
position of subjectivity by designating one particular person as an universal point of 
reference. If 'I am' Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'I have toothaches' becomes 'There are toothaches' 
and 'A has toothaches' can be rephrased as 'A behaves like Ludwig Wittgenstein when there 
are toothaches'. (PhBemerkungen VI, 58). The apparent uniqueness of subjective experience 
is transformed into a qualitative difference in public discourse; the mysterious realm of 
subjectivity replaced by an idiom of matching complexity: everyone can take center stage in 
this language. Once this focus is set the remaining moves of the language game are 
equivalent to the traditional one. Wittgenstein offers a playful simile. The logic of first-person 
talk recalls oriental despotism, with the subject taking the place of the despot in providing 
the origin of the communicative coordinate system.
The point is that talk about sensations is inevitably dualistic. 'The subject' - as well as an 
oriental despot - is supposed to fall outside ordinary discourse directed towards physical 
things. If Timur Lenk's state of health is taken as the measuring device of health-talk it makes 
no sense to ask whether he has toothaches. In the event, toothaches simply are among his 
personal states and having toothaches is a condition derived from this primordial condition. 
Even though Wittgenstein has thus eliminated first-person talk the Tractarian criterion of 
meaning fails, however. It is impossible to attribute possession of toothaches or lack thereof 
to a suitably designated individuum. (The discussion prefigures later reflections on the Paris 
ur-meter.) After this setting of the stage Wittgenstein embarks on a series of grammatical 
investigations, exploring the comprehensibility of our dualistic idiom. There is no obvious way 
to stratify his dialectical dialogues into a single argument. 'I cannot feel your toothaches.' 
Does this sentence express an empirical truth or rather a kind of logical necessity 
Wittgenstein had not provided for in his Tractatus? (cf. PhB VI, 61) Rather than answering 
questions like this, Wittgenstein keeps changing his focus and his examples, circling around 
the issues. What is he up to? To a casual reader it looks like an open-ended, aporetic 
elenchus. But Wittgenstein, surprisingly, and without so much as minimal warning, does 
actually close his argument by the strategic placement of one paragraph.
Wittgenstein's transposition of first person talk was anchored in the neutral statement: 'There 
are toothaches'. The following quote is an obvious echo, concluding the argument:
Das Phänomen des Schmerzgefühls in einem Zahn, welches ich kenne, ist in der 
Ausdrucksweise der gewöhnlichen Sprache dargestellt durch ' ich habe in dem und dem Zahn 
Schmerzen'. Nicht durch einen Ausdruck von der Art, 'an diesem Ort ist ein Schmerzgefühl'. 
(PhB VI, 66)
As it turns out, it is impossible to capture the subjectivist intuitions in Wittgenstein's 
alternative scheme. There cannot be pains outside of consciousness. Designating a physical 
body to be the paradigmatic bearer of pain is no better than ascribing pain to some tooth put 
on a table ( Philosophische Bermerkungen VI, 65). Timur Lenk is, inevitably, located in public 
space, so we are back to Wittgenstein's initial reminder: the problem arises because physical 
circumstances are inappropriately projected onto another context.
Das ganze Feld dieser Erfahrung wird in dieser Sprache durch Ausdrücke von der Form 'ich 
habe ...' beschrieben. Die Sätze von der Form 'N hat Zahnschmerzen' sind für ein ganz 
anderes Feld reserviert. (PhB VI, 66) 
In other words: Wittgenstein advises himself to desist from trying to battle ordinary language. 
He is quite aware of the tension: In order to unravel the philosophical knot one has to re-
trace the complicated movements underlying it. Thus ends the second take on toothaches. 
Resting content with the ordinary was, however, always a temporary affair for Wittgenstein. 
In 1932 we find him returning to the very issues he had supposedly resolved in MS 110, 30ff 
(WA5, 179ff). These are the quotes remarked upon earlier in this paper: Wittgenstein's 
second, condensing revision of the material on toothaches.
This third stratum of the textual evidence and its further development will not be pursued 
here. The sole purpose of the preceding intermezzo was to redress the balance between the 
digital toolkit and topics in established Wittgenstein scholarship. The problem was to mediate 
between proponents of largely syntactic manipulation of linguistic data and traditional 
approaches that turn to texts with a prior understanding of their subject matter. The way to 
escape a stand-off is to refuse the contra-position from the very start. Semantic data-
mining11 as exemplified by the previous sub-section, is simultaneously an exercise in digital 
philology and philosophy. Wittgenstein's Nachlass is an excellent place to look for such a 
synthesis because the author's ideas are, to a large extent, expressed by arranging and 
rearranging small textual units. Tracking the dynamics of Wittgenstein's philosophical 
variations can, admittedly, be done in the conventional framework of a printed edition of his 
manuscripts and type-scripts. Computer-assisted procedures do, however, push philology 
towards horizons previously out of reach. To repeat: No collection of printed volumes can 
conceivably present any synopsis of any terms, occurring at arbitrary dates, in just a few 
seconds. Such opportunities are bound to have a major impact on future Wittgenstein 
scholarship. This concludes the philological assessment of conventional versus digital 
approaches to the Wittgenstein papers. A more detached attitude has already been hinted 
at. It seems that Wittgenstein's writing is particularly well suited to a post-Gutenberg 
environment. In order to get the full picture regarding the Bergen edition we have to take a 
closer look at Wittgenstein's failure to turn his writings into a book.
BEYOND BOOKS 
J.C. Nyíri has made a strong case for considering the Wittgenstein Nachlass in the light of 
recent media philosophy. Quoting Walter Ong and Erich Havelock he reminds his readers of the 
prospect that the age of literacy might be giving way to a period of secondary orality, with 
the spoken word regaining the most influential position in a broadcast society. According to 
Nyíri's suggestion Wittgenstein's failure to distinguish between the written and the spoken 
word might explain his 'ultimate inability to complete the "book" he always wanted to 
complete'12. The ductus of his writings is, indeed, more akin to on-going conversations than 
to neatly delineated propositions. Did Wittgenstein miss the adequate medium for his 
exertions? Nyíri draws attention to the fact that his writing is, in certain places, a direct 
rejoinder to the Socratic dialogues. 'Ich finde bei Plato auf eine Frage wie 'was ist Erkenntnis' 
nicht die vorläufige Antwort: Sehen wir einmal nach, wie dieses Wort gebraucht wird.' (TS 
211, 17) Wittgenstein's inverse Socratic role consists in dissolving platonic confidence in 
essences and is, therefore, ill suited to be put into a classical philosophical treatise. As Nyíri 
(following Havelock) rightly reminds us, Platonic ideas are inextricably connected to the rise of 
literacy over an oral tradition which lacked expressive means for a proper treatment of 
abstract terms. Yet, Wittgenstein could have rested content with his actual teaching, leaving 
it to his disciples to provide written records. He did not do so, but rather forced himself, 
against better knowledge, to conform to the given standard.
Wenn ich für mich denke ohne ein Buch schreiben zu wollen, so springe ich um das Thema 
herum; das ist die einzige mir natürliche Denkweise. In einer Reihe gezwungen fortzudenken ist 
mir eine Qual. Soll ich es nun überhaupt probieren? Ich verschwende unsägliche Mühe auf ein 
Anordnen der Gedanken, das vielleicht gar keinen Wert hat. (MS 118, 185)
The key word is 'vielleicht' indicating Wittgenstein's ambivalent ambitions to write a book. His 
difficulties are methodologically profound. One way to bring this into focus is to position them 
at the crossroads between books and hypertext.
Decades of Wittgenstein scholarship have been shaped by editorial decisions made by the 
trustees of the Nachlass. Their general policy was to present provisional steps in 
Wittgenstein's ongoing process of revision as standalone volumes, often effacing the 
dynamics demonstrated in the preceding section. David Stern, in his perceptive paper, 
correctly describes the state of affairs.
The Wittgenstein Nachlass is not a haphazard pile of working papers that happened to survive 
his death, nor is it a collection of works that only awaited publication. While it is both a 
carefully selected and highly structured record of his life's work, a collection of material that 
he deliberately assembled and left to posterity, it is also the record of a writer continually in 
flux, never entirely satisfied with anything he had written.13  
In view of this situation it actually seems a little unfair to reapproach the editors of 
Wittgenstein's posthumous writing. There is no good way to capture the activity vividly 
described by Stern into the confines of a printed volume. Despite outward appearances there 
are no 'works of Wittgenstein' that could confidently be taken as points of departure. Even 
the Philosophische Untersuchungen are, as Stern observes, 'only one of a number of possible 
arrangements Wittgenstein proposed, many of which extend, amplify, or cast light on the 
remarks in the published book.'14 References to current models of textual interdependency 
become almost irresistible at this point. 'Because the Wittgenstein Nachlass is the result of 
such an extensive act of rewriting, it is less a collection of texts than a hypertext, an 
interconnected network of remarks.'15 Stern's remarks certainly point into the right direction. 
Still, there are some intermediary steps between the range of options available to 
Wittgenstein and writing that is embedded in digital technology. Those steps have to be 
spelled out if one wants to get a grasp on how the CD-ROM edition might change out habits 
of scholarship based on self-contained books. 
One feature of a culture based on books deserves special attention as this culture is 
challenged by the advent of digital, globally distributed information. Books are marked by the 
coincidence of two seperate decisions: their content and its appearance are determined 
simultaneously. This is what publication of a book, in effect, amounts to - and it throws some 
light on Wittgenstein's qualms. He felt unable to decide on one shape for his ideas. 
Publication, throughout European history, simply meant drawing a line between a creative 
process and its (albeit provisional) results. Sending a manuscript to the publisher was to 
distinguish a line between sketches, preliminary attempts, experimental drafts and an entity 
exhibiting both the features of the most prestigious information technology and of auctorial 
closure. Books divided the lifetime of an author into continuous activity and singular results, 
texts that, from a certain moment in time, assume a life of their own. This arrangement is 
being thoroughly shaken by the advent of new media. First of all, digital encoding disrupts the 
familiar coordination between form and content. Characters are mapped into numbers that 
are, in turn, symbolized in an electronic format unsuitable for direct perception. And this 
transposition, secondly, triggers dramatic changes in the nature of publicity. Electronic texts 
can instantly be published to a world audience and still be constantly revised.
In the given context it is particularly instructive to notice the implication for posthumous 
'works'. In the world of books a Nachlass is defined as all the material an author did not 
manage or see fit to get printed. Its peculiar character is that future generations retro-
activly elevate such writing to the status of books. If books published by an author are what 
software developers call a 'feature-freeze', publications from a Nachlass are based on 
decisions to overrule such limitations. There is no way to escape the allure of 'works' in book 
culture. In Nachlass-publications auxiliary authors assume responsibility to supplement a 
writer's oeuvre with 'second order' books. Applying this to the case at hand yields a 
suggestive prospect. While the trustees failed to do justice to Wittgenstein's open-ended, 
conversations philosophical style, a digital edition of the Nachlass is much better suited to 
achieve this aim. Such an enterprise is not forced to turn a collection of tentative designs 
into bound volumes. The 'Wiener Ausgabe' seems set to publish the largely repetetive material 
from 1929-1933 in 12 weighty volumes. Michael Nedo sounds apologetic in defending this 
expenditure:
... the book is still the carrier of thoughts, of written heritage in our culture, and familiarity 
with this medium certainly affects not only one's dealings with the texts themselves, but also 
the accompanying Apparatuses.16  
One does not have to subscribe to deconstruction to find this eulogy anachronistic. The 
transitory character of Wittgenstein's writing, its complex genealogy and its numerous 
recapitulations seem to call for a digital format of presentation which matches its inherent 
temporality by avoiding ultimate editorial decisions and allowing easy manipulation of the 
textual material.
Impressions like these, convincing as they may sound - once again - overstress technology. 
Wittgenstein, it is true, despaired of achieving the linear order demanded by a printed book. 
But this does not imply that hypertext could have solved his problem. His desparation is the 
important feature: the fight against a spell cast upon his writing by the demands of books 
culture. He worried about the correct arrangement of his ideas, so much is obvious from the 
examples discussed above. One understanding of 'hypertext' is of segments of texts linked 
together in a more or less haphazard way, often without any single, controling authority. This 
meaning is certainly not applicable to Wittgenstein. He could have saved himself a lot of 
trouble had he been prepared to regard his writing as a kind of private web-space. A second 
understanding might be more appropriate. Hypertext can also refer to autonomous non-linear 
writing which transcends the obligatory step-by-step sequence of print-products by 
constructing a topological matrix without hierarchical order. Digitized texts are encoded as 
numbers and have to be re-established in a legible format. Visualization by a monitor is one 
step removed from the pages of a book and offers flexibility unmatched by their arrangement. 
Wittgenstein's famous metaphor of wandering through a philosophical landscape comes to 
mind. The Nachlass does, in fact, contain a number of tentative registers that could easily be 
implemented as a hypertext.17 
This is one side of Wittgenstein's struggle with conventional means of expressing thoughts. 
But his need for a different kind of complexity is offset by an equally important desire. In 
many places he insists on finding definitive answers. This motive, manifest in the Tractatus , 
is also present in Wittgenstein's later calls for 'Übersichtlichkeit' (surveyability) and well laid-
out description:
Wir wollen nicht das Regelsystem für die Verwendung unserer Worte in unerhörter Weise 
verfeinern oder vervollständigen. Denn die Klarheit, die wir anstreben, ist allerdings eine 
vollkommene. Aber das heißt nur, daß die philosophischen Probleme vollkommen verschwinden 
sollen. (PhU § 133)
In this context, the 'treatment' of philosophical problems is likened to therapeutical 
intervention and its ultimate aim is to put vexing thoughts to rest. Such an attitude cannot 
be easily reconciled with calls for open-ended auctorial multiplicity and the suspension of 
binding results. Wittgenstein's 'hypertext' avant la lettre arises from unsuccessful attempts at 
closure rather than from intentional design. It does not anticipate a more flexible medium 
which might alleviate the rigor of philosophical arguments. As the Nachlass material on 
toothaches shows, Wittgenstein did not simply reject the linear progression of thoughts in 
favor of a compilation of aphorisms. He actually proposes a solution - even though it does not 
satisfy him in the long run. Look at it this way: If he had been able to reach a satisfactory 
conclusion he would have put it into print. Hypertext, on the other hand, is by design non-
conclusive. Had Wittgenstein used hypertext, his characteristic struggle against premature 
closure would have been lost. Hypertext lacks the kind of physical inertia needed to make a 
sentence stick to a certain position and while Wittgenstein kept overturning pre-established 
patterns of thought and inferences he never abandoned his drive to return to 
straightforward, easily surveyable positions.
Wir sind aufs Glatteis geraten, wo die Reibung fehlt, also die Bedingungen in gewissem Sinn 
ideal sind, aber wir eben deshalb auch nicht gehen können. Wir wollen gehen; dann brauchen 
wir Reibung. Zurück auf den rauhen Boden. (PhU § 107)
Wittgenstein would, in all likelihood, have extended this complaint against free-floating 
philosophical speculation to l'art pour l'art hypertext.
To sum up and focus on the case at hand: Electronic texts are not just a kind of print; the 
graphical rendering of information on a monitor is no 'page' in any ordinary sense. It is 
tempting - and to some extent plausible - to distinguish Wittgenstein's writing from 
conventional philosophical authorship by employing jargon from media studies. Actually putting 
his Nachlass on a CD-ROM adds considerable complexity to the story. There is an important 
difference between a writer's decision to publish his or her work (in whatever format) and 
someone else administering a heritage. Nachlass publications, including electronic editions, are 
per definitionem second order closures. The flexibility of digitized texts is of another order as 
Wittgenstein's work in progress. How those papers are to be rendered on CD-ROMs is by no 
means self-evident. It is easy to pretend that the Bergen project is just an extension of well-
known editorial strategies. Such an attitude does, however, seriously underestimate the 
range of problems involved. All the conveniences set forth in the previous pages do not come 
for free. The change from books to computers is in itself an important theoretical and political 
issue. Putting Wittgenstein on disk demands a considerable number of decisions beyond the 
scope of printed editions. This is new territory, hardly even noticed as a philosophical issue 
amongst Wittgenstein scholars.
THE POLITICS OF DIGITAL TEXTS 
The Bergen electronic edition effaces its own novelty. Its structuring principle are the 
physical volumes of the Nachlass which are presented one after the other in linear sequence. 
The search facilities include easy access to single manuscripts or type-scripts. Facsimiles 
provide unprecedented opportunities to scrutinize Wittgenstein's actual output.The electronic 
edition might be argued to beat its print competitors at their own game. One apparent 
platitude is of utmost importance, though. Digitized texts need computers which need 
software which needs operating systems. In centuries of print culture we have become 
accustomed to the fact that once a book is published it is freely accessible to readers 
without further effort. Historical pictures of lockable books raise amused smiles. Yet, they are 
not a bad analogy to so-called digital books: in order to read them one needs additional 
devices, even 'keys'. Book publishing is a business charging once per item, regardless of its 
further use. But those products are, nowadays, revealed as just one interface to information. 
In many respects digital documents offer more convenient access to identical content. This 
surplus value has a price: a set of electronic equipment is inserted between the reader and 
her text. Once they have been published (and as long as they are in print) books are available 
without further decoding. As everyone who has to exchange files on the internet knows, this 
is far from true for electronic documents. Different computer platforms, different word 
processors and conflicting versions tend to produce confusions unheard of in former times.
The reason for this is that there are several competing standards to implement a mapping 
between alpha-numerical symbols and digital numbers. Strictly speaking only the basic letters, 
numerals and diacritical signs of the English alphabet are interchangeable on any platform. 
Different sets of characters, and in particular the elaborate additional code necessary to 
simulate printed pages on a monitor, demand special attention. International bodies are in 
charge of supervising the encoding of the world's languages. Software simulation of written 
material, however, obeys different rules. It is to a considerable extent a commercial affair and 
subject to the laws of economics. The result is, predictably, a considerable variety of 
proprietary software tools trying to get their share of the market by offering particularly 
comfortable - and mutually incompatible - features. This is the state of affairs confronting 
any digitization of texts. Two minimalistic approaches are either to scan existing pages or to 
stick to 7-bit ASCII code in transcribing them electronically. It is immediately obvious that 
neither of these options is satisfactory for a textual corpus of the degree of complexity of the 
Wittgenstein Nachlass. The editors were faced with a situation unprecedented in ordinary 
publishing. They had to decide upon a software package capable of producing the desired 
results, which also meant forcing that package upon the readers. Textual scholarship finds 
itself on unfamiliar terrain. The tools it needs to even access its subject matter are produced 
by big companies with only marginal interest in the academy.
The Bergen edition runs on the Windows platform (Windows 3.1, 3.11, Windows 95 and 
Windows NT4 according to the promotion sheet). For word-processing capacity it uses a 
program named 'FolioViews' which provides the usual services: cut and paste, printing, 
searching, window control, electronic bookmarks and back tracing. For scholars who habitually 
use the Microsoft range of products and do not worry about the ensuing dependency of their 
basic data on market competition these are excellent choices, even though some of its 
limitations will affect the ordinary user. The entire collection of normalized and diplomatic 
transcripts is put into a single binary file respectively. (The facsimiles are offered as single 
graphic documents, one per physical page.) Consequently, two huge electronic files contain 
the entire content of the Bergen edition in a completely opaque format. The user is allowed to 
read and manipulate texts via FolioViews but none of the structural information that has been 
presented in the first section of this paper is directly accessible to her. She can copy 
selected texts, paste and print them - but neither can she touch the indexing mechanism nor 
modify any of the underlying data. There is a strict separation between interface and non-
transparent, computational deep structure. Copyright considerations are a prominent reason 
for this arrangement: the content of a printed book cannot as easily be reproduced, 
manipulated and distributed as its digital counterpart. Provisions have to be taken to protect 
the investment put into such long-term projects. Media change unsettles venerable customs. 
The traditional understanding was that the result of scholarly work, most often financed by 
the taxpayer's money, are generally available in their entirety. This feature does, indeed, 
distinguish scholarship from commercially induced research. As teams of experts have to use 
proprietary software to reassure the copyright-holders and ensure the profit for the publishing 
house, this availability is restricted. But, it might be objected, where is the problem? 
Wittgenstein's writings are at one's disposal, all of them and in an extremely comfortable 
fashion. True enough, judged by the standards of the printed book. Yet, as was discussed in 
section two, Wittgenstein's Nachlass transcends the limits of such standards and an 
electronic edition might be better suited to capture those peculiarities. It might be organized 
so as to mirror Wittgenstein's editorial techniques, starting with single remarks as elementary 
building blocks and putting them together in a variety of ways, following Wittgenstein's lead. 
His working process, not its result, could be taken as the guiding principle. As a matter of fact 
the encapsulated FolioViews file is the very opposite of hypertext.18 Yet, the Bergen edition 
does not offer any tools to actually rearrange its content or redesign its appearance on the 
primary level. For all its flexibility and ease of use the Bergen edition is still in the conceptual 
grip of classical printed editions. Does it have to mimic the necessities of print culture?
The question turns on the issue of access to the internal, structural information hidden inside 
the binary files. Under present conditions one can find a particular paragraph and all of its 
subsequent instances as they appear in the later volumes. It is, however, impossible to break 
out of the straitjacket of the von Wright classification and deal with paragraphs as basic data 
units. If this were possible digital equivalences of Wittgenstein's notes could be freely 
assembled and re-assembled. As of now one is, for example, presented with manuscripts 105-
108 plus typescripts 208-209 plus manuscript 110 and has to extract relevant paragraphs for 
personal post-processing. A more appropriate way might be to pick out relevant paragraphs 
(e.g. on toothaches) and re-assemble them at bottom level, echoing the author's own 
procedure. It would be an attractive way to overcome the Nachlass effect of irrevocable 
closure. The internal dynamics of the Wittgenstein papers would be much more in evidence if 
a more open digital format had been chosen. Years of labor have been spent on the electronic 
transcription of the original documents. The records of the Wittgenstein archive do in fact 
contain all the information necessary for micrological analysis and multiple synthesis. The use 
of the CD-ROM, however, remains restricted to find, cut and paste with no provisions to 
address the editorial information from outside FolioViews. In order to visualize the conclusion 
on toothaches from the first section one might want to write a small program. It could not 
operate on the existing data structure which would have to be re-inscribed onto copies of 
segments extracted from the database.
This is the place to touch upon some basic issues in the theory and practice of text 
encoding. The discussion of the peculiar overlap between the requirements of digitization and 
commercial interests at the beginning of this section deliberately omitted an alternative 
possibility. Standard General Markup Language (SGML) is an attempt to avoid dependency on 
proprietary formats and irreconcilable software development with regard to electronic texts. 
The idea is, briefly, to supplement the alpha-numeric ciphers with additional (groups of) 
characters ('mark up') that serve the purpose of encoding meta-information by means of the 
available, restricted set of ASCII code. HTML, the language of the World Wide Web, in an 
instance of SGML. An easy example of mark up is the use (in HTML) of '<h1>' to indicate the 
beginning (and '</h1>' the end) of a top level heading. Such mark up indications do not in 
themselves cause any formatting to be done. (This distinguishes them from the binary code 
inserted into text files by common word processors.) Their function is to delineate the logical 
structure of the document and provide anchors to include additional content (like cross-
references, dates or hierarchical dependencies). A marked-up document can be read on any 
computer platform, the catch being that it needs software to render the mark-up as 
intended. This is a substantial difficulty given the fact that word processing has been much 
more popular with the general public. But consider a Web browser to get the general idea. 
Such browser are software which takes '<h1>Title</h1>' as an input and turns it (e.g.) into
                                                          TITLE
SGML (and its recent variant XML) offers a top-down solution to the problem of incompatible 
standards in text encoding and concurrent information storage.
The Bergen edition is based upon transcriptions of Wittgenstein's original pages into a mark up 
language using the 'Multi-Element Code System' (MECS). This system provides a meta-
grammar that can be implemented in particular instances of transcriptional grammar and is 
well suited to the task of capturing the complexities of Wittgenstein's autographs in a digital 
format. For technical reasons MECS is not entirely compatible with SGML. The thing to keep in 
mind is, however, that the Bergen transcriptions contain the entire set of editorial information 
in mark up format, i.e. in 'tags' that can be addressed in programming constructions. This 
information is filtered to produce the diplomatic and normalized versions offered on the CD-
ROMs. In customary, printed editions there is no possible gap between the pages on offer and 
their basic encoding. This does not carry over into the electronic realm where digital code has 
to be re-implemented in order to be perceptible. The need for secondary processing 
introduces a discrepancy which can be used to shield off operative background information 
from its surface rendition. Electronic documents offer spectacular improvements over many of 
the usual features of printed texts. Ironically, it is just because of their versatility that 
mechanisms to constrain their scope are feasible - and called for. The Bergen edition is just 
one example of a more comprehensive problem that is often overlooked in recent digitization 
campaigns. It is perfectly possible to combine global, digital distribution of information with 
highly selective, exclusive standards of its generation and transmission. While most people 
would be prepared to accept this for cable TV or DVD it should at least be a matter of 
concern in textual scholarship.
This is an area of conflict between claims of copyright holders and the scientific community. 
Broaching this issue is not intended to deflect attention from the impressive achievements of 
the Bergen electronic edition. Its presentation of the material is an epochal advance in 
Wittgenstein scholarship. It is, at the same time, a precursor of many electronic editions yet 
to be published and is apt to trigger a more general discussion on how similar scholarly 
editions might be designed. Disregarding, for the purpose of this conclusion, external 
constraints an optimum solution for (future) computer-savvy scholars would enable them to 
address their texts at any of the three levels that have to constitute a serious editorial 
project: the mark-up, diplomatic and normalized versions should all be manipulable to ensure 
optimum results. It is impossible for any single endeavor to adequately charter the wealth of 
variants and cross-relations in Wittgenstein's Nachlass. But if scholars were able to freely 
access the underlying mark up resources based on the canonical transcription could easily be 
enriched by resources taken from literal computing. As several commentators have pointed 
out, the recent 'Open Source' movement in software management echoes the concepts of 
free peer access and peer review well established within science. In the best case scenario 
source code, e.g. the mark-up version of Wittgenstein's texts, would be freely available. Book 
culture charges relatively little for relatively static texts. Expensive electronic editions offer 
advanced research tools, blocking collaboration based on their data structure. There will be 
an 'open source' Wittgenstein sometime this century.
Currently, a confusing variety of formats is used to tentatively provide comprehensive access 
in selected collections, mainly for corpora from earlier centuries. Projects like CELT, the 'Celtic 
Corpus of Electronic Texts'19and the 'Victorian Women Writer's Project'20 offer browsable 
HTML-front-ends, ftp download of marked-up documents and printable Postscript copies. TMI 
('Thesaurus Musicarum Italicarum')21 or 'The William Blake Archive'22 employ DynaWeb to 
translate SGML-coded files for use with common browsers. At the Wittgenstein archive's web-
site23 TS 201a 'Notes on Logic' and MS 115, 'Philosophische Bemerkungen' are available in 
different versions: HTML frames for concurrent inspection of the diplomatic and normalized 
text and for download in Postscript and Word Perfect format respectively. It remains unclear 
whether electronic publishing will develop standards as transparent as those of traditional 
literary culture. The technological advances we have been discussing are in fact instrumental 
in de-familiarizing earlier standards that have acquired second nature status. New 
opportunities arise, but there is still little institutional background and almost none of the hard 
questions have been answered. Meanwhile, from a philosophical point of view, the 
Wittgenstein papers raise an issue that cuts across old and new forms of writing. 
Wittgenstein's struggle against the linear progression of arguments should neither be 
remodeled as a peaceful exercise in hypertext, nor put to rest in an series of (printed or 
virtual) volumes. The driving force behind the Nachlass is a continuous effort to put together 
the pieces of a number of puzzles that seem to change as this activity unfolds. Nachlass 
means: this process has definitely ended. Digitization of the Nachlass offers an opportunity to 
breath life back into an accumulation of notes.
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THE CHANGED STATE OF WITTGENSTEIN SCHOLARSHIP 
Two independent publishing projects have thoroughly changed the state of Wittgenstein 
scholarship in recent years. Michael Nedo's 'Wiener Ausgabe'1 offers a traditional critical 
edition of Wittgenstein's philosophical writings ranging from 1929 up to and including the 'Big 
Typescript' (1933). Considering the eclectic and - at times - arbitrary editorial policy 
underlying previous publications from the Nachlass2 Nedo's project offers unprecedented 
philosophical rigor as well as textual criticism in volumes designed for comfortable reading. A 
second, more ambitious, attempt at a critical edition is the Bergen electronic edition.3 It is 
planned to include 4 CD-ROMs, covering the entire range of the philosopher's unpublished 
writing. Two disks are currently available, comprising all of Wittgenstein's manuscripts from 
1929-1939, as well as type-scripts, beginning with 'Notes on Logic' (1913) and leading up to 
Typescript 226, composed in 1939.
Wittgenstein's writings from the Thirties are, therefore, available in independent, reliable 
printed and electronic editions respectively. Readers can, for the first time, observe the 
philosopher at work, transferring paragraphs from pocket notebooks to handwritten 'volumes'; 
picking acceptable remarks to be included in type-scripts that are, at a later stage, cut up 
into slips of paper which are again annotated, rearranged and put together in further volumes 
and type-scripts. But this is only half the excitement. The 'Wiener Ausgabe' and the 'Bergen 
Edition' stake their success on different media, inevitably provoking a comparison between the 
well known features of printed scholarly editions and the not so familiar realm of digitized 
texts.
Some of the differences are immediately obvious. Scrutinizing philosophical texts on a printed 
page implies sensual qualities lacking in electronic space. Many readers will prefer a material 
sheet of paper over its virtual substitute. There are, on the other hand, definite advantages 
in digitally stored transcriptions. A CD-ROM does not occupy desk-space and allows almost 
instant access to every single remark of the extended Wittgenstein corpus. In addition to the 
actual texts, the 'Wiener Ausgabe' contains separate volumes of sophisticated registers, 
cross-referencing all the printed material. Considering the fact that the Bergen edition 
includes an excellent search function Nedo's tables are an anachronistic nicety at best. In a 
recent volume Nedo, in fact, announces a 'comprehensive electronic Apparatus, 
supplementing the Wiener Ausgabe'4. And there is simply no viable alternative to an electronic 
medium if one wants to present facsimiles of every page of the Nachlass, suitably linked to 
diplomatic and normalized versions of its content. These features make the Bergen edition a 
far more comprehensive enterprise. It seems that, pace  the predictable skepticism stemming 
from deeply ingrained scholarly habits, there is a convincing case in favor of switching to the 
digital format. The present paper will, at any rate, proceed from this assumption. But matters 
of technical convenience should not be allowed to decide the more profound issues arising 
from the competition of the media involved.
The accessibility of Wittgenstein's texts has been tremendously enhanced by putting them on 
CD-ROMs. If this were information like the listings in a telephone directory one could let the 
issue rest at this point. It might be confined to a discussion of the availability and design of 
necessary electronic interfaces. Philosophical production, and in particular Wittgenstein's 
literary remains, raise more interesting questions, though. Can conceptual content be neatly 
separated from its presentation in a given medium? Since its inception philosophy was done 
by teaching, in scholarly discourse, or by writing books/papers. What will be the impact of 
current digital technology on those traditional practices?5 
The preceding sketch has emphasized several characteristics of electronic texts that printed 
books cannot match. It does not follow that a given work actually demands - or even bears - 
digital treatment. Essential use of single pages, to mention a simple case, cannot easily be 
simulated electronically. The first section of this paper will, therefore, explore what might be 
called the textuality of Wittgenstein's Nachlass. Tracing the development of an important 
Wittgensteinian motive, this exploration surveys part of the newly available material, testing 
the suitability of computer-assisted scholarship to this particular collection of writings. Is 
there a general lesson to be learned from involving oneself in hands-on digital philology? As it 
turns out the Wittgenstein Nachlass provides an excellent occasion to reflect upon the range 
and limits of the Gutenberg heritage. This is discussed in section two. The concluding remarks 
focus on the Bergen edition. Given that digitization does not simply extend the established 
tool-set of textual scholarship but opens up new philosophical perspectives - how well does 
this particular enterprise support (and possibly inspire) a re-configuration of the philological 
status quo?
TOOTHACHES: PHILOLOGY 
The so-called 'private language' argument laid out in Philosophical Investigations §§ 243ff has 
been widely discussed in the literature. One of Wittgenstein's ways to introduce the problem 
is to argue for the incomprehensibility of naming pains in a strictly solipsistic setting. What are 
the circumstances enabling us to identify sensations? We have to participate in interpersonal 
activities expressing e.g. pain.
Wie wäre es, wenn die Menschen ihre Schmerzen nicht äußerten (nicht stöhnten, das Gesicht 
nicht verzögen etc.)? Dann könnte man einem Kind nicht den Gebrauch des Wortes 
'Zahnschmerzen' beibringen. (PhU § 257)
The fleeting reference to toothaches here does not carry conceptual weight in the context of 
the Investigations. But, surprisingly enough, Wittgenstein's earliest treatment of the issues 
that were to lead to his private language argument centers around this very sensation. There 
are at least three methods available to reach the present conclusion. By juxtaposing them we 
get a first glimpse at the possible scope of computer-assisted textual criticism. 
(1) Five volumes of the Wiener Ausgabe have hitherto been published, comprising - in appr. 
1300 pages - Wittgenstein's manuscripts from the time when he took up philosophy again, 
ending his self-imposed moratorium subsequent to the completion of the Tractatus . These 
manuscripts contain, in chronological order, Wittgenstein's discussions of a wide range of 
issues. In essence they are philosophical diaries, freely switching between different matters 
of interest, developing threads of thought up to a certain point, interrupting and returning at 
a later date. One might read through all of this material and pick out remarks concerning 
toothaches. The term appears for the first time on Nov. 19, 1929: 'Warum nenne ich 
Zahnschmerzen ' meine Zahnschmerzen' ?' (MS 107, 199; WA 2, 1146). Wittgenstein then 
develops this motive from different angles up to Dec. 14, 1929 (MS 108, 8f; WA 2,136) and 
returns to discuss it in a loose sequence of remarks from Jan. 31, 1930 (MS 107, 270; WA 2, 
186) to Feb. 7, 1930 (MS 107, 288; WA 2, 196). All of those entries are intermingled with 
reflections on many different topics: probability, theory of measurement, Euclidean geometry, 
realism et.al.. No guiding principle is discernible. Wittgenstein is following his own idiosyncratic 
lines of thought that often consist of digressions, retractions and cognitive jumps. It is not 
impossible, but exceedingly hard, to recognize the making of the private language argument in 
those scattered aphorisms. This should not come as a surprise since, after all, the 
manuscripts are Wittgenstein's philosophical workshop. Philological attention is often informed 
by prior knowledge of the results of such incipient processes.
In the light of Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy the first approach does, anyway, make 
little sense. Examining his manuscripts he picked a number of remarks for dictation. Copies of 
the resulting type-scripts were consequently cut into slips of paper and rearranged according 
to rules that seem to be revised within the organizing process itself. This procedure can be 
appropriately illustrated by tracking the course of Wittgenstein's notes on toothaches. 
Typescript 208, which is an extract from manuscripts 105-108, is only partially preserved.7 As 
far as toothaches are concerned, only the paragraphs dating from Dec. 14, 1929 can be 
found in this compilation. Alois Pichler has reconstructed the likely shape of TS 208. According 
to his conjecture most of the material on toothaches was contained in the missing pages 1-
1448. It reappears, completely rearranged, in TS 209, which is the text source for 
Philosophische Bemerkungen, edited by Rush Rees and published in 1964. Wittgenstein's 
original typescript shows no classifications whatsoever. At first inspection it is simply a very 
long sequence of paragraphs. Rush Rees divided the script into sections and invented groups 
of paragraphs which he numbered according to an undocumented, inscrutable scheme. A 
collection of Wittgenstein's reflections on toothaches happens to make up section VI of 
Philosophische Bemerkungen. This is a promising place to look for the conceptual genesis of 
his later views on mental states, sensations and language.
While all sections of Philosophische Bemerkungen are the invention of Rush Rees it is, 
nevertheless, also true that it was Wittgenstein who assembles the pieces into one particular 
order, thus emphazising his interest in an analysis of how first-person talk determines our 
understanding of pain. These notes have been available for a long time and attentive readers 
have doubtlessly noticed connections between them and later discussions of similar issues. 
This material was, however, entirely separated from its context of origin, a stand-alone 
compilation of philosophical insights. There is nothing per se wrong with restricting oneself to 
this state of affairs. It can very well serve as a starting point for enquiries like the present 
essay. Yet, the recent publications from the Nachlass have opened up a range of exiting 
possibilities. What used to be philologically opaque collections of Wittgensteinian ideas can 
now be disassembled and regarded as intermediate results of an ongoing process of creative 
writing and revision. It has become feasible not only to identify the building blocks of 
Wittgenstein's more elaborate editorial arrangements but - what is more important - to 
actually observe his philosophical labor, i.e. the decision process leading from day-to-day 
notes towards (as he envisaged it) eventual publication of his thoughts.
(2) Conventional methodology offers indices and synopses to assist such an enterprise. Both 
are provided by the Wiener Ausgabe, suggesting a second approach to access the 
Wittgensteinian corpus. 'Toothache' is an index entry; it can be looked up and the resulting 
items can in turn be traced through the Wittgenstein papers. Wiener Ausgabe - Apparatus, 
Register zu den Bänden 1-5 consists entirely of tables correlating every single paragraph from 
the manuscripts to its subsequent occurances in these volumes and (more commonly) to its 
location within the Philosophische Bemerkungen or Philosophische Grammatik. On Nov. 29, 
1929 Wittgenstein noted:
Von Sinnesdaten in dem Sinne des Wortes in dem es undenkbar ist daß der Andere sie hat, 
kann man eben aus diesem Grunde auch nicht sagen, daß der Andere sie nicht hat. Und aus 
ebendiesem Grunde ist es sinnlos zu sagen, daß  ich im Gegensatz zum Anderen sie habe. (MS 
107, 215f; WA 2, 124)
As the synopsis shows this remark was included in TS 209 (aka Philosophische Bemerkungen) 
presumably in mid-19309 as entry VI, 61 and taken up again on Jun. 1, 1932, when 
Wittgenstein started a revision of his earlier ideas on the topic. Investigating this kind of 
dependency is standard procedure in textual criticism. Until very recently this had to be done 
by consulting printed synopses. It seems fair to say that there is very little sense in carrying 
on the old way, if the advance of digital technologies is taken into account.
The point is not just that it is quite cumbersome to work with multiple versions of basically 
the same paragraph located in different places in various bound volumes. This impediment 
could be alleviated by liberal use of the xerox machine. Printed synopses of material as 
complex as Wittgenstein's Nachlass face a more serious problem. It seems next to impossible 
to combine indexing and synopsis. The reader is presented with either a list of significant 
terms or a table of correlations of textual segments. She cannot simultaneously look for the 
occurance of a word and the history of rearrangements of the paragraph it is included in. No 
one would finance a series of books (or care to use them) containing the astronomical number 
of relations between index entries and changes of contexts in gory detail. Consider the remark 
quoted above. Instinctively one would at least consider the terms 'Sinnesdaten', 'Sinn', 'Wort', 
'der Andere', 'Grund', 'sinnlos' and 'Gegensatz'.10 The quote considered here does not even 
contain the term 'Zahnschmerzen' which is, at this point, Wittgenstein's guiding paradigm. 
Imagine all those terms put into correlation with all the changes of their occurrences 
elsewhere in the Nachlass. The ensuing combinatorial explosion effectively prevents putting 
the result on paper. In the present case one cannot have a general, usable, semantics-to-
(section)-numbers and (section)-numbers-to-(section-)numbers mapping, one on top of the 
other, in a print medium.
(3) It is easily done if the texts have been properly digitized. Since words are encoded by 
numbers it is quite simple to set up an index and it takes just another couple of numbers to 
represent the trace of 'words' to and from given contexts. Much of this can be done 
automatically; there is no need to actually visualize the necessary relational apparatus. If a 
correlation seems interesting it can be called up at will, with no time lost for browsing, 
copying or shuffling around papers. Searching for 'Zahnschmerzen' in the Bergen edition 
immediately yields 138 hits across the entire collection. The search can be restricted to 
particular (groups of) volumes and modified to include co-occurring or proximate terms as well 
as dates. A query for 'Sinnesdaten and Zahnschmerzen' produces as a result precisely three 
common occurances. First is a paragraph from MS 114 (MS 114, 16; WA 5, 179) into which 
Wittgenstein had assimilated separate earlier notes, followed by its typescript derivatives in 
TS 211, 755 and TS 213, 510 (Big Typescript). The quote previously presented (MS 107, 
215f; WA 2, 124), lacking the term 'Zahnschmerzen', is picked out among the 30 hits returned 
by querying 'Sinnesdaten'. It occurs in a stand-alone paragraph in TS 209, 23 (PhB VI, 61) 
and is flagged accordingly. In other words: a couple of straightforward enquiries lead directly 
to an important juncture in Wittgenstein's investigation of the logic of talk about sense 
impressions and toothaches in particular.
But wait. There is something suspicious about the last sentence. Manipulation of the index 
mechanism per se cannot produce important results. The disappearance of manifest meaning 
is, in fact, the price to pay for enhanced electronic facilities. One can easily pick any 
combination of terms and search constraints - but there is no guarantee whatsoever that this 
will lead to an interesting result. So where does 'importance' come in? This is a category of 
reflective assessment, crucially different from automated procedures. The discrepancy is at 
the center of any discussion about computer-assisted philology. A certain amount of cheating 
is necessary to reach the comfortable conclusion presented in the previous paragraph. 
Criteria enabling one to judge upon the importance of algorithmic procedures have to be 
presupposed in order for such procedures to be of any help. To put it very simply: elaborate 
tools are of little help without knowledge of their proper use. One has to have a hunch about 
the possible significance of a term to profitably employ the electronic search function. The 
non-sequitur above may serve as a reminder to first-generation digital scholars. It is easy to 
fall into the trap of overestimating technology. None of the powerful programming at work 
below the WYSIWYG-surface guarantees philosophical content. 
The difficulty, consequently, is the following one: How can technological advancements in 
textual criticism be constrained by a sense of proportion relating to a prior understanding of 
the subject matter. This type of question is well-known and often discussed between 
technophiles and technophobes. The present paper is a case study, trying to answer the 
question for one particular instance of the general problem. But we have not yet assembled 
the necessary evidence. It remains quite unclear why a philosopher should worry about 
toothaches. A powerful mechanism has been sketched, yet it is fair to assume that 
Wittgenstein scholars go about their business projecting hypotheses to understand the 
complexities of the Nachlass quite independently. The above account does not include a 
reason for using the mechanism. Providing such reasons is itself a philosophical activity. This 
section has offered a rough overview of the itinerary of some sample paragraphs. One has to 
explore their content and in particular the conceptual significance of their itinerary in order to 
get the full picture. A satisfactory answer to the issue at stake between digital technology 
and its critics has to appeal to philosophy in action.
TOOTHACHES: PHILOSOPHY 
Wittgenstein's first entry into manuscript 107 refers back to the Tractatus . There he had 
claimed: 'Das denkende, vorstellende, Subjekt gibt es nicht.' (5.631) And he had explained 
this dictum by pointing to the visual field: 'nichts am Gesichtsfeld läßt darauf schließen, daß 
es von einem Auge gesehen wird.' ( Tractatus  5.633). Compare MS 107, 1 (WA 2,3): 'Der 
Gesichtsraum so wie er ist hat seine selbständige Realität. Er selbst enthält kein Subjekt. Er 
ist autonom.' In 1929 Wittgenstein's anti-intentionalism is still in place, but his views on 
atomic sentences begin to change. The basic units of his epistemological account are not 
single sentences any more: 'Ich lege nicht den Satz als Maßstab an die Wirklichkeit an 
sondern das System von Sätzen.' (MS 107, 35; WA 2, 149) The logic of color terms has, as 
Wittgenstein discovered, to take account of the field of possibilities given by the spectrum. 
Atomic sentences cannot be independent of each other since 'This plate is blue' logically 
implies - among many other propositions - that it is not red. Yet, this is not a tautology. 
Given the visual field and the customary color space one has a priori knowledge of the 
structural dependencies of possible colors. To look for any actual one necessarily includes 
mastery of a presupposed color scheme. 'Wie es einen Sinn hat zu sagen die Farbe R ist am 
Ort P wenn ich überhaupt den Gesichtsraum mit dem Farbraum "vor mir" habe.' (MS 107, 158; 
WA 2, 92) Wittgenstein's quotes indicate that he is still officially unwilling to grant the 
existence of a subject. But it is interesting to take a closer look at his day's work (Oct. 10, 
1929).
The point of reference of the previous quote ('Wie es einen Sinn hat ...') are stomach aches. 
Wittgenstein is discussing the meaning of negation. How can one truthfully deny the presence 
of stomach aches? Such sentences seem to lack external sensual corroboration. They cannot 
be constructed as somehow linking stomachs and pains either. 'Es ist nur wesentlich, daß ich 
den Raum vor mir habe in dem der Magen liegt und den worin die Schmerzen liegen.' (MS 107, 
157; WA 2, 92) Like colors within the visual field pains are a kind of sensation constitutivly 
associated with stomachs. This seems an unobjectionable parallel - with a twist. We have 
noted Wittgenstein's avoidance of the common notion of a subject in his discussion of the 
visual field. This strategy cannot, however, be carried over to the case of 'internal' 
sensations. There is nothing comparable to the geometry of shared, public, visible spaces in 
the realm of our intestines. If you remove the subject from stomach aches not even the 
illusion of a legitimate issue remains. Switching from the visual field to internal sensations, 
Wittgenstein's doctrine of the subject is severely shaken. He cannot but employ the first 
person pronoun in these contexts, even though his commitment is to exclude it from the 
scientific vocabulary. Such is the dilemma apparent in his first remark on toothaches: 'Warum 
nenne ich Zahnschmerzen " meine Zahnschmerzen" '? (MS 107, 199; WA 2, 114)
Wittgenstein does not follow any pre-set agenda that could lead to a systematic 
investigation of various modalities of the senses. His move from vision to stomach aches to 
tooth aches is obviously not aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive view. Ten 
days after raising the issue of toothaches being my toothaches Wittgenstein comes up with 
the brilliant aphorism quoted above. The private language argument is, in nuce, contained in 
two extremely compact sentences (MS 107, 215f; WA 2, 124). If another person cannot be 
said to be the subject of my internal sense data it is meaningless to deny her those very 
sense data. Their possible occurrences do not include this kind of bearer. Alas, this is no 
comfort for anyone tempted to regard awareness of one's own intentional states as privileged 
knowledge. There is no force in such pronouncements. I cannot determine something uniquely 
subjective in appealing to an incomprehensible option, i.e. another person's having my internal 
states. The Tractatus  view of the subject was of a metaphysical entity, a border of the 
World, not part of it ( Tractatus 5.641). The early post-Tractarian manuscripts are gradually 
abandoning this dualism, conceding a role for first-person talk. Yet, most of the original 
skepticism remains. How can one conceive of a role for 'private' sensations and avoid 
idealism?
Such questions are external to Wittgenstein's writing in the manuscripts. The present sketch 
puts emphasis on only a small number of issues discussed within those volumes. The general 
line of argument is, however, supported by Wittgenstein's own subsequent selective rewriting 
of the material. When he cut up TS 208 to rearrange its content into what is now known as 
the Philosophische Bemerkungen, one of his points of emphasis was toothaches. His 
discussion of logical features of talk about the subject centers around a selection of remarks 
devoted to the remarkable fact of me - Ludwig Wittgenstein - having toothaches (cf. PhB VI, 
58). This revision introduces complexity of a higher order. Many of Wittgenstein's paragraphs 
are initially small, self-contained philosophical analyses. The next auctorial step is to try and 
put them together so that some larger, overarching connection is established. Philosophische 
Bemerkungen VI does, in fact, offer extremely dense philosophical substance, much too 
involved to be discussed here. Just an outline of Wittgenstein's strategy of using his 
arrangements as arguments can be given.
A first group of remarks, serving as a kind of prolegomenon, is derived from entries for Dec. 
14, 1929 and Oct. 11, 1929, expounding the general direction of the succeeding paragraphs. 
The use of the first person pronoun is fraught with difficulties, particularly if talk about 
perception is modelled according to external circumstances. 'I am experiencing a red patch' is 
quoted as a case in point. To analyze the difficulties one might re-write the puzzling 
descriptions, substituting some un-objectionable term for the offensive 'I'. This exercise is 
next. Remarkably, Wittgenstein switches from sense impressions to internal sensation again, 
as he designs a language game supposed to exhibit the same logical multiplicity as the 
common idiom and yet to avoid mention of a subject. His idea is to externalize the privileged 
position of subjectivity by designating one particular person as an universal point of 
reference. If 'I am' Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'I have toothaches' becomes 'There are toothaches' 
and 'A has toothaches' can be rephrased as 'A behaves like Ludwig Wittgenstein when there 
are toothaches'. (PhBemerkungen VI, 58). The apparent uniqueness of subjective experience 
is transformed into a qualitative difference in public discourse; the mysterious realm of 
subjectivity replaced by an idiom of matching complexity: everyone can take center stage in 
this language. Once this focus is set the remaining moves of the language game are 
equivalent to the traditional one. Wittgenstein offers a playful simile. The logic of first-person 
talk recalls oriental despotism, with the subject taking the place of the despot in providing 
the origin of the communicative coordinate system.
The point is that talk about sensations is inevitably dualistic. 'The subject' - as well as an 
oriental despot - is supposed to fall outside ordinary discourse directed towards physical 
things. If Timur Lenk's state of health is taken as the measuring device of health-talk it makes 
no sense to ask whether he has toothaches. In the event, toothaches simply are among his 
personal states and having toothaches is a condition derived from this primordial condition. 
Even though Wittgenstein has thus eliminated first-person talk the Tractarian criterion of 
meaning fails, however. It is impossible to attribute possession of toothaches or lack thereof 
to a suitably designated individuum. (The discussion prefigures later reflections on the Paris 
ur-meter.) After this setting of the stage Wittgenstein embarks on a series of grammatical 
investigations, exploring the comprehensibility of our dualistic idiom. There is no obvious way 
to stratify his dialectical dialogues into a single argument. 'I cannot feel your toothaches.' 
Does this sentence express an empirical truth or rather a kind of logical necessity 
Wittgenstein had not provided for in his Tractatus? (cf. PhB VI, 61) Rather than answering 
questions like this, Wittgenstein keeps changing his focus and his examples, circling around 
the issues. What is he up to? To a casual reader it looks like an open-ended, aporetic 
elenchus. But Wittgenstein, surprisingly, and without so much as minimal warning, does 
actually close his argument by the strategic placement of one paragraph.
Wittgenstein's transposition of first person talk was anchored in the neutral statement: 'There 
are toothaches'. The following quote is an obvious echo, concluding the argument:
Das Phänomen des Schmerzgefühls in einem Zahn, welches ich kenne, ist in der 
Ausdrucksweise der gewöhnlichen Sprache dargestellt durch ' ich habe in dem und dem Zahn 
Schmerzen'. Nicht durch einen Ausdruck von der Art, 'an diesem Ort ist ein Schmerzgefühl'. 
(PhB VI, 66)
As it turns out, it is impossible to capture the subjectivist intuitions in Wittgenstein's 
alternative scheme. There cannot be pains outside of consciousness. Designating a physical 
body to be the paradigmatic bearer of pain is no better than ascribing pain to some tooth put 
on a table ( Philosophische Bermerkungen VI, 65). Timur Lenk is, inevitably, located in public 
space, so we are back to Wittgenstein's initial reminder: the problem arises because physical 
circumstances are inappropriately projected onto another context.
Das ganze Feld dieser Erfahrung wird in dieser Sprache durch Ausdrücke von der Form 'ich 
habe ...' beschrieben. Die Sätze von der Form 'N hat Zahnschmerzen' sind für ein ganz 
anderes Feld reserviert. (PhB VI, 66) 
In other words: Wittgenstein advises himself to desist from trying to battle ordinary language. 
He is quite aware of the tension: In order to unravel the philosophical knot one has to re-
trace the complicated movements underlying it. Thus ends the second take on toothaches. 
Resting content with the ordinary was, however, always a temporary affair for Wittgenstein. 
In 1932 we find him returning to the very issues he had supposedly resolved in MS 110, 30ff 
(WA5, 179ff). These are the quotes remarked upon earlier in this paper: Wittgenstein's 
second, condensing revision of the material on toothaches.
This third stratum of the textual evidence and its further development will not be pursued 
here. The sole purpose of the preceding intermezzo was to redress the balance between the 
digital toolkit and topics in established Wittgenstein scholarship. The problem was to mediate 
between proponents of largely syntactic manipulation of linguistic data and traditional 
approaches that turn to texts with a prior understanding of their subject matter. The way to 
escape a stand-off is to refuse the contra-position from the very start. Semantic data-
mining11 as exemplified by the previous sub-section, is simultaneously an exercise in digital 
philology and philosophy. Wittgenstein's Nachlass is an excellent place to look for such a 
synthesis because the author's ideas are, to a large extent, expressed by arranging and 
rearranging small textual units. Tracking the dynamics of Wittgenstein's philosophical 
variations can, admittedly, be done in the conventional framework of a printed edition of his 
manuscripts and type-scripts. Computer-assisted procedures do, however, push philology 
towards horizons previously out of reach. To repeat: No collection of printed volumes can 
conceivably present any synopsis of any terms, occurring at arbitrary dates, in just a few 
seconds. Such opportunities are bound to have a major impact on future Wittgenstein 
scholarship. This concludes the philological assessment of conventional versus digital 
approaches to the Wittgenstein papers. A more detached attitude has already been hinted 
at. It seems that Wittgenstein's writing is particularly well suited to a post-Gutenberg 
environment. In order to get the full picture regarding the Bergen edition we have to take a 
closer look at Wittgenstein's failure to turn his writings into a book.
BEYOND BOOKS 
J.C. Nyíri has made a strong case for considering the Wittgenstein Nachlass in the light of 
recent media philosophy. Quoting Walter Ong and Erich Havelock he reminds his readers of the 
prospect that the age of literacy might be giving way to a period of secondary orality, with 
the spoken word regaining the most influential position in a broadcast society. According to 
Nyíri's suggestion Wittgenstein's failure to distinguish between the written and the spoken 
word might explain his 'ultimate inability to complete the "book" he always wanted to 
complete'12. The ductus of his writings is, indeed, more akin to on-going conversations than 
to neatly delineated propositions. Did Wittgenstein miss the adequate medium for his 
exertions? Nyíri draws attention to the fact that his writing is, in certain places, a direct 
rejoinder to the Socratic dialogues. 'Ich finde bei Plato auf eine Frage wie 'was ist Erkenntnis' 
nicht die vorläufige Antwort: Sehen wir einmal nach, wie dieses Wort gebraucht wird.' (TS 
211, 17) Wittgenstein's inverse Socratic role consists in dissolving platonic confidence in 
essences and is, therefore, ill suited to be put into a classical philosophical treatise. As Nyíri 
(following Havelock) rightly reminds us, Platonic ideas are inextricably connected to the rise of 
literacy over an oral tradition which lacked expressive means for a proper treatment of 
abstract terms. Yet, Wittgenstein could have rested content with his actual teaching, leaving 
it to his disciples to provide written records. He did not do so, but rather forced himself, 
against better knowledge, to conform to the given standard.
Wenn ich für mich denke ohne ein Buch schreiben zu wollen, so springe ich um das Thema 
herum; das ist die einzige mir natürliche Denkweise. In einer Reihe gezwungen fortzudenken ist 
mir eine Qual. Soll ich es nun überhaupt probieren? Ich verschwende unsägliche Mühe auf ein 
Anordnen der Gedanken, das vielleicht gar keinen Wert hat. (MS 118, 185)
The key word is 'vielleicht' indicating Wittgenstein's ambivalent ambitions to write a book. His 
difficulties are methodologically profound. One way to bring this into focus is to position them 
at the crossroads between books and hypertext.
Decades of Wittgenstein scholarship have been shaped by editorial decisions made by the 
trustees of the Nachlass. Their general policy was to present provisional steps in 
Wittgenstein's ongoing process of revision as standalone volumes, often effacing the 
dynamics demonstrated in the preceding section. David Stern, in his perceptive paper, 
correctly describes the state of affairs.
The Wittgenstein Nachlass is not a haphazard pile of working papers that happened to survive 
his death, nor is it a collection of works that only awaited publication. While it is both a 
carefully selected and highly structured record of his life's work, a collection of material that 
he deliberately assembled and left to posterity, it is also the record of a writer continually in 
flux, never entirely satisfied with anything he had written.13  
In view of this situation it actually seems a little unfair to reapproach the editors of 
Wittgenstein's posthumous writing. There is no good way to capture the activity vividly 
described by Stern into the confines of a printed volume. Despite outward appearances there 
are no 'works of Wittgenstein' that could confidently be taken as points of departure. Even 
the Philosophische Untersuchungen are, as Stern observes, 'only one of a number of possible 
arrangements Wittgenstein proposed, many of which extend, amplify, or cast light on the 
remarks in the published book.'14 References to current models of textual interdependency 
become almost irresistible at this point. 'Because the Wittgenstein Nachlass is the result of 
such an extensive act of rewriting, it is less a collection of texts than a hypertext, an 
interconnected network of remarks.'15 Stern's remarks certainly point into the right direction. 
Still, there are some intermediary steps between the range of options available to 
Wittgenstein and writing that is embedded in digital technology. Those steps have to be 
spelled out if one wants to get a grasp on how the CD-ROM edition might change out habits 
of scholarship based on self-contained books. 
One feature of a culture based on books deserves special attention as this culture is 
challenged by the advent of digital, globally distributed information. Books are marked by the 
coincidence of two seperate decisions: their content and its appearance are determined 
simultaneously. This is what publication of a book, in effect, amounts to - and it throws some 
light on Wittgenstein's qualms. He felt unable to decide on one shape for his ideas. 
Publication, throughout European history, simply meant drawing a line between a creative 
process and its (albeit provisional) results. Sending a manuscript to the publisher was to 
distinguish a line between sketches, preliminary attempts, experimental drafts and an entity 
exhibiting both the features of the most prestigious information technology and of auctorial 
closure. Books divided the lifetime of an author into continuous activity and singular results, 
texts that, from a certain moment in time, assume a life of their own. This arrangement is 
being thoroughly shaken by the advent of new media. First of all, digital encoding disrupts the 
familiar coordination between form and content. Characters are mapped into numbers that 
are, in turn, symbolized in an electronic format unsuitable for direct perception. And this 
transposition, secondly, triggers dramatic changes in the nature of publicity. Electronic texts 
can instantly be published to a world audience and still be constantly revised.
In the given context it is particularly instructive to notice the implication for posthumous 
'works'. In the world of books a Nachlass is defined as all the material an author did not 
manage or see fit to get printed. Its peculiar character is that future generations retro-
activly elevate such writing to the status of books. If books published by an author are what 
software developers call a 'feature-freeze', publications from a Nachlass are based on 
decisions to overrule such limitations. There is no way to escape the allure of 'works' in book 
culture. In Nachlass-publications auxiliary authors assume responsibility to supplement a 
writer's oeuvre with 'second order' books. Applying this to the case at hand yields a 
suggestive prospect. While the trustees failed to do justice to Wittgenstein's open-ended, 
conversations philosophical style, a digital edition of the Nachlass is much better suited to 
achieve this aim. Such an enterprise is not forced to turn a collection of tentative designs 
into bound volumes. The 'Wiener Ausgabe' seems set to publish the largely repetetive material 
from 1929-1933 in 12 weighty volumes. Michael Nedo sounds apologetic in defending this 
expenditure:
... the book is still the carrier of thoughts, of written heritage in our culture, and familiarity 
with this medium certainly affects not only one's dealings with the texts themselves, but also 
the accompanying Apparatuses.16  
One does not have to subscribe to deconstruction to find this eulogy anachronistic. The 
transitory character of Wittgenstein's writing, its complex genealogy and its numerous 
recapitulations seem to call for a digital format of presentation which matches its inherent 
temporality by avoiding ultimate editorial decisions and allowing easy manipulation of the 
textual material.
Impressions like these, convincing as they may sound - once again - overstress technology. 
Wittgenstein, it is true, despaired of achieving the linear order demanded by a printed book. 
But this does not imply that hypertext could have solved his problem. His desparation is the 
important feature: the fight against a spell cast upon his writing by the demands of books 
culture. He worried about the correct arrangement of his ideas, so much is obvious from the 
examples discussed above. One understanding of 'hypertext' is of segments of texts linked 
together in a more or less haphazard way, often without any single, controling authority. This 
meaning is certainly not applicable to Wittgenstein. He could have saved himself a lot of 
trouble had he been prepared to regard his writing as a kind of private web-space. A second 
understanding might be more appropriate. Hypertext can also refer to autonomous non-linear 
writing which transcends the obligatory step-by-step sequence of print-products by 
constructing a topological matrix without hierarchical order. Digitized texts are encoded as 
numbers and have to be re-established in a legible format. Visualization by a monitor is one 
step removed from the pages of a book and offers flexibility unmatched by their arrangement. 
Wittgenstein's famous metaphor of wandering through a philosophical landscape comes to 
mind. The Nachlass does, in fact, contain a number of tentative registers that could easily be 
implemented as a hypertext.17 
This is one side of Wittgenstein's struggle with conventional means of expressing thoughts. 
But his need for a different kind of complexity is offset by an equally important desire. In 
many places he insists on finding definitive answers. This motive, manifest in the Tractatus , 
is also present in Wittgenstein's later calls for 'Übersichtlichkeit' (surveyability) and well laid-
out description:
Wir wollen nicht das Regelsystem für die Verwendung unserer Worte in unerhörter Weise 
verfeinern oder vervollständigen. Denn die Klarheit, die wir anstreben, ist allerdings eine 
vollkommene. Aber das heißt nur, daß die philosophischen Probleme vollkommen verschwinden 
sollen. (PhU § 133)
In this context, the 'treatment' of philosophical problems is likened to therapeutical 
intervention and its ultimate aim is to put vexing thoughts to rest. Such an attitude cannot 
be easily reconciled with calls for open-ended auctorial multiplicity and the suspension of 
binding results. Wittgenstein's 'hypertext' avant la lettre arises from unsuccessful attempts at 
closure rather than from intentional design. It does not anticipate a more flexible medium 
which might alleviate the rigor of philosophical arguments. As the Nachlass material on 
toothaches shows, Wittgenstein did not simply reject the linear progression of thoughts in 
favor of a compilation of aphorisms. He actually proposes a solution - even though it does not 
satisfy him in the long run. Look at it this way: If he had been able to reach a satisfactory 
conclusion he would have put it into print. Hypertext, on the other hand, is by design non-
conclusive. Had Wittgenstein used hypertext, his characteristic struggle against premature 
closure would have been lost. Hypertext lacks the kind of physical inertia needed to make a 
sentence stick to a certain position and while Wittgenstein kept overturning pre-established 
patterns of thought and inferences he never abandoned his drive to return to 
straightforward, easily surveyable positions.
Wir sind aufs Glatteis geraten, wo die Reibung fehlt, also die Bedingungen in gewissem Sinn 
ideal sind, aber wir eben deshalb auch nicht gehen können. Wir wollen gehen; dann brauchen 
wir Reibung. Zurück auf den rauhen Boden. (PhU § 107)
Wittgenstein would, in all likelihood, have extended this complaint against free-floating 
philosophical speculation to l'art pour l'art hypertext.
To sum up and focus on the case at hand: Electronic texts are not just a kind of print; the 
graphical rendering of information on a monitor is no 'page' in any ordinary sense. It is 
tempting - and to some extent plausible - to distinguish Wittgenstein's writing from 
conventional philosophical authorship by employing jargon from media studies. Actually putting 
his Nachlass on a CD-ROM adds considerable complexity to the story. There is an important 
difference between a writer's decision to publish his or her work (in whatever format) and 
someone else administering a heritage. Nachlass publications, including electronic editions, are 
per definitionem second order closures. The flexibility of digitized texts is of another order as 
Wittgenstein's work in progress. How those papers are to be rendered on CD-ROMs is by no 
means self-evident. It is easy to pretend that the Bergen project is just an extension of well-
known editorial strategies. Such an attitude does, however, seriously underestimate the 
range of problems involved. All the conveniences set forth in the previous pages do not come 
for free. The change from books to computers is in itself an important theoretical and political 
issue. Putting Wittgenstein on disk demands a considerable number of decisions beyond the 
scope of printed editions. This is new territory, hardly even noticed as a philosophical issue 
amongst Wittgenstein scholars.
THE POLITICS OF DIGITAL TEXTS 
The Bergen electronic edition effaces its own novelty. Its structuring principle are the 
physical volumes of the Nachlass which are presented one after the other in linear sequence. 
The search facilities include easy access to single manuscripts or type-scripts. Facsimiles 
provide unprecedented opportunities to scrutinize Wittgenstein's actual output.The electronic 
edition might be argued to beat its print competitors at their own game. One apparent 
platitude is of utmost importance, though. Digitized texts need computers which need 
software which needs operating systems. In centuries of print culture we have become 
accustomed to the fact that once a book is published it is freely accessible to readers 
without further effort. Historical pictures of lockable books raise amused smiles. Yet, they are 
not a bad analogy to so-called digital books: in order to read them one needs additional 
devices, even 'keys'. Book publishing is a business charging once per item, regardless of its 
further use. But those products are, nowadays, revealed as just one interface to information. 
In many respects digital documents offer more convenient access to identical content. This 
surplus value has a price: a set of electronic equipment is inserted between the reader and 
her text. Once they have been published (and as long as they are in print) books are available 
without further decoding. As everyone who has to exchange files on the internet knows, this 
is far from true for electronic documents. Different computer platforms, different word 
processors and conflicting versions tend to produce confusions unheard of in former times.
The reason for this is that there are several competing standards to implement a mapping 
between alpha-numerical symbols and digital numbers. Strictly speaking only the basic letters, 
numerals and diacritical signs of the English alphabet are interchangeable on any platform. 
Different sets of characters, and in particular the elaborate additional code necessary to 
simulate printed pages on a monitor, demand special attention. International bodies are in 
charge of supervising the encoding of the world's languages. Software simulation of written 
material, however, obeys different rules. It is to a considerable extent a commercial affair and 
subject to the laws of economics. The result is, predictably, a considerable variety of 
proprietary software tools trying to get their share of the market by offering particularly 
comfortable - and mutually incompatible - features. This is the state of affairs confronting 
any digitization of texts. Two minimalistic approaches are either to scan existing pages or to 
stick to 7-bit ASCII code in transcribing them electronically. It is immediately obvious that 
neither of these options is satisfactory for a textual corpus of the degree of complexity of the 
Wittgenstein Nachlass. The editors were faced with a situation unprecedented in ordinary 
publishing. They had to decide upon a software package capable of producing the desired 
results, which also meant forcing that package upon the readers. Textual scholarship finds 
itself on unfamiliar terrain. The tools it needs to even access its subject matter are produced 
by big companies with only marginal interest in the academy.
The Bergen edition runs on the Windows platform (Windows 3.1, 3.11, Windows 95 and 
Windows NT4 according to the promotion sheet). For word-processing capacity it uses a 
program named 'FolioViews' which provides the usual services: cut and paste, printing, 
searching, window control, electronic bookmarks and back tracing. For scholars who habitually 
use the Microsoft range of products and do not worry about the ensuing dependency of their 
basic data on market competition these are excellent choices, even though some of its 
limitations will affect the ordinary user. The entire collection of normalized and diplomatic 
transcripts is put into a single binary file respectively. (The facsimiles are offered as single 
graphic documents, one per physical page.) Consequently, two huge electronic files contain 
the entire content of the Bergen edition in a completely opaque format. The user is allowed to 
read and manipulate texts via FolioViews but none of the structural information that has been 
presented in the first section of this paper is directly accessible to her. She can copy 
selected texts, paste and print them - but neither can she touch the indexing mechanism nor 
modify any of the underlying data. There is a strict separation between interface and non-
transparent, computational deep structure. Copyright considerations are a prominent reason 
for this arrangement: the content of a printed book cannot as easily be reproduced, 
manipulated and distributed as its digital counterpart. Provisions have to be taken to protect 
the investment put into such long-term projects. Media change unsettles venerable customs. 
The traditional understanding was that the result of scholarly work, most often financed by 
the taxpayer's money, are generally available in their entirety. This feature does, indeed, 
distinguish scholarship from commercially induced research. As teams of experts have to use 
proprietary software to reassure the copyright-holders and ensure the profit for the publishing 
house, this availability is restricted. But, it might be objected, where is the problem? 
Wittgenstein's writings are at one's disposal, all of them and in an extremely comfortable 
fashion. True enough, judged by the standards of the printed book. Yet, as was discussed in 
section two, Wittgenstein's Nachlass transcends the limits of such standards and an 
electronic edition might be better suited to capture those peculiarities. It might be organized 
so as to mirror Wittgenstein's editorial techniques, starting with single remarks as elementary 
building blocks and putting them together in a variety of ways, following Wittgenstein's lead. 
His working process, not its result, could be taken as the guiding principle. As a matter of fact 
the encapsulated FolioViews file is the very opposite of hypertext.18 Yet, the Bergen edition 
does not offer any tools to actually rearrange its content or redesign its appearance on the 
primary level. For all its flexibility and ease of use the Bergen edition is still in the conceptual 
grip of classical printed editions. Does it have to mimic the necessities of print culture?
The question turns on the issue of access to the internal, structural information hidden inside 
the binary files. Under present conditions one can find a particular paragraph and all of its 
subsequent instances as they appear in the later volumes. It is, however, impossible to break 
out of the straitjacket of the von Wright classification and deal with paragraphs as basic data 
units. If this were possible digital equivalences of Wittgenstein's notes could be freely 
assembled and re-assembled. As of now one is, for example, presented with manuscripts 105-
108 plus typescripts 208-209 plus manuscript 110 and has to extract relevant paragraphs for 
personal post-processing. A more appropriate way might be to pick out relevant paragraphs 
(e.g. on toothaches) and re-assemble them at bottom level, echoing the author's own 
procedure. It would be an attractive way to overcome the Nachlass effect of irrevocable 
closure. The internal dynamics of the Wittgenstein papers would be much more in evidence if 
a more open digital format had been chosen. Years of labor have been spent on the electronic 
transcription of the original documents. The records of the Wittgenstein archive do in fact 
contain all the information necessary for micrological analysis and multiple synthesis. The use 
of the CD-ROM, however, remains restricted to find, cut and paste with no provisions to 
address the editorial information from outside FolioViews. In order to visualize the conclusion 
on toothaches from the first section one might want to write a small program. It could not 
operate on the existing data structure which would have to be re-inscribed onto copies of 
segments extracted from the database.
This is the place to touch upon some basic issues in the theory and practice of text 
encoding. The discussion of the peculiar overlap between the requirements of digitization and 
commercial interests at the beginning of this section deliberately omitted an alternative 
possibility. Standard General Markup Language (SGML) is an attempt to avoid dependency on 
proprietary formats and irreconcilable software development with regard to electronic texts. 
The idea is, briefly, to supplement the alpha-numeric ciphers with additional (groups of) 
characters ('mark up') that serve the purpose of encoding meta-information by means of the 
available, restricted set of ASCII code. HTML, the language of the World Wide Web, in an 
instance of SGML. An easy example of mark up is the use (in HTML) of '<h1>' to indicate the 
beginning (and '</h1>' the end) of a top level heading. Such mark up indications do not in 
themselves cause any formatting to be done. (This distinguishes them from the binary code 
inserted into text files by common word processors.) Their function is to delineate the logical 
structure of the document and provide anchors to include additional content (like cross-
references, dates or hierarchical dependencies). A marked-up document can be read on any 
computer platform, the catch being that it needs software to render the mark-up as 
intended. This is a substantial difficulty given the fact that word processing has been much 
more popular with the general public. But consider a Web browser to get the general idea. 
Such browser are software which takes '<h1>Title</h1>' as an input and turns it (e.g.) into
                                                          TITLE
SGML (and its recent variant XML) offers a top-down solution to the problem of incompatible 
standards in text encoding and concurrent information storage.
The Bergen edition is based upon transcriptions of Wittgenstein's original pages into a mark up 
language using the 'Multi-Element Code System' (MECS). This system provides a meta-
grammar that can be implemented in particular instances of transcriptional grammar and is 
well suited to the task of capturing the complexities of Wittgenstein's autographs in a digital 
format. For technical reasons MECS is not entirely compatible with SGML. The thing to keep in 
mind is, however, that the Bergen transcriptions contain the entire set of editorial information 
in mark up format, i.e. in 'tags' that can be addressed in programming constructions. This 
information is filtered to produce the diplomatic and normalized versions offered on the CD-
ROMs. In customary, printed editions there is no possible gap between the pages on offer and 
their basic encoding. This does not carry over into the electronic realm where digital code has 
to be re-implemented in order to be perceptible. The need for secondary processing 
introduces a discrepancy which can be used to shield off operative background information 
from its surface rendition. Electronic documents offer spectacular improvements over many of 
the usual features of printed texts. Ironically, it is just because of their versatility that 
mechanisms to constrain their scope are feasible - and called for. The Bergen edition is just 
one example of a more comprehensive problem that is often overlooked in recent digitization 
campaigns. It is perfectly possible to combine global, digital distribution of information with 
highly selective, exclusive standards of its generation and transmission. While most people 
would be prepared to accept this for cable TV or DVD it should at least be a matter of 
concern in textual scholarship.
This is an area of conflict between claims of copyright holders and the scientific community. 
Broaching this issue is not intended to deflect attention from the impressive achievements of 
the Bergen electronic edition. Its presentation of the material is an epochal advance in 
Wittgenstein scholarship. It is, at the same time, a precursor of many electronic editions yet 
to be published and is apt to trigger a more general discussion on how similar scholarly 
editions might be designed. Disregarding, for the purpose of this conclusion, external 
constraints an optimum solution for (future) computer-savvy scholars would enable them to 
address their texts at any of the three levels that have to constitute a serious editorial 
project: the mark-up, diplomatic and normalized versions should all be manipulable to ensure 
optimum results. It is impossible for any single endeavor to adequately charter the wealth of 
variants and cross-relations in Wittgenstein's Nachlass. But if scholars were able to freely 
access the underlying mark up resources based on the canonical transcription could easily be 
enriched by resources taken from literal computing. As several commentators have pointed 
out, the recent 'Open Source' movement in software management echoes the concepts of 
free peer access and peer review well established within science. In the best case scenario 
source code, e.g. the mark-up version of Wittgenstein's texts, would be freely available. Book 
culture charges relatively little for relatively static texts. Expensive electronic editions offer 
advanced research tools, blocking collaboration based on their data structure. There will be 
an 'open source' Wittgenstein sometime this century.
Currently, a confusing variety of formats is used to tentatively provide comprehensive access 
in selected collections, mainly for corpora from earlier centuries. Projects like CELT, the 'Celtic 
Corpus of Electronic Texts'19and the 'Victorian Women Writer's Project'20 offer browsable 
HTML-front-ends, ftp download of marked-up documents and printable Postscript copies. TMI 
('Thesaurus Musicarum Italicarum')21 or 'The William Blake Archive'22 employ DynaWeb to 
translate SGML-coded files for use with common browsers. At the Wittgenstein archive's web-
site23 TS 201a 'Notes on Logic' and MS 115, 'Philosophische Bemerkungen' are available in 
different versions: HTML frames for concurrent inspection of the diplomatic and normalized 
text and for download in Postscript and Word Perfect format respectively. It remains unclear 
whether electronic publishing will develop standards as transparent as those of traditional 
literary culture. The technological advances we have been discussing are in fact instrumental 
in de-familiarizing earlier standards that have acquired second nature status. New 
opportunities arise, but there is still little institutional background and almost none of the hard 
questions have been answered. Meanwhile, from a philosophical point of view, the 
Wittgenstein papers raise an issue that cuts across old and new forms of writing. 
Wittgenstein's struggle against the linear progression of arguments should neither be 
remodeled as a peaceful exercise in hypertext, nor put to rest in an series of (printed or 
virtual) volumes. The driving force behind the Nachlass is a continuous effort to put together 
the pieces of a number of puzzles that seem to change as this activity unfolds. Nachlass 
means: this process has definitely ended. Digitization of the Nachlass offers an opportunity to 
breath life back into an accumulation of notes.
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THE CHANGED STATE OF WITTGENSTEIN SCHOLARSHIP 
Two independent publishing projects have thoroughly changed the state of Wittgenstein 
scholarship in recent years. Michael Nedo's 'Wiener Ausgabe'1 offers a traditional critical 
edition of Wittgenstein's philosophical writings ranging from 1929 up to and including the 'Big 
Typescript' (1933). Considering the eclectic and - at times - arbitrary editorial policy 
underlying previous publications from the Nachlass2 Nedo's project offers unprecedented 
philosophical rigor as well as textual criticism in volumes designed for comfortable reading. A 
second, more ambitious, attempt at a critical edition is the Bergen electronic edition.3 It is 
planned to include 4 CD-ROMs, covering the entire range of the philosopher's unpublished 
writing. Two disks are currently available, comprising all of Wittgenstein's manuscripts from 
1929-1939, as well as type-scripts, beginning with 'Notes on Logic' (1913) and leading up to 
Typescript 226, composed in 1939.
Wittgenstein's writings from the Thirties are, therefore, available in independent, reliable 
printed and electronic editions respectively. Readers can, for the first time, observe the 
philosopher at work, transferring paragraphs from pocket notebooks to handwritten 'volumes'; 
picking acceptable remarks to be included in type-scripts that are, at a later stage, cut up 
into slips of paper which are again annotated, rearranged and put together in further volumes 
and type-scripts. But this is only half the excitement. The 'Wiener Ausgabe' and the 'Bergen 
Edition' stake their success on different media, inevitably provoking a comparison between the 
well known features of printed scholarly editions and the not so familiar realm of digitized 
texts.
Some of the differences are immediately obvious. Scrutinizing philosophical texts on a printed 
page implies sensual qualities lacking in electronic space. Many readers will prefer a material 
sheet of paper over its virtual substitute. There are, on the other hand, definite advantages 
in digitally stored transcriptions. A CD-ROM does not occupy desk-space and allows almost 
instant access to every single remark of the extended Wittgenstein corpus. In addition to the 
actual texts, the 'Wiener Ausgabe' contains separate volumes of sophisticated registers, 
cross-referencing all the printed material. Considering the fact that the Bergen edition 
includes an excellent search function Nedo's tables are an anachronistic nicety at best. In a 
recent volume Nedo, in fact, announces a 'comprehensive electronic Apparatus, 
supplementing the Wiener Ausgabe'4. And there is simply no viable alternative to an electronic 
medium if one wants to present facsimiles of every page of the Nachlass, suitably linked to 
diplomatic and normalized versions of its content. These features make the Bergen edition a 
far more comprehensive enterprise. It seems that, pace  the predictable skepticism stemming 
from deeply ingrained scholarly habits, there is a convincing case in favor of switching to the 
digital format. The present paper will, at any rate, proceed from this assumption. But matters 
of technical convenience should not be allowed to decide the more profound issues arising 
from the competition of the media involved.
The accessibility of Wittgenstein's texts has been tremendously enhanced by putting them on 
CD-ROMs. If this were information like the listings in a telephone directory one could let the 
issue rest at this point. It might be confined to a discussion of the availability and design of 
necessary electronic interfaces. Philosophical production, and in particular Wittgenstein's 
literary remains, raise more interesting questions, though. Can conceptual content be neatly 
separated from its presentation in a given medium? Since its inception philosophy was done 
by teaching, in scholarly discourse, or by writing books/papers. What will be the impact of 
current digital technology on those traditional practices?5 
The preceding sketch has emphasized several characteristics of electronic texts that printed 
books cannot match. It does not follow that a given work actually demands - or even bears - 
digital treatment. Essential use of single pages, to mention a simple case, cannot easily be 
simulated electronically. The first section of this paper will, therefore, explore what might be 
called the textuality of Wittgenstein's Nachlass. Tracing the development of an important 
Wittgensteinian motive, this exploration surveys part of the newly available material, testing 
the suitability of computer-assisted scholarship to this particular collection of writings. Is 
there a general lesson to be learned from involving oneself in hands-on digital philology? As it 
turns out the Wittgenstein Nachlass provides an excellent occasion to reflect upon the range 
and limits of the Gutenberg heritage. This is discussed in section two. The concluding remarks 
focus on the Bergen edition. Given that digitization does not simply extend the established 
tool-set of textual scholarship but opens up new philosophical perspectives - how well does 
this particular enterprise support (and possibly inspire) a re-configuration of the philological 
status quo?
TOOTHACHES: PHILOLOGY 
The so-called 'private language' argument laid out in Philosophical Investigations §§ 243ff has 
been widely discussed in the literature. One of Wittgenstein's ways to introduce the problem 
is to argue for the incomprehensibility of naming pains in a strictly solipsistic setting. What are 
the circumstances enabling us to identify sensations? We have to participate in interpersonal 
activities expressing e.g. pain.
Wie wäre es, wenn die Menschen ihre Schmerzen nicht äußerten (nicht stöhnten, das Gesicht 
nicht verzögen etc.)? Dann könnte man einem Kind nicht den Gebrauch des Wortes 
'Zahnschmerzen' beibringen. (PhU § 257)
The fleeting reference to toothaches here does not carry conceptual weight in the context of 
the Investigations. But, surprisingly enough, Wittgenstein's earliest treatment of the issues 
that were to lead to his private language argument centers around this very sensation. There 
are at least three methods available to reach the present conclusion. By juxtaposing them we 
get a first glimpse at the possible scope of computer-assisted textual criticism. 
(1) Five volumes of the Wiener Ausgabe have hitherto been published, comprising - in appr. 
1300 pages - Wittgenstein's manuscripts from the time when he took up philosophy again, 
ending his self-imposed moratorium subsequent to the completion of the Tractatus . These 
manuscripts contain, in chronological order, Wittgenstein's discussions of a wide range of 
issues. In essence they are philosophical diaries, freely switching between different matters 
of interest, developing threads of thought up to a certain point, interrupting and returning at 
a later date. One might read through all of this material and pick out remarks concerning 
toothaches. The term appears for the first time on Nov. 19, 1929: 'Warum nenne ich 
Zahnschmerzen ' meine Zahnschmerzen' ?' (MS 107, 199; WA 2, 1146). Wittgenstein then 
develops this motive from different angles up to Dec. 14, 1929 (MS 108, 8f; WA 2,136) and 
returns to discuss it in a loose sequence of remarks from Jan. 31, 1930 (MS 107, 270; WA 2, 
186) to Feb. 7, 1930 (MS 107, 288; WA 2, 196). All of those entries are intermingled with 
reflections on many different topics: probability, theory of measurement, Euclidean geometry, 
realism et.al.. No guiding principle is discernible. Wittgenstein is following his own idiosyncratic 
lines of thought that often consist of digressions, retractions and cognitive jumps. It is not 
impossible, but exceedingly hard, to recognize the making of the private language argument in 
those scattered aphorisms. This should not come as a surprise since, after all, the 
manuscripts are Wittgenstein's philosophical workshop. Philological attention is often informed 
by prior knowledge of the results of such incipient processes.
In the light of Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy the first approach does, anyway, make 
little sense. Examining his manuscripts he picked a number of remarks for dictation. Copies of 
the resulting type-scripts were consequently cut into slips of paper and rearranged according 
to rules that seem to be revised within the organizing process itself. This procedure can be 
appropriately illustrated by tracking the course of Wittgenstein's notes on toothaches. 
Typescript 208, which is an extract from manuscripts 105-108, is only partially preserved.7 As 
far as toothaches are concerned, only the paragraphs dating from Dec. 14, 1929 can be 
found in this compilation. Alois Pichler has reconstructed the likely shape of TS 208. According 
to his conjecture most of the material on toothaches was contained in the missing pages 1-
1448. It reappears, completely rearranged, in TS 209, which is the text source for 
Philosophische Bemerkungen, edited by Rush Rees and published in 1964. Wittgenstein's 
original typescript shows no classifications whatsoever. At first inspection it is simply a very 
long sequence of paragraphs. Rush Rees divided the script into sections and invented groups 
of paragraphs which he numbered according to an undocumented, inscrutable scheme. A 
collection of Wittgenstein's reflections on toothaches happens to make up section VI of 
Philosophische Bemerkungen. This is a promising place to look for the conceptual genesis of 
his later views on mental states, sensations and language.
While all sections of Philosophische Bemerkungen are the invention of Rush Rees it is, 
nevertheless, also true that it was Wittgenstein who assembles the pieces into one particular 
order, thus emphazising his interest in an analysis of how first-person talk determines our 
understanding of pain. These notes have been available for a long time and attentive readers 
have doubtlessly noticed connections between them and later discussions of similar issues. 
This material was, however, entirely separated from its context of origin, a stand-alone 
compilation of philosophical insights. There is nothing per se wrong with restricting oneself to 
this state of affairs. It can very well serve as a starting point for enquiries like the present 
essay. Yet, the recent publications from the Nachlass have opened up a range of exiting 
possibilities. What used to be philologically opaque collections of Wittgensteinian ideas can 
now be disassembled and regarded as intermediate results of an ongoing process of creative 
writing and revision. It has become feasible not only to identify the building blocks of 
Wittgenstein's more elaborate editorial arrangements but - what is more important - to 
actually observe his philosophical labor, i.e. the decision process leading from day-to-day 
notes towards (as he envisaged it) eventual publication of his thoughts.
(2) Conventional methodology offers indices and synopses to assist such an enterprise. Both 
are provided by the Wiener Ausgabe, suggesting a second approach to access the 
Wittgensteinian corpus. 'Toothache' is an index entry; it can be looked up and the resulting 
items can in turn be traced through the Wittgenstein papers. Wiener Ausgabe - Apparatus, 
Register zu den Bänden 1-5 consists entirely of tables correlating every single paragraph from 
the manuscripts to its subsequent occurances in these volumes and (more commonly) to its 
location within the Philosophische Bemerkungen or Philosophische Grammatik. On Nov. 29, 
1929 Wittgenstein noted:
Von Sinnesdaten in dem Sinne des Wortes in dem es undenkbar ist daß der Andere sie hat, 
kann man eben aus diesem Grunde auch nicht sagen, daß der Andere sie nicht hat. Und aus 
ebendiesem Grunde ist es sinnlos zu sagen, daß  ich im Gegensatz zum Anderen sie habe. (MS 
107, 215f; WA 2, 124)
As the synopsis shows this remark was included in TS 209 (aka Philosophische Bemerkungen) 
presumably in mid-19309 as entry VI, 61 and taken up again on Jun. 1, 1932, when 
Wittgenstein started a revision of his earlier ideas on the topic. Investigating this kind of 
dependency is standard procedure in textual criticism. Until very recently this had to be done 
by consulting printed synopses. It seems fair to say that there is very little sense in carrying 
on the old way, if the advance of digital technologies is taken into account.
The point is not just that it is quite cumbersome to work with multiple versions of basically 
the same paragraph located in different places in various bound volumes. This impediment 
could be alleviated by liberal use of the xerox machine. Printed synopses of material as 
complex as Wittgenstein's Nachlass face a more serious problem. It seems next to impossible 
to combine indexing and synopsis. The reader is presented with either a list of significant 
terms or a table of correlations of textual segments. She cannot simultaneously look for the 
occurance of a word and the history of rearrangements of the paragraph it is included in. No 
one would finance a series of books (or care to use them) containing the astronomical number 
of relations between index entries and changes of contexts in gory detail. Consider the remark 
quoted above. Instinctively one would at least consider the terms 'Sinnesdaten', 'Sinn', 'Wort', 
'der Andere', 'Grund', 'sinnlos' and 'Gegensatz'.10 The quote considered here does not even 
contain the term 'Zahnschmerzen' which is, at this point, Wittgenstein's guiding paradigm. 
Imagine all those terms put into correlation with all the changes of their occurrences 
elsewhere in the Nachlass. The ensuing combinatorial explosion effectively prevents putting 
the result on paper. In the present case one cannot have a general, usable, semantics-to-
(section)-numbers and (section)-numbers-to-(section-)numbers mapping, one on top of the 
other, in a print medium.
(3) It is easily done if the texts have been properly digitized. Since words are encoded by 
numbers it is quite simple to set up an index and it takes just another couple of numbers to 
represent the trace of 'words' to and from given contexts. Much of this can be done 
automatically; there is no need to actually visualize the necessary relational apparatus. If a 
correlation seems interesting it can be called up at will, with no time lost for browsing, 
copying or shuffling around papers. Searching for 'Zahnschmerzen' in the Bergen edition 
immediately yields 138 hits across the entire collection. The search can be restricted to 
particular (groups of) volumes and modified to include co-occurring or proximate terms as well 
as dates. A query for 'Sinnesdaten and Zahnschmerzen' produces as a result precisely three 
common occurances. First is a paragraph from MS 114 (MS 114, 16; WA 5, 179) into which 
Wittgenstein had assimilated separate earlier notes, followed by its typescript derivatives in 
TS 211, 755 and TS 213, 510 (Big Typescript). The quote previously presented (MS 107, 
215f; WA 2, 124), lacking the term 'Zahnschmerzen', is picked out among the 30 hits returned 
by querying 'Sinnesdaten'. It occurs in a stand-alone paragraph in TS 209, 23 (PhB VI, 61) 
and is flagged accordingly. In other words: a couple of straightforward enquiries lead directly 
to an important juncture in Wittgenstein's investigation of the logic of talk about sense 
impressions and toothaches in particular.
But wait. There is something suspicious about the last sentence. Manipulation of the index 
mechanism per se cannot produce important results. The disappearance of manifest meaning 
is, in fact, the price to pay for enhanced electronic facilities. One can easily pick any 
combination of terms and search constraints - but there is no guarantee whatsoever that this 
will lead to an interesting result. So where does 'importance' come in? This is a category of 
reflective assessment, crucially different from automated procedures. The discrepancy is at 
the center of any discussion about computer-assisted philology. A certain amount of cheating 
is necessary to reach the comfortable conclusion presented in the previous paragraph. 
Criteria enabling one to judge upon the importance of algorithmic procedures have to be 
presupposed in order for such procedures to be of any help. To put it very simply: elaborate 
tools are of little help without knowledge of their proper use. One has to have a hunch about 
the possible significance of a term to profitably employ the electronic search function. The 
non-sequitur above may serve as a reminder to first-generation digital scholars. It is easy to 
fall into the trap of overestimating technology. None of the powerful programming at work 
below the WYSIWYG-surface guarantees philosophical content. 
The difficulty, consequently, is the following one: How can technological advancements in 
textual criticism be constrained by a sense of proportion relating to a prior understanding of 
the subject matter. This type of question is well-known and often discussed between 
technophiles and technophobes. The present paper is a case study, trying to answer the 
question for one particular instance of the general problem. But we have not yet assembled 
the necessary evidence. It remains quite unclear why a philosopher should worry about 
toothaches. A powerful mechanism has been sketched, yet it is fair to assume that 
Wittgenstein scholars go about their business projecting hypotheses to understand the 
complexities of the Nachlass quite independently. The above account does not include a 
reason for using the mechanism. Providing such reasons is itself a philosophical activity. This 
section has offered a rough overview of the itinerary of some sample paragraphs. One has to 
explore their content and in particular the conceptual significance of their itinerary in order to 
get the full picture. A satisfactory answer to the issue at stake between digital technology 
and its critics has to appeal to philosophy in action.
TOOTHACHES: PHILOSOPHY 
Wittgenstein's first entry into manuscript 107 refers back to the Tractatus . There he had 
claimed: 'Das denkende, vorstellende, Subjekt gibt es nicht.' (5.631) And he had explained 
this dictum by pointing to the visual field: 'nichts am Gesichtsfeld läßt darauf schließen, daß 
es von einem Auge gesehen wird.' ( Tractatus  5.633). Compare MS 107, 1 (WA 2,3): 'Der 
Gesichtsraum so wie er ist hat seine selbständige Realität. Er selbst enthält kein Subjekt. Er 
ist autonom.' In 1929 Wittgenstein's anti-intentionalism is still in place, but his views on 
atomic sentences begin to change. The basic units of his epistemological account are not 
single sentences any more: 'Ich lege nicht den Satz als Maßstab an die Wirklichkeit an 
sondern das System von Sätzen.' (MS 107, 35; WA 2, 149) The logic of color terms has, as 
Wittgenstein discovered, to take account of the field of possibilities given by the spectrum. 
Atomic sentences cannot be independent of each other since 'This plate is blue' logically 
implies - among many other propositions - that it is not red. Yet, this is not a tautology. 
Given the visual field and the customary color space one has a priori knowledge of the 
structural dependencies of possible colors. To look for any actual one necessarily includes 
mastery of a presupposed color scheme. 'Wie es einen Sinn hat zu sagen die Farbe R ist am 
Ort P wenn ich überhaupt den Gesichtsraum mit dem Farbraum "vor mir" habe.' (MS 107, 158; 
WA 2, 92) Wittgenstein's quotes indicate that he is still officially unwilling to grant the 
existence of a subject. But it is interesting to take a closer look at his day's work (Oct. 10, 
1929).
The point of reference of the previous quote ('Wie es einen Sinn hat ...') are stomach aches. 
Wittgenstein is discussing the meaning of negation. How can one truthfully deny the presence 
of stomach aches? Such sentences seem to lack external sensual corroboration. They cannot 
be constructed as somehow linking stomachs and pains either. 'Es ist nur wesentlich, daß ich 
den Raum vor mir habe in dem der Magen liegt und den worin die Schmerzen liegen.' (MS 107, 
157; WA 2, 92) Like colors within the visual field pains are a kind of sensation constitutivly 
associated with stomachs. This seems an unobjectionable parallel - with a twist. We have 
noted Wittgenstein's avoidance of the common notion of a subject in his discussion of the 
visual field. This strategy cannot, however, be carried over to the case of 'internal' 
sensations. There is nothing comparable to the geometry of shared, public, visible spaces in 
the realm of our intestines. If you remove the subject from stomach aches not even the 
illusion of a legitimate issue remains. Switching from the visual field to internal sensations, 
Wittgenstein's doctrine of the subject is severely shaken. He cannot but employ the first 
person pronoun in these contexts, even though his commitment is to exclude it from the 
scientific vocabulary. Such is the dilemma apparent in his first remark on toothaches: 'Warum 
nenne ich Zahnschmerzen " meine Zahnschmerzen" '? (MS 107, 199; WA 2, 114)
Wittgenstein does not follow any pre-set agenda that could lead to a systematic 
investigation of various modalities of the senses. His move from vision to stomach aches to 
tooth aches is obviously not aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive view. Ten 
days after raising the issue of toothaches being my toothaches Wittgenstein comes up with 
the brilliant aphorism quoted above. The private language argument is, in nuce, contained in 
two extremely compact sentences (MS 107, 215f; WA 2, 124). If another person cannot be 
said to be the subject of my internal sense data it is meaningless to deny her those very 
sense data. Their possible occurrences do not include this kind of bearer. Alas, this is no 
comfort for anyone tempted to regard awareness of one's own intentional states as privileged 
knowledge. There is no force in such pronouncements. I cannot determine something uniquely 
subjective in appealing to an incomprehensible option, i.e. another person's having my internal 
states. The Tractatus  view of the subject was of a metaphysical entity, a border of the 
World, not part of it ( Tractatus 5.641). The early post-Tractarian manuscripts are gradually 
abandoning this dualism, conceding a role for first-person talk. Yet, most of the original 
skepticism remains. How can one conceive of a role for 'private' sensations and avoid 
idealism?
Such questions are external to Wittgenstein's writing in the manuscripts. The present sketch 
puts emphasis on only a small number of issues discussed within those volumes. The general 
line of argument is, however, supported by Wittgenstein's own subsequent selective rewriting 
of the material. When he cut up TS 208 to rearrange its content into what is now known as 
the Philosophische Bemerkungen, one of his points of emphasis was toothaches. His 
discussion of logical features of talk about the subject centers around a selection of remarks 
devoted to the remarkable fact of me - Ludwig Wittgenstein - having toothaches (cf. PhB VI, 
58). This revision introduces complexity of a higher order. Many of Wittgenstein's paragraphs 
are initially small, self-contained philosophical analyses. The next auctorial step is to try and 
put them together so that some larger, overarching connection is established. Philosophische 
Bemerkungen VI does, in fact, offer extremely dense philosophical substance, much too 
involved to be discussed here. Just an outline of Wittgenstein's strategy of using his 
arrangements as arguments can be given.
A first group of remarks, serving as a kind of prolegomenon, is derived from entries for Dec. 
14, 1929 and Oct. 11, 1929, expounding the general direction of the succeeding paragraphs. 
The use of the first person pronoun is fraught with difficulties, particularly if talk about 
perception is modelled according to external circumstances. 'I am experiencing a red patch' is 
quoted as a case in point. To analyze the difficulties one might re-write the puzzling 
descriptions, substituting some un-objectionable term for the offensive 'I'. This exercise is 
next. Remarkably, Wittgenstein switches from sense impressions to internal sensation again, 
as he designs a language game supposed to exhibit the same logical multiplicity as the 
common idiom and yet to avoid mention of a subject. His idea is to externalize the privileged 
position of subjectivity by designating one particular person as an universal point of 
reference. If 'I am' Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'I have toothaches' becomes 'There are toothaches' 
and 'A has toothaches' can be rephrased as 'A behaves like Ludwig Wittgenstein when there 
are toothaches'. (PhBemerkungen VI, 58). The apparent uniqueness of subjective experience 
is transformed into a qualitative difference in public discourse; the mysterious realm of 
subjectivity replaced by an idiom of matching complexity: everyone can take center stage in 
this language. Once this focus is set the remaining moves of the language game are 
equivalent to the traditional one. Wittgenstein offers a playful simile. The logic of first-person 
talk recalls oriental despotism, with the subject taking the place of the despot in providing 
the origin of the communicative coordinate system.
The point is that talk about sensations is inevitably dualistic. 'The subject' - as well as an 
oriental despot - is supposed to fall outside ordinary discourse directed towards physical 
things. If Timur Lenk's state of health is taken as the measuring device of health-talk it makes 
no sense to ask whether he has toothaches. In the event, toothaches simply are among his 
personal states and having toothaches is a condition derived from this primordial condition. 
Even though Wittgenstein has thus eliminated first-person talk the Tractarian criterion of 
meaning fails, however. It is impossible to attribute possession of toothaches or lack thereof 
to a suitably designated individuum. (The discussion prefigures later reflections on the Paris 
ur-meter.) After this setting of the stage Wittgenstein embarks on a series of grammatical 
investigations, exploring the comprehensibility of our dualistic idiom. There is no obvious way 
to stratify his dialectical dialogues into a single argument. 'I cannot feel your toothaches.' 
Does this sentence express an empirical truth or rather a kind of logical necessity 
Wittgenstein had not provided for in his Tractatus? (cf. PhB VI, 61) Rather than answering 
questions like this, Wittgenstein keeps changing his focus and his examples, circling around 
the issues. What is he up to? To a casual reader it looks like an open-ended, aporetic 
elenchus. But Wittgenstein, surprisingly, and without so much as minimal warning, does 
actually close his argument by the strategic placement of one paragraph.
Wittgenstein's transposition of first person talk was anchored in the neutral statement: 'There 
are toothaches'. The following quote is an obvious echo, concluding the argument:
Das Phänomen des Schmerzgefühls in einem Zahn, welches ich kenne, ist in der 
Ausdrucksweise der gewöhnlichen Sprache dargestellt durch ' ich habe in dem und dem Zahn 
Schmerzen'. Nicht durch einen Ausdruck von der Art, 'an diesem Ort ist ein Schmerzgefühl'. 
(PhB VI, 66)
As it turns out, it is impossible to capture the subjectivist intuitions in Wittgenstein's 
alternative scheme. There cannot be pains outside of consciousness. Designating a physical 
body to be the paradigmatic bearer of pain is no better than ascribing pain to some tooth put 
on a table ( Philosophische Bermerkungen VI, 65). Timur Lenk is, inevitably, located in public 
space, so we are back to Wittgenstein's initial reminder: the problem arises because physical 
circumstances are inappropriately projected onto another context.
Das ganze Feld dieser Erfahrung wird in dieser Sprache durch Ausdrücke von der Form 'ich 
habe ...' beschrieben. Die Sätze von der Form 'N hat Zahnschmerzen' sind für ein ganz 
anderes Feld reserviert. (PhB VI, 66) 
In other words: Wittgenstein advises himself to desist from trying to battle ordinary language. 
He is quite aware of the tension: In order to unravel the philosophical knot one has to re-
trace the complicated movements underlying it. Thus ends the second take on toothaches. 
Resting content with the ordinary was, however, always a temporary affair for Wittgenstein. 
In 1932 we find him returning to the very issues he had supposedly resolved in MS 110, 30ff 
(WA5, 179ff). These are the quotes remarked upon earlier in this paper: Wittgenstein's 
second, condensing revision of the material on toothaches.
This third stratum of the textual evidence and its further development will not be pursued 
here. The sole purpose of the preceding intermezzo was to redress the balance between the 
digital toolkit and topics in established Wittgenstein scholarship. The problem was to mediate 
between proponents of largely syntactic manipulation of linguistic data and traditional 
approaches that turn to texts with a prior understanding of their subject matter. The way to 
escape a stand-off is to refuse the contra-position from the very start. Semantic data-
mining11 as exemplified by the previous sub-section, is simultaneously an exercise in digital 
philology and philosophy. Wittgenstein's Nachlass is an excellent place to look for such a 
synthesis because the author's ideas are, to a large extent, expressed by arranging and 
rearranging small textual units. Tracking the dynamics of Wittgenstein's philosophical 
variations can, admittedly, be done in the conventional framework of a printed edition of his 
manuscripts and type-scripts. Computer-assisted procedures do, however, push philology 
towards horizons previously out of reach. To repeat: No collection of printed volumes can 
conceivably present any synopsis of any terms, occurring at arbitrary dates, in just a few 
seconds. Such opportunities are bound to have a major impact on future Wittgenstein 
scholarship. This concludes the philological assessment of conventional versus digital 
approaches to the Wittgenstein papers. A more detached attitude has already been hinted 
at. It seems that Wittgenstein's writing is particularly well suited to a post-Gutenberg 
environment. In order to get the full picture regarding the Bergen edition we have to take a 
closer look at Wittgenstein's failure to turn his writings into a book.
BEYOND BOOKS 
J.C. Nyíri has made a strong case for considering the Wittgenstein Nachlass in the light of 
recent media philosophy. Quoting Walter Ong and Erich Havelock he reminds his readers of the 
prospect that the age of literacy might be giving way to a period of secondary orality, with 
the spoken word regaining the most influential position in a broadcast society. According to 
Nyíri's suggestion Wittgenstein's failure to distinguish between the written and the spoken 
word might explain his 'ultimate inability to complete the "book" he always wanted to 
complete'12. The ductus of his writings is, indeed, more akin to on-going conversations than 
to neatly delineated propositions. Did Wittgenstein miss the adequate medium for his 
exertions? Nyíri draws attention to the fact that his writing is, in certain places, a direct 
rejoinder to the Socratic dialogues. 'Ich finde bei Plato auf eine Frage wie 'was ist Erkenntnis' 
nicht die vorläufige Antwort: Sehen wir einmal nach, wie dieses Wort gebraucht wird.' (TS 
211, 17) Wittgenstein's inverse Socratic role consists in dissolving platonic confidence in 
essences and is, therefore, ill suited to be put into a classical philosophical treatise. As Nyíri 
(following Havelock) rightly reminds us, Platonic ideas are inextricably connected to the rise of 
literacy over an oral tradition which lacked expressive means for a proper treatment of 
abstract terms. Yet, Wittgenstein could have rested content with his actual teaching, leaving 
it to his disciples to provide written records. He did not do so, but rather forced himself, 
against better knowledge, to conform to the given standard.
Wenn ich für mich denke ohne ein Buch schreiben zu wollen, so springe ich um das Thema 
herum; das ist die einzige mir natürliche Denkweise. In einer Reihe gezwungen fortzudenken ist 
mir eine Qual. Soll ich es nun überhaupt probieren? Ich verschwende unsägliche Mühe auf ein 
Anordnen der Gedanken, das vielleicht gar keinen Wert hat. (MS 118, 185)
The key word is 'vielleicht' indicating Wittgenstein's ambivalent ambitions to write a book. His 
difficulties are methodologically profound. One way to bring this into focus is to position them 
at the crossroads between books and hypertext.
Decades of Wittgenstein scholarship have been shaped by editorial decisions made by the 
trustees of the Nachlass. Their general policy was to present provisional steps in 
Wittgenstein's ongoing process of revision as standalone volumes, often effacing the 
dynamics demonstrated in the preceding section. David Stern, in his perceptive paper, 
correctly describes the state of affairs.
The Wittgenstein Nachlass is not a haphazard pile of working papers that happened to survive 
his death, nor is it a collection of works that only awaited publication. While it is both a 
carefully selected and highly structured record of his life's work, a collection of material that 
he deliberately assembled and left to posterity, it is also the record of a writer continually in 
flux, never entirely satisfied with anything he had written.13  
In view of this situation it actually seems a little unfair to reapproach the editors of 
Wittgenstein's posthumous writing. There is no good way to capture the activity vividly 
described by Stern into the confines of a printed volume. Despite outward appearances there 
are no 'works of Wittgenstein' that could confidently be taken as points of departure. Even 
the Philosophische Untersuchungen are, as Stern observes, 'only one of a number of possible 
arrangements Wittgenstein proposed, many of which extend, amplify, or cast light on the 
remarks in the published book.'14 References to current models of textual interdependency 
become almost irresistible at this point. 'Because the Wittgenstein Nachlass is the result of 
such an extensive act of rewriting, it is less a collection of texts than a hypertext, an 
interconnected network of remarks.'15 Stern's remarks certainly point into the right direction. 
Still, there are some intermediary steps between the range of options available to 
Wittgenstein and writing that is embedded in digital technology. Those steps have to be 
spelled out if one wants to get a grasp on how the CD-ROM edition might change out habits 
of scholarship based on self-contained books. 
One feature of a culture based on books deserves special attention as this culture is 
challenged by the advent of digital, globally distributed information. Books are marked by the 
coincidence of two seperate decisions: their content and its appearance are determined 
simultaneously. This is what publication of a book, in effect, amounts to - and it throws some 
light on Wittgenstein's qualms. He felt unable to decide on one shape for his ideas. 
Publication, throughout European history, simply meant drawing a line between a creative 
process and its (albeit provisional) results. Sending a manuscript to the publisher was to 
distinguish a line between sketches, preliminary attempts, experimental drafts and an entity 
exhibiting both the features of the most prestigious information technology and of auctorial 
closure. Books divided the lifetime of an author into continuous activity and singular results, 
texts that, from a certain moment in time, assume a life of their own. This arrangement is 
being thoroughly shaken by the advent of new media. First of all, digital encoding disrupts the 
familiar coordination between form and content. Characters are mapped into numbers that 
are, in turn, symbolized in an electronic format unsuitable for direct perception. And this 
transposition, secondly, triggers dramatic changes in the nature of publicity. Electronic texts 
can instantly be published to a world audience and still be constantly revised.
In the given context it is particularly instructive to notice the implication for posthumous 
'works'. In the world of books a Nachlass is defined as all the material an author did not 
manage or see fit to get printed. Its peculiar character is that future generations retro-
activly elevate such writing to the status of books. If books published by an author are what 
software developers call a 'feature-freeze', publications from a Nachlass are based on 
decisions to overrule such limitations. There is no way to escape the allure of 'works' in book 
culture. In Nachlass-publications auxiliary authors assume responsibility to supplement a 
writer's oeuvre with 'second order' books. Applying this to the case at hand yields a 
suggestive prospect. While the trustees failed to do justice to Wittgenstein's open-ended, 
conversations philosophical style, a digital edition of the Nachlass is much better suited to 
achieve this aim. Such an enterprise is not forced to turn a collection of tentative designs 
into bound volumes. The 'Wiener Ausgabe' seems set to publish the largely repetetive material 
from 1929-1933 in 12 weighty volumes. Michael Nedo sounds apologetic in defending this 
expenditure:
... the book is still the carrier of thoughts, of written heritage in our culture, and familiarity 
with this medium certainly affects not only one's dealings with the texts themselves, but also 
the accompanying Apparatuses.16  
One does not have to subscribe to deconstruction to find this eulogy anachronistic. The 
transitory character of Wittgenstein's writing, its complex genealogy and its numerous 
recapitulations seem to call for a digital format of presentation which matches its inherent 
temporality by avoiding ultimate editorial decisions and allowing easy manipulation of the 
textual material.
Impressions like these, convincing as they may sound - once again - overstress technology. 
Wittgenstein, it is true, despaired of achieving the linear order demanded by a printed book. 
But this does not imply that hypertext could have solved his problem. His desparation is the 
important feature: the fight against a spell cast upon his writing by the demands of books 
culture. He worried about the correct arrangement of his ideas, so much is obvious from the 
examples discussed above. One understanding of 'hypertext' is of segments of texts linked 
together in a more or less haphazard way, often without any single, controling authority. This 
meaning is certainly not applicable to Wittgenstein. He could have saved himself a lot of 
trouble had he been prepared to regard his writing as a kind of private web-space. A second 
understanding might be more appropriate. Hypertext can also refer to autonomous non-linear 
writing which transcends the obligatory step-by-step sequence of print-products by 
constructing a topological matrix without hierarchical order. Digitized texts are encoded as 
numbers and have to be re-established in a legible format. Visualization by a monitor is one 
step removed from the pages of a book and offers flexibility unmatched by their arrangement. 
Wittgenstein's famous metaphor of wandering through a philosophical landscape comes to 
mind. The Nachlass does, in fact, contain a number of tentative registers that could easily be 
implemented as a hypertext.17 
This is one side of Wittgenstein's struggle with conventional means of expressing thoughts. 
But his need for a different kind of complexity is offset by an equally important desire. In 
many places he insists on finding definitive answers. This motive, manifest in the Tractatus , 
is also present in Wittgenstein's later calls for 'Übersichtlichkeit' (surveyability) and well laid-
out description:
Wir wollen nicht das Regelsystem für die Verwendung unserer Worte in unerhörter Weise 
verfeinern oder vervollständigen. Denn die Klarheit, die wir anstreben, ist allerdings eine 
vollkommene. Aber das heißt nur, daß die philosophischen Probleme vollkommen verschwinden 
sollen. (PhU § 133)
In this context, the 'treatment' of philosophical problems is likened to therapeutical 
intervention and its ultimate aim is to put vexing thoughts to rest. Such an attitude cannot 
be easily reconciled with calls for open-ended auctorial multiplicity and the suspension of 
binding results. Wittgenstein's 'hypertext' avant la lettre arises from unsuccessful attempts at 
closure rather than from intentional design. It does not anticipate a more flexible medium 
which might alleviate the rigor of philosophical arguments. As the Nachlass material on 
toothaches shows, Wittgenstein did not simply reject the linear progression of thoughts in 
favor of a compilation of aphorisms. He actually proposes a solution - even though it does not 
satisfy him in the long run. Look at it this way: If he had been able to reach a satisfactory 
conclusion he would have put it into print. Hypertext, on the other hand, is by design non-
conclusive. Had Wittgenstein used hypertext, his characteristic struggle against premature 
closure would have been lost. Hypertext lacks the kind of physical inertia needed to make a 
sentence stick to a certain position and while Wittgenstein kept overturning pre-established 
patterns of thought and inferences he never abandoned his drive to return to 
straightforward, easily surveyable positions.
Wir sind aufs Glatteis geraten, wo die Reibung fehlt, also die Bedingungen in gewissem Sinn 
ideal sind, aber wir eben deshalb auch nicht gehen können. Wir wollen gehen; dann brauchen 
wir Reibung. Zurück auf den rauhen Boden. (PhU § 107)
Wittgenstein would, in all likelihood, have extended this complaint against free-floating 
philosophical speculation to l'art pour l'art hypertext.
To sum up and focus on the case at hand: Electronic texts are not just a kind of print; the 
graphical rendering of information on a monitor is no 'page' in any ordinary sense. It is 
tempting - and to some extent plausible - to distinguish Wittgenstein's writing from 
conventional philosophical authorship by employing jargon from media studies. Actually putting 
his Nachlass on a CD-ROM adds considerable complexity to the story. There is an important 
difference between a writer's decision to publish his or her work (in whatever format) and 
someone else administering a heritage. Nachlass publications, including electronic editions, are 
per definitionem second order closures. The flexibility of digitized texts is of another order as 
Wittgenstein's work in progress. How those papers are to be rendered on CD-ROMs is by no 
means self-evident. It is easy to pretend that the Bergen project is just an extension of well-
known editorial strategies. Such an attitude does, however, seriously underestimate the 
range of problems involved. All the conveniences set forth in the previous pages do not come 
for free. The change from books to computers is in itself an important theoretical and political 
issue. Putting Wittgenstein on disk demands a considerable number of decisions beyond the 
scope of printed editions. This is new territory, hardly even noticed as a philosophical issue 
amongst Wittgenstein scholars.
THE POLITICS OF DIGITAL TEXTS 
The Bergen electronic edition effaces its own novelty. Its structuring principle are the 
physical volumes of the Nachlass which are presented one after the other in linear sequence. 
The search facilities include easy access to single manuscripts or type-scripts. Facsimiles 
provide unprecedented opportunities to scrutinize Wittgenstein's actual output.The electronic 
edition might be argued to beat its print competitors at their own game. One apparent 
platitude is of utmost importance, though. Digitized texts need computers which need 
software which needs operating systems. In centuries of print culture we have become 
accustomed to the fact that once a book is published it is freely accessible to readers 
without further effort. Historical pictures of lockable books raise amused smiles. Yet, they are 
not a bad analogy to so-called digital books: in order to read them one needs additional 
devices, even 'keys'. Book publishing is a business charging once per item, regardless of its 
further use. But those products are, nowadays, revealed as just one interface to information. 
In many respects digital documents offer more convenient access to identical content. This 
surplus value has a price: a set of electronic equipment is inserted between the reader and 
her text. Once they have been published (and as long as they are in print) books are available 
without further decoding. As everyone who has to exchange files on the internet knows, this 
is far from true for electronic documents. Different computer platforms, different word 
processors and conflicting versions tend to produce confusions unheard of in former times.
The reason for this is that there are several competing standards to implement a mapping 
between alpha-numerical symbols and digital numbers. Strictly speaking only the basic letters, 
numerals and diacritical signs of the English alphabet are interchangeable on any platform. 
Different sets of characters, and in particular the elaborate additional code necessary to 
simulate printed pages on a monitor, demand special attention. International bodies are in 
charge of supervising the encoding of the world's languages. Software simulation of written 
material, however, obeys different rules. It is to a considerable extent a commercial affair and 
subject to the laws of economics. The result is, predictably, a considerable variety of 
proprietary software tools trying to get their share of the market by offering particularly 
comfortable - and mutually incompatible - features. This is the state of affairs confronting 
any digitization of texts. Two minimalistic approaches are either to scan existing pages or to 
stick to 7-bit ASCII code in transcribing them electronically. It is immediately obvious that 
neither of these options is satisfactory for a textual corpus of the degree of complexity of the 
Wittgenstein Nachlass. The editors were faced with a situation unprecedented in ordinary 
publishing. They had to decide upon a software package capable of producing the desired 
results, which also meant forcing that package upon the readers. Textual scholarship finds 
itself on unfamiliar terrain. The tools it needs to even access its subject matter are produced 
by big companies with only marginal interest in the academy.
The Bergen edition runs on the Windows platform (Windows 3.1, 3.11, Windows 95 and 
Windows NT4 according to the promotion sheet). For word-processing capacity it uses a 
program named 'FolioViews' which provides the usual services: cut and paste, printing, 
searching, window control, electronic bookmarks and back tracing. For scholars who habitually 
use the Microsoft range of products and do not worry about the ensuing dependency of their 
basic data on market competition these are excellent choices, even though some of its 
limitations will affect the ordinary user. The entire collection of normalized and diplomatic 
transcripts is put into a single binary file respectively. (The facsimiles are offered as single 
graphic documents, one per physical page.) Consequently, two huge electronic files contain 
the entire content of the Bergen edition in a completely opaque format. The user is allowed to 
read and manipulate texts via FolioViews but none of the structural information that has been 
presented in the first section of this paper is directly accessible to her. She can copy 
selected texts, paste and print them - but neither can she touch the indexing mechanism nor 
modify any of the underlying data. There is a strict separation between interface and non-
transparent, computational deep structure. Copyright considerations are a prominent reason 
for this arrangement: the content of a printed book cannot as easily be reproduced, 
manipulated and distributed as its digital counterpart. Provisions have to be taken to protect 
the investment put into such long-term projects. Media change unsettles venerable customs. 
The traditional understanding was that the result of scholarly work, most often financed by 
the taxpayer's money, are generally available in their entirety. This feature does, indeed, 
distinguish scholarship from commercially induced research. As teams of experts have to use 
proprietary software to reassure the copyright-holders and ensure the profit for the publishing 
house, this availability is restricted. But, it might be objected, where is the problem? 
Wittgenstein's writings are at one's disposal, all of them and in an extremely comfortable 
fashion. True enough, judged by the standards of the printed book. Yet, as was discussed in 
section two, Wittgenstein's Nachlass transcends the limits of such standards and an 
electronic edition might be better suited to capture those peculiarities. It might be organized 
so as to mirror Wittgenstein's editorial techniques, starting with single remarks as elementary 
building blocks and putting them together in a variety of ways, following Wittgenstein's lead. 
His working process, not its result, could be taken as the guiding principle. As a matter of fact 
the encapsulated FolioViews file is the very opposite of hypertext.18 Yet, the Bergen edition 
does not offer any tools to actually rearrange its content or redesign its appearance on the 
primary level. For all its flexibility and ease of use the Bergen edition is still in the conceptual 
grip of classical printed editions. Does it have to mimic the necessities of print culture?
The question turns on the issue of access to the internal, structural information hidden inside 
the binary files. Under present conditions one can find a particular paragraph and all of its 
subsequent instances as they appear in the later volumes. It is, however, impossible to break 
out of the straitjacket of the von Wright classification and deal with paragraphs as basic data 
units. If this were possible digital equivalences of Wittgenstein's notes could be freely 
assembled and re-assembled. As of now one is, for example, presented with manuscripts 105-
108 plus typescripts 208-209 plus manuscript 110 and has to extract relevant paragraphs for 
personal post-processing. A more appropriate way might be to pick out relevant paragraphs 
(e.g. on toothaches) and re-assemble them at bottom level, echoing the author's own 
procedure. It would be an attractive way to overcome the Nachlass effect of irrevocable 
closure. The internal dynamics of the Wittgenstein papers would be much more in evidence if 
a more open digital format had been chosen. Years of labor have been spent on the electronic 
transcription of the original documents. The records of the Wittgenstein archive do in fact 
contain all the information necessary for micrological analysis and multiple synthesis. The use 
of the CD-ROM, however, remains restricted to find, cut and paste with no provisions to 
address the editorial information from outside FolioViews. In order to visualize the conclusion 
on toothaches from the first section one might want to write a small program. It could not 
operate on the existing data structure which would have to be re-inscribed onto copies of 
segments extracted from the database.
This is the place to touch upon some basic issues in the theory and practice of text 
encoding. The discussion of the peculiar overlap between the requirements of digitization and 
commercial interests at the beginning of this section deliberately omitted an alternative 
possibility. Standard General Markup Language (SGML) is an attempt to avoid dependency on 
proprietary formats and irreconcilable software development with regard to electronic texts. 
The idea is, briefly, to supplement the alpha-numeric ciphers with additional (groups of) 
characters ('mark up') that serve the purpose of encoding meta-information by means of the 
available, restricted set of ASCII code. HTML, the language of the World Wide Web, in an 
instance of SGML. An easy example of mark up is the use (in HTML) of '<h1>' to indicate the 
beginning (and '</h1>' the end) of a top level heading. Such mark up indications do not in 
themselves cause any formatting to be done. (This distinguishes them from the binary code 
inserted into text files by common word processors.) Their function is to delineate the logical 
structure of the document and provide anchors to include additional content (like cross-
references, dates or hierarchical dependencies). A marked-up document can be read on any 
computer platform, the catch being that it needs software to render the mark-up as 
intended. This is a substantial difficulty given the fact that word processing has been much 
more popular with the general public. But consider a Web browser to get the general idea. 
Such browser are software which takes '<h1>Title</h1>' as an input and turns it (e.g.) into
                                                          TITLE
SGML (and its recent variant XML) offers a top-down solution to the problem of incompatible 
standards in text encoding and concurrent information storage.
The Bergen edition is based upon transcriptions of Wittgenstein's original pages into a mark up 
language using the 'Multi-Element Code System' (MECS). This system provides a meta-
grammar that can be implemented in particular instances of transcriptional grammar and is 
well suited to the task of capturing the complexities of Wittgenstein's autographs in a digital 
format. For technical reasons MECS is not entirely compatible with SGML. The thing to keep in 
mind is, however, that the Bergen transcriptions contain the entire set of editorial information 
in mark up format, i.e. in 'tags' that can be addressed in programming constructions. This 
information is filtered to produce the diplomatic and normalized versions offered on the CD-
ROMs. In customary, printed editions there is no possible gap between the pages on offer and 
their basic encoding. This does not carry over into the electronic realm where digital code has 
to be re-implemented in order to be perceptible. The need for secondary processing 
introduces a discrepancy which can be used to shield off operative background information 
from its surface rendition. Electronic documents offer spectacular improvements over many of 
the usual features of printed texts. Ironically, it is just because of their versatility that 
mechanisms to constrain their scope are feasible - and called for. The Bergen edition is just 
one example of a more comprehensive problem that is often overlooked in recent digitization 
campaigns. It is perfectly possible to combine global, digital distribution of information with 
highly selective, exclusive standards of its generation and transmission. While most people 
would be prepared to accept this for cable TV or DVD it should at least be a matter of 
concern in textual scholarship.
This is an area of conflict between claims of copyright holders and the scientific community. 
Broaching this issue is not intended to deflect attention from the impressive achievements of 
the Bergen electronic edition. Its presentation of the material is an epochal advance in 
Wittgenstein scholarship. It is, at the same time, a precursor of many electronic editions yet 
to be published and is apt to trigger a more general discussion on how similar scholarly 
editions might be designed. Disregarding, for the purpose of this conclusion, external 
constraints an optimum solution for (future) computer-savvy scholars would enable them to 
address their texts at any of the three levels that have to constitute a serious editorial 
project: the mark-up, diplomatic and normalized versions should all be manipulable to ensure 
optimum results. It is impossible for any single endeavor to adequately charter the wealth of 
variants and cross-relations in Wittgenstein's Nachlass. But if scholars were able to freely 
access the underlying mark up resources based on the canonical transcription could easily be 
enriched by resources taken from literal computing. As several commentators have pointed 
out, the recent 'Open Source' movement in software management echoes the concepts of 
free peer access and peer review well established within science. In the best case scenario 
source code, e.g. the mark-up version of Wittgenstein's texts, would be freely available. Book 
culture charges relatively little for relatively static texts. Expensive electronic editions offer 
advanced research tools, blocking collaboration based on their data structure. There will be 
an 'open source' Wittgenstein sometime this century.
Currently, a confusing variety of formats is used to tentatively provide comprehensive access 
in selected collections, mainly for corpora from earlier centuries. Projects like CELT, the 'Celtic 
Corpus of Electronic Texts'19and the 'Victorian Women Writer's Project'20 offer browsable 
HTML-front-ends, ftp download of marked-up documents and printable Postscript copies. TMI 
('Thesaurus Musicarum Italicarum')21 or 'The William Blake Archive'22 employ DynaWeb to 
translate SGML-coded files for use with common browsers. At the Wittgenstein archive's web-
site23 TS 201a 'Notes on Logic' and MS 115, 'Philosophische Bemerkungen' are available in 
different versions: HTML frames for concurrent inspection of the diplomatic and normalized 
text and for download in Postscript and Word Perfect format respectively. It remains unclear 
whether electronic publishing will develop standards as transparent as those of traditional 
literary culture. The technological advances we have been discussing are in fact instrumental 
in de-familiarizing earlier standards that have acquired second nature status. New 
opportunities arise, but there is still little institutional background and almost none of the hard 
questions have been answered. Meanwhile, from a philosophical point of view, the 
Wittgenstein papers raise an issue that cuts across old and new forms of writing. 
Wittgenstein's struggle against the linear progression of arguments should neither be 
remodeled as a peaceful exercise in hypertext, nor put to rest in an series of (printed or 
virtual) volumes. The driving force behind the Nachlass is a continuous effort to put together 
the pieces of a number of puzzles that seem to change as this activity unfolds. Nachlass 
means: this process has definitely ended. Digitization of the Nachlass offers an opportunity to 
breath life back into an accumulation of notes.
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THE CHANGED STATE OF WITTGENSTEIN SCHOLARSHIP 
Two independent publishing projects have thoroughly changed the state of Wittgenstein 
scholarship in recent years. Michael Nedo's 'Wiener Ausgabe'1 offers a traditional critical 
edition of Wittgenstein's philosophical writings ranging from 1929 up to and including the 'Big 
Typescript' (1933). Considering the eclectic and - at times - arbitrary editorial policy 
underlying previous publications from the Nachlass2 Nedo's project offers unprecedented 
philosophical rigor as well as textual criticism in volumes designed for comfortable reading. A 
second, more ambitious, attempt at a critical edition is the Bergen electronic edition.3 It is 
planned to include 4 CD-ROMs, covering the entire range of the philosopher's unpublished 
writing. Two disks are currently available, comprising all of Wittgenstein's manuscripts from 
1929-1939, as well as type-scripts, beginning with 'Notes on Logic' (1913) and leading up to 
Typescript 226, composed in 1939.
Wittgenstein's writings from the Thirties are, therefore, available in independent, reliable 
printed and electronic editions respectively. Readers can, for the first time, observe the 
philosopher at work, transferring paragraphs from pocket notebooks to handwritten 'volumes'; 
picking acceptable remarks to be included in type-scripts that are, at a later stage, cut up 
into slips of paper which are again annotated, rearranged and put together in further volumes 
and type-scripts. But this is only half the excitement. The 'Wiener Ausgabe' and the 'Bergen 
Edition' stake their success on different media, inevitably provoking a comparison between the 
well known features of printed scholarly editions and the not so familiar realm of digitized 
texts.
Some of the differences are immediately obvious. Scrutinizing philosophical texts on a printed 
page implies sensual qualities lacking in electronic space. Many readers will prefer a material 
sheet of paper over its virtual substitute. There are, on the other hand, definite advantages 
in digitally stored transcriptions. A CD-ROM does not occupy desk-space and allows almost 
instant access to every single remark of the extended Wittgenstein corpus. In addition to the 
actual texts, the 'Wiener Ausgabe' contains separate volumes of sophisticated registers, 
cross-referencing all the printed material. Considering the fact that the Bergen edition 
includes an excellent search function Nedo's tables are an anachronistic nicety at best. In a 
recent volume Nedo, in fact, announces a 'comprehensive electronic Apparatus, 
supplementing the Wiener Ausgabe'4. And there is simply no viable alternative to an electronic 
medium if one wants to present facsimiles of every page of the Nachlass, suitably linked to 
diplomatic and normalized versions of its content. These features make the Bergen edition a 
far more comprehensive enterprise. It seems that, pace  the predictable skepticism stemming 
from deeply ingrained scholarly habits, there is a convincing case in favor of switching to the 
digital format. The present paper will, at any rate, proceed from this assumption. But matters 
of technical convenience should not be allowed to decide the more profound issues arising 
from the competition of the media involved.
The accessibility of Wittgenstein's texts has been tremendously enhanced by putting them on 
CD-ROMs. If this were information like the listings in a telephone directory one could let the 
issue rest at this point. It might be confined to a discussion of the availability and design of 
necessary electronic interfaces. Philosophical production, and in particular Wittgenstein's 
literary remains, raise more interesting questions, though. Can conceptual content be neatly 
separated from its presentation in a given medium? Since its inception philosophy was done 
by teaching, in scholarly discourse, or by writing books/papers. What will be the impact of 
current digital technology on those traditional practices?5 
The preceding sketch has emphasized several characteristics of electronic texts that printed 
books cannot match. It does not follow that a given work actually demands - or even bears - 
digital treatment. Essential use of single pages, to mention a simple case, cannot easily be 
simulated electronically. The first section of this paper will, therefore, explore what might be 
called the textuality of Wittgenstein's Nachlass. Tracing the development of an important 
Wittgensteinian motive, this exploration surveys part of the newly available material, testing 
the suitability of computer-assisted scholarship to this particular collection of writings. Is 
there a general lesson to be learned from involving oneself in hands-on digital philology? As it 
turns out the Wittgenstein Nachlass provides an excellent occasion to reflect upon the range 
and limits of the Gutenberg heritage. This is discussed in section two. The concluding remarks 
focus on the Bergen edition. Given that digitization does not simply extend the established 
tool-set of textual scholarship but opens up new philosophical perspectives - how well does 
this particular enterprise support (and possibly inspire) a re-configuration of the philological 
status quo?
TOOTHACHES: PHILOLOGY 
The so-called 'private language' argument laid out in Philosophical Investigations §§ 243ff has 
been widely discussed in the literature. One of Wittgenstein's ways to introduce the problem 
is to argue for the incomprehensibility of naming pains in a strictly solipsistic setting. What are 
the circumstances enabling us to identify sensations? We have to participate in interpersonal 
activities expressing e.g. pain.
Wie wäre es, wenn die Menschen ihre Schmerzen nicht äußerten (nicht stöhnten, das Gesicht 
nicht verzögen etc.)? Dann könnte man einem Kind nicht den Gebrauch des Wortes 
'Zahnschmerzen' beibringen. (PhU § 257)
The fleeting reference to toothaches here does not carry conceptual weight in the context of 
the Investigations. But, surprisingly enough, Wittgenstein's earliest treatment of the issues 
that were to lead to his private language argument centers around this very sensation. There 
are at least three methods available to reach the present conclusion. By juxtaposing them we 
get a first glimpse at the possible scope of computer-assisted textual criticism. 
(1) Five volumes of the Wiener Ausgabe have hitherto been published, comprising - in appr. 
1300 pages - Wittgenstein's manuscripts from the time when he took up philosophy again, 
ending his self-imposed moratorium subsequent to the completion of the Tractatus . These 
manuscripts contain, in chronological order, Wittgenstein's discussions of a wide range of 
issues. In essence they are philosophical diaries, freely switching between different matters 
of interest, developing threads of thought up to a certain point, interrupting and returning at 
a later date. One might read through all of this material and pick out remarks concerning 
toothaches. The term appears for the first time on Nov. 19, 1929: 'Warum nenne ich 
Zahnschmerzen ' meine Zahnschmerzen' ?' (MS 107, 199; WA 2, 1146). Wittgenstein then 
develops this motive from different angles up to Dec. 14, 1929 (MS 108, 8f; WA 2,136) and 
returns to discuss it in a loose sequence of remarks from Jan. 31, 1930 (MS 107, 270; WA 2, 
186) to Feb. 7, 1930 (MS 107, 288; WA 2, 196). All of those entries are intermingled with 
reflections on many different topics: probability, theory of measurement, Euclidean geometry, 
realism et.al.. No guiding principle is discernible. Wittgenstein is following his own idiosyncratic 
lines of thought that often consist of digressions, retractions and cognitive jumps. It is not 
impossible, but exceedingly hard, to recognize the making of the private language argument in 
those scattered aphorisms. This should not come as a surprise since, after all, the 
manuscripts are Wittgenstein's philosophical workshop. Philological attention is often informed 
by prior knowledge of the results of such incipient processes.
In the light of Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy the first approach does, anyway, make 
little sense. Examining his manuscripts he picked a number of remarks for dictation. Copies of 
the resulting type-scripts were consequently cut into slips of paper and rearranged according 
to rules that seem to be revised within the organizing process itself. This procedure can be 
appropriately illustrated by tracking the course of Wittgenstein's notes on toothaches. 
Typescript 208, which is an extract from manuscripts 105-108, is only partially preserved.7 As 
far as toothaches are concerned, only the paragraphs dating from Dec. 14, 1929 can be 
found in this compilation. Alois Pichler has reconstructed the likely shape of TS 208. According 
to his conjecture most of the material on toothaches was contained in the missing pages 1-
1448. It reappears, completely rearranged, in TS 209, which is the text source for 
Philosophische Bemerkungen, edited by Rush Rees and published in 1964. Wittgenstein's 
original typescript shows no classifications whatsoever. At first inspection it is simply a very 
long sequence of paragraphs. Rush Rees divided the script into sections and invented groups 
of paragraphs which he numbered according to an undocumented, inscrutable scheme. A 
collection of Wittgenstein's reflections on toothaches happens to make up section VI of 
Philosophische Bemerkungen. This is a promising place to look for the conceptual genesis of 
his later views on mental states, sensations and language.
While all sections of Philosophische Bemerkungen are the invention of Rush Rees it is, 
nevertheless, also true that it was Wittgenstein who assembles the pieces into one particular 
order, thus emphazising his interest in an analysis of how first-person talk determines our 
understanding of pain. These notes have been available for a long time and attentive readers 
have doubtlessly noticed connections between them and later discussions of similar issues. 
This material was, however, entirely separated from its context of origin, a stand-alone 
compilation of philosophical insights. There is nothing per se wrong with restricting oneself to 
this state of affairs. It can very well serve as a starting point for enquiries like the present 
essay. Yet, the recent publications from the Nachlass have opened up a range of exiting 
possibilities. What used to be philologically opaque collections of Wittgensteinian ideas can 
now be disassembled and regarded as intermediate results of an ongoing process of creative 
writing and revision. It has become feasible not only to identify the building blocks of 
Wittgenstein's more elaborate editorial arrangements but - what is more important - to 
actually observe his philosophical labor, i.e. the decision process leading from day-to-day 
notes towards (as he envisaged it) eventual publication of his thoughts.
(2) Conventional methodology offers indices and synopses to assist such an enterprise. Both 
are provided by the Wiener Ausgabe, suggesting a second approach to access the 
Wittgensteinian corpus. 'Toothache' is an index entry; it can be looked up and the resulting 
items can in turn be traced through the Wittgenstein papers. Wiener Ausgabe - Apparatus, 
Register zu den Bänden 1-5 consists entirely of tables correlating every single paragraph from 
the manuscripts to its subsequent occurances in these volumes and (more commonly) to its 
location within the Philosophische Bemerkungen or Philosophische Grammatik. On Nov. 29, 
1929 Wittgenstein noted:
Von Sinnesdaten in dem Sinne des Wortes in dem es undenkbar ist daß der Andere sie hat, 
kann man eben aus diesem Grunde auch nicht sagen, daß der Andere sie nicht hat. Und aus 
ebendiesem Grunde ist es sinnlos zu sagen, daß  ich im Gegensatz zum Anderen sie habe. (MS 
107, 215f; WA 2, 124)
As the synopsis shows this remark was included in TS 209 (aka Philosophische Bemerkungen) 
presumably in mid-19309 as entry VI, 61 and taken up again on Jun. 1, 1932, when 
Wittgenstein started a revision of his earlier ideas on the topic. Investigating this kind of 
dependency is standard procedure in textual criticism. Until very recently this had to be done 
by consulting printed synopses. It seems fair to say that there is very little sense in carrying 
on the old way, if the advance of digital technologies is taken into account.
The point is not just that it is quite cumbersome to work with multiple versions of basically 
the same paragraph located in different places in various bound volumes. This impediment 
could be alleviated by liberal use of the xerox machine. Printed synopses of material as 
complex as Wittgenstein's Nachlass face a more serious problem. It seems next to impossible 
to combine indexing and synopsis. The reader is presented with either a list of significant 
terms or a table of correlations of textual segments. She cannot simultaneously look for the 
occurance of a word and the history of rearrangements of the paragraph it is included in. No 
one would finance a series of books (or care to use them) containing the astronomical number 
of relations between index entries and changes of contexts in gory detail. Consider the remark 
quoted above. Instinctively one would at least consider the terms 'Sinnesdaten', 'Sinn', 'Wort', 
'der Andere', 'Grund', 'sinnlos' and 'Gegensatz'.10 The quote considered here does not even 
contain the term 'Zahnschmerzen' which is, at this point, Wittgenstein's guiding paradigm. 
Imagine all those terms put into correlation with all the changes of their occurrences 
elsewhere in the Nachlass. The ensuing combinatorial explosion effectively prevents putting 
the result on paper. In the present case one cannot have a general, usable, semantics-to-
(section)-numbers and (section)-numbers-to-(section-)numbers mapping, one on top of the 
other, in a print medium.
(3) It is easily done if the texts have been properly digitized. Since words are encoded by 
numbers it is quite simple to set up an index and it takes just another couple of numbers to 
represent the trace of 'words' to and from given contexts. Much of this can be done 
automatically; there is no need to actually visualize the necessary relational apparatus. If a 
correlation seems interesting it can be called up at will, with no time lost for browsing, 
copying or shuffling around papers. Searching for 'Zahnschmerzen' in the Bergen edition 
immediately yields 138 hits across the entire collection. The search can be restricted to 
particular (groups of) volumes and modified to include co-occurring or proximate terms as well 
as dates. A query for 'Sinnesdaten and Zahnschmerzen' produces as a result precisely three 
common occurances. First is a paragraph from MS 114 (MS 114, 16; WA 5, 179) into which 
Wittgenstein had assimilated separate earlier notes, followed by its typescript derivatives in 
TS 211, 755 and TS 213, 510 (Big Typescript). The quote previously presented (MS 107, 
215f; WA 2, 124), lacking the term 'Zahnschmerzen', is picked out among the 30 hits returned 
by querying 'Sinnesdaten'. It occurs in a stand-alone paragraph in TS 209, 23 (PhB VI, 61) 
and is flagged accordingly. In other words: a couple of straightforward enquiries lead directly 
to an important juncture in Wittgenstein's investigation of the logic of talk about sense 
impressions and toothaches in particular.
But wait. There is something suspicious about the last sentence. Manipulation of the index 
mechanism per se cannot produce important results. The disappearance of manifest meaning 
is, in fact, the price to pay for enhanced electronic facilities. One can easily pick any 
combination of terms and search constraints - but there is no guarantee whatsoever that this 
will lead to an interesting result. So where does 'importance' come in? This is a category of 
reflective assessment, crucially different from automated procedures. The discrepancy is at 
the center of any discussion about computer-assisted philology. A certain amount of cheating 
is necessary to reach the comfortable conclusion presented in the previous paragraph. 
Criteria enabling one to judge upon the importance of algorithmic procedures have to be 
presupposed in order for such procedures to be of any help. To put it very simply: elaborate 
tools are of little help without knowledge of their proper use. One has to have a hunch about 
the possible significance of a term to profitably employ the electronic search function. The 
non-sequitur above may serve as a reminder to first-generation digital scholars. It is easy to 
fall into the trap of overestimating technology. None of the powerful programming at work 
below the WYSIWYG-surface guarantees philosophical content. 
The difficulty, consequently, is the following one: How can technological advancements in 
textual criticism be constrained by a sense of proportion relating to a prior understanding of 
the subject matter. This type of question is well-known and often discussed between 
technophiles and technophobes. The present paper is a case study, trying to answer the 
question for one particular instance of the general problem. But we have not yet assembled 
the necessary evidence. It remains quite unclear why a philosopher should worry about 
toothaches. A powerful mechanism has been sketched, yet it is fair to assume that 
Wittgenstein scholars go about their business projecting hypotheses to understand the 
complexities of the Nachlass quite independently. The above account does not include a 
reason for using the mechanism. Providing such reasons is itself a philosophical activity. This 
section has offered a rough overview of the itinerary of some sample paragraphs. One has to 
explore their content and in particular the conceptual significance of their itinerary in order to 
get the full picture. A satisfactory answer to the issue at stake between digital technology 
and its critics has to appeal to philosophy in action.
TOOTHACHES: PHILOSOPHY 
Wittgenstein's first entry into manuscript 107 refers back to the Tractatus . There he had 
claimed: 'Das denkende, vorstellende, Subjekt gibt es nicht.' (5.631) And he had explained 
this dictum by pointing to the visual field: 'nichts am Gesichtsfeld läßt darauf schließen, daß 
es von einem Auge gesehen wird.' ( Tractatus  5.633). Compare MS 107, 1 (WA 2,3): 'Der 
Gesichtsraum so wie er ist hat seine selbständige Realität. Er selbst enthält kein Subjekt. Er 
ist autonom.' In 1929 Wittgenstein's anti-intentionalism is still in place, but his views on 
atomic sentences begin to change. The basic units of his epistemological account are not 
single sentences any more: 'Ich lege nicht den Satz als Maßstab an die Wirklichkeit an 
sondern das System von Sätzen.' (MS 107, 35; WA 2, 149) The logic of color terms has, as 
Wittgenstein discovered, to take account of the field of possibilities given by the spectrum. 
Atomic sentences cannot be independent of each other since 'This plate is blue' logically 
implies - among many other propositions - that it is not red. Yet, this is not a tautology. 
Given the visual field and the customary color space one has a priori knowledge of the 
structural dependencies of possible colors. To look for any actual one necessarily includes 
mastery of a presupposed color scheme. 'Wie es einen Sinn hat zu sagen die Farbe R ist am 
Ort P wenn ich überhaupt den Gesichtsraum mit dem Farbraum "vor mir" habe.' (MS 107, 158; 
WA 2, 92) Wittgenstein's quotes indicate that he is still officially unwilling to grant the 
existence of a subject. But it is interesting to take a closer look at his day's work (Oct. 10, 
1929).
The point of reference of the previous quote ('Wie es einen Sinn hat ...') are stomach aches. 
Wittgenstein is discussing the meaning of negation. How can one truthfully deny the presence 
of stomach aches? Such sentences seem to lack external sensual corroboration. They cannot 
be constructed as somehow linking stomachs and pains either. 'Es ist nur wesentlich, daß ich 
den Raum vor mir habe in dem der Magen liegt und den worin die Schmerzen liegen.' (MS 107, 
157; WA 2, 92) Like colors within the visual field pains are a kind of sensation constitutivly 
associated with stomachs. This seems an unobjectionable parallel - with a twist. We have 
noted Wittgenstein's avoidance of the common notion of a subject in his discussion of the 
visual field. This strategy cannot, however, be carried over to the case of 'internal' 
sensations. There is nothing comparable to the geometry of shared, public, visible spaces in 
the realm of our intestines. If you remove the subject from stomach aches not even the 
illusion of a legitimate issue remains. Switching from the visual field to internal sensations, 
Wittgenstein's doctrine of the subject is severely shaken. He cannot but employ the first 
person pronoun in these contexts, even though his commitment is to exclude it from the 
scientific vocabulary. Such is the dilemma apparent in his first remark on toothaches: 'Warum 
nenne ich Zahnschmerzen " meine Zahnschmerzen" '? (MS 107, 199; WA 2, 114)
Wittgenstein does not follow any pre-set agenda that could lead to a systematic 
investigation of various modalities of the senses. His move from vision to stomach aches to 
tooth aches is obviously not aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive view. Ten 
days after raising the issue of toothaches being my toothaches Wittgenstein comes up with 
the brilliant aphorism quoted above. The private language argument is, in nuce, contained in 
two extremely compact sentences (MS 107, 215f; WA 2, 124). If another person cannot be 
said to be the subject of my internal sense data it is meaningless to deny her those very 
sense data. Their possible occurrences do not include this kind of bearer. Alas, this is no 
comfort for anyone tempted to regard awareness of one's own intentional states as privileged 
knowledge. There is no force in such pronouncements. I cannot determine something uniquely 
subjective in appealing to an incomprehensible option, i.e. another person's having my internal 
states. The Tractatus  view of the subject was of a metaphysical entity, a border of the 
World, not part of it ( Tractatus 5.641). The early post-Tractarian manuscripts are gradually 
abandoning this dualism, conceding a role for first-person talk. Yet, most of the original 
skepticism remains. How can one conceive of a role for 'private' sensations and avoid 
idealism?
Such questions are external to Wittgenstein's writing in the manuscripts. The present sketch 
puts emphasis on only a small number of issues discussed within those volumes. The general 
line of argument is, however, supported by Wittgenstein's own subsequent selective rewriting 
of the material. When he cut up TS 208 to rearrange its content into what is now known as 
the Philosophische Bemerkungen, one of his points of emphasis was toothaches. His 
discussion of logical features of talk about the subject centers around a selection of remarks 
devoted to the remarkable fact of me - Ludwig Wittgenstein - having toothaches (cf. PhB VI, 
58). This revision introduces complexity of a higher order. Many of Wittgenstein's paragraphs 
are initially small, self-contained philosophical analyses. The next auctorial step is to try and 
put them together so that some larger, overarching connection is established. Philosophische 
Bemerkungen VI does, in fact, offer extremely dense philosophical substance, much too 
involved to be discussed here. Just an outline of Wittgenstein's strategy of using his 
arrangements as arguments can be given.
A first group of remarks, serving as a kind of prolegomenon, is derived from entries for Dec. 
14, 1929 and Oct. 11, 1929, expounding the general direction of the succeeding paragraphs. 
The use of the first person pronoun is fraught with difficulties, particularly if talk about 
perception is modelled according to external circumstances. 'I am experiencing a red patch' is 
quoted as a case in point. To analyze the difficulties one might re-write the puzzling 
descriptions, substituting some un-objectionable term for the offensive 'I'. This exercise is 
next. Remarkably, Wittgenstein switches from sense impressions to internal sensation again, 
as he designs a language game supposed to exhibit the same logical multiplicity as the 
common idiom and yet to avoid mention of a subject. His idea is to externalize the privileged 
position of subjectivity by designating one particular person as an universal point of 
reference. If 'I am' Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'I have toothaches' becomes 'There are toothaches' 
and 'A has toothaches' can be rephrased as 'A behaves like Ludwig Wittgenstein when there 
are toothaches'. (PhBemerkungen VI, 58). The apparent uniqueness of subjective experience 
is transformed into a qualitative difference in public discourse; the mysterious realm of 
subjectivity replaced by an idiom of matching complexity: everyone can take center stage in 
this language. Once this focus is set the remaining moves of the language game are 
equivalent to the traditional one. Wittgenstein offers a playful simile. The logic of first-person 
talk recalls oriental despotism, with the subject taking the place of the despot in providing 
the origin of the communicative coordinate system.
The point is that talk about sensations is inevitably dualistic. 'The subject' - as well as an 
oriental despot - is supposed to fall outside ordinary discourse directed towards physical 
things. If Timur Lenk's state of health is taken as the measuring device of health-talk it makes 
no sense to ask whether he has toothaches. In the event, toothaches simply are among his 
personal states and having toothaches is a condition derived from this primordial condition. 
Even though Wittgenstein has thus eliminated first-person talk the Tractarian criterion of 
meaning fails, however. It is impossible to attribute possession of toothaches or lack thereof 
to a suitably designated individuum. (The discussion prefigures later reflections on the Paris 
ur-meter.) After this setting of the stage Wittgenstein embarks on a series of grammatical 
investigations, exploring the comprehensibility of our dualistic idiom. There is no obvious way 
to stratify his dialectical dialogues into a single argument. 'I cannot feel your toothaches.' 
Does this sentence express an empirical truth or rather a kind of logical necessity 
Wittgenstein had not provided for in his Tractatus? (cf. PhB VI, 61) Rather than answering 
questions like this, Wittgenstein keeps changing his focus and his examples, circling around 
the issues. What is he up to? To a casual reader it looks like an open-ended, aporetic 
elenchus. But Wittgenstein, surprisingly, and without so much as minimal warning, does 
actually close his argument by the strategic placement of one paragraph.
Wittgenstein's transposition of first person talk was anchored in the neutral statement: 'There 
are toothaches'. The following quote is an obvious echo, concluding the argument:
Das Phänomen des Schmerzgefühls in einem Zahn, welches ich kenne, ist in der 
Ausdrucksweise der gewöhnlichen Sprache dargestellt durch ' ich habe in dem und dem Zahn 
Schmerzen'. Nicht durch einen Ausdruck von der Art, 'an diesem Ort ist ein Schmerzgefühl'. 
(PhB VI, 66)
As it turns out, it is impossible to capture the subjectivist intuitions in Wittgenstein's 
alternative scheme. There cannot be pains outside of consciousness. Designating a physical 
body to be the paradigmatic bearer of pain is no better than ascribing pain to some tooth put 
on a table ( Philosophische Bermerkungen VI, 65). Timur Lenk is, inevitably, located in public 
space, so we are back to Wittgenstein's initial reminder: the problem arises because physical 
circumstances are inappropriately projected onto another context.
Das ganze Feld dieser Erfahrung wird in dieser Sprache durch Ausdrücke von der Form 'ich 
habe ...' beschrieben. Die Sätze von der Form 'N hat Zahnschmerzen' sind für ein ganz 
anderes Feld reserviert. (PhB VI, 66) 
In other words: Wittgenstein advises himself to desist from trying to battle ordinary language. 
He is quite aware of the tension: In order to unravel the philosophical knot one has to re-
trace the complicated movements underlying it. Thus ends the second take on toothaches. 
Resting content with the ordinary was, however, always a temporary affair for Wittgenstein. 
In 1932 we find him returning to the very issues he had supposedly resolved in MS 110, 30ff 
(WA5, 179ff). These are the quotes remarked upon earlier in this paper: Wittgenstein's 
second, condensing revision of the material on toothaches.
This third stratum of the textual evidence and its further development will not be pursued 
here. The sole purpose of the preceding intermezzo was to redress the balance between the 
digital toolkit and topics in established Wittgenstein scholarship. The problem was to mediate 
between proponents of largely syntactic manipulation of linguistic data and traditional 
approaches that turn to texts with a prior understanding of their subject matter. The way to 
escape a stand-off is to refuse the contra-position from the very start. Semantic data-
mining11 as exemplified by the previous sub-section, is simultaneously an exercise in digital 
philology and philosophy. Wittgenstein's Nachlass is an excellent place to look for such a 
synthesis because the author's ideas are, to a large extent, expressed by arranging and 
rearranging small textual units. Tracking the dynamics of Wittgenstein's philosophical 
variations can, admittedly, be done in the conventional framework of a printed edition of his 
manuscripts and type-scripts. Computer-assisted procedures do, however, push philology 
towards horizons previously out of reach. To repeat: No collection of printed volumes can 
conceivably present any synopsis of any terms, occurring at arbitrary dates, in just a few 
seconds. Such opportunities are bound to have a major impact on future Wittgenstein 
scholarship. This concludes the philological assessment of conventional versus digital 
approaches to the Wittgenstein papers. A more detached attitude has already been hinted 
at. It seems that Wittgenstein's writing is particularly well suited to a post-Gutenberg 
environment. In order to get the full picture regarding the Bergen edition we have to take a 
closer look at Wittgenstein's failure to turn his writings into a book.
BEYOND BOOKS 
J.C. Nyíri has made a strong case for considering the Wittgenstein Nachlass in the light of 
recent media philosophy. Quoting Walter Ong and Erich Havelock he reminds his readers of the 
prospect that the age of literacy might be giving way to a period of secondary orality, with 
the spoken word regaining the most influential position in a broadcast society. According to 
Nyíri's suggestion Wittgenstein's failure to distinguish between the written and the spoken 
word might explain his 'ultimate inability to complete the "book" he always wanted to 
complete'12. The ductus of his writings is, indeed, more akin to on-going conversations than 
to neatly delineated propositions. Did Wittgenstein miss the adequate medium for his 
exertions? Nyíri draws attention to the fact that his writing is, in certain places, a direct 
rejoinder to the Socratic dialogues. 'Ich finde bei Plato auf eine Frage wie 'was ist Erkenntnis' 
nicht die vorläufige Antwort: Sehen wir einmal nach, wie dieses Wort gebraucht wird.' (TS 
211, 17) Wittgenstein's inverse Socratic role consists in dissolving platonic confidence in 
essences and is, therefore, ill suited to be put into a classical philosophical treatise. As Nyíri 
(following Havelock) rightly reminds us, Platonic ideas are inextricably connected to the rise of 
literacy over an oral tradition which lacked expressive means for a proper treatment of 
abstract terms. Yet, Wittgenstein could have rested content with his actual teaching, leaving 
it to his disciples to provide written records. He did not do so, but rather forced himself, 
against better knowledge, to conform to the given standard.
Wenn ich für mich denke ohne ein Buch schreiben zu wollen, so springe ich um das Thema 
herum; das ist die einzige mir natürliche Denkweise. In einer Reihe gezwungen fortzudenken ist 
mir eine Qual. Soll ich es nun überhaupt probieren? Ich verschwende unsägliche Mühe auf ein 
Anordnen der Gedanken, das vielleicht gar keinen Wert hat. (MS 118, 185)
The key word is 'vielleicht' indicating Wittgenstein's ambivalent ambitions to write a book. His 
difficulties are methodologically profound. One way to bring this into focus is to position them 
at the crossroads between books and hypertext.
Decades of Wittgenstein scholarship have been shaped by editorial decisions made by the 
trustees of the Nachlass. Their general policy was to present provisional steps in 
Wittgenstein's ongoing process of revision as standalone volumes, often effacing the 
dynamics demonstrated in the preceding section. David Stern, in his perceptive paper, 
correctly describes the state of affairs.
The Wittgenstein Nachlass is not a haphazard pile of working papers that happened to survive 
his death, nor is it a collection of works that only awaited publication. While it is both a 
carefully selected and highly structured record of his life's work, a collection of material that 
he deliberately assembled and left to posterity, it is also the record of a writer continually in 
flux, never entirely satisfied with anything he had written.13  
In view of this situation it actually seems a little unfair to reapproach the editors of 
Wittgenstein's posthumous writing. There is no good way to capture the activity vividly 
described by Stern into the confines of a printed volume. Despite outward appearances there 
are no 'works of Wittgenstein' that could confidently be taken as points of departure. Even 
the Philosophische Untersuchungen are, as Stern observes, 'only one of a number of possible 
arrangements Wittgenstein proposed, many of which extend, amplify, or cast light on the 
remarks in the published book.'14 References to current models of textual interdependency 
become almost irresistible at this point. 'Because the Wittgenstein Nachlass is the result of 
such an extensive act of rewriting, it is less a collection of texts than a hypertext, an 
interconnected network of remarks.'15 Stern's remarks certainly point into the right direction. 
Still, there are some intermediary steps between the range of options available to 
Wittgenstein and writing that is embedded in digital technology. Those steps have to be 
spelled out if one wants to get a grasp on how the CD-ROM edition might change out habits 
of scholarship based on self-contained books. 
One feature of a culture based on books deserves special attention as this culture is 
challenged by the advent of digital, globally distributed information. Books are marked by the 
coincidence of two seperate decisions: their content and its appearance are determined 
simultaneously. This is what publication of a book, in effect, amounts to - and it throws some 
light on Wittgenstein's qualms. He felt unable to decide on one shape for his ideas. 
Publication, throughout European history, simply meant drawing a line between a creative 
process and its (albeit provisional) results. Sending a manuscript to the publisher was to 
distinguish a line between sketches, preliminary attempts, experimental drafts and an entity 
exhibiting both the features of the most prestigious information technology and of auctorial 
closure. Books divided the lifetime of an author into continuous activity and singular results, 
texts that, from a certain moment in time, assume a life of their own. This arrangement is 
being thoroughly shaken by the advent of new media. First of all, digital encoding disrupts the 
familiar coordination between form and content. Characters are mapped into numbers that 
are, in turn, symbolized in an electronic format unsuitable for direct perception. And this 
transposition, secondly, triggers dramatic changes in the nature of publicity. Electronic texts 
can instantly be published to a world audience and still be constantly revised.
In the given context it is particularly instructive to notice the implication for posthumous 
'works'. In the world of books a Nachlass is defined as all the material an author did not 
manage or see fit to get printed. Its peculiar character is that future generations retro-
activly elevate such writing to the status of books. If books published by an author are what 
software developers call a 'feature-freeze', publications from a Nachlass are based on 
decisions to overrule such limitations. There is no way to escape the allure of 'works' in book 
culture. In Nachlass-publications auxiliary authors assume responsibility to supplement a 
writer's oeuvre with 'second order' books. Applying this to the case at hand yields a 
suggestive prospect. While the trustees failed to do justice to Wittgenstein's open-ended, 
conversations philosophical style, a digital edition of the Nachlass is much better suited to 
achieve this aim. Such an enterprise is not forced to turn a collection of tentative designs 
into bound volumes. The 'Wiener Ausgabe' seems set to publish the largely repetetive material 
from 1929-1933 in 12 weighty volumes. Michael Nedo sounds apologetic in defending this 
expenditure:
... the book is still the carrier of thoughts, of written heritage in our culture, and familiarity 
with this medium certainly affects not only one's dealings with the texts themselves, but also 
the accompanying Apparatuses.16  
One does not have to subscribe to deconstruction to find this eulogy anachronistic. The 
transitory character of Wittgenstein's writing, its complex genealogy and its numerous 
recapitulations seem to call for a digital format of presentation which matches its inherent 
temporality by avoiding ultimate editorial decisions and allowing easy manipulation of the 
textual material.
Impressions like these, convincing as they may sound - once again - overstress technology. 
Wittgenstein, it is true, despaired of achieving the linear order demanded by a printed book. 
But this does not imply that hypertext could have solved his problem. His desparation is the 
important feature: the fight against a spell cast upon his writing by the demands of books 
culture. He worried about the correct arrangement of his ideas, so much is obvious from the 
examples discussed above. One understanding of 'hypertext' is of segments of texts linked 
together in a more or less haphazard way, often without any single, controling authority. This 
meaning is certainly not applicable to Wittgenstein. He could have saved himself a lot of 
trouble had he been prepared to regard his writing as a kind of private web-space. A second 
understanding might be more appropriate. Hypertext can also refer to autonomous non-linear 
writing which transcends the obligatory step-by-step sequence of print-products by 
constructing a topological matrix without hierarchical order. Digitized texts are encoded as 
numbers and have to be re-established in a legible format. Visualization by a monitor is one 
step removed from the pages of a book and offers flexibility unmatched by their arrangement. 
Wittgenstein's famous metaphor of wandering through a philosophical landscape comes to 
mind. The Nachlass does, in fact, contain a number of tentative registers that could easily be 
implemented as a hypertext.17 
This is one side of Wittgenstein's struggle with conventional means of expressing thoughts. 
But his need for a different kind of complexity is offset by an equally important desire. In 
many places he insists on finding definitive answers. This motive, manifest in the Tractatus , 
is also present in Wittgenstein's later calls for 'Übersichtlichkeit' (surveyability) and well laid-
out description:
Wir wollen nicht das Regelsystem für die Verwendung unserer Worte in unerhörter Weise 
verfeinern oder vervollständigen. Denn die Klarheit, die wir anstreben, ist allerdings eine 
vollkommene. Aber das heißt nur, daß die philosophischen Probleme vollkommen verschwinden 
sollen. (PhU § 133)
In this context, the 'treatment' of philosophical problems is likened to therapeutical 
intervention and its ultimate aim is to put vexing thoughts to rest. Such an attitude cannot 
be easily reconciled with calls for open-ended auctorial multiplicity and the suspension of 
binding results. Wittgenstein's 'hypertext' avant la lettre arises from unsuccessful attempts at 
closure rather than from intentional design. It does not anticipate a more flexible medium 
which might alleviate the rigor of philosophical arguments. As the Nachlass material on 
toothaches shows, Wittgenstein did not simply reject the linear progression of thoughts in 
favor of a compilation of aphorisms. He actually proposes a solution - even though it does not 
satisfy him in the long run. Look at it this way: If he had been able to reach a satisfactory 
conclusion he would have put it into print. Hypertext, on the other hand, is by design non-
conclusive. Had Wittgenstein used hypertext, his characteristic struggle against premature 
closure would have been lost. Hypertext lacks the kind of physical inertia needed to make a 
sentence stick to a certain position and while Wittgenstein kept overturning pre-established 
patterns of thought and inferences he never abandoned his drive to return to 
straightforward, easily surveyable positions.
Wir sind aufs Glatteis geraten, wo die Reibung fehlt, also die Bedingungen in gewissem Sinn 
ideal sind, aber wir eben deshalb auch nicht gehen können. Wir wollen gehen; dann brauchen 
wir Reibung. Zurück auf den rauhen Boden. (PhU § 107)
Wittgenstein would, in all likelihood, have extended this complaint against free-floating 
philosophical speculation to l'art pour l'art hypertext.
To sum up and focus on the case at hand: Electronic texts are not just a kind of print; the 
graphical rendering of information on a monitor is no 'page' in any ordinary sense. It is 
tempting - and to some extent plausible - to distinguish Wittgenstein's writing from 
conventional philosophical authorship by employing jargon from media studies. Actually putting 
his Nachlass on a CD-ROM adds considerable complexity to the story. There is an important 
difference between a writer's decision to publish his or her work (in whatever format) and 
someone else administering a heritage. Nachlass publications, including electronic editions, are 
per definitionem second order closures. The flexibility of digitized texts is of another order as 
Wittgenstein's work in progress. How those papers are to be rendered on CD-ROMs is by no 
means self-evident. It is easy to pretend that the Bergen project is just an extension of well-
known editorial strategies. Such an attitude does, however, seriously underestimate the 
range of problems involved. All the conveniences set forth in the previous pages do not come 
for free. The change from books to computers is in itself an important theoretical and political 
issue. Putting Wittgenstein on disk demands a considerable number of decisions beyond the 
scope of printed editions. This is new territory, hardly even noticed as a philosophical issue 
amongst Wittgenstein scholars.
THE POLITICS OF DIGITAL TEXTS 
The Bergen electronic edition effaces its own novelty. Its structuring principle are the 
physical volumes of the Nachlass which are presented one after the other in linear sequence. 
The search facilities include easy access to single manuscripts or type-scripts. Facsimiles 
provide unprecedented opportunities to scrutinize Wittgenstein's actual output.The electronic 
edition might be argued to beat its print competitors at their own game. One apparent 
platitude is of utmost importance, though. Digitized texts need computers which need 
software which needs operating systems. In centuries of print culture we have become 
accustomed to the fact that once a book is published it is freely accessible to readers 
without further effort. Historical pictures of lockable books raise amused smiles. Yet, they are 
not a bad analogy to so-called digital books: in order to read them one needs additional 
devices, even 'keys'. Book publishing is a business charging once per item, regardless of its 
further use. But those products are, nowadays, revealed as just one interface to information. 
In many respects digital documents offer more convenient access to identical content. This 
surplus value has a price: a set of electronic equipment is inserted between the reader and 
her text. Once they have been published (and as long as they are in print) books are available 
without further decoding. As everyone who has to exchange files on the internet knows, this 
is far from true for electronic documents. Different computer platforms, different word 
processors and conflicting versions tend to produce confusions unheard of in former times.
The reason for this is that there are several competing standards to implement a mapping 
between alpha-numerical symbols and digital numbers. Strictly speaking only the basic letters, 
numerals and diacritical signs of the English alphabet are interchangeable on any platform. 
Different sets of characters, and in particular the elaborate additional code necessary to 
simulate printed pages on a monitor, demand special attention. International bodies are in 
charge of supervising the encoding of the world's languages. Software simulation of written 
material, however, obeys different rules. It is to a considerable extent a commercial affair and 
subject to the laws of economics. The result is, predictably, a considerable variety of 
proprietary software tools trying to get their share of the market by offering particularly 
comfortable - and mutually incompatible - features. This is the state of affairs confronting 
any digitization of texts. Two minimalistic approaches are either to scan existing pages or to 
stick to 7-bit ASCII code in transcribing them electronically. It is immediately obvious that 
neither of these options is satisfactory for a textual corpus of the degree of complexity of the 
Wittgenstein Nachlass. The editors were faced with a situation unprecedented in ordinary 
publishing. They had to decide upon a software package capable of producing the desired 
results, which also meant forcing that package upon the readers. Textual scholarship finds 
itself on unfamiliar terrain. The tools it needs to even access its subject matter are produced 
by big companies with only marginal interest in the academy.
The Bergen edition runs on the Windows platform (Windows 3.1, 3.11, Windows 95 and 
Windows NT4 according to the promotion sheet). For word-processing capacity it uses a 
program named 'FolioViews' which provides the usual services: cut and paste, printing, 
searching, window control, electronic bookmarks and back tracing. For scholars who habitually 
use the Microsoft range of products and do not worry about the ensuing dependency of their 
basic data on market competition these are excellent choices, even though some of its 
limitations will affect the ordinary user. The entire collection of normalized and diplomatic 
transcripts is put into a single binary file respectively. (The facsimiles are offered as single 
graphic documents, one per physical page.) Consequently, two huge electronic files contain 
the entire content of the Bergen edition in a completely opaque format. The user is allowed to 
read and manipulate texts via FolioViews but none of the structural information that has been 
presented in the first section of this paper is directly accessible to her. She can copy 
selected texts, paste and print them - but neither can she touch the indexing mechanism nor 
modify any of the underlying data. There is a strict separation between interface and non-
transparent, computational deep structure. Copyright considerations are a prominent reason 
for this arrangement: the content of a printed book cannot as easily be reproduced, 
manipulated and distributed as its digital counterpart. Provisions have to be taken to protect 
the investment put into such long-term projects. Media change unsettles venerable customs. 
The traditional understanding was that the result of scholarly work, most often financed by 
the taxpayer's money, are generally available in their entirety. This feature does, indeed, 
distinguish scholarship from commercially induced research. As teams of experts have to use 
proprietary software to reassure the copyright-holders and ensure the profit for the publishing 
house, this availability is restricted. But, it might be objected, where is the problem? 
Wittgenstein's writings are at one's disposal, all of them and in an extremely comfortable 
fashion. True enough, judged by the standards of the printed book. Yet, as was discussed in 
section two, Wittgenstein's Nachlass transcends the limits of such standards and an 
electronic edition might be better suited to capture those peculiarities. It might be organized 
so as to mirror Wittgenstein's editorial techniques, starting with single remarks as elementary 
building blocks and putting them together in a variety of ways, following Wittgenstein's lead. 
His working process, not its result, could be taken as the guiding principle. As a matter of fact 
the encapsulated FolioViews file is the very opposite of hypertext.18 Yet, the Bergen edition 
does not offer any tools to actually rearrange its content or redesign its appearance on the 
primary level. For all its flexibility and ease of use the Bergen edition is still in the conceptual 
grip of classical printed editions. Does it have to mimic the necessities of print culture?
The question turns on the issue of access to the internal, structural information hidden inside 
the binary files. Under present conditions one can find a particular paragraph and all of its 
subsequent instances as they appear in the later volumes. It is, however, impossible to break 
out of the straitjacket of the von Wright classification and deal with paragraphs as basic data 
units. If this were possible digital equivalences of Wittgenstein's notes could be freely 
assembled and re-assembled. As of now one is, for example, presented with manuscripts 105-
108 plus typescripts 208-209 plus manuscript 110 and has to extract relevant paragraphs for 
personal post-processing. A more appropriate way might be to pick out relevant paragraphs 
(e.g. on toothaches) and re-assemble them at bottom level, echoing the author's own 
procedure. It would be an attractive way to overcome the Nachlass effect of irrevocable 
closure. The internal dynamics of the Wittgenstein papers would be much more in evidence if 
a more open digital format had been chosen. Years of labor have been spent on the electronic 
transcription of the original documents. The records of the Wittgenstein archive do in fact 
contain all the information necessary for micrological analysis and multiple synthesis. The use 
of the CD-ROM, however, remains restricted to find, cut and paste with no provisions to 
address the editorial information from outside FolioViews. In order to visualize the conclusion 
on toothaches from the first section one might want to write a small program. It could not 
operate on the existing data structure which would have to be re-inscribed onto copies of 
segments extracted from the database.
This is the place to touch upon some basic issues in the theory and practice of text 
encoding. The discussion of the peculiar overlap between the requirements of digitization and 
commercial interests at the beginning of this section deliberately omitted an alternative 
possibility. Standard General Markup Language (SGML) is an attempt to avoid dependency on 
proprietary formats and irreconcilable software development with regard to electronic texts. 
The idea is, briefly, to supplement the alpha-numeric ciphers with additional (groups of) 
characters ('mark up') that serve the purpose of encoding meta-information by means of the 
available, restricted set of ASCII code. HTML, the language of the World Wide Web, in an 
instance of SGML. An easy example of mark up is the use (in HTML) of '<h1>' to indicate the 
beginning (and '</h1>' the end) of a top level heading. Such mark up indications do not in 
themselves cause any formatting to be done. (This distinguishes them from the binary code 
inserted into text files by common word processors.) Their function is to delineate the logical 
structure of the document and provide anchors to include additional content (like cross-
references, dates or hierarchical dependencies). A marked-up document can be read on any 
computer platform, the catch being that it needs software to render the mark-up as 
intended. This is a substantial difficulty given the fact that word processing has been much 
more popular with the general public. But consider a Web browser to get the general idea. 
Such browser are software which takes '<h1>Title</h1>' as an input and turns it (e.g.) into
                                                          TITLE
SGML (and its recent variant XML) offers a top-down solution to the problem of incompatible 
standards in text encoding and concurrent information storage.
The Bergen edition is based upon transcriptions of Wittgenstein's original pages into a mark up 
language using the 'Multi-Element Code System' (MECS). This system provides a meta-
grammar that can be implemented in particular instances of transcriptional grammar and is 
well suited to the task of capturing the complexities of Wittgenstein's autographs in a digital 
format. For technical reasons MECS is not entirely compatible with SGML. The thing to keep in 
mind is, however, that the Bergen transcriptions contain the entire set of editorial information 
in mark up format, i.e. in 'tags' that can be addressed in programming constructions. This 
information is filtered to produce the diplomatic and normalized versions offered on the CD-
ROMs. In customary, printed editions there is no possible gap between the pages on offer and 
their basic encoding. This does not carry over into the electronic realm where digital code has 
to be re-implemented in order to be perceptible. The need for secondary processing 
introduces a discrepancy which can be used to shield off operative background information 
from its surface rendition. Electronic documents offer spectacular improvements over many of 
the usual features of printed texts. Ironically, it is just because of their versatility that 
mechanisms to constrain their scope are feasible - and called for. The Bergen edition is just 
one example of a more comprehensive problem that is often overlooked in recent digitization 
campaigns. It is perfectly possible to combine global, digital distribution of information with 
highly selective, exclusive standards of its generation and transmission. While most people 
would be prepared to accept this for cable TV or DVD it should at least be a matter of 
concern in textual scholarship.
This is an area of conflict between claims of copyright holders and the scientific community. 
Broaching this issue is not intended to deflect attention from the impressive achievements of 
the Bergen electronic edition. Its presentation of the material is an epochal advance in 
Wittgenstein scholarship. It is, at the same time, a precursor of many electronic editions yet 
to be published and is apt to trigger a more general discussion on how similar scholarly 
editions might be designed. Disregarding, for the purpose of this conclusion, external 
constraints an optimum solution for (future) computer-savvy scholars would enable them to 
address their texts at any of the three levels that have to constitute a serious editorial 
project: the mark-up, diplomatic and normalized versions should all be manipulable to ensure 
optimum results. It is impossible for any single endeavor to adequately charter the wealth of 
variants and cross-relations in Wittgenstein's Nachlass. But if scholars were able to freely 
access the underlying mark up resources based on the canonical transcription could easily be 
enriched by resources taken from literal computing. As several commentators have pointed 
out, the recent 'Open Source' movement in software management echoes the concepts of 
free peer access and peer review well established within science. In the best case scenario 
source code, e.g. the mark-up version of Wittgenstein's texts, would be freely available. Book 
culture charges relatively little for relatively static texts. Expensive electronic editions offer 
advanced research tools, blocking collaboration based on their data structure. There will be 
an 'open source' Wittgenstein sometime this century.
Currently, a confusing variety of formats is used to tentatively provide comprehensive access 
in selected collections, mainly for corpora from earlier centuries. Projects like CELT, the 'Celtic 
Corpus of Electronic Texts'19and the 'Victorian Women Writer's Project'20 offer browsable 
HTML-front-ends, ftp download of marked-up documents and printable Postscript copies. TMI 
('Thesaurus Musicarum Italicarum')21 or 'The William Blake Archive'22 employ DynaWeb to 
translate SGML-coded files for use with common browsers. At the Wittgenstein archive's web-
site23 TS 201a 'Notes on Logic' and MS 115, 'Philosophische Bemerkungen' are available in 
different versions: HTML frames for concurrent inspection of the diplomatic and normalized 
text and for download in Postscript and Word Perfect format respectively. It remains unclear 
whether electronic publishing will develop standards as transparent as those of traditional 
literary culture. The technological advances we have been discussing are in fact instrumental 
in de-familiarizing earlier standards that have acquired second nature status. New 
opportunities arise, but there is still little institutional background and almost none of the hard 
questions have been answered. Meanwhile, from a philosophical point of view, the 
Wittgenstein papers raise an issue that cuts across old and new forms of writing. 
Wittgenstein's struggle against the linear progression of arguments should neither be 
remodeled as a peaceful exercise in hypertext, nor put to rest in an series of (printed or 
virtual) volumes. The driving force behind the Nachlass is a continuous effort to put together 
the pieces of a number of puzzles that seem to change as this activity unfolds. Nachlass 
means: this process has definitely ended. Digitization of the Nachlass offers an opportunity to 
breath life back into an accumulation of notes.
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THE CHANGED STATE OF WITTGENSTEIN SCHOLARSHIP 
Two independent publishing projects have thoroughly changed the state of Wittgenstein 
scholarship in recent years. Michael Nedo's 'Wiener Ausgabe'1 offers a traditional critical 
edition of Wittgenstein's philosophical writings ranging from 1929 up to and including the 'Big 
Typescript' (1933). Considering the eclectic and - at times - arbitrary editorial policy 
underlying previous publications from the Nachlass2 Nedo's project offers unprecedented 
philosophical rigor as well as textual criticism in volumes designed for comfortable reading. A 
second, more ambitious, attempt at a critical edition is the Bergen electronic edition.3 It is 
planned to include 4 CD-ROMs, covering the entire range of the philosopher's unpublished 
writing. Two disks are currently available, comprising all of Wittgenstein's manuscripts from 
1929-1939, as well as type-scripts, beginning with 'Notes on Logic' (1913) and leading up to 
Typescript 226, composed in 1939.
Wittgenstein's writings from the Thirties are, therefore, available in independent, reliable 
printed and electronic editions respectively. Readers can, for the first time, observe the 
philosopher at work, transferring paragraphs from pocket notebooks to handwritten 'volumes'; 
picking acceptable remarks to be included in type-scripts that are, at a later stage, cut up 
into slips of paper which are again annotated, rearranged and put together in further volumes 
and type-scripts. But this is only half the excitement. The 'Wiener Ausgabe' and the 'Bergen 
Edition' stake their success on different media, inevitably provoking a comparison between the 
well known features of printed scholarly editions and the not so familiar realm of digitized 
texts.
Some of the differences are immediately obvious. Scrutinizing philosophical texts on a printed 
page implies sensual qualities lacking in electronic space. Many readers will prefer a material 
sheet of paper over its virtual substitute. There are, on the other hand, definite advantages 
in digitally stored transcriptions. A CD-ROM does not occupy desk-space and allows almost 
instant access to every single remark of the extended Wittgenstein corpus. In addition to the 
actual texts, the 'Wiener Ausgabe' contains separate volumes of sophisticated registers, 
cross-referencing all the printed material. Considering the fact that the Bergen edition 
includes an excellent search function Nedo's tables are an anachronistic nicety at best. In a 
recent volume Nedo, in fact, announces a 'comprehensive electronic Apparatus, 
supplementing the Wiener Ausgabe'4. And there is simply no viable alternative to an electronic 
medium if one wants to present facsimiles of every page of the Nachlass, suitably linked to 
diplomatic and normalized versions of its content. These features make the Bergen edition a 
far more comprehensive enterprise. It seems that, pace  the predictable skepticism stemming 
from deeply ingrained scholarly habits, there is a convincing case in favor of switching to the 
digital format. The present paper will, at any rate, proceed from this assumption. But matters 
of technical convenience should not be allowed to decide the more profound issues arising 
from the competition of the media involved.
The accessibility of Wittgenstein's texts has been tremendously enhanced by putting them on 
CD-ROMs. If this were information like the listings in a telephone directory one could let the 
issue rest at this point. It might be confined to a discussion of the availability and design of 
necessary electronic interfaces. Philosophical production, and in particular Wittgenstein's 
literary remains, raise more interesting questions, though. Can conceptual content be neatly 
separated from its presentation in a given medium? Since its inception philosophy was done 
by teaching, in scholarly discourse, or by writing books/papers. What will be the impact of 
current digital technology on those traditional practices?5 
The preceding sketch has emphasized several characteristics of electronic texts that printed 
books cannot match. It does not follow that a given work actually demands - or even bears - 
digital treatment. Essential use of single pages, to mention a simple case, cannot easily be 
simulated electronically. The first section of this paper will, therefore, explore what might be 
called the textuality of Wittgenstein's Nachlass. Tracing the development of an important 
Wittgensteinian motive, this exploration surveys part of the newly available material, testing 
the suitability of computer-assisted scholarship to this particular collection of writings. Is 
there a general lesson to be learned from involving oneself in hands-on digital philology? As it 
turns out the Wittgenstein Nachlass provides an excellent occasion to reflect upon the range 
and limits of the Gutenberg heritage. This is discussed in section two. The concluding remarks 
focus on the Bergen edition. Given that digitization does not simply extend the established 
tool-set of textual scholarship but opens up new philosophical perspectives - how well does 
this particular enterprise support (and possibly inspire) a re-configuration of the philological 
status quo?
TOOTHACHES: PHILOLOGY 
The so-called 'private language' argument laid out in Philosophical Investigations §§ 243ff has 
been widely discussed in the literature. One of Wittgenstein's ways to introduce the problem 
is to argue for the incomprehensibility of naming pains in a strictly solipsistic setting. What are 
the circumstances enabling us to identify sensations? We have to participate in interpersonal 
activities expressing e.g. pain.
Wie wäre es, wenn die Menschen ihre Schmerzen nicht äußerten (nicht stöhnten, das Gesicht 
nicht verzögen etc.)? Dann könnte man einem Kind nicht den Gebrauch des Wortes 
'Zahnschmerzen' beibringen. (PhU § 257)
The fleeting reference to toothaches here does not carry conceptual weight in the context of 
the Investigations. But, surprisingly enough, Wittgenstein's earliest treatment of the issues 
that were to lead to his private language argument centers around this very sensation. There 
are at least three methods available to reach the present conclusion. By juxtaposing them we 
get a first glimpse at the possible scope of computer-assisted textual criticism. 
(1) Five volumes of the Wiener Ausgabe have hitherto been published, comprising - in appr. 
1300 pages - Wittgenstein's manuscripts from the time when he took up philosophy again, 
ending his self-imposed moratorium subsequent to the completion of the Tractatus . These 
manuscripts contain, in chronological order, Wittgenstein's discussions of a wide range of 
issues. In essence they are philosophical diaries, freely switching between different matters 
of interest, developing threads of thought up to a certain point, interrupting and returning at 
a later date. One might read through all of this material and pick out remarks concerning 
toothaches. The term appears for the first time on Nov. 19, 1929: 'Warum nenne ich 
Zahnschmerzen ' meine Zahnschmerzen' ?' (MS 107, 199; WA 2, 1146). Wittgenstein then 
develops this motive from different angles up to Dec. 14, 1929 (MS 108, 8f; WA 2,136) and 
returns to discuss it in a loose sequence of remarks from Jan. 31, 1930 (MS 107, 270; WA 2, 
186) to Feb. 7, 1930 (MS 107, 288; WA 2, 196). All of those entries are intermingled with 
reflections on many different topics: probability, theory of measurement, Euclidean geometry, 
realism et.al.. No guiding principle is discernible. Wittgenstein is following his own idiosyncratic 
lines of thought that often consist of digressions, retractions and cognitive jumps. It is not 
impossible, but exceedingly hard, to recognize the making of the private language argument in 
those scattered aphorisms. This should not come as a surprise since, after all, the 
manuscripts are Wittgenstein's philosophical workshop. Philological attention is often informed 
by prior knowledge of the results of such incipient processes.
In the light of Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy the first approach does, anyway, make 
little sense. Examining his manuscripts he picked a number of remarks for dictation. Copies of 
the resulting type-scripts were consequently cut into slips of paper and rearranged according 
to rules that seem to be revised within the organizing process itself. This procedure can be 
appropriately illustrated by tracking the course of Wittgenstein's notes on toothaches. 
Typescript 208, which is an extract from manuscripts 105-108, is only partially preserved.7 As 
far as toothaches are concerned, only the paragraphs dating from Dec. 14, 1929 can be 
found in this compilation. Alois Pichler has reconstructed the likely shape of TS 208. According 
to his conjecture most of the material on toothaches was contained in the missing pages 1-
1448. It reappears, completely rearranged, in TS 209, which is the text source for 
Philosophische Bemerkungen, edited by Rush Rees and published in 1964. Wittgenstein's 
original typescript shows no classifications whatsoever. At first inspection it is simply a very 
long sequence of paragraphs. Rush Rees divided the script into sections and invented groups 
of paragraphs which he numbered according to an undocumented, inscrutable scheme. A 
collection of Wittgenstein's reflections on toothaches happens to make up section VI of 
Philosophische Bemerkungen. This is a promising place to look for the conceptual genesis of 
his later views on mental states, sensations and language.
While all sections of Philosophische Bemerkungen are the invention of Rush Rees it is, 
nevertheless, also true that it was Wittgenstein who assembles the pieces into one particular 
order, thus emphazising his interest in an analysis of how first-person talk determines our 
understanding of pain. These notes have been available for a long time and attentive readers 
have doubtlessly noticed connections between them and later discussions of similar issues. 
This material was, however, entirely separated from its context of origin, a stand-alone 
compilation of philosophical insights. There is nothing per se wrong with restricting oneself to 
this state of affairs. It can very well serve as a starting point for enquiries like the present 
essay. Yet, the recent publications from the Nachlass have opened up a range of exiting 
possibilities. What used to be philologically opaque collections of Wittgensteinian ideas can 
now be disassembled and regarded as intermediate results of an ongoing process of creative 
writing and revision. It has become feasible not only to identify the building blocks of 
Wittgenstein's more elaborate editorial arrangements but - what is more important - to 
actually observe his philosophical labor, i.e. the decision process leading from day-to-day 
notes towards (as he envisaged it) eventual publication of his thoughts.
(2) Conventional methodology offers indices and synopses to assist such an enterprise. Both 
are provided by the Wiener Ausgabe, suggesting a second approach to access the 
Wittgensteinian corpus. 'Toothache' is an index entry; it can be looked up and the resulting 
items can in turn be traced through the Wittgenstein papers. Wiener Ausgabe - Apparatus, 
Register zu den Bänden 1-5 consists entirely of tables correlating every single paragraph from 
the manuscripts to its subsequent occurances in these volumes and (more commonly) to its 
location within the Philosophische Bemerkungen or Philosophische Grammatik. On Nov. 29, 
1929 Wittgenstein noted:
Von Sinnesdaten in dem Sinne des Wortes in dem es undenkbar ist daß der Andere sie hat, 
kann man eben aus diesem Grunde auch nicht sagen, daß der Andere sie nicht hat. Und aus 
ebendiesem Grunde ist es sinnlos zu sagen, daß  ich im Gegensatz zum Anderen sie habe. (MS 
107, 215f; WA 2, 124)
As the synopsis shows this remark was included in TS 209 (aka Philosophische Bemerkungen) 
presumably in mid-19309 as entry VI, 61 and taken up again on Jun. 1, 1932, when 
Wittgenstein started a revision of his earlier ideas on the topic. Investigating this kind of 
dependency is standard procedure in textual criticism. Until very recently this had to be done 
by consulting printed synopses. It seems fair to say that there is very little sense in carrying 
on the old way, if the advance of digital technologies is taken into account.
The point is not just that it is quite cumbersome to work with multiple versions of basically 
the same paragraph located in different places in various bound volumes. This impediment 
could be alleviated by liberal use of the xerox machine. Printed synopses of material as 
complex as Wittgenstein's Nachlass face a more serious problem. It seems next to impossible 
to combine indexing and synopsis. The reader is presented with either a list of significant 
terms or a table of correlations of textual segments. She cannot simultaneously look for the 
occurance of a word and the history of rearrangements of the paragraph it is included in. No 
one would finance a series of books (or care to use them) containing the astronomical number 
of relations between index entries and changes of contexts in gory detail. Consider the remark 
quoted above. Instinctively one would at least consider the terms 'Sinnesdaten', 'Sinn', 'Wort', 
'der Andere', 'Grund', 'sinnlos' and 'Gegensatz'.10 The quote considered here does not even 
contain the term 'Zahnschmerzen' which is, at this point, Wittgenstein's guiding paradigm. 
Imagine all those terms put into correlation with all the changes of their occurrences 
elsewhere in the Nachlass. The ensuing combinatorial explosion effectively prevents putting 
the result on paper. In the present case one cannot have a general, usable, semantics-to-
(section)-numbers and (section)-numbers-to-(section-)numbers mapping, one on top of the 
other, in a print medium.
(3) It is easily done if the texts have been properly digitized. Since words are encoded by 
numbers it is quite simple to set up an index and it takes just another couple of numbers to 
represent the trace of 'words' to and from given contexts. Much of this can be done 
automatically; there is no need to actually visualize the necessary relational apparatus. If a 
correlation seems interesting it can be called up at will, with no time lost for browsing, 
copying or shuffling around papers. Searching for 'Zahnschmerzen' in the Bergen edition 
immediately yields 138 hits across the entire collection. The search can be restricted to 
particular (groups of) volumes and modified to include co-occurring or proximate terms as well 
as dates. A query for 'Sinnesdaten and Zahnschmerzen' produces as a result precisely three 
common occurances. First is a paragraph from MS 114 (MS 114, 16; WA 5, 179) into which 
Wittgenstein had assimilated separate earlier notes, followed by its typescript derivatives in 
TS 211, 755 and TS 213, 510 (Big Typescript). The quote previously presented (MS 107, 
215f; WA 2, 124), lacking the term 'Zahnschmerzen', is picked out among the 30 hits returned 
by querying 'Sinnesdaten'. It occurs in a stand-alone paragraph in TS 209, 23 (PhB VI, 61) 
and is flagged accordingly. In other words: a couple of straightforward enquiries lead directly 
to an important juncture in Wittgenstein's investigation of the logic of talk about sense 
impressions and toothaches in particular.
But wait. There is something suspicious about the last sentence. Manipulation of the index 
mechanism per se cannot produce important results. The disappearance of manifest meaning 
is, in fact, the price to pay for enhanced electronic facilities. One can easily pick any 
combination of terms and search constraints - but there is no guarantee whatsoever that this 
will lead to an interesting result. So where does 'importance' come in? This is a category of 
reflective assessment, crucially different from automated procedures. The discrepancy is at 
the center of any discussion about computer-assisted philology. A certain amount of cheating 
is necessary to reach the comfortable conclusion presented in the previous paragraph. 
Criteria enabling one to judge upon the importance of algorithmic procedures have to be 
presupposed in order for such procedures to be of any help. To put it very simply: elaborate 
tools are of little help without knowledge of their proper use. One has to have a hunch about 
the possible significance of a term to profitably employ the electronic search function. The 
non-sequitur above may serve as a reminder to first-generation digital scholars. It is easy to 
fall into the trap of overestimating technology. None of the powerful programming at work 
below the WYSIWYG-surface guarantees philosophical content. 
The difficulty, consequently, is the following one: How can technological advancements in 
textual criticism be constrained by a sense of proportion relating to a prior understanding of 
the subject matter. This type of question is well-known and often discussed between 
technophiles and technophobes. The present paper is a case study, trying to answer the 
question for one particular instance of the general problem. But we have not yet assembled 
the necessary evidence. It remains quite unclear why a philosopher should worry about 
toothaches. A powerful mechanism has been sketched, yet it is fair to assume that 
Wittgenstein scholars go about their business projecting hypotheses to understand the 
complexities of the Nachlass quite independently. The above account does not include a 
reason for using the mechanism. Providing such reasons is itself a philosophical activity. This 
section has offered a rough overview of the itinerary of some sample paragraphs. One has to 
explore their content and in particular the conceptual significance of their itinerary in order to 
get the full picture. A satisfactory answer to the issue at stake between digital technology 
and its critics has to appeal to philosophy in action.
TOOTHACHES: PHILOSOPHY 
Wittgenstein's first entry into manuscript 107 refers back to the Tractatus . There he had 
claimed: 'Das denkende, vorstellende, Subjekt gibt es nicht.' (5.631) And he had explained 
this dictum by pointing to the visual field: 'nichts am Gesichtsfeld läßt darauf schließen, daß 
es von einem Auge gesehen wird.' ( Tractatus  5.633). Compare MS 107, 1 (WA 2,3): 'Der 
Gesichtsraum so wie er ist hat seine selbständige Realität. Er selbst enthält kein Subjekt. Er 
ist autonom.' In 1929 Wittgenstein's anti-intentionalism is still in place, but his views on 
atomic sentences begin to change. The basic units of his epistemological account are not 
single sentences any more: 'Ich lege nicht den Satz als Maßstab an die Wirklichkeit an 
sondern das System von Sätzen.' (MS 107, 35; WA 2, 149) The logic of color terms has, as 
Wittgenstein discovered, to take account of the field of possibilities given by the spectrum. 
Atomic sentences cannot be independent of each other since 'This plate is blue' logically 
implies - among many other propositions - that it is not red. Yet, this is not a tautology. 
Given the visual field and the customary color space one has a priori knowledge of the 
structural dependencies of possible colors. To look for any actual one necessarily includes 
mastery of a presupposed color scheme. 'Wie es einen Sinn hat zu sagen die Farbe R ist am 
Ort P wenn ich überhaupt den Gesichtsraum mit dem Farbraum "vor mir" habe.' (MS 107, 158; 
WA 2, 92) Wittgenstein's quotes indicate that he is still officially unwilling to grant the 
existence of a subject. But it is interesting to take a closer look at his day's work (Oct. 10, 
1929).
The point of reference of the previous quote ('Wie es einen Sinn hat ...') are stomach aches. 
Wittgenstein is discussing the meaning of negation. How can one truthfully deny the presence 
of stomach aches? Such sentences seem to lack external sensual corroboration. They cannot 
be constructed as somehow linking stomachs and pains either. 'Es ist nur wesentlich, daß ich 
den Raum vor mir habe in dem der Magen liegt und den worin die Schmerzen liegen.' (MS 107, 
157; WA 2, 92) Like colors within the visual field pains are a kind of sensation constitutivly 
associated with stomachs. This seems an unobjectionable parallel - with a twist. We have 
noted Wittgenstein's avoidance of the common notion of a subject in his discussion of the 
visual field. This strategy cannot, however, be carried over to the case of 'internal' 
sensations. There is nothing comparable to the geometry of shared, public, visible spaces in 
the realm of our intestines. If you remove the subject from stomach aches not even the 
illusion of a legitimate issue remains. Switching from the visual field to internal sensations, 
Wittgenstein's doctrine of the subject is severely shaken. He cannot but employ the first 
person pronoun in these contexts, even though his commitment is to exclude it from the 
scientific vocabulary. Such is the dilemma apparent in his first remark on toothaches: 'Warum 
nenne ich Zahnschmerzen " meine Zahnschmerzen" '? (MS 107, 199; WA 2, 114)
Wittgenstein does not follow any pre-set agenda that could lead to a systematic 
investigation of various modalities of the senses. His move from vision to stomach aches to 
tooth aches is obviously not aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive view. Ten 
days after raising the issue of toothaches being my toothaches Wittgenstein comes up with 
the brilliant aphorism quoted above. The private language argument is, in nuce, contained in 
two extremely compact sentences (MS 107, 215f; WA 2, 124). If another person cannot be 
said to be the subject of my internal sense data it is meaningless to deny her those very 
sense data. Their possible occurrences do not include this kind of bearer. Alas, this is no 
comfort for anyone tempted to regard awareness of one's own intentional states as privileged 
knowledge. There is no force in such pronouncements. I cannot determine something uniquely 
subjective in appealing to an incomprehensible option, i.e. another person's having my internal 
states. The Tractatus  view of the subject was of a metaphysical entity, a border of the 
World, not part of it ( Tractatus 5.641). The early post-Tractarian manuscripts are gradually 
abandoning this dualism, conceding a role for first-person talk. Yet, most of the original 
skepticism remains. How can one conceive of a role for 'private' sensations and avoid 
idealism?
Such questions are external to Wittgenstein's writing in the manuscripts. The present sketch 
puts emphasis on only a small number of issues discussed within those volumes. The general 
line of argument is, however, supported by Wittgenstein's own subsequent selective rewriting 
of the material. When he cut up TS 208 to rearrange its content into what is now known as 
the Philosophische Bemerkungen, one of his points of emphasis was toothaches. His 
discussion of logical features of talk about the subject centers around a selection of remarks 
devoted to the remarkable fact of me - Ludwig Wittgenstein - having toothaches (cf. PhB VI, 
58). This revision introduces complexity of a higher order. Many of Wittgenstein's paragraphs 
are initially small, self-contained philosophical analyses. The next auctorial step is to try and 
put them together so that some larger, overarching connection is established. Philosophische 
Bemerkungen VI does, in fact, offer extremely dense philosophical substance, much too 
involved to be discussed here. Just an outline of Wittgenstein's strategy of using his 
arrangements as arguments can be given.
A first group of remarks, serving as a kind of prolegomenon, is derived from entries for Dec. 
14, 1929 and Oct. 11, 1929, expounding the general direction of the succeeding paragraphs. 
The use of the first person pronoun is fraught with difficulties, particularly if talk about 
perception is modelled according to external circumstances. 'I am experiencing a red patch' is 
quoted as a case in point. To analyze the difficulties one might re-write the puzzling 
descriptions, substituting some un-objectionable term for the offensive 'I'. This exercise is 
next. Remarkably, Wittgenstein switches from sense impressions to internal sensation again, 
as he designs a language game supposed to exhibit the same logical multiplicity as the 
common idiom and yet to avoid mention of a subject. His idea is to externalize the privileged 
position of subjectivity by designating one particular person as an universal point of 
reference. If 'I am' Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'I have toothaches' becomes 'There are toothaches' 
and 'A has toothaches' can be rephrased as 'A behaves like Ludwig Wittgenstein when there 
are toothaches'. (PhBemerkungen VI, 58). The apparent uniqueness of subjective experience 
is transformed into a qualitative difference in public discourse; the mysterious realm of 
subjectivity replaced by an idiom of matching complexity: everyone can take center stage in 
this language. Once this focus is set the remaining moves of the language game are 
equivalent to the traditional one. Wittgenstein offers a playful simile. The logic of first-person 
talk recalls oriental despotism, with the subject taking the place of the despot in providing 
the origin of the communicative coordinate system.
The point is that talk about sensations is inevitably dualistic. 'The subject' - as well as an 
oriental despot - is supposed to fall outside ordinary discourse directed towards physical 
things. If Timur Lenk's state of health is taken as the measuring device of health-talk it makes 
no sense to ask whether he has toothaches. In the event, toothaches simply are among his 
personal states and having toothaches is a condition derived from this primordial condition. 
Even though Wittgenstein has thus eliminated first-person talk the Tractarian criterion of 
meaning fails, however. It is impossible to attribute possession of toothaches or lack thereof 
to a suitably designated individuum. (The discussion prefigures later reflections on the Paris 
ur-meter.) After this setting of the stage Wittgenstein embarks on a series of grammatical 
investigations, exploring the comprehensibility of our dualistic idiom. There is no obvious way 
to stratify his dialectical dialogues into a single argument. 'I cannot feel your toothaches.' 
Does this sentence express an empirical truth or rather a kind of logical necessity 
Wittgenstein had not provided for in his Tractatus? (cf. PhB VI, 61) Rather than answering 
questions like this, Wittgenstein keeps changing his focus and his examples, circling around 
the issues. What is he up to? To a casual reader it looks like an open-ended, aporetic 
elenchus. But Wittgenstein, surprisingly, and without so much as minimal warning, does 
actually close his argument by the strategic placement of one paragraph.
Wittgenstein's transposition of first person talk was anchored in the neutral statement: 'There 
are toothaches'. The following quote is an obvious echo, concluding the argument:
Das Phänomen des Schmerzgefühls in einem Zahn, welches ich kenne, ist in der 
Ausdrucksweise der gewöhnlichen Sprache dargestellt durch ' ich habe in dem und dem Zahn 
Schmerzen'. Nicht durch einen Ausdruck von der Art, 'an diesem Ort ist ein Schmerzgefühl'. 
(PhB VI, 66)
As it turns out, it is impossible to capture the subjectivist intuitions in Wittgenstein's 
alternative scheme. There cannot be pains outside of consciousness. Designating a physical 
body to be the paradigmatic bearer of pain is no better than ascribing pain to some tooth put 
on a table ( Philosophische Bermerkungen VI, 65). Timur Lenk is, inevitably, located in public 
space, so we are back to Wittgenstein's initial reminder: the problem arises because physical 
circumstances are inappropriately projected onto another context.
Das ganze Feld dieser Erfahrung wird in dieser Sprache durch Ausdrücke von der Form 'ich 
habe ...' beschrieben. Die Sätze von der Form 'N hat Zahnschmerzen' sind für ein ganz 
anderes Feld reserviert. (PhB VI, 66) 
In other words: Wittgenstein advises himself to desist from trying to battle ordinary language. 
He is quite aware of the tension: In order to unravel the philosophical knot one has to re-
trace the complicated movements underlying it. Thus ends the second take on toothaches. 
Resting content with the ordinary was, however, always a temporary affair for Wittgenstein. 
In 1932 we find him returning to the very issues he had supposedly resolved in MS 110, 30ff 
(WA5, 179ff). These are the quotes remarked upon earlier in this paper: Wittgenstein's 
second, condensing revision of the material on toothaches.
This third stratum of the textual evidence and its further development will not be pursued 
here. The sole purpose of the preceding intermezzo was to redress the balance between the 
digital toolkit and topics in established Wittgenstein scholarship. The problem was to mediate 
between proponents of largely syntactic manipulation of linguistic data and traditional 
approaches that turn to texts with a prior understanding of their subject matter. The way to 
escape a stand-off is to refuse the contra-position from the very start. Semantic data-
mining11 as exemplified by the previous sub-section, is simultaneously an exercise in digital 
philology and philosophy. Wittgenstein's Nachlass is an excellent place to look for such a 
synthesis because the author's ideas are, to a large extent, expressed by arranging and 
rearranging small textual units. Tracking the dynamics of Wittgenstein's philosophical 
variations can, admittedly, be done in the conventional framework of a printed edition of his 
manuscripts and type-scripts. Computer-assisted procedures do, however, push philology 
towards horizons previously out of reach. To repeat: No collection of printed volumes can 
conceivably present any synopsis of any terms, occurring at arbitrary dates, in just a few 
seconds. Such opportunities are bound to have a major impact on future Wittgenstein 
scholarship. This concludes the philological assessment of conventional versus digital 
approaches to the Wittgenstein papers. A more detached attitude has already been hinted 
at. It seems that Wittgenstein's writing is particularly well suited to a post-Gutenberg 
environment. In order to get the full picture regarding the Bergen edition we have to take a 
closer look at Wittgenstein's failure to turn his writings into a book.
BEYOND BOOKS 
J.C. Nyíri has made a strong case for considering the Wittgenstein Nachlass in the light of 
recent media philosophy. Quoting Walter Ong and Erich Havelock he reminds his readers of the 
prospect that the age of literacy might be giving way to a period of secondary orality, with 
the spoken word regaining the most influential position in a broadcast society. According to 
Nyíri's suggestion Wittgenstein's failure to distinguish between the written and the spoken 
word might explain his 'ultimate inability to complete the "book" he always wanted to 
complete'12. The ductus of his writings is, indeed, more akin to on-going conversations than 
to neatly delineated propositions. Did Wittgenstein miss the adequate medium for his 
exertions? Nyíri draws attention to the fact that his writing is, in certain places, a direct 
rejoinder to the Socratic dialogues. 'Ich finde bei Plato auf eine Frage wie 'was ist Erkenntnis' 
nicht die vorläufige Antwort: Sehen wir einmal nach, wie dieses Wort gebraucht wird.' (TS 
211, 17) Wittgenstein's inverse Socratic role consists in dissolving platonic confidence in 
essences and is, therefore, ill suited to be put into a classical philosophical treatise. As Nyíri 
(following Havelock) rightly reminds us, Platonic ideas are inextricably connected to the rise of 
literacy over an oral tradition which lacked expressive means for a proper treatment of 
abstract terms. Yet, Wittgenstein could have rested content with his actual teaching, leaving 
it to his disciples to provide written records. He did not do so, but rather forced himself, 
against better knowledge, to conform to the given standard.
Wenn ich für mich denke ohne ein Buch schreiben zu wollen, so springe ich um das Thema 
herum; das ist die einzige mir natürliche Denkweise. In einer Reihe gezwungen fortzudenken ist 
mir eine Qual. Soll ich es nun überhaupt probieren? Ich verschwende unsägliche Mühe auf ein 
Anordnen der Gedanken, das vielleicht gar keinen Wert hat. (MS 118, 185)
The key word is 'vielleicht' indicating Wittgenstein's ambivalent ambitions to write a book. His 
difficulties are methodologically profound. One way to bring this into focus is to position them 
at the crossroads between books and hypertext.
Decades of Wittgenstein scholarship have been shaped by editorial decisions made by the 
trustees of the Nachlass. Their general policy was to present provisional steps in 
Wittgenstein's ongoing process of revision as standalone volumes, often effacing the 
dynamics demonstrated in the preceding section. David Stern, in his perceptive paper, 
correctly describes the state of affairs.
The Wittgenstein Nachlass is not a haphazard pile of working papers that happened to survive 
his death, nor is it a collection of works that only awaited publication. While it is both a 
carefully selected and highly structured record of his life's work, a collection of material that 
he deliberately assembled and left to posterity, it is also the record of a writer continually in 
flux, never entirely satisfied with anything he had written.13  
In view of this situation it actually seems a little unfair to reapproach the editors of 
Wittgenstein's posthumous writing. There is no good way to capture the activity vividly 
described by Stern into the confines of a printed volume. Despite outward appearances there 
are no 'works of Wittgenstein' that could confidently be taken as points of departure. Even 
the Philosophische Untersuchungen are, as Stern observes, 'only one of a number of possible 
arrangements Wittgenstein proposed, many of which extend, amplify, or cast light on the 
remarks in the published book.'14 References to current models of textual interdependency 
become almost irresistible at this point. 'Because the Wittgenstein Nachlass is the result of 
such an extensive act of rewriting, it is less a collection of texts than a hypertext, an 
interconnected network of remarks.'15 Stern's remarks certainly point into the right direction. 
Still, there are some intermediary steps between the range of options available to 
Wittgenstein and writing that is embedded in digital technology. Those steps have to be 
spelled out if one wants to get a grasp on how the CD-ROM edition might change out habits 
of scholarship based on self-contained books. 
One feature of a culture based on books deserves special attention as this culture is 
challenged by the advent of digital, globally distributed information. Books are marked by the 
coincidence of two seperate decisions: their content and its appearance are determined 
simultaneously. This is what publication of a book, in effect, amounts to - and it throws some 
light on Wittgenstein's qualms. He felt unable to decide on one shape for his ideas. 
Publication, throughout European history, simply meant drawing a line between a creative 
process and its (albeit provisional) results. Sending a manuscript to the publisher was to 
distinguish a line between sketches, preliminary attempts, experimental drafts and an entity 
exhibiting both the features of the most prestigious information technology and of auctorial 
closure. Books divided the lifetime of an author into continuous activity and singular results, 
texts that, from a certain moment in time, assume a life of their own. This arrangement is 
being thoroughly shaken by the advent of new media. First of all, digital encoding disrupts the 
familiar coordination between form and content. Characters are mapped into numbers that 
are, in turn, symbolized in an electronic format unsuitable for direct perception. And this 
transposition, secondly, triggers dramatic changes in the nature of publicity. Electronic texts 
can instantly be published to a world audience and still be constantly revised.
In the given context it is particularly instructive to notice the implication for posthumous 
'works'. In the world of books a Nachlass is defined as all the material an author did not 
manage or see fit to get printed. Its peculiar character is that future generations retro-
activly elevate such writing to the status of books. If books published by an author are what 
software developers call a 'feature-freeze', publications from a Nachlass are based on 
decisions to overrule such limitations. There is no way to escape the allure of 'works' in book 
culture. In Nachlass-publications auxiliary authors assume responsibility to supplement a 
writer's oeuvre with 'second order' books. Applying this to the case at hand yields a 
suggestive prospect. While the trustees failed to do justice to Wittgenstein's open-ended, 
conversations philosophical style, a digital edition of the Nachlass is much better suited to 
achieve this aim. Such an enterprise is not forced to turn a collection of tentative designs 
into bound volumes. The 'Wiener Ausgabe' seems set to publish the largely repetetive material 
from 1929-1933 in 12 weighty volumes. Michael Nedo sounds apologetic in defending this 
expenditure:
... the book is still the carrier of thoughts, of written heritage in our culture, and familiarity 
with this medium certainly affects not only one's dealings with the texts themselves, but also 
the accompanying Apparatuses.16  
One does not have to subscribe to deconstruction to find this eulogy anachronistic. The 
transitory character of Wittgenstein's writing, its complex genealogy and its numerous 
recapitulations seem to call for a digital format of presentation which matches its inherent 
temporality by avoiding ultimate editorial decisions and allowing easy manipulation of the 
textual material.
Impressions like these, convincing as they may sound - once again - overstress technology. 
Wittgenstein, it is true, despaired of achieving the linear order demanded by a printed book. 
But this does not imply that hypertext could have solved his problem. His desparation is the 
important feature: the fight against a spell cast upon his writing by the demands of books 
culture. He worried about the correct arrangement of his ideas, so much is obvious from the 
examples discussed above. One understanding of 'hypertext' is of segments of texts linked 
together in a more or less haphazard way, often without any single, controling authority. This 
meaning is certainly not applicable to Wittgenstein. He could have saved himself a lot of 
trouble had he been prepared to regard his writing as a kind of private web-space. A second 
understanding might be more appropriate. Hypertext can also refer to autonomous non-linear 
writing which transcends the obligatory step-by-step sequence of print-products by 
constructing a topological matrix without hierarchical order. Digitized texts are encoded as 
numbers and have to be re-established in a legible format. Visualization by a monitor is one 
step removed from the pages of a book and offers flexibility unmatched by their arrangement. 
Wittgenstein's famous metaphor of wandering through a philosophical landscape comes to 
mind. The Nachlass does, in fact, contain a number of tentative registers that could easily be 
implemented as a hypertext.17 
This is one side of Wittgenstein's struggle with conventional means of expressing thoughts. 
But his need for a different kind of complexity is offset by an equally important desire. In 
many places he insists on finding definitive answers. This motive, manifest in the Tractatus , 
is also present in Wittgenstein's later calls for 'Übersichtlichkeit' (surveyability) and well laid-
out description:
Wir wollen nicht das Regelsystem für die Verwendung unserer Worte in unerhörter Weise 
verfeinern oder vervollständigen. Denn die Klarheit, die wir anstreben, ist allerdings eine 
vollkommene. Aber das heißt nur, daß die philosophischen Probleme vollkommen verschwinden 
sollen. (PhU § 133)
In this context, the 'treatment' of philosophical problems is likened to therapeutical 
intervention and its ultimate aim is to put vexing thoughts to rest. Such an attitude cannot 
be easily reconciled with calls for open-ended auctorial multiplicity and the suspension of 
binding results. Wittgenstein's 'hypertext' avant la lettre arises from unsuccessful attempts at 
closure rather than from intentional design. It does not anticipate a more flexible medium 
which might alleviate the rigor of philosophical arguments. As the Nachlass material on 
toothaches shows, Wittgenstein did not simply reject the linear progression of thoughts in 
favor of a compilation of aphorisms. He actually proposes a solution - even though it does not 
satisfy him in the long run. Look at it this way: If he had been able to reach a satisfactory 
conclusion he would have put it into print. Hypertext, on the other hand, is by design non-
conclusive. Had Wittgenstein used hypertext, his characteristic struggle against premature 
closure would have been lost. Hypertext lacks the kind of physical inertia needed to make a 
sentence stick to a certain position and while Wittgenstein kept overturning pre-established 
patterns of thought and inferences he never abandoned his drive to return to 
straightforward, easily surveyable positions.
Wir sind aufs Glatteis geraten, wo die Reibung fehlt, also die Bedingungen in gewissem Sinn 
ideal sind, aber wir eben deshalb auch nicht gehen können. Wir wollen gehen; dann brauchen 
wir Reibung. Zurück auf den rauhen Boden. (PhU § 107)
Wittgenstein would, in all likelihood, have extended this complaint against free-floating 
philosophical speculation to l'art pour l'art hypertext.
To sum up and focus on the case at hand: Electronic texts are not just a kind of print; the 
graphical rendering of information on a monitor is no 'page' in any ordinary sense. It is 
tempting - and to some extent plausible - to distinguish Wittgenstein's writing from 
conventional philosophical authorship by employing jargon from media studies. Actually putting 
his Nachlass on a CD-ROM adds considerable complexity to the story. There is an important 
difference between a writer's decision to publish his or her work (in whatever format) and 
someone else administering a heritage. Nachlass publications, including electronic editions, are 
per definitionem second order closures. The flexibility of digitized texts is of another order as 
Wittgenstein's work in progress. How those papers are to be rendered on CD-ROMs is by no 
means self-evident. It is easy to pretend that the Bergen project is just an extension of well-
known editorial strategies. Such an attitude does, however, seriously underestimate the 
range of problems involved. All the conveniences set forth in the previous pages do not come 
for free. The change from books to computers is in itself an important theoretical and political 
issue. Putting Wittgenstein on disk demands a considerable number of decisions beyond the 
scope of printed editions. This is new territory, hardly even noticed as a philosophical issue 
amongst Wittgenstein scholars.
THE POLITICS OF DIGITAL TEXTS 
The Bergen electronic edition effaces its own novelty. Its structuring principle are the 
physical volumes of the Nachlass which are presented one after the other in linear sequence. 
The search facilities include easy access to single manuscripts or type-scripts. Facsimiles 
provide unprecedented opportunities to scrutinize Wittgenstein's actual output.The electronic 
edition might be argued to beat its print competitors at their own game. One apparent 
platitude is of utmost importance, though. Digitized texts need computers which need 
software which needs operating systems. In centuries of print culture we have become 
accustomed to the fact that once a book is published it is freely accessible to readers 
without further effort. Historical pictures of lockable books raise amused smiles. Yet, they are 
not a bad analogy to so-called digital books: in order to read them one needs additional 
devices, even 'keys'. Book publishing is a business charging once per item, regardless of its 
further use. But those products are, nowadays, revealed as just one interface to information. 
In many respects digital documents offer more convenient access to identical content. This 
surplus value has a price: a set of electronic equipment is inserted between the reader and 
her text. Once they have been published (and as long as they are in print) books are available 
without further decoding. As everyone who has to exchange files on the internet knows, this 
is far from true for electronic documents. Different computer platforms, different word 
processors and conflicting versions tend to produce confusions unheard of in former times.
The reason for this is that there are several competing standards to implement a mapping 
between alpha-numerical symbols and digital numbers. Strictly speaking only the basic letters, 
numerals and diacritical signs of the English alphabet are interchangeable on any platform. 
Different sets of characters, and in particular the elaborate additional code necessary to 
simulate printed pages on a monitor, demand special attention. International bodies are in 
charge of supervising the encoding of the world's languages. Software simulation of written 
material, however, obeys different rules. It is to a considerable extent a commercial affair and 
subject to the laws of economics. The result is, predictably, a considerable variety of 
proprietary software tools trying to get their share of the market by offering particularly 
comfortable - and mutually incompatible - features. This is the state of affairs confronting 
any digitization of texts. Two minimalistic approaches are either to scan existing pages or to 
stick to 7-bit ASCII code in transcribing them electronically. It is immediately obvious that 
neither of these options is satisfactory for a textual corpus of the degree of complexity of the 
Wittgenstein Nachlass. The editors were faced with a situation unprecedented in ordinary 
publishing. They had to decide upon a software package capable of producing the desired 
results, which also meant forcing that package upon the readers. Textual scholarship finds 
itself on unfamiliar terrain. The tools it needs to even access its subject matter are produced 
by big companies with only marginal interest in the academy.
The Bergen edition runs on the Windows platform (Windows 3.1, 3.11, Windows 95 and 
Windows NT4 according to the promotion sheet). For word-processing capacity it uses a 
program named 'FolioViews' which provides the usual services: cut and paste, printing, 
searching, window control, electronic bookmarks and back tracing. For scholars who habitually 
use the Microsoft range of products and do not worry about the ensuing dependency of their 
basic data on market competition these are excellent choices, even though some of its 
limitations will affect the ordinary user. The entire collection of normalized and diplomatic 
transcripts is put into a single binary file respectively. (The facsimiles are offered as single 
graphic documents, one per physical page.) Consequently, two huge electronic files contain 
the entire content of the Bergen edition in a completely opaque format. The user is allowed to 
read and manipulate texts via FolioViews but none of the structural information that has been 
presented in the first section of this paper is directly accessible to her. She can copy 
selected texts, paste and print them - but neither can she touch the indexing mechanism nor 
modify any of the underlying data. There is a strict separation between interface and non-
transparent, computational deep structure. Copyright considerations are a prominent reason 
for this arrangement: the content of a printed book cannot as easily be reproduced, 
manipulated and distributed as its digital counterpart. Provisions have to be taken to protect 
the investment put into such long-term projects. Media change unsettles venerable customs. 
The traditional understanding was that the result of scholarly work, most often financed by 
the taxpayer's money, are generally available in their entirety. This feature does, indeed, 
distinguish scholarship from commercially induced research. As teams of experts have to use 
proprietary software to reassure the copyright-holders and ensure the profit for the publishing 
house, this availability is restricted. But, it might be objected, where is the problem? 
Wittgenstein's writings are at one's disposal, all of them and in an extremely comfortable 
fashion. True enough, judged by the standards of the printed book. Yet, as was discussed in 
section two, Wittgenstein's Nachlass transcends the limits of such standards and an 
electronic edition might be better suited to capture those peculiarities. It might be organized 
so as to mirror Wittgenstein's editorial techniques, starting with single remarks as elementary 
building blocks and putting them together in a variety of ways, following Wittgenstein's lead. 
His working process, not its result, could be taken as the guiding principle. As a matter of fact 
the encapsulated FolioViews file is the very opposite of hypertext.18 Yet, the Bergen edition 
does not offer any tools to actually rearrange its content or redesign its appearance on the 
primary level. For all its flexibility and ease of use the Bergen edition is still in the conceptual 
grip of classical printed editions. Does it have to mimic the necessities of print culture?
The question turns on the issue of access to the internal, structural information hidden inside 
the binary files. Under present conditions one can find a particular paragraph and all of its 
subsequent instances as they appear in the later volumes. It is, however, impossible to break 
out of the straitjacket of the von Wright classification and deal with paragraphs as basic data 
units. If this were possible digital equivalences of Wittgenstein's notes could be freely 
assembled and re-assembled. As of now one is, for example, presented with manuscripts 105-
108 plus typescripts 208-209 plus manuscript 110 and has to extract relevant paragraphs for 
personal post-processing. A more appropriate way might be to pick out relevant paragraphs 
(e.g. on toothaches) and re-assemble them at bottom level, echoing the author's own 
procedure. It would be an attractive way to overcome the Nachlass effect of irrevocable 
closure. The internal dynamics of the Wittgenstein papers would be much more in evidence if 
a more open digital format had been chosen. Years of labor have been spent on the electronic 
transcription of the original documents. The records of the Wittgenstein archive do in fact 
contain all the information necessary for micrological analysis and multiple synthesis. The use 
of the CD-ROM, however, remains restricted to find, cut and paste with no provisions to 
address the editorial information from outside FolioViews. In order to visualize the conclusion 
on toothaches from the first section one might want to write a small program. It could not 
operate on the existing data structure which would have to be re-inscribed onto copies of 
segments extracted from the database.
This is the place to touch upon some basic issues in the theory and practice of text 
encoding. The discussion of the peculiar overlap between the requirements of digitization and 
commercial interests at the beginning of this section deliberately omitted an alternative 
possibility. Standard General Markup Language (SGML) is an attempt to avoid dependency on 
proprietary formats and irreconcilable software development with regard to electronic texts. 
The idea is, briefly, to supplement the alpha-numeric ciphers with additional (groups of) 
characters ('mark up') that serve the purpose of encoding meta-information by means of the 
available, restricted set of ASCII code. HTML, the language of the World Wide Web, in an 
instance of SGML. An easy example of mark up is the use (in HTML) of '<h1>' to indicate the 
beginning (and '</h1>' the end) of a top level heading. Such mark up indications do not in 
themselves cause any formatting to be done. (This distinguishes them from the binary code 
inserted into text files by common word processors.) Their function is to delineate the logical 
structure of the document and provide anchors to include additional content (like cross-
references, dates or hierarchical dependencies). A marked-up document can be read on any 
computer platform, the catch being that it needs software to render the mark-up as 
intended. This is a substantial difficulty given the fact that word processing has been much 
more popular with the general public. But consider a Web browser to get the general idea. 
Such browser are software which takes '<h1>Title</h1>' as an input and turns it (e.g.) into
                                                          TITLE
SGML (and its recent variant XML) offers a top-down solution to the problem of incompatible 
standards in text encoding and concurrent information storage.
The Bergen edition is based upon transcriptions of Wittgenstein's original pages into a mark up 
language using the 'Multi-Element Code System' (MECS). This system provides a meta-
grammar that can be implemented in particular instances of transcriptional grammar and is 
well suited to the task of capturing the complexities of Wittgenstein's autographs in a digital 
format. For technical reasons MECS is not entirely compatible with SGML. The thing to keep in 
mind is, however, that the Bergen transcriptions contain the entire set of editorial information 
in mark up format, i.e. in 'tags' that can be addressed in programming constructions. This 
information is filtered to produce the diplomatic and normalized versions offered on the CD-
ROMs. In customary, printed editions there is no possible gap between the pages on offer and 
their basic encoding. This does not carry over into the electronic realm where digital code has 
to be re-implemented in order to be perceptible. The need for secondary processing 
introduces a discrepancy which can be used to shield off operative background information 
from its surface rendition. Electronic documents offer spectacular improvements over many of 
the usual features of printed texts. Ironically, it is just because of their versatility that 
mechanisms to constrain their scope are feasible - and called for. The Bergen edition is just 
one example of a more comprehensive problem that is often overlooked in recent digitization 
campaigns. It is perfectly possible to combine global, digital distribution of information with 
highly selective, exclusive standards of its generation and transmission. While most people 
would be prepared to accept this for cable TV or DVD it should at least be a matter of 
concern in textual scholarship.
This is an area of conflict between claims of copyright holders and the scientific community. 
Broaching this issue is not intended to deflect attention from the impressive achievements of 
the Bergen electronic edition. Its presentation of the material is an epochal advance in 
Wittgenstein scholarship. It is, at the same time, a precursor of many electronic editions yet 
to be published and is apt to trigger a more general discussion on how similar scholarly 
editions might be designed. Disregarding, for the purpose of this conclusion, external 
constraints an optimum solution for (future) computer-savvy scholars would enable them to 
address their texts at any of the three levels that have to constitute a serious editorial 
project: the mark-up, diplomatic and normalized versions should all be manipulable to ensure 
optimum results. It is impossible for any single endeavor to adequately charter the wealth of 
variants and cross-relations in Wittgenstein's Nachlass. But if scholars were able to freely 
access the underlying mark up resources based on the canonical transcription could easily be 
enriched by resources taken from literal computing. As several commentators have pointed 
out, the recent 'Open Source' movement in software management echoes the concepts of 
free peer access and peer review well established within science. In the best case scenario 
source code, e.g. the mark-up version of Wittgenstein's texts, would be freely available. Book 
culture charges relatively little for relatively static texts. Expensive electronic editions offer 
advanced research tools, blocking collaboration based on their data structure. There will be 
an 'open source' Wittgenstein sometime this century.
Currently, a confusing variety of formats is used to tentatively provide comprehensive access 
in selected collections, mainly for corpora from earlier centuries. Projects like CELT, the 'Celtic 
Corpus of Electronic Texts'19and the 'Victorian Women Writer's Project'20 offer browsable 
HTML-front-ends, ftp download of marked-up documents and printable Postscript copies. TMI 
('Thesaurus Musicarum Italicarum')21 or 'The William Blake Archive'22 employ DynaWeb to 
translate SGML-coded files for use with common browsers. At the Wittgenstein archive's web-
site23 TS 201a 'Notes on Logic' and MS 115, 'Philosophische Bemerkungen' are available in 
different versions: HTML frames for concurrent inspection of the diplomatic and normalized 
text and for download in Postscript and Word Perfect format respectively. It remains unclear 
whether electronic publishing will develop standards as transparent as those of traditional 
literary culture. The technological advances we have been discussing are in fact instrumental 
in de-familiarizing earlier standards that have acquired second nature status. New 
opportunities arise, but there is still little institutional background and almost none of the hard 
questions have been answered. Meanwhile, from a philosophical point of view, the 
Wittgenstein papers raise an issue that cuts across old and new forms of writing. 
Wittgenstein's struggle against the linear progression of arguments should neither be 
remodeled as a peaceful exercise in hypertext, nor put to rest in an series of (printed or 
virtual) volumes. The driving force behind the Nachlass is a continuous effort to put together 
the pieces of a number of puzzles that seem to change as this activity unfolds. Nachlass 
means: this process has definitely ended. Digitization of the Nachlass offers an opportunity to 
breath life back into an accumulation of notes.
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